Gal 5. W. 6.

INDIA TRACTS.

BY

John Zephaniah Holwell, Esq. F.R.S.

AND FRIENDS.

CONTAINING,

I. An Address to the Proprietors of East-India Stock; setting forth, the unavoidable Necessity, and real Motives, for the Revolution in Bengal, 1760.

II. A Refutation of a Letter from certain Gentlemen of the Council at Bengal, to the Honourable the Secret Committee.

III. Important Facts regarding the East-India Company's Affairs in Bengal, from the Years 1752 to 1760, with Copies of several very interesting Letters.

IV. A Narrative of the deplorable Deaths of the English Gentlemen who were suffocated in the Black Hole in Fort William, at Calcutta, June 1756.

V. A Defence of Mr. Vansittart's Conduct.

ILLUSTRATED WITH

A FRONTISPIECE, representing the Monument erected at Calcutta, in Memory of the Sufferers in the Black-Hole Prison.

THE THIRD EDITION,
Revised and Corrected, with ADDITIONS.

LONDON:
Printed for T. BECKET, Corner of the Adelphi, in the Strand. MDCCLXXIV.

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PH
MVSEVM
BRITANNICVM

TO

SIR WILLIAM BAKER, Knt.

WILLIAM MABBOT,

AND

JOHN PAYNE, Esqrs.

GENTLEMEN,

THE following small Tracts, in consequence of unprovoked injuries, were hastily thrown together, during the late clamorous disputes between Directors, Proprietors, and Candidates for the management of East-India affairs at home and abroad.—How they came to be so hastily produced, and as hastily published, it seems requisite I should explain a little more at large.

At the beginning of these intestine broils, I was determined to avoid engaging on either side; and, to shun solicitation, I disposed of all the stock I stood possessed of, without retaining as much as might entitle me to a single vote; so truly desirous I was to enjoy

in quiet that peaceful retirement, I had dearly purchaſed at the expence of ſo many difficulties, miſeries, and heavy misfortunes as fell to my lot, while in the ſervice of the Company.

SUCH, I ſay, were my reſolutions, to which I ſhould moſt ſtrictly have adhered, if I had not found my character firſt indirectly, afterwards openly attacked, by the baſeſt calumnies, which were levelled againſt me in a manner, ſudden, unmerited and unexpected.

UNDER theſe circumſtances, there was a neceſſity of ſpeaking for myſelf, and, which was ſtill more unpleaſing, I found myſelf likewiſe conſtrained to enter upon my vindication without delay.—The pungency of theſe accuſations — the precipitancy of the times, and a diſpoſition to take every thing for granted that was not immediately refuted; obliged me not only to diſpatch them as quickly as was poſſible, but alſo to produce them in like hurry to the publick eye.

IT was from theſe accidents, which I could not either foreſee or avoid, that they came into the world not ſo well digeſted, and with much leſs accuracy, than the candid part of

mankind have a right to expect in every production that claims their consideration, and is submitted to their judgment.

To the same causes I may very justly refer those errors of the press, which were in some of them so numerous as scarce to leave the sense intelligible; to say nothing of other mistakes in orthography and diction, all arising from the utter impossibility of allowing me time requisite to revise and correct the proof sheets.

It is from a just sense of these involuntary imperfections, that I have been led to review, to reform, and to cast into somewhat a different shape, these little pieces, that were thus exposed; and to render them still clearer and more satisfactory, I have added some other Tracts, which, however seasonable, I had not the leisure to prepare, and which, from my observing the obscurity arising from their omission, I conceived it my duty to add as soon as opportunity would permit.

My narrative of the fatal catastrophe at Calcutta, and that unexampled scene of horror to which so many subjects of Great Britain were exposed in the prison of the

Black-Hole, has ſo cloſe a connection with one of the pieces that precede it, as ſcarce to require an apology for reprinting it in this edition; prefixing, as a frontiſpiece to the Volume, a Print of the Monument which I erected, at my own expence, to the memory of thoſe unhappy ſufferers.

MANY, if not moſt of the matters contained in theſe ſheets, are to you, Gentlemen, very well known, as having been often the ſubject of your deliberations; and, therefore, to whom could I ſo properly addreſs them as to yourſelves? — Two of you firſt incited my endeavours, and directed my labours for the Company's intereſt. — Mr. Payne, with the ſame diſtinguiſhed zeal, encouraged and ſupported them; a zeal truly diſintereſted, for I was a ſtranger to you all; ſo that you could have no motive to the favour you beſtowed, and the protection you ſo generouſly afforded me, except the warm and pure regard which you ever ſhewed, rather than profeſſed, for that reſpectable body, whoſe concerns were then committed to your care.

YOU have, Gentlemen, frequently done me the honour to ſay, I did not diſgrace

your

your patronage, or diſappoint your favourable expectations: to me this was the moſt ample reward — but I could not help thinking there yet remained ſomething due on my part; and that I ought to attempt the juſtifying your choice to the knowing, the ingenuous, and the judicious world.

THIS became more eſpecially incumbent on me, when I found Envy and Malice arraign the character of him, whom you had eſpouſed, and whom you had ſo long honoured with your friendſhip. —— This, I thought, I could not better effect than by publiſhing the following Pieces.

WITH all poſſible ſubmiſſion, I lay them in their new dreſs before you, as thereby I am favoured with what I have long and ardently wiſhed, an opportunity of giving this public teſtimony of a grateful heart, for the many and repeated proofs I have received of your reſpectable patronage.

I am,

GENTLEMEN,

Your moſt obliged, and

moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Mount Felix,
Walton upon Thames,
July 3, 1764.

J. Z. HOLWELL.

AN
ADDRESS
TO THE
PROPRIETORS
Of EAST-INDIA STOCK;

SETTING FORTH

The unavoidable NECESSITY and real MOTIVES

FOR THE

REVOLUTION in BENGAL, in 1760.

By JOHN ZEPHANIAH HOLWELL, Esq;

EXPLANATION *of certain* PERSIAN *and* MOORISH *Terms in the following Sheets.*

A.

AMDANNY and *Rufftanny*—Imports and Exports.

Arzgee—A Petition—*Arzdaſht*—Idem.

Aſſammees—Dealers in different Branches of Trade.

B.

Banka Bazar—Formerly the Oſtend Factory.

Begum—Princeſs—meaning without Care.

Buxey—A Paymaſter of Troops.

Buckſerrias—Foot Soldiers whoſe common Arms are Sword and Target only.

C.

Chowkeys—Guards at the Stairs, or Landing-places.

Chinam—Lime.

Coſſid—A Foot-meſſenger, or Poſt.

Chubdaar—An Uſher.

Cooley—A Porter.

Chout—A Fourth Part.

A Coſs, or *Corſe*—A Meaſure from two Miles to two Miles and Half.

A Corore of Rupees—An hundred Lack, or one Million Sterling.

D.

Dewan—King's Treaſurer.

Dewanny—Superintendancy over the Royal Revenues.

Duſſutary—An Impoſt of ten per Cent.

Durbar—Court or Council, and ſometimes a Levee only.

Decoyt—A Robber.

Dummadah—A River.

F.

Fowzdar—A Military Officer.

G.

Gomaſtah—Factor or Agent.
Gwallers—Carriers of Palanquins.
Gunge—Grain-Market.

H.

Hackeries—Carts or Coaches drawn by Oxen.
Harkarahs—Spies.

I.

John Nagore—A Village ſo called.
Jaggemaut—The Gentoo Pagoda.
Jemmautdaar—An Officer of the ſame Rank with the Roman Centurion.

M.

Machulka—An Obligation with a Penalty annexed.
Moonſhee—A Perſian Secretary.
Muſnud—Throne.
Moories—Writers.
Maund--A groſs Weight between 70 and 80 Pounds.

N.

Negrai—A new Settlement at one of the Pegu Iſlands.
Nobut—A Drum, a Mark of Royalty aſſumed by the Subahs of Bengal.

P.

Perwannah—An Order or Command, ſometimes a Grant.
Purranea—In the Province of Bengal; a Nabobſhip ſubordinate to the Subah.
Phirmaund—A Royal Mandate, or Grant.

Pykes

Pykes—Officers relative to the Service of the Lands.
Ponſways—Guard-Boats.
Podâr or *Shroff*—A Money-changer.
Peons—Infantry.
Pottahs—Grants.
Pondary, *Foorea*—Farmers diſtinct Allowances on Grain at the Gunge.

R.

Rumnah—Diſtrict for the Royal Game.

S.

Seer, *Chetac*, *Maund*—Forty Seer is one Maund, and ſixteen Chetac one Seer.

T.

Telinga—The Carnatic Country on the Coaſt of Coromandel.
Tankſal—A Mint for Coinage.
Tanners and *Buzbudgea*—Forts on the River Ganges.
Tunkahs—Aſſignments upon Lands.
Tuzſaconna, *Ginanah*—Wardrobe and Seraglio.

V.

Vaqueel—Engliſh Agent or Reſident at the Nabob's Court.
Vizerut—The Grant for the Viſierſhip.

W.

Wazeed—A conſiderable Mahometan Merchant who reſided at Hougley upon the Ganges.

Z.

Zemin—Ground—*Zemindary*—Relative to Lands.

AN ADDRESS TO THE PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK.

GENTLEMEN and LADIES,

I KNOW not any body of people in the kingdom ſo much to be pitied, or ſo deſervedly the object of attention, at this period, as yourſelves: ſtrangers to the ſecret ſprings and workings of the great machine you are embarked in, you muſt be alſo ſtrangers to the nature of its defects, and incapable of applying proper remedies to its irregular, and conſequently deſtructive motions.

Thoſe intruſted with the conduct of your concerns at home, diſtracted and divided in their councils; your Agents abroad, in the ſame unhappy diviſions and animoſities; a general Court at hand, where it is to be feared, not one in a hundred of you will be able to form any clear idea of the matters to be diſcuſſed: What ſalutary effects then can be expected from its reſolutions, in your preſent uninformed ſtate?

I will not begin ſo endleſs a work as the inveſtigating, from their original ſource, the various

combined cauſes, which gave riſe to theſe diſſentions, as it would anſwer no one uſeful purpoſe at preſent: an honeſt indignation, and true regard for the welfare of the Company provokes my pen, to reſcue you from impreſſions, the beſt and moſt ſenſible are ſometimes liable to, from miſrepreſentation, artful invective, plauſible, ſpecious, though fallacious argument, and cruel inſinuation; enough of theſe are, at this particular juncture, thrown out to amuſe and blind you, by ſome no better acquainted with the ſubjects they write and ſpeak on, than moſt of yourſelves.

The productions of paltry ſcriblers are below mine, and every gentleman's notice, (ſuch as appeared in a late evening paper;) but when men of ſenſe, virtue and character, and others who have poſſeſſed high and diſtinguiſhed ſtations and emoluments in your ſervice, join the cry, and help to keep up and increaſe this anarchy in your affairs, it is time to guard you, not only againſt the venom of their pens, but their tongues alſo; for, from them there may be danger.

That your affairs have been brought to the brink of ruin, is moſt certain, and poſſibly by this time (tho' God forbid) you may not have a foot of land, nor a rupee of property, in the three provinces of Bengal; a diſmal and alarming proſpect.—The queſtion is, What is the real and more immediate cauſe of this melancholy ſituation? If you hearken to the preſent torrent of abuſe, you will be told, the revolution which depoſed Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, and ſet up his ſon-in-law, Koſſim Aly Khan, in the year 1760, is ſtained *with unparalleled infamy*, and is the cauſe of every ſubſequent miſchief to you: you are further told, this change will be explained to you *from the moſt undoubted authority, and unanſwerable arguments:* but nothing of this kind yet appears to enlighten you.

From

From another quarter you are informed, your Court of Directors are culpable.—Thoſe who ſhoot in the dark, may fire boldly indeed, not being immediately liable to diſcovery; but then they may be ſometimes liable to miſtake their aim—the charge againſt them is couched in the following terms: "Your Court of Directors at home, "pleaſed with the preſent advantages, never exa- "mined the means by which they were obtained, "or whence the neceſſities aroſe that were pleaded "in excuſe of the revolution."—I ſhould be grieved you could imagine I am ſet down to form an apology for the whole conduct of your Court of Directors.—Far be it from me—but as I know their judgment on, and ſanction given to this revolution, were the reſult of mature examination, both as to the means, and neceſſities that produced it, it would be diſhoneſt in me not to ſay ſo; and I will venture to pronounce, that before I cloſe this Addreſs to you, yourſelves will acquit them of this charge, and be convinced their conduct, as to this particular tranſaction, was ſtrictly conſiſtent, not only with your intereſt but honour—nor will I doubt, but this revolution will, in the ſequel, reflect honour and credit on every one of your ſervants who had a part in it.

To vindicate the revolution of 1760, is the taſk I now impoſe upon myſelf, not only for your information, (though I confeſs that to be a moving, and at this time a very eſſential conſideration) but alſo in juſtification of my ſelf, who, it is very well known, had ſo large a ſhare in it, and in defence of one of the beſt and moſt capable ſervants you ever had abroad. Juſtice to his merits exacts this teſtimony from me, though he ſuperceded me in the government of your preſidency of Bengal—I conceive Mr. Vanſittart's character, on this occaſion, injuriouſly traduced; he is not here to vindi-

cate

cate himſelf; it is therefore incumbent on me (who only can) to do it; the more eſpecially, becauſe if any juſt cenſure lies againſt him on account of this revolution, it is owing to the repreſentations laid before him by me, touching the ſtate of the Company's affairs at the period he came to the government.

Previous to laying proofs and vouchers before you, it will not be amiſs, to ſay what I intend to prove. I therefore ſet out with theſe poſitions: Firſt, That the diſtreſt ſituation of your affairs, as well as impending ruin of the provinces, made it unavoidably neceſſary to diveſt Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan of power to do greater miſchiefs, as by a ſeries of mal-adminiſtration and cruelties he had well nigh brought himſelf, his family, the provinces, and the Company, to deſtruction; ſo that it became a reproach to the Engliſh name and arms to ſupport his tyrannic government any longer. Secondly, That Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan was guilty of a breach of every article of the offenſive and defenſive treaty made with him in the year 1757, when he was by us promoted to the Subaſhip of Bengal.—Thirdly, That your honour, and the honour of the nation, remain inviolate, and ſtand unimpeached by this revolution, though the contrary has been ſo induſtriouſly inſinuated.

This conteſt is reducible to a very narrow compaſs.—If the depoſing Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan was a juſt and neceſſary meaſure, every ſubſequent oppoſition to it muſt be wrong, and highly detrimental to your intereſt, trade, and poſſeſſions; on the contrary, if you deem the depoſing Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, an unjuſt and unneceſſary meaſure, the reſtoring him muſt be right, in the eye of ſtrict juſtice, provided ſuch reſtoration is ſo circumſtanced, as to be brought about without the manifeſt hazard of ruin to your affairs. On this we

join iſſue, and proceed to our proofs. In order to which, a ſhort introduction to facts will be needful.

In Auguſt 1760, Henry Vanſittart, Eſq; arrived at Fort William, Bengal, and received the government. Your affairs, as well as the ſtate of the provinces, being in a moſt ruinous, intricate, and disjointed ſituation, Mr. Holwell thought it an indiſpenſible duty on him, to draw up ſuch a clear repreſentation of theſe matters as ſhould afford that gentleman an immediate general idea of our political ſtate at that period—which he accordingly did, in the following terms, introduced by a ſhort addreſs to your ſecret Committee.

To the Honourable HENRY VANSITTART, *Eſq*; &c.
Members of the Select Committee.

Honble Sir and Sirs,

AS my health, and the conſideration of other circumſtances, will ſoon oblige me to requeſt permiſſion of the Board to reſign the ſervice, I beg leave, previous to that ſtep, to accompany this ſhort addreſs with ſuch remarks and memorials, as may convey to the Honourable the Preſident, (ſo lately arrived among you) a knowledge of the preſent ſtate and ſituation of the Company's affairs, as they ſtand connected with, or are dependant on, the country government of Bengal.

I have the Honour to be, &c.
J. Z. H.

MEMORIAL.

TO form a judgment of the preſent ſtate of things at Bengal, it will be needful to have a retroſpect to the late revolution of the year 1757, when neceſſity, and a juſt reſentment for the moſt cruel

cruel injuries, obliged us to enter on a plan to deprive Surajud Dowla of his government, which was accordingly done, and Mhir Mahomet Jaffier Aly Khan, fixed by us at the head of the provinces, on certain conditions, and under a treaty of alliance, offenſive and defenſive.

A ſhort ſpace fully proved how unworthy the family thus raiſed to the Subaſhip were: the conditions of the treaty could not be obtained from the Suba, without, in a manner, being extorted from him; and by a thouſand ſhifts and evaſions, it was plain, no ſingle article would ever have been complied with, had the Suba been inveſted with ſufficient power to prevent it, or could he have diveſted himſelf of his own fears and apprehenſions from our reſentment.

Tunka's on the lands were, however, granted for payment of the ſtipulated ſums, at ſtated times, by which the Roy Royen, (or Collector of the Revenues) and the Dewans, Mutſoodies, &c. (dependents of that office) with every harpy employed in the Zemindary or lands, became our implacable enemies; and conſequently,

A party was ſoon raiſed at the Durbar, headed by the Suba's ſon Mhiran, and Raja Raage Bullob, who were daily planning ſchemes, to ſhake off their dependance on the Engliſh, and continually urging to the Suba, that until this was effected, his government was nominal only. The Suba, ſomething irritated, by the protection given to Raja Doolubram, better known by the name of Roy Doolub, and weak and irreſolute in himſelf, fell too ſoon into theſe ſentiments.

The firſt ſtep taken to accompliſh this ſcheme of independence, was, to aſſaſſinate and cut off, under one pretence or another, every miniſter and officer at the Durbar, whom they knew were attached to the Engliſh: to this purpoſe, Coju Haady,

Haady, and Coſſim Aly Khan, firſt and ſecond Buxey, were aſſaſſinated in November and December 1758. After many attempts made on the perſons of Rheim Khan and Golam Shaw, his uncle and brother, they were at laſt obliged to ſeek an aſylum with the Shaw Zadda, 1759. Roy Doolub's ſon and four brothers were proſcribed, on no other cauſe, but his known inviolable attachment to us; this family would have fallen a ſacrifice had they not been reſcued out of the Suba's hands by force of arms. Omhir Beg Khan would, from the ſame cauſe, have ſuffered the ſame fate, had he not given his ſolemn engagement to quit the kingdom, which he accordingly did, in a miſerable ſtate of health, and lived only to arrive at Buſſorah.

The next project of the Durbar, appeared (by every ſubſequent concurring circumſtance) to be a ſecret negotiation with the Dutch, for tranſporting troops from Batavia into theſe provinces, that with their united force a ſtop might be put to the power of the Engliſh. This ſcheme was conducted by Raja Raage Bullob, on the part of the Suba, and by Fookru Toojaar Khan (better known by the name of Coja Wazeed) on the part of the Dutch, about October or November 1758, the period when the Decan expedition took place under Colonel Forde, and your garriſons were much reduced.

Soon after the provinces were invaded by the Shaw Zadda, (undoubted heir to the Mogul empire) on the ſide of Patna, and Colonel Clive, with the Engliſh troops and Seapoys, joined the Suba and his army, and by forced marches preſerved Rajah Ramnaran (Nabob of Patna) ſteady in his duty, and arrived juſt in time to ſave that city and province, and drive the Prince beyond the river Kurrumnaſſa, and brought the Budgepoore, &c. countries under ſubjection.

The

The Prince, more than once, wrote to the Colonel, offering any terms for the Company and himſelf, on condition the Engliſh would quit the Suba, and join his arms; but the Colonel, thinking it incompatible with our treaty of alliance, gave the Prince no encouragement.

At the end of the campaign, in June 1759, the Colonel returned to us; and about the ſame time, the Suba and young Nabob Mhiran arrived at Muxadabad: both, now, with full conviction of our firm attachment to his government and family, and of our religious regard to treaties. What ſenſe they retained of theſe obligations, and how long, will appear by and by.

The Suba and his ſon, thinking themſelves now better eſtabliſhed in the government, and ſcreened by ſuch a powerful ſupport as our arms, ſet no bounds to their cruelties, oppreſſions, and exactions from thoſe who had any thing to be plundered of; and theſe barely received a check, from the frequent and ſevere remonſtrances of Colonel Clive to the Suba, on a conduct, which he foretold him, *muſt, from the general deteſtation of his people, end in the deſtruction of himſelf, family, and country.*— His troops clamorous for their pay, whilſt the Suba, in place of appropriating the ſums he had acquired, by repeated aſſaſſinations, to the juſt demands of his Jummautdars and troops, laviſhed the ſame in boundleſs extravagancies.

About the latter end of July 1759, the young Nabob arrived in Calcutta, on a pretended viſit to the Colonel; but the real deſign was, to negociate, if poſſible, the ſurrender of Roy Doolub, and two or three other articles, given him in charge by his father; ſuch as, giving up the Tunka lands on ſecurity,—borrowing a large ſum of money:—but in theſe the ſon proving unſucceſsful, a member of the Board and Select Committee, was, at his deſire,

ſent

ſent to accompany him to the city, to reconcile the Suba to the negatives his ſon had met with at Calcutta, and at the ſame time to intimate to him the advice we had received, that a large armament was fitting out at Batavia, deſtined for Bengal, and to know his reſolution, in caſe that force arrived in the river.

He was not to be reconciled to the refuſals his ſon had met with, but determined to try his own power, and declared his intention to viſit the Colonel himſelf in September, (which he did, but with no more ſucceſs) he ſeemed to make light of the intelligence touching the Dutch armament, and not to give much credit to it, though he diſcovered great perplexity; however, he wrote a letter to the Colonel, demanding our aſſiſtance, by virtue of the treaty of alliance, in caſe the Dutch troops came into the river.

The armament from Batavia arrived during his viſit at Calcutta; his ſtay after that was ſhort, his mind ſeemed much embarraſſed, and his whole ſubſequent conduct gave moſt undoubted proofs, that the Dutch force was arrived at his invitation; that ſuch were the ſentiments of Colonel Clive and his Council, appears from the narrative of our conteſt with the Dutch, November 1759, tranſmitted to the Court of Directors, and to our ſeveral Admirals: a peruſal of this narrative will convince the impartial, that the Suba's behaviour on this occaſion, was a moſt flagitious breach of the treaty of alliance; and that no terms whatever ſhould have been preſerved with him after ſuch treachery and ingratitude; to which we may add, by way of illuſtration, the ſubſequent farces carried on between the Nabobs and the Dutch, even until the month of July 1760, as ſet forth in the ſeveral letters between Mr. Holwell and the Reſident at Morad-Baag, on this ſubject, to which I refer; where it

will

will appear moſt manifeſt, that the Suba's real intentions never were to oppoſe theſe people, though he was from time to time calling upon us, and demanding aſſiſtance, by virtue of the treaty of alliance ſubſiſting between him and the Engliſh :—— witneſs the private orders and inſtructions given to his ſon-in-law, Mhir Mahomet Coſſim Aly Khan, ſo oppoſite to the public orders given to amuſe and deceive us, when he was ſent down to demoliſh the new works at Chinſura, the apparent delay in which drew much cenſure upon that General, until the truth was known.

In the beginning of the year 1760, the Shaw Zadda invaded the provinces again, with a force more reſpectable than in the preceding one, both in troops and commanders, by the revolt of Comgar Khan, Golam Shaw, Rheim Khan, and others; the Suba, by this time, having made himſelf and family ſo univerſally hated, that we may juſtly ſay, there was hardly a man in the province that did not wiſh ſucceſs to the Prince.

Colonel Clive reſigned the government early in February 1760, about which time the Morattors entered the province from the ſouthward, and penetrated Burdomaan country, making a conſiderable diverſion in favour of the Prince; the Suba demanded a body of our troops, Seapoys and field artillery, for defence of his country, to join his army under the command of Mhir Coſſim Aly Khan; which were granted:—but here the ſervice expected, and intended by this united force, was intirely fruſtrated, by the puſillanimous and contradictory orders from the Suba to that General, which ended at laſt in commanding him to advance towards Cutwah, for the defence of the city, in place of ordering him to march to the ſouthward, againſt the Morattors, to drive them out of the country: and this in oppoſition to the ſtrongeſt

remonſtrances made againſt it, by Mr. Holwell and Mhir Coſſim Aly Khan: thus the country fell a prey to the Morattors, and a total ſtop was put to the collection of our Tunkas, on which was our dependence and expectation, for the ſervice of the year. (*Vid.* Military Correſpondence, Feb. and Mar. 1760.)

Our troops, under command of Major Caillaud, in conjunction with the Suba's army, commanded by his ſon Mhiran, had taken the field ſome time before Colonel Clive's departure for Europe, and ſhaped their rout towards Patna, whilſt the Suba remained in the neighbourhood of Rajamaal, a check upon Cuddeim Hoſſein Khan, Nabob of Purnea.

A regular and particular detail of the tranſactions of this laborious campaign, will not be expected here, as the progreſs of it will preſent itſelf in the courſe of the military correſpondence, laid before the Select Committee; therefore general remarks on the ſucceſs, effects, and probable conſequences, will ſuffice.

This campaign, like the former ones, produced no definitive action, or ſtroke, to lay the leaſt foundation of peace to the provinces: in the courſe of it, three morally ſure, and important opportunities, were loſt by the cowardice of both Nabobs.—The firſt, when Mhiran refuſed to join Major Caillaud with his horſe, in the immediate purſuit of the Prince, when defeated near Patna.—The ſecond, when the Suba refuſed to comply with the Major's requeſt and demand, to croſs his horſe over Burdomaan river, to attack the Prince, when united with Subabut, the Morattor general.—And the third, when in the laſt purſuit of Cuddeim Hoſſein Khan, the young Nabob refuſed to lead or detach his horſe to the Major's aſſiſtance, by which a general action might have been brought on; but

on the contrary, kept himſelf encamped above a mile in the Major's rear, as if his intentions were to leave our troops, without horſe, a ſacrifice to the enemy.

On the near approach of the Major to Patna, he received a Phirmaund from the Prince, of which he adviſed the Board, and promiſed to forward a copy; but no wonder that, in the courſe of ſo extraordinary and fatiguing a campaign, it ſhould eſcape his memory.—On the Shaw Zadda's arrival in the Bierboheen country, (after the unexpected march he formed upon his defeat near Patna) the Preſident received intelligence that the Suba had actually a Vackeel in his camp; and that he was negotiating a ſeparate treaty for himſelf. This appeared to have ſo dangerous a tendency, that any means were eligible to obtain the truth.

The late Preſident, by a third hand, cauſed Aſſud Jumma Khan, Raja of Bierboheen, and his uncle Comgar Khan, to be wrote to, on this ſubject of the Suba's Vackeel and treaty.—This ſoon produced a Phirmaund from the Prince, incloſing copy of the Suba's Arzdaſht. The Preſident made no reply to the Phirmaund, but returned a ſhort one to Comgar Khan's letter, (which accompanied the Phirmaund) intimating, that copies were of little validity, where originals were in being.

A few days before the Prince began his retreat from the hills, the Preſident received a ſecond Phirmaund from him, incloſing original Arzdaſht from the Suba.—All that can be ſaid for or againſt belief being given either to the authenticity of the copy or the original, will appear on the face of the correſpondence, in two letters from the Preſident to the Major, under dates the 22d and 24th of laſt April, and to Mr. Haſtings the Reſident at Morad-baag, the 20th of the ſame month: to theſe, we may further remark, that if they were

forgeries,

forgeries, they have yet corroborating ſignatures of truth; and the whole tenor of the Suba's conduct moſt exactly tallies with the terms of the Arzdaſht (or petition). But to reſume the courſe of the campaign to the preſent time.

Patna is relieved and ſecured for the preſent—Cuddeim Hoſſein Khan is depoſed from his government of Purnea, and drove out of the country, but with all his treaſure and valuable effects, to the reproach and infamy of the young Nabob's memory; ſo that after the rains he will eaſily join the Prince, with the eſſential ſinews of war, money, the only thing he ſtands in need of to enable him to harraſs the provinces five years longer.

The young Nabob is taken off by lightening,—and our troops are gone into quarters, after having done as much or more than could have been expected from men ſo wretchedly ſupported, by thoſe for whoſe preſervation they endured every diſtreſs and fatigue, and braved variety of deaths.—

The Prince has found means to preſerve himſelf and forces, a footing on this ſide the Sone, and in the neighbourhood of Patna: it is ſaid, Comgar Khan has forſaken the cauſe of the Prince, which appears moſt improbable; not only on account that he has no other chance for reimburſing himſelf, but perſeverance; but alſo, becauſe we have undoubted intelligence that 3000 of his troops have joined his nephew, Aſſud Jumma Khan, who has thrown off his allegiance to the Suba.—Theſe troops are certainly lodged, to make an early and important diverſion, at the opening of the next campaign, by entering the Burdomaan country as ſoon as the Prince begins to be in motion to the northward; and thus our ſupplies from thence will be again cut off, and the Company's affairs reduced to the laſt extremity of diſtreſs, unleſs the approaching ſhips of the ſeaſon

relieve us, or the whole Tunka's on thoſe lands be collected during the rains.—The latter is hardly poſſible, and the former carries very little probability with it.—The laſt propoſal from the Suba, to pay our balances, and reſume his lands, is devoutly to be wiſhed, but it is to be feared he has no meaning in it.

The various reaſons urged againſt ſupporting the preſent government longer, on the plan we have been ſome time purſuing, to the heavy injury of the Company, with various expedients to reſcue them from their manifeſt approaching ruin, are ſet forth at large in the military correſpondence—in letters from the Preſident to Major Caillaud, under dates the 24th and 25th of May, and 14th of June, and 3d of July;—to Mr. Amyat, under dates the 25th and 30th of May, and 1ſt July; to Mr. Haſtings, under dates the 24th of May, and 30th of June, and 5th and 8th July.

The ſudden death of the young Nabob, if made a proper uſe of, ſeems to point out a middle way, if things are not gone too far already, to admit any other alternative than diveſting this family from the government altogether.—Vide the Preſident's letter to Mr. Haſtings, of the 16th July, and to Major Caillaud, of the 26th, on the ſubject of a ſucceſſor to the young Nabob's poſts.—

J. Z. H.

The foregoing Memorial, we believe, would carry ſufficient conviction with it, to eſtabliſh our three poſitions, were we to go no farther:—the facts there ſtated are faithfully recited, and without exaggeration: if they are not, we are open to detection, from one ſide or other of the preſent diviſion in the Court of Directors; there are leading members in both parties, who can have recourſe to the face of their records of conſultations and committee proceedings.

As the ſeveral charges laid againſt Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, in this Memorial, may, by being too much divided, not appear ſo clear and intelligible as we could wiſh, though ſufficiently ſo for whom it was then drawn; we ſhall, for your more ready comprehenſion, throw the whole into a regular connection as follows:—That, very ſoon after his advancement, he reſolved to reduce that power which raiſed him to wealth and princely grandeur.—That, in order to effect it, he began (by baſe aſſaſſinations, or other methods) to cut off, and drive out of the provinces, every officer and perſon of importance whom he had the leaſt cauſe to ſurmiſe favoured our intereſt, or were attached to us.—That he had been ſcarce ſeated in his government, when he entered into a ſecret negotiation with the Dutch, to introduce an armament in the Provinces, to counteract and deſtroy our power and influence;—a meaſure as wicked as fooliſh.—That he was guilty of the deepeſt deceit and treachery towards us, his benefactors and allies, in repeated inſtances.—That, whilſt our officers and troops were ſuffering every diſtreſs, and hazard of their lives, in defence of him, his ſon, and country, our commander in chief was baſely and treacherouſly deſerted, at three different periods, by father and ſon.—That he meditated a ſeparate, ſecret, treaty with the Shaw Zadda, and offered to ſacrifice us to the Prince, but was not (happily for us) believed, or heard.—That the whole term of his government was an uniform chain of cruelty, tyranny and oppreſſion.—That (over and above what is charged againſt him in the Memorial) he meditated, and was near carrying into execution, an infamous ſecret treaty with the Morattors, which would have proved the total deſtruction of the country, if it had not been timely prevented.—That he threw every poſſible lett and hindrance in

our way, in the collection of our Tunka's.—That he encouraged, and winked at, the obſtructions given to the free currency of our Calcutta Sicca's; by which, at times, the Company ſuffered heavy loſſes.—

Each of theſe charges is a violation of that treaty which put Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan in poſſeſſion of a government of more value than many kingdoms of Europe, ſupported by us at the expence of our blood, until it became a ſcandal and reproach to our name and nation.—But it is time we proceed to other proofs than bare aſſertions: Theſe we ſhall take from the correſpondence ſo often referred to; and if, in the ſeveral vouchers we exhibit to you, ſome parts of your affairs ſhould be laid more open than you, or rather your Court of Directors, wiſh—the neceſſity muſt plead our apology; faithfully aſſuring you, that we will only touch on ſuch matters as may be abſolutely requiſite to ſupport our charge.

Governor Clive departing for Europe the 8th of February, 1760, Mr. Holwell ſucceeded by his rank to the government; the eſtabliſhed committee entruſted with the conduct of all political occurrences, with the country government, conſiſted of the Preſident, Peter Amyatt, Eſq; Major Caillaud, W. B. Sumner, Eſq; and W. Macguire, Eſq. The Major and Mr. Amyatt abſent, the one in the field, the other chief at Patna.—We ſhall open our proofs with a letter from the Preſident to the Major, and that gentleman's anſwer, as the correſpondence between Mr. Holwell and Major Caillaud was only on public affairs, which having long ceaſed to be of a ſecret nature, we think we cannot be juſtly accuſed of any breach of propriety in publiſhing any part of that correſpondence which the public information calls for; eſpecially, as whatever we ſhall produce from this quarter, will redound to that gentleman's honour.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Esq*;

SIR, *Fort William*, 15th February, 1760.

I Congratulate your ſucceſs in the reduction of Cuddeim Hoſſein Khan, the particulars of which I received from the Nabob, and diſpatched them immediately to the Colonel, though fear too late for his receiving that ſatisfaction: he was a good deal anxious on this head, as he feared it might have been the cauſe of delaying your advance towards Raiah Ramnarain.

Subut at the head of about 3000 horſe and a few foot, has advanced as far as Midnapore, and given a general alarm to the country; they demanded their chout; if they come with further views, their deſigns are not yet manifeſted.—Rumour, without any foundation, ſays, that Roy Doolub has encouraged their march; be it ſo or not, I have thought it neceſſary to have a more than uſual watchful eye over him at this juncture.—I have wrote the Nabob on the ſubject of the Subut's advance; and gave it him as my opinion, that as he has now nothing to apprehend from Purnea, he ſhould return to his capital.—If you judge the ſervice to the northward will admit of ſuch a ſtep, you will enforce it. Your correſpondence will ever afford a real pleaſure to him, who is with much eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Honourable J. Z. HOLWELL, *Esq*; *Preſident and Governor of* Fort William.

SIR, *Camp Shahſadapore*, Feb. 27, 1760.

I Have been honoured with your obliging favour of the 15th inſtant; you may be aſſured of finding in me a punctual correſpondent, both from inclination and duty.

The part of your letter, Sir, with regard to Roy Doolub, I have anſwered fully in the general letter which accompanies this.—I ſhould have firſt wrote on the ſubject, had you not prevented me; and am almoſt convinced, that, on further examination, we ſhall find that both your ſuſpicions and mine are true and juſt; indeed the Letter to the Shaw Zadda, of which I ſend the copy, would be quite ſufficient to condemn him, were it not that there is a poſſibility of its being formed by the Nabob on purpoſe; *who is, from principle, very capable of doing that, or any other infamous action to gain his ends.*—I ſhall, however, ſuſpend my judgment, until your examination is over.—The precautions you have taken were highly judicious; for though the proofs againſt him may not, on trial, appear ſo clear as we could wiſh for our ſatisfaction; yet he is ſtill a perſon to be ſuſpected, and of conſequence cannot be too narrowly or ſtrictly watched.

Your opinion, with regard to the Nabob's return to the Capital, agreed perfectly with mine; I had adviſed him to that ſtep before the receipt of your letter, and have ſince enforced it on your judgment:—he may eaſily, if he pleaſes, put an end to this beginning of trouble, if he will purſue the proper methods, and pay them their chout; but indeed, ſo dilatory is his conduct in every reſpect, and particularly where payments of money are to be made, that I ſuppoſe he will put it off, until they come with ſuch a force as will oblige him to it, but that not until they have done as much damage to the country as will amount to double their tribute regularly paid.

The more I ſee of the Nabob, the more I am convinced, that he muſt be ruined in ſpite of all our endeavours, if he doth not alter his preſent meaſures—He is neither loved nor feared by his troops or his people; he neglects ſecuring the one by

by the badneſs of his payments, and he wants ſpirit and ſteadineſs to command the other.—As no one knows him better than you, Sir, no one is more proper to give him the neceſſary advice on the occaſion; nor can you too forcibly or frequently repreſent to him, the fatal conſequences, if he perſiſts in his folly. Believe me, Sir, with truth and reſpect,

Your obedient and obliged humble Servant,

J. C.

Our reaſon for introducing the firſt of theſe letters is for ſake of the reply, and to do honour to the good ſenſe and penetration of that gentleman; who could ſo early, and on ſo ſhort an intercourſe with him, form a conſummate judgment of that weak and infatuated man; in which he had cauſe to be confirmed, day by day.—We have only further to remark, on the ſubject of this letter, that on the ſtricteſt examination into the ſuppoſed letter of Roy Doolub to the Shaw Zadda, ſaid to be intercepted by the Suba's Harkarahs, (or ſpys) it was proved a palpable forgery of the Suba, to get him delivered into his hands; hoping thereby to get the plunder of a Corore of Rupees.—An attempt ſimilar to this, he made in Colonel Clive's time, againſt the ſame perſon, but was ſhamefully detected; and ſure, none but him could ever have thought of it again.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS, *Reſident at* Morad Baag.

SIR, *Fort William*, 22d Feb. 1760.

I Wrote by the Nabob's Harkarahs laſt night, and this morning received your favour of the 18th, and obſerved, by the Nabob's repeated anxieties concerning Subut, that his intelligence on that head is very imperfect; it is true he has poſ-

ſeſſed

ſeſſed himſelf of Midnapore, but as yet there appears not the leaſt foundation for his ſuppoſed advance to the city:—He himſelf remains at Midnapore, ſome of his people are advanced to Chundercona, and a very few to Bowannypore, but not a man of his one foot to the northward of that place: if he ever had any deſign of marching to the city, the advance of our troops to join Coſſim Aly Khan, and my putting Roy Doolub under an arreſt, may probably have put a ſtop to it, though it never appeared to me he had forces with him equal to ſuch an attempt.—Things thus circumſtanced, I muſt differ from you in opinion touching Coſſim Aly Khan's march to the city with our troops; as it appears to me more eligible, that he throws himſelf between them and the city at as great a diſtance from the latter as poſſible, by which ſtep he will have it in his power, either to march down and force Subut to quit Midnapore, or retreat towards the city at laſt; but it is very clear to me, Subut will withdraw as ſoon as Coſſim Aly Khan begins his march.——I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq*;

SIR, *Fort William*, 24th Feb. 1760.

LEST the general confuſion and apprehenſions of the approach of Subut and his Morattors, which now reign in the city of Muxadabad, ſhould ſpread to the northward, and affect your operations, I judge it neceſſary you ſhould be acquainted with the real ſtate of this circumſtance.

On the Nabob's departure from the city, Subut began his march from Ballaſore, and after a ſhort conflict with Kooſall Sing, poſſeſſed himſelf of Midnapore, and ſent ſmall detached parties to ſeize on the

country round him; one of which advanced as far as Chundercona, and another as far as Bowannypore, where they ſtill remain without a man advancing a foot further to the northward; his whole force conſiſts of about 1000 vagabond horſe, and half as many foot: This force, by the timidity of ſome, and roguery of others at the city, has been magnified to ten times the number; and fear has taken ſuch total poſſeſſion of the people there, that they imagine him and his troops within an hour's march of them; our Gentlemen at Coſſimbuzar, and Morad-baag, ſeem, by their letters, to be alſo under the greateſt apprehenſions.——Coſſim Aly Khan, who has juſt now taken his leave of me, takes the field to-morrow with about 1500 of the Nabob's troops; we have judged it neceſſary, at the Nabob's requeſt, to reinforce him with the detachment intended for you, and 100 Europeans more, 200 Seapoys, and two field pieces: the whole have been encamped ſome days at the French gardens, and I doubt not but their firſt motion will reſtore the tranquillity of the city and country. I am moſt truly, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

We propoſe by theſe two letters to point out the puſillanimity and folly of the Suba, in ordering the troops under Coſſim Aly Khan to march towards Cutwah and the city, by which unfortunate meaſure, the Burdomaan country was abandoned, and left a prey to Subut and his handful of raggamuffin Morattors, to the irreparable ſtain and diſgrace of the Suba's government, and heavy diſtreſs of your ſervants; whoſe whole dependance for ſupply was from the Tunkas (or aſſignments) upon that diſtrict—as before remarked in the Memorial.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Fort William*, 8th March, 1760.

I HAD yeſterday your favour of the 28th, ſtill on the ſubject of Roy Doolub and Rajaram, in which I find the Nabob's intelligence is as bad as it has been hitherto, with reſpect to Subut and his Morattors, who have gained ſome footing in the country, and eclat from no cauſe, but the Nabob's ſupineneſs and contradictory orders to his ſon-in-law Coſſim Aly Khan.—You mention the Nabob's having ſent a Harkarah with your letter, who had ſeen Raſbeharry, &c. in Subut's camp, but no ſuch Harkarah is come, and there was very good reaſon for it; he had impoſed on the Nabob; and the fellow who brought your letter tells me, the other was ordered to accompany him, but left him after they were diſpatched; he believed he went to Subut's army—the ſame intelligence I had ſent me in an anonymous letter from Ballaſore, reſpecting Raſbeharry, &c. and of Roy Doolub's having ſent Subut money, for which I could not, on the ſtricteſt enquiry, find the leaſt foundation.—On my firſt intelligence, I ordered Raſbeharry to be brought before me; he has been long dangerouſly ill, and I could venture to ſwear he has never been out of Calcutta ſince November. On the receipt of your letter, I had him brought to me yeſterday again at the manifeſt hazard of his life.—From the palpable falſity of this intelligence, let the Nabob judge of the reſt, and let him be ſatisfied, that let who will be with Subut, neither Roy Doolub nor Rajaram ſhall have it in their power to injure him.—I have turned all his armed people out of the ſettlement (excepting a few for the ſervice of his Tuzſaconna and Ginanah) they are both under the ſtricteſt guard, and at his own requeſt, to quiet the

the Nabob's ſuſpicions, he moves this day into a houſe next to the Armenian church—He writes me to put Roy Doolub in fetters, a diſgrace I cannot think of inflicting, without being guilty of a breach of the ſacred laws of protection granted him, unleſs a proved violation on his ſide juſtifies it; in that caſe, I will not only put him in irons, but ſend him directly to the Nabob.—It has been hinted to me, whether by the Nabob's authority or knowledge, I will not ſay, that a preſent of four Lack was ready for me, provided I would deliver him up, or that I might make my own terms. Should any intimation of this kind be inſinuated to you, I requeſt you would return the ſame reply I did, that I would not be guilty of ſuch an action for four Crore.——I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Fort William*, 11th March, 1760.

I AM favoured with yours of the 27th ult. With reſpect to my ſentiments of Roy Doolub, you have them in part in our public letter of this date; to which I will here add, that I am very ſenſible there are probable appearances that he has given ſome underhand encouragement, both to the Shaw Zadda and the Morattors; yet whilſt proofs are not plain againſt him, I think we cannot proceed further than we have, conſiſtent with the firſt plan of politics we ſet out with when this man had our protection given him. One ruling motive to the Nabob's having him in his hands, is moſt certainly his wealth; but he is ſtill ſwayed by a much greater, to wit, that we ſhould not have ſo ſtrong a check over him as our detention of Roy Doolub ever will be. The protection given him is (next

to

to our troops) the beſt ſecurity we have for the Nabob's good behaviour. The letter referred to in the general letter, was one ſent down to the Colonel; it was ſaid to be wrote by Roy Doolub to Coja Huddy; the purport to cut the Nabob off,—but the Colonel aſſured me the forgery of the letter was ſo palpable and ſcandalous, that it ought to deſtroy the credit of any future attempts from that quarter; and ſuch are the reaſons aſſigned this year, in the ſelect Committee's letter to the Company, for the protection granted and continued to Roy Doolub, that we cannot conſiſtently or prudently give him up, without the moſt glaring proofs againſt him. The judgment you have formed of the Nabob is too juſt; weakneſs, irreſolution, ſuſpicion, and (conſequently) cruelty, form his diſpoſition. What but the iſſue you predict, can reſult from theſe, when joined to a moſt ungracious and inſolent demeanor, which has made him univerſally hated and deſpiſed? We muſt however ſupport him and his government as long as we poſſibly can, without involving ourſelves and employers in his ruin: when this appears, it will be time to think a little further, as I judge there is no treaty ſubſiſting between us can exact that ſacrifice.———I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To PETER AMYATT, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Calcutta*, 11th March, 1760.

FORGIVE my late reply to your favour of the 24th ult. You know the plague and hurry attending the diſpatch of our laſt ſhip, and will therefore attribute my neglect to the real and only cauſe, and not as proceeding from any diſregard of your obliging letters, for which I requeſt

you

you will accept my very ſincere thanks; and permit me to aſſure you I ſhall receive your correſpondence and commands with much pleaſure, and be glad, on my part, in every ſhape, to promote every view you have or may have, either to the public or your own private advantage. Your ſituation, I believe, has been diſagreeable enough; by expreſs intelligence this morning, I learn, the Prince has eſcaped the Major's vigilance, and is advancing this way, and that the Major is marching back to ſecure the paſſes. In this I fear the Prince will have too much the ſtart of him; ſhould this prove the caſe, matters will begin to grow ſerious, and the face of things in this province require your early ſentiments on this ſubject. I intreat you eſteem me with great truth, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Calcutta*, 15th March, 1760.

I YESTERDAY received your letter of the 11th from Coſſimbuzar, adviſing me of the intended march of the Nabob to Sukragully. I wrote you I think the 12th at night and incloſed you a letter to the Nabob, and copy of it for your peruſal, as alſo copy of Subut's letter to me, which I incloſed to the Nabob. I have kept in readineſs 200 Europeans more to join Capt. Spears, being hourly in expectation of the Nabob's inſtructions to be joined by his command; but as yet I have not had a line from him on the ſubject of the Shaw Zadda's unexpected motion towards the paſſes. Coſſim Aly Khan with Capt. Spear's command, was at Burdwan yeſterday; if he continues thus dilatory and inactive, and I receive no demand for troops from the Nabob, I will certainly ſend Capt. Yorke

Yorke with a ſeparate command of 3 or 400 Europeans, field artillery, and ſeapoys, directly into the Kirpy country, where our Gomaſtah and Aurungs are daily plundered. I long for further advices from you. We have no intelligence from the Major, later than the 6th from Deuniapore.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Calcutta*, 21ſt March, 1760.

FROM the accounts I have had from the Commiſſary and Capt. Spears, the monthly expences of this expedition cannot be leſs than 50,000 rupees. You eſtimate wrong in ſuppoſing the force leſs than one-fourth of the Major's. It exceeds his in Europeans, and is on the whole one thouſand; therefore requeſt you will preſs the Nabob, as the ſtate of our treaſury is very low, by our continual current expences, and total ſtop to our Tunkas. Theſe you are to obſerve, are the incident charges of the expedition, excluſive of the pay of the troops. And I once more requeſt you inſiſt on the Nabob's making an immediate remittance, to enable me to ſupport the expedition, or he will lay me under an unavoidable neceſſity of recalling the troops into garriſon. He writes me to order the troops to join him. I have already adviſed him thoſe orders are ſent to Capt. Spears, the moment he receives his ſummons; in contradiction to this, I laſt night received a letter from Mr. Watts, of the 18th at night, informing me that Coſſim Aly Khan had juſt then received orders from the Nabob, to march againſt Subut, and prevent, if poſſible, his advance to Bierboheen. His irreſolution and ſupineneſs, I much fear, will prove his

his deſtruction at laſt, in ſpite of our utmoſt endeavours to ſave him. I ſee it will behove us to think of guarding againſt our being involved in the ſame ruin.

I am from good authority informed, that the Nabob has diſpatched a truſty perſon with an abject petition to the Prince, who was, the 23d of the Moon, at Deingeer; that the perſon and petition is there with him. The purport of the petition runs thus: "*That* on advices reaching him that "the Morattors intended to enter the country by "the way of Patna, he had ſent his ſon and the "Major to oppoſe them; that it never was his "intention to oppoſe his Majeſty's arms, to whom "he was an old profeſſed ſlave; but by the evil "counſels of Rajahram, Narain, his ſon Mhiran, "and the Major, had acted contrary to his inten-"tions and orders; and that if the Prince deſired it, "he was ready to ſurrender himſelf to his pleaſure."

If theſe are his tricks, you will, I doubt not, think with me, it is time we ſhould look to the Company and ourſelves. What makes me the leſs heſitate in my belief of the above, is my knowledge of his ſcheme of ſending Jaffier Cooley Khan on the like errand, before the Colonel went, which he then dropt on a threatening letter from the Colonel, which by his order I dictated to the Moonſhee. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To CAPTAIN SPEARS.

SIR, *Calcutta*, 22d March, 1760.

VARIOUS difficulties intervening, have retarded the march of your reinforcement under Capt. Fiſcher until now; though I think this evening or to-morrow morning will be the lateſt of their

ſtay. The artillery and ſeapoys have been croſſed theſe two days. Capt. Fiſcher will have orders to take the neareſt rout to join you at Burdomaan; but as I have reaſon to think you may by this time be joined by the old Nabob, and are advancing to the ſouthward or ſouth-weſt, you will be careful from time to time to diſpatch advices to Capt. Fiſcher of your intended rout. It would not be amiſs if you report this reinforcement much ſtronger than it is. You have given me no advice of your having received the commiſſion I ſent you, impowering you to hold general court-martials. Agreeably to your requeſt, I have given Mr. Watts permiſſion to pay the recruits the remainder of the bounty-money, if you and he think it abſolutely neceſſary. Dr. Steward is appointed an additional ſurgeon for your command. Notwithſtanding the orders you have already received, ſhould you, upon any unforeſeen emergency, receive orders from Major Caillaud to join him, you are to pay immediate obedience to ſuch orders, or any others you may receive from him, touching the conduct of, or conducting the troops under your command. And here I think it neceſſary to explain to you, that although, as auxiliaries to the Nabob, you are to pay regard touching the deſtination of your troops for the defence of his government; yet ſhould you ſee a probability of your coming to action with any of his enemies, you are, with reſpect to a proper diſpoſition of your troops, to pay no regard to any orders you may receive from him on that head; but in conjunction with your Captains and officers, in a council of war, determine on ſuch diſpoſitions as are moſt likely to give ſucceſs and honour to the arms of your country. If the Nabob and his army join you, you are to take the moſt particular care to have no communication whatever between his troops and yours; to which end you muſt

always

always encamp at proper diſtance from him, and by no means, in the uſual courſe of your march, permit his troops to take the lead, unleſs you judge it neceſſary at any time, that advanced parties of his cavalry ſhould precede your van. You are not only ever to be on your guard againſt a ſurprize from the enemy, but alſo againſt treachery from the Nabob himſelf; for which precaution I have my particular reaſons: but you are likewiſe to have the ſtricteſt guard upon yourſelf, that no ſuſpicions of this kind eſcape you unto any one, unleſs you ſhould have cauſe ſufficient to lay them before a ſelect council of war, conſiſting of your Captains only.

I heartily wiſh you a ſucceſsful campaign, and expect to have as frequent intelligence from you as poſſible. Sir,

Your moſt humble Servant, J. Z. H.

To Mr. HUGH WATTS.

SIR, *Fort William*, 29th March, 1760.

I HAVE before me your favours of the 20th, 21ſt, and 24th inſtant. The Nabob's inconſiſtencies and irreſolution continue very uniform, and will in the end prove his ruin, unleſs he has better luck than he deſerves. By a letter I have juſt received from him, he now ſeems to think the Prince will enter by the way of Bierboheen, and Lecra Koonda, and tells me he intends joining your party ſoon, and will advance that way to oppoſe him. I encloſe you copy of the letter I diſpatched ſome days ago to the Rajah of Bierboheen, and have by Capt. Fiſcher ſent you a ſupply of 15,000 ſunwad rupees.

I have wrote this morning to the Nabob, enjoining him to ſecure ſome advantageous poſt near Burdwan, where he may have it in his option to

fight or not, and with equal facility ſtop the advance of the Prince from Bierboheen, or of Subut from the ſouthward; but by no means to be provoked to fight before the Major joins him. If the Nabob advances beyond the Dummadah, the party of Morattors which fell on your rear, will moſt probably puſh for the city, where their 600 will, in the fears of the people, ſwell to as many thouſands. As to the Subut, I think I can depend on the intelligence I have of his having taken the road from Biſſnapore towards Bydenaut, to join the Prince. I have wrote however to the Nabob, and adviſed him, ſhould he hold his reſolution of marching with our troops to Bierboheen, to take care that he leaves a truſty and capable officer, with as ſtrong a body of cavalry as he can ſpare, at Cutwah, to defend that key to the city; and to the ſame purport I ſhall directly diſpatch a letter to the Roy Royen. I am, Sir,

Your moſt humble Servant, J. Z. H.

To CAPTAIN MACKLEAN.

SIR, *Fort William*, March 30, 1760.

IN conſequence of your addreſs to the Board from Gangam, under date the 7th inſtant, which reached us the 24th, I judged you within a few days march of Calcutta, and diſpatched to you a letter the 26th at night, adviſing you that Major Caillaud, with our forces, were in the field, ſomewhere about the Bierboheen country; and that you ſhould follow all ſuch orders as you might receive from him, whether with reſpect to joining him with your command, or otherwiſe reſpecting the conduct of your march. By a letter received late laſt night from our reſident at Cuttack, I have the pleaſure of knowing you were arrived within half an hour of that city, which makes it needful

I ſhould

I ſhould give you a ſhort ſtate of things, as they are now circumſtanced, for the guidance of your future conduct.—The Shaw Zadda, with a conſiderable army, chiefly horſe and without artillery, is advanced at the back of the hills, with intention to enter this province by the way of the Bierboheen or Patcheet, to ſubvert this government. Subut (whoſe force is lately much increaſed by meeting no oppoſition to the ſouthward) at the head of 5 or 6000 Moratta horſe, is in poſſeſſion of Midnapore, Kirpy, and all that part of the country; and I hear is advancing with the greateſt part of his force from Biſnapore towards Bydenaut, or Bierboheen, to join the Shaw Zadda. Major Caillaud, with the main body of our troops, in conjunction with the young Nabob and his forces, is in purſuit of, and cloſe in the rear of the Shaw Zadda's army. The old Nabob, with the reſt of the forces of the province, are at Boodeegaam, in the road to Bierboheen, to oppoſe the Shaw Zadda in front, whilſt the Major preſſes his rear. A body of 500 Europeans, as many Seapoys, and ſix field-pieces, are under the command of Capt. Spear, near the city of Burdwan, the capital of Burdomaan, and are to march and join the old Nabob; and have, I conclude, by this time joined him. A detachment from Subut, of about 800 horſe, are in the neighbourhood of Burdomaan, with intention to harraſs the rear of Capt. Spear, and retard as much as poſſible the junction of his troops with the old Nabob's. From this diſpoſition of the enemy, it will behove you to advance with the utmoſt care and circumſpection; and as you have only horſe, without artillery to encounter, you need not be apprehenſive of any thing, but a ſurprize or treachery from the part of Subut; againſt which, you muſt be ever on your guard. Our Reſident at Cuttack adviſes me Subut's Dewan

has ſupplied your party with proviſion, &c. This amicable appearance carries ſuſpicion with it; as any aſſiſtance given you from a friendly motive, is, at this juncture, againſt the real deſigns and views of his maſter: therefore be aſſured they are meditating ſome advantage over you, or at leaſt will attempt to bring about a deſertion of your people.

We have already given orders for our reſident, Mr. Rogers, to withdraw himſelf and the Company's effects on your arrival; both him and thoſe you will take with you, and direct your march without loſs of time towards Ballaſore, and from thence to Midnapore; from this laſt mentioned place you will have a fair and open road to Burdamaan. Should you, on good intelligence, find it practicable to make a ſucceſsful attack on Midnapore, and diſpoſſeſs the Morattas, without the loſs of time or riſque of a reduction of your people, you will do an acceptable ſervice to the Nabob; but you are by no means to take this, or any other ſtep that can long retard your march to Burdomaan, where you are to halt until you receive further orders, either from myſelf, Major Caillaud, or Capt. Spear. If you find you have it not in your power (from cauſes unknown to me) to follow implicitly the foregoing inſtructions, you will then proceed according to your own diſcretion, and as the exigencies of your ſituation may require, taking care to give me frequent advice of your intended rout and determinations. I am, Sir,

Your moſt humble Servant, J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Fort William*, 1ſt April, 1760.

I INCLOSE you copy of mine yeſterday, and wait an expreſs anſwer from the Nabob, as I judge Macklean's party marched from Cuttack the

23d;

23d: I will ſuppoſe him advanced this day about Midnapore. The Major's and Spear's command having exhauſted our military camp ſtores, occaſioned many unforeſeen difficulties in the diſpatch of the reinforcement under Captain Fiſcher, who will encamp at Niah Serai, I judge, this afternoon. As I received an alarm from Captain Spear, that the Shaw Zadda was within two or three days march of the Nabob, I ſent poſitive orders yeſterday to Captain Fiſcher, to make forced marches, with his cannon and ammunition only, to join him, and to leave his ſpare ſtores, tents, &c. to follow him; for the ſecurity of which, I have this day diſpatched twenty Europeans and twenty Seapoys more to join the eſcort; with orders to follow Fiſcher's rout, with the utmoſt expedition. The advance for this expedition muſt be ſent directly here, as I have ſupplied the Commiſſary and Paymaſter largely, and we much want caſh for our current expences. I am, Sir,

Your moſt humble Servant, J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Fort William*, April 5th, 1760.

I HAVE the pleaſure of receiving yours of the 27th ult. from Oparabaund, and by advices from Mr. Haſtings, of the 2d inſtant, may venture now to congratulate your having ſome reſt from your labours, which I am ſure have been ſevere enough. Your junction with the old Nabob and Captain Spear's command, will, I imagine, determine the Prince's retreat to the ſouthward, as it muſt extinguiſh the hopes he may have cheriſhed of acting offenſively in this province; and as I judge by the time this reaches you, you will have ſettled the future operations of this campaign, I requeſt you will favour me with the reſult of your

Council, as ſoon as you conveniently can, and point out in what manner we can promote them from hence. I am, with perfect regard, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

The eight preceding letters are recited in confirmation of ſome parts of our Memorial, and introductory and explanatory of others, and withal to give you a general idea of the campaign of 1760.

To the Hon. JOHN Z. HOLWELL, *Eſq; Preſident and Governor of* FORT WILLIAM.

SIR, *Camp at Burpore*, 6th April, 1760.

MY laſt was dated the 24th Inſt. Yeſterday we marched about five corſe, and this day three; which brought us ſo near the enemy as to expect they would come and give us battle; but finding about noon they did not advance, I deſired the Nabob to march on towards them, but he ſaid the day was too far ſpent, and his people too much fatigued. The Prince is encamped near the Damoudah river, about three corſe from us, and I hope to-morrow we ſhall bring him to an engagement. The Maharattas are encamped very near him. I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf, with the moſt perfect reſpect and eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

J. C.

To the Hon. JOHN Z. HOLWELL, *Eſq; Preſident, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at* FORT WILLIAM.

Camp at Belgaſs, April 8th, 1760.

Hon. Sir and Sirs,

MY laſt to the Preſident was dated the 6th Inſt. in which I informed him of my hopes of coming next day to an engagement with the enemy, who

who were encamped on the other ſide of the river Damoudah; and we ſhould have ſucceeded according to my wiſh, could I have perſuaded the Nabob to croſs the river, or ſend over a large body of horſe to keep them in play, until we ſhould get up with them. But to neither of theſe would he conſent, and all we could do was to get near enough to their rear to cannonade them. This they did not ſtand long, but ſoon got out of our reach, and purſued their march towards Biſnapoore, and, by the intelligence we received laſt night, are encamped ſeven corſe from us. Thus all hopes of bringing them to another engagement, this campaign, is now over. We have loſt the only opportunity we had, nor indeed can we expect much to improve opportunities, while we have to do with men, who are as ignorant as obſtinate, and whoſe troops are under no order or command. I have the honour to be, with the moſt perfect reſpect and eſteem, Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

J. C.

To the Honourable J. Z. HOLWELL, *Eſq*;

SIR, April 10th, 1760.

THE Shaw Zadda was within three corſe of us this morning, but having early intelligence of our approach, has repaſſed the river Damoudah, and I ſuppoſe by this time is far enough from our reach.

I muſt frankly own, the motives of the Prince's preſent actions are quite a myſtery to me; and as I cannot form the leaſt probable judgment of them myſelf, I will not even pretend to conjecture what may be the event of them. Both the Nabob and him ſeem equally to avoid fighting, and there is no knowing in what manner to proceed, or what

plan

plan previouſly to determine on, while the Nabob continues to act ſo irreſolutely, and while his puſillanimity prevents his exerting himſelf as he ſhould do, on the faireſt occaſions which can offer. I have the honour to be, with the moſt perfect reſpect and eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

J. C.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Fort William*, 7th April, 1760.

I AM now forced to touch upon a ſubject, which appears to me to require our greateſt attention. Some days ago I wrote to Mr. Haſtings, concerning an information which was given me, that the old Nabob had ſent a truſty perſon with a ſubmiſſive Arzgee to the Shaw Zadda, in which he exculpated himſelf, by throwing the whole blame of the oppoſition made to his arms, on the machinations of the Engliſh. Mr. Haſtings, in his letter in anſwer to mine, ſeemed to think it impoſſible ſuch a ſtep could have been taken by the Nabob, or indeed that he could have ſent any Arzgee at all: however, in a ſubſequent letter from him, of the 27th, he finds out that an Arzgee was ſent, though different in purport to that I informed him of. As I thought it moſt eſſential to us, to trace, if poſſible, the truth, I employed an emiſſary to Comgaar Khan, the conſequence of which has been a Phirmaund from the Shaw Zadda, incloſing copy of the old Nabob's Arzgee to him, with an apology for not ſending the original. A copy of the copy I ſend you incloſed, and requeſt your ſentiments, how and in what light this appears to you. If the copy is authentic, the caſe is plain, that this man for whom we have drawn the ſword, would not ſcruple, if driven to any extremity, to make

his

his peace by the ſacrifice of his protectors. The Phirmaund, I ſuppoſe, differs little in matter from that he ſent you; he reminds me of the obligations the Engliſh lay under to his anceſtors, and offers a carte blanche for the Company, provided we will draw our forces off from *that doer of evil*, and join them to his ſtandard; which, he adviſes me, he has at preſent fixed at Seegur, and in a few days after purpoſes to erect it in Morſhadabad, &c.

I incloſe you a copy of a letter, ſent the old Nabob by the Colonel, which I dictated to the Moonſhee, by his order, a few days before his departure for Europe, on being informed the Nabob intended ſending a meſſenger and petition to the Prince.

Whether this is a real copy or not, I will not ſay; though I firmly believe it true; that an Arzgee has been ſent is allowed; and if it contained not matter detracting and injurious to us, why was it ſent without being communicated to you by Mhiran, or to Haſtings by the Nabob?

I am, Sir, your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq*;

SIR, *Fort William*, April 9th, 1760.

LAST night I received your favour of the 4th, from Mungul Koot. I think, from your mutual advance to each other, you muſt have, before this, obliged the Prince to make ſome deciſive motion. I muſt confeſs I have no idea that he will ſtand a battle with you, and yet believe that he harbours ſome hopes of a general defection of the Nabob's troops, though at the ſame time he deceives himſelf, if he imagines even this could be of any real ſervice to him; if he fights, it is from the melancholy reflection of this being his *ne plus ultra*; and that if he does not now make a puſh, he will be deſerted by Comgaar Khan and the reſt

of

of his followers, and be without any reaſonable hopes of having any powers whatever to join and follow his future fortunes.

In mine of the 3d and 5th, I incloſed you copies of my inſtructions to Captain McLean; as he is adviſed of the ſituation of the enemy, I conceive he will naturally bend his march towards Injilee, and advance towards us as far Eaſt as he can, and keep the courſe of the river.

I confeſs myſelf ſomething impatient to have your ſentiments on mine of the 7th. I have returned no anſwer to the Prince's Phirmaund, but have replied to Comgaar Khan's letter, and intimated to him, that I can put no faith in copies; but that if he will ſend to me the Subah's original Arzgee, I ſhall then be able to form a judgment. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Fort William*, April 15, 1760.

I MOST heartily pity the embarraſſed ſituation you muſt neceſſarily be in, with people who manifeſt themſelves unworthy that government they have uſurped. I muſt confeſs, the Nabob's whole conduct appears to me much more myſterious than that of the Prince; circumſtanced as he is, he muſt plan various ſchemes, and from the nature of things, his councils muſt be attended with much confuſion and irreſolution. The Nabob's backwardneſs to engage him appears to me abſolutely unaccountable, unleſs it ariſes from ſome ſecret negotiations, which it is poſſible he may be carrying on with the Prince, to make his own peace at the expence of his friends. I ſhould not think myſelf juſtified in this conjecture, nor have

given

given credit ſo readily to the petition ſent by him to the Prince, (copy of which I ſent you on the 7th) did I not know him capable of any thing ever ſo unworthy and treacherous. By letters from Mr. Amyatt, I learn Abdallah has gained another victory over the Vizier and his friends the Morattors, and that the Vizier and the young king Shaw Jehawan have ſheltered themſelves with the Jauts: this intelligence has, I doubt not, reached the Nabob, whoſe weak and cowardly imagination probably ſuggeſts ſome turn from that victory in favour of the Prince, and therefore thinks it neceſſary to temporiſe. Theſe are ſurmiſes of my own, and poſſibly may have no foundation; they call, however, for ſome attention. The parts acted by both the old and young Nabob, in the recent conteſt with the Dutch, ought ever to awaken our apprehenſions, and urge our being on our guard againſt the politics of an Indoſtan Durbar; the more eſpecially, as we ſee the party round the Nabob, who we know would cut our throats if they could, obtain every day more power and influence over his councils; men, who being raiſed as he himſelf was, from the dirt, can never vary the complexion of their groveling genius. Diſpoſitions, ſuch as you, Sir, have now (unhappily) to deal with, can only be worked on by the moſt peremptory dictates. The Nabob muſt be urged (I intended to ſay forced) to ſomething deciſive, or in a ſhort time his country will be worth nothing to himſelf or any body elſe. I hitherto avoided writing to him on his late unaccountable and provoking conduct. My wiſh and intention is, that you ſhould have every weight your preſent poſt and ſituation requires; your ſway and influence over the Nabob is, at this juncture, of the utmoſt importance to the Company's affairs; and it is your own fault if you are not inveſted with ſuch authority as yourſelf

ſelf can wiſh. I therefore requeſt you will, without reſerve, point out to me, if any additional power or inſtructions to you, to act independently of the Nabob, (which we, as a Committee or Board, can inveſt you with) will conduce to the good of the ſervice, and be a means of enforcing your ſalutary councils to the Nabob, and it ſhall be forthwith tranſmitted to you.

I am, Sir, your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Hon. J. Z. HOLWELL, *Eſq; Preſident and Governor of* FORT WILLIAM.

SIR, *Camp at Dignagur*, April 15, 1760.

IN order to come at the truth, with regard to the Nabob's Arzgee to the Prince, Mr. Haſtings had recourſe to the Nabob's Perſian writer; a man who hath, on many occaſions, given him proofs of attachment and fidelity. The moment he ſet his eyes on the paper, he declared it to be a forgery. May I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Haſtings for the reaſons he gave for it; as that Gentleman's knowledge in the language will enable him to give you a clearer idea of theſe diſtinctions in addreſs and ſtile of their letters, than I can pretend to. For my part, I own after Mr. Haſtings had repeated them to me, they were ſo ſatisfactory as to convince me the probability of its being a forgery was greatly in the Nabob's favour.

Two days before I received your letter, Sir, the Nabob and his ſon were with me, and I found the old man big with ſomething that he did not know well how to begin breaking to me. I helped him forward all I could by thoſe kind of aſſurances which often open the hearts of men; and he then told me he had wrote to the Prince, and had received an anſwer, ſuch a one as gave him hopes,

with

with other circumſtances, that the Prince might be inclinable to treat and put himſelf perhaps in his power; but that he knew he (the Prince) would not do this, without I would be ſecurity for his ſafety. The Nabob was deſirous to know, in ſuch a caſe, how I would act; but the main drift of the diſcourſe was, to find out how far I would be conſenting to give him an opportunity of diſplaying the true eaſtern ſyſtem of politics, by cutting him off. You may eaſily, Sir, gueſs my anſwer, that I was ready to do every thing for his ſervice conſiſtent with the honour of my country, and the ſacred regard we gave to our word; and beſides, if the Prince made any addreſs to me on this ſubject of ſecurity, I muſt firſt have your orders and inſtructions in this affair. And thus the converſation ended.

I made it my buſineſs afterwards to enquire among ſome of the Nabob's people, on what grounds he founded theſe hopes of getting the Prince in his power? but they all aſſured me, as I ſuſpected, that they were no more than the idle reports of ſome of his minions, who knew ſuch ſtories would be well received and credited, and ſo found advantage in flattering his fooliſh hopes.

It is a very unfortunate circumſtance that we have to do with a weak man, who neither from principle nor merit deſerves the dignity of the ſtation in which we have put him, and in which he would not remain twenty-four hours, if we were to withdraw our protection from him, and on which he ſo much depends, that I am obliged to give him a guard of Seapoys for the ſafety of his perſon. It doth not appear to me, however, in juſtice or in reaſon, that we ought to ſupport him in the purſuit of unjuſtifiable meaſures; ſuch as he follows in regard to not diſcharging the vaſt arrears due to his troops, who to a man have publickly

declared, they will not draw their ſwords in his cauſe, and that only their fears of us prevent their uſing them againſt him. The conſequence will be, as to his part, that while he is not afraid of his head he never will ſatisfy them; and to us, that though we may protect him from immediate danger to his perſon, we muſt relinquiſh the hopes of ſeeing the country free from troubles, while he keeps a body of troops that he will not pay regularly, and over whom he conſequently hath no command. This rotten ſyſtem ſtill we might in ſome meaſure ſupport, were we always aſſured none but the country powers would diſturb us: but it is more than probable that the French or Dutch, if not both, may ſome time or other renew their attempts to be concerned, and with how much the more probability of ſucceſs from the diſtracted ſtate of the country while the Nabob continues to govern it ſo ill.

The firſt opportunity I propoſe repreſenting all this to him in the ſtrongeſt light I poſſibly can; and ſhould our opinions agree, I ſhall take it as a favour if you would incloſe a letter from yourſelf to him, on the ſubject; I will deliver it, and take that opportunity as the beſt to try what can be done by working on his fears, the only way indeed I am convinced of managing him to our own advantage and his good. In particular, Sir, you will be pleaſed to enforce the payment of his troops, by hinting, that if he delays it, I have your orders not to prevent them taking their own meaſures.

To-morrow Captain Knox's detachment marches. The Prince is certainly gone back, and we talk of nothing but the pleaſures of the great Rumnah firſt, and then of an expedition againſt the Purnea Nabob to conclude the campaign. As this laſt ſtep is abſolutely neceſſary, I ſhall do all in my power

to prevent the former obſtructing it; with what ſucceſs, we ſhall ſoon know. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

J. C.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Calcutta*, 22d April, 1760.

I HAVE the pleaſure of your two favours of the 15th and 17th, and muſt take a farther day to reply to them more circumſtantially. For the preſent, I encloſe you a Letter to the old Nabob to the purport of your requeſt, and with it a copy for your peruſal, and I hope approval. It contains, I think, nothing but what ſhould at all events be urged to him at this juncture. Something muſt be done, and ſoon, to recover the currency of the trade of the provinces, or the Company muſt be loſt; the ſale of their woollen goods, copper, &c. exports is totally obſtructed; their inveſtments in conſequence of this, and the unavoidable ſtoppage of the Tunkas wholly at a ſtand, and not more than a Lack and half in the treaſury: Particulars you ſhould be neceſſarily acquainted with, as they ariſe from the perpetual troubles of the country, perpetuated, I may ſay, by the wickedneſs as well as weakneſs of thoſe who govern it.

To give you what are ſtill my ſentiments on the Nabob's Arzdaſht to the Prince, and my reaſons for thoſe ſentiments, I now encloſe you a copy of my reply to Mr. Haſtings on that head; and think my judgment of this affair more confirmed from the circumſtance recited in your favour of the 15th, to wit, the Nabob's having acknowledged to you his writing to the Prince, and that his replies gave him hopes he was inclined to treat. The carrying on this concealed correſpondence with the Prince I cannot look on in any other light than as the higheſt infringement of that reſpect and deference due to

your ſtation, and the treaty ſubſiſting between us. And here it becomes needful, Sir, to remark, it is full time the Nabob ſhould be convinced he ſhould not look on you as an officer ſent implicitly to ſubmit to his orders or ſentiments, but as his co-adjutor and protector in the war. And ſhould, at any time, his wretched politics dictate meaſures, which appear in your opinion deſtructive of the general end propoſed, I hope, and doubt not, but you will think yourſelf fully authoriſed peremptorily to over-rule them, without loſing time in application here, as I am very well ſatisfied we may depend on the propriety of your conduct in the command you are inveſted with. I have the honour to be, with very real eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

This letter affords you a genuine picture of the diſtreſſed ſtate of your affairs at this period.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Fort William*, 20th April, 1760.

I HAVE your favours of the 13th and 14th, accompanied by your tranſlation of the Suba's Arzdaſht to the Prince, and your ſentiments thereon. Though I confeſs your reaſoning and concluſions in favour of the Subah's innocence, carry probability with it, they appear not to me convincing, nor ſquare with my mode of thinking on this ſubject, for the following reaſons: That the Nabob's Moonſhee ſhould, on the inſtant, pronounce it a forgery, amounts to no proof of its being ſo; that the Nabob had ſent ſuch an Arzdaſht to the Prince, and that it was encloſed by the latter to me, was the diſcourſe of the Buzar, two or three days before it reached me. If you remember, I hinted in a former the intimation I had received of it; ſo

that

that I may juſtly ſuppoſe the Moonſhee was well prepared againſt a ſurprize, and conſequently ready to diſavow it and pronounce it a forgery; which he ſeems by your letter to have done, even before he gave it a peruſal. The variation of its diction, and deviation from the uſual form of the Nabob's addreſſes, appear to me equally inconcluſive, as it is not at all improbable theſe might be done with deſign to plead and invalidate, in caſe of its coming to our knowledge. Whether this Arzdaſht was ſent by the Nabob or not, it is impoſſible to ſay with any preciſion; but this I am clear in, that it contains the very dictates of the hearts of the minions about him, and of courſe his own; and the very pleas he would have made uſe of in his juſtification, if ſucceſs and victory had attended the Prince. Theſe ſtriking conſiderations, joined to the whole tenor of his conduct reſpecting the Dutch, &c. joined to his holding any correſpondence at all with the Prince without our knowledge and approval, leaves my judgment of this in the ſame ſtate it was; though, at the ſame time, I ſee it muſt reſt here for want of more ſufficient proof. I am, Sir, your moſt humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq*;

SIR, *Fort William*, 24th April, 1760.

I LONG much to have your ſentiments on the ſubject of mine of the 22d and yeſterday. I have juſt now had the pleaſure of yours of the 20th from Goperra, and think it neceſſary to adviſe you I laſt night received a letter from the old Nabob, chiefly to requeſt that I would order Captain Macklean and half his troops to be entered in his ſervice and pay: A requeſt which can with no propriety whatever be complied with (in which opinion I

dare ſay I ſhall meet your concurrence.) To this effect I now write him, and encloſe you copy of my letter, that you be upon your guard when he touches you on that ſubject, which I ſuppoſe he will.

I think I have already intimated to you, I made no reply to the Phirmaund ſent me from the Prince, but that I anſwered Comgaar Khan's; the contents of my letter to him were literally this, "That I had received the Phirmaund, and pitied "the Prince's unhappy ſituation and misfortunes "of his royal houſe; that he (Comgaar Khan) "was no ſtranger to the tyes and obligations "which bound us to ſupport Mhir Jaffier Aly "Khan and his government; that copies amounted "to no proof, but that if his original Arzdaſht "was ſent me by the Prince, I ſhould then know "what judgment to form of it." With this anſwer I diſpatched the Prince's meſſenger, and the ſame time ſent two of my own Harkara's to return with an anſwer, in caſe the Prince thought proper to give me one. On the 16th they were returned to me with a ſecond Phirmaund from him, and a reply from Comgaar Khan, as alſo two letters from him; one for Rajaram Harkara, and the other from Nund-comar. In the diſtrict of Seergur, the Harkaras were ſeized, ſtripped, kept prioners 24 hours, plunder'd of the Phirmaund and letters, and then diſmiſſed. I have taken every means poſſible for the recovery of the papers, but fear I ſhall fail in it, which gives me no ſmall vexation, as I am almoſt convinced they contained the original Arzdaſht, with poſſibly ſome other pieces of the Nabob's concealed correſpondence with him. The Harkaras left the Shaw Zadda at Gorrea Hottea, his troops much diſtreſſed for proviſions, &c. He was then halting for Subut, whom he left at Jamgam with 3000 Moratta horſe, and had the day my people came away received an expreſs from

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the north-weſt from ſome Rajahs who were advancing with troops to join him, and who preſſed the Shaw Zadda's ſpeedy advance towards Patna, on which the Prince ſent a meſſenger expreſs to haſten Subut. On the other hand, it is conjectured, that the Prince's march to Bahaar is a feint only; that his intention is to lie perdue amongſt the hills, and as ſoon as the combined troops are advanced to the northward, return ſuddenly into this province and ſurprize the city; and that in this caſe, the Dutch will declare for him, and join him. This ſyſtem I would certainly adopt, was I the Shaw Zadda—however, on the whole, you will be better able to judge of theſe matters than I can at preſent.

I am, with perfect eſteem, Sir,

Your humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

You have now before you all that has been ſaid on the ſubject of the Suba's concealed Arzdaſht, to the Prince, upon which you will form your own judgment. True, we have been robbed (literally ſo) of abſolute proofs in this charge———but if the ſtrongeſt preſumptive ones, ſupported by a thouſand corroborating evidences in the Suba's conduct, have any weight, our proof is ſufficient to claim belief:———the intermediate letters from our laſt remark but one, ſpeak for themſelves, and fully prove the cowardice, or treachery, or rather both, at the river Dummodur.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Calcutta*, April 25, 1760.

I HAVE your favour of the 20th, on the ſubject of the Nabob's having a conſiderable part of our troops in his pay, ſervice, and conſtant attendance on his perſon: three days paſt, I received

a letter from him on the ſubject, to which I yeſterday incloſed my anſwer, in a letter to Major Caillaud, with a copy of mine to the Nabob, for his peruſal. To our complying with this requeſt of the Nabob, I think there are ſtrong and manifeſt objections; the moſt important of which is, that ſuch a ſtep will, I am convinced, lay the foundation of his independence. The 22d, I wrote a long letter to the Nabob, touching the payment of his troops, and neceſſity for his diſbanding his rabble of Burcundaſſes, and the greateſt part of his uſeleſs cavalry: the letter I incloſed to the Major, with a copy of it; confer with him as ſoon as you can, and requeſt he will communicate to you the purport of thoſe letters.—Two reaſons can only be urged in favour of the requeſt now made by the Nabob; the reducing his immenſe expences, and at the ſame time thoſe of the Company, by ſuch a reduction of troops now in their pay: to accompliſh the firſt, complying with his requeſt is needleſs, becauſe, though the troops continue in our pay and dependence on us, yet they will be always at his call and ſervice;—and when this campaign is ended, we can, with much propriety, eaſe the Company by a reduction of the Seapoys to 2000 picked men, which Colonel Clive had determined, if he had ſtaid. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Calcutta*, May 2d, 1760.

YOUR favour from Maraud-Baag, of the 28th ult. I had the pleaſure of receiving late laſt night, and find the ſituation of things between the two Nabobs juſt as I ſurmiſed.—Having occaſion to reply to a letter of the young Nabob's, I take

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the opportunity to urge the neceſſity of his remaining in the city, but touch the ſubject in ſuch a way, as to carry the appearance of the higheſt compliment to his proweſs. That one of them ſhould keep the city is abſolutely neceſſary, and a ſecurity to them both, as well as the province. I know but of one way to keep them ſteady, with reſpect to the operations of this campaign, and that a very ſhort one: when the meaſures determined on are in your judgment abſolutely needful and proper, juſt ſignify to them, that if they are not immediately carried into execution, you will march to Calcutta, and leave them to fight their own battles, and purſue their own councils: I will engage you have no further trouble with them; —and I dare ſay, Sir, you are by this time convinced, that had they been treated in this way, on the defeat of the Shaw Zadda, above, and in the fortunate conjunction of attacking and deſtroying him ſo lately loſt (in both which your judicious reſolutions and advice were over-ruled) there had been a happy end to the troubles of the country.

That part of my letter to the Nabob you object to, has been wrong tranſlated and explained to you; the utmoſt I intimated on that head was, "That as the ſeaſon was ſo far advanced, one "moment of it was not to be ſpent unprofitably." —By which I intended to prevent the Nabob's idling his time away in the pleaſures of the Rumna and the city, of which you yourſelf ſeemed apprehenſive.

I am, with ſincere eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Calcutta*, May 5, 1760.

I TAKE this juncture of complying with a recommendation left me by Colonel Clive, in favour of Coſſim Aly Khan, and have wrote the Nabob on the ſubject; copy I incloſe for your peruſal.—I have, I think, with good reaſon, many doubts touching the integrity, as well as capacity, in theſe times, of Rajah Ramnarain, and every principal perſon under him, and am ſure the Nabob ſhould change hands there. If your ſentiments do not run counter to mine in this particular, I ſhall receive as a favour, your intereſting yourſelf in behalf of Coſſim Aly Khan.

I am ever, with ſincere eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Calcutta*, May 6, 1760.

I HAVE already intimated to you the very low ebb of the Company's treaſury; their whole inveſtments at the Arungs are at a ſtand; and without conſiderable ſupplies, we ſhall not in one month more have ſufficient for even the current expences of the Factory.—We were yeſterday under the neceſſity of recommending to the Gentlemen of Coſſimbuzar, their endeavouring to take up the money there on the Company's account, for the uſe of the ſilk inveſtments; as alſo to the Gentlemen at Ducca, to the ſame purpoſe, for the carrying on their inveſtment. Theſe conſiderations will, I doubt not, be ſufficient to awaken your attention, reſpecting the expences of the parties under Spears and Fiſcher, on account not a

Rupee

Rupee has yet been remitted to us. Therefore I am obliged to preſs your obtaining at leaſt one lack of Rupees on this account, and that you will ſend it down with the utmoſt expedition: ſhould it exceed the ſums diſburſed, which I am ſure it will not, the Nabob ſhall be duly credited for it. Suffering him thus to run in arrears, in this article of field expences, is the very worſt ſyſtem of politics we can adopt; and an effectual ſtop muſt in future be put to it, by inſiſting on an advance before our troops leave the garriſon. Without this precaution, the Company muſt ſuffer great diſtreſs and difficulties in the conducting their mercantile affairs, as we find ſo little dependance on the punctuality of the Nabob's re-imburſing us. I wrote you very preſſingly on this ſubject the 23d ult. of which you have hitherto taken no notice. The repayment of the 200,000 Rupees lent the Nabob by Mr. Manningham, on the Company's account, muſt be demanded in the moſt urgent terms; and if you think it is not in his power to advance that ſum, a freſh Tunka on the Kiſtnagur Country muſt abſolutely be inſiſted on---I mention this country in preference, becauſe the remaining ballances to be collected from it are now but ſmall.

We have the greateſt reaſon to complain of the Nabob's injurious behaviour, reſpecting his obſtructing the collection of our Tunkas, both in the Burdowan and Kiſtnagur Countries: from whence I am informed, by Meſſ. Watts and Howit, that his people are, by every oppreſſive meaſure, extorting that money which ſhould pay our Kiſtebundees. I have wrote the Nabob and the Roy Royen warmly on the ſubject, and I requeſt you remonſtrate againſt it in the ſtrongeſt manner.—And that you ſignify to the former, without the leaſt reſerve, that I abſolutely will not ſuffer a ſingle Rupee to be carried out of thoſe countries, whilſt we have any the leaſt

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Rupee

Rupee has yet been remitted to us. Therefore I am obliged to preſs your obtaining at leaſt one lack of Rupees on this account, and that you will ſend it down with the utmoſt expedition: ſhould it exceed the ſums diſburſed, which I am ſure it will not, the Nabob ſhall be duly credited for it. Suffering him thus to run in arrears, in this article of field expences, is the very worſt ſyſtem of politics we can adopt; and an effectual ſtop muſt in future be put to it, by inſiſting on an advance before our troops leave the garriſon. Without this precaution, the Company muſt ſuffer great diſtreſs and difficulties in the conducting their mercantile affairs, as we find ſo little dependance on the punctuality of the Nabob's re-imburſing us. I wrote you very preſſingly on this ſubject the 23d ult. of which you have hitherto taken no notice. The repayment of the 200,000 Rupees lent the Nabob by Mr. Manningham, on the Company's account, muſt be demanded in the moſt urgent terms; and if you think it is not in his power to advance that ſum, a freſh Tunka on the Kiſtnagur Country muſt abſolutely be inſiſted on---I mention this country in preference, becauſe the remaining ballances to be collected from it are now but ſmall.

We have the greateſt reaſon to complain of the Nabob's injurious behaviour, reſpecting his obſtructing the collection of our Tunkas, both in the Burdowan and Kiſtnagur Countries: from whence I am informed, by Meſſ. Watts and Howit, that his people are, by every oppreſſive meaſure, extorting that money which ſhould pay our Kiſtebundees. I have wrote the Nabob and the Roy Royen warmly on the ſubject, and I requeſt you remonſtrate againſt it in the ſtrongeſt manner.—And that you ſignify to the former, without the leaſt reſerve, that I abſolutely will not ſuffer a ſingle Rupee to be carried out of thoſe countries, whilſt we have any the leaſt

claim

claim upon them. And demand likewiſe, that he immediately order his people to withdraw from thence, or I will, without any ceremony, drive them out.

The neceſſity of the Company's affairs is ſuch, that I have been obliged to apply to the Seats for a loan of 10 or 15 Lack, which they, under various pretences, have refuſed: I judged their own ſecurity, as well as an opportunity of obliging the Company, would have influenced their ready compliance; but herein I judged ill. However, I doubt not but an occaſion may offer, for manifeſting a proper reſentment to that houſe for this refuſal.

I requeſt your ſpeedy reply to this, and am, as ever, moſt truly, Sir,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq;*

SIR, *Calcutta*, May 8, 1760.

MY laſt were under dates the 2d and 5th inſtant. In the former I incloſed, for your peruſal, tranſlation of a private letter from Mr. Biſdom, with copy of my anſwer. I now forward to you, tranſlate of his replication. After you have conſidered them, I requeſt you will favour me in returning them.

What weight or dependance can be laid on the ſentiments or aſſertions contained in thoſe letters from the direction of Chinſura, you will be as capable of judging as I am; and I ſhould be extremely glad of your thoughts on this ſubject: — for my own part, it appears to me, that the Nabob, with reſpect to the Dutch, is in a purſuit very wide of the road we have pointed out to him; and in which we ought not, nor can, from any juſtifiable cauſe, countenance him. That they ſhould be ſo far diſ-

armed of any means or power of raiſing diſturbances in the country becomes abſolutely neceſſary, both for his ſecurity and our own:—but beyond this, that we ſhould ſuffer his extorting ſums of money from them (which can anſwer no uſeful purpoſe to us, but on the contrary, reflect diſhonour on the power and influence we are ſuppoſed to have over him) is a meaſure which I really think will not give credit to our name or arms; and which we cannot too ſoon diſclaim and object to. In theſe ſentiments, I dare ſay, I have your private concurrence; and I muſt confeſs, I ſee no public motive which can fully vindicate our even winking at any oppreſſive or iniquitous deſigns, levelled againſt theſe or any other individuals under his government; becauſe, whatever odium may fall on him, the world will beſtow, and that juſtly, a large proportion on us, as knowing he dare not meditate practices of this kind, but under the ſanction of the alliance between us: let us, therefore, for our own ſakes, and to preſerve as much as we can the peace of the country, inſiſt on the execution of the plan laid down to him; but oppoſe that meaſure which the Nabobs, in place thereof, ſeem to have only in view, the plundering their poſſeſſions; and by this laudable oppoſition evince them and the world, it is not our wiſh or aim to injure them in their trade, rights, or properties; but to diveſt them only of that power which they ſo lately, tho' impotently, employed to the ſubverſion of ours.

I am, as ever, with much eſteem, Sir,
Your obedient humble ſervant,
J. Z. H.

P. S. To what I have before urged, I may add the driving the Dutch to a deſperate extremity, by laying ſuch heavy and exorbitant demands on them, which they cannot in nature comply with, will anſwer

ſwer no end, at leaſt no good one; for they will have no reſource left, but joining, at all events, the Nabob's enemies with the whole force they can collect together.—I have wrote the Nabob on this ſubject; copy of the letter I incloſe you, and forward another to Mr. Haſtings, by theſe Coſſids.

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Calcutta*, June 13, 1760.

BY expreſs yeſterday from Dacca we have advice, that the Suba has taken off Allyverdee and Shaw Amet Khan's Begums.——He ſent a Jammaut-daar and 100 horſe, with orders to Jeſſeraut Khan to carry this bloody ſcheme into execution, with ſeparate orders to the Jemmaut-daar, in caſe Jeſſeraut Khan refuſed obedience: he refuſed acting any part in the tragedy, and left it to the other; who carried them out by night about two miles above the city in a boat, tied weights to their legs, and threw them over-board: they ſtruggled for ſome time, and held by the gunwall of the boat, but by ſtrokes on their heads with Latties, and cutting of their hands, they ſunk.—Theſe are the acts of the Tyger we are ſupporting and fighting for. I am,

Your obedient humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

To the Hon. JOHN ZEPH. HOLWELL, *Eſq*;

SIR, *Maraud-baag*, June 21, 1760.

THE relation tranſmitted to me in your letter of the 13th, of the murder of the two Begums, filled me with horror and aſtoniſhment; but how were thoſe ſenſations increaſed, when upon inquiry I was told, that not only the two wretched ſufferers

ſufferers above-mentioned, but the whole family, to the number of nine perſons, had undergone the ſame fate. I will not mention their names, till I have undoubted proofs of the truth of my intelligence, which I wiſh (though I cannot expect it) I may find not ſo bad at laſt as it has been repreſented to me.—How this circumſtance eſcaped my knowledge, I know not. It was not indeed an event to be learned from inquiry, and poſſibly the infamy of the fact might have made my friends, who were in the ſecret, neglect to ſpeak to me upon a ſubject which, from our particular connections with the Nabob, and his intire dependence on our power, could not but reflect diſhonour upon the Engliſh name. I have hitherto been generally an advocate for the Nabob, whoſe extortions and oppreſſions I imputed to the neceſſity of the times, and want of œconomy in his revenues;—but, if this charge againſt him be true, no argument can excuſe or palliate ſo atrocious and complicated a villainy, nor (forgive me, Sir, if I add) our ſupporting ſuch a tyrant.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your moſt obedient, moſt faithful ſervant,

WARREN HASTINGS.

The advices ſent from Dacca touching theſe murders, were diſpatched immediately after the firſt rumour of the deed; and from thence, as uſual, imperfect: ſubſequent advices brought the true ſtate of that execution, as follows:

Goſſeta Begum, widow of Shaw Amet Jung;
Emna Begum, mother to the Nabob Surajud Dowla, and widow to Geynde Amet Khan;
Morad Dowla, the ſon of Patſha Kooly Khan; adopted by the Shaw Amet Jung;
Lutſen Neſſa Begum, widow of Surajud Dowla;

Her

Her infant daughters by Nabob Surajud Dowla.

Theſe unhappy ſufferers periſhed all in one night at Dacca, in the manner before-recited, with about twenty of their women of inferior note.——It was ſaid Alleverdy Khan's Begum by ſome means eſcaped this maſſacre of her whole family.

A conceived though groundleſs jealouſy of Morad Dowla's making his eſcape from his confinement in Dacca, was the cauſe of this infernal carnage.

In the liſt of the Subah's aſſaſſination given in the Memorial, theſe were omitted:

Abdel Ohab Khan, way-laid and murdered by the Subah's order, on the Ramna, on pretence of a conſpiracy, in March 1760.

Yar Mahomet, a favourite of Surajah Dowla, aſſaſſinated in preſence of Mhiran, April 1760.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Fort William*, May 8, 1760.

YOUR favour of the 3d I received only yeſterday; and, out of the fulneſs of my heart, I wrote to you the 6th, on the obvious near approach of the unſurmountable difficulties I ſhall have to encounter, in conducting the Company's buſineſs for the current year.——The apology you make for the Seats, and they for themſelves, we muſt ſubmit to; but though they may hold good reſpecting the large loan I requeſted of them, yet had they been inclined to have ſhewn a readineſs to oblige the Company, they would at leaſt have made a tender to me of ſuch a ſum as they could have ſpared with convenience to themſelves. One reaſon they alledge to me for their refuſal is, their having refuſed the Nabob, which I now find had

not

not a word of truth in it. Had they complied with my requeſt, it would have armed them with the beſt reaſon they could have urged for not complying with his demand; and it would have been incumbent on us to ſcreen and protect them from any violence intended againſt them.——A time may come, when they may ſtand in need of the Company's protection, in which caſe they may be aſſured they ſhall be left to Satan to be buffeted.

I obſerve what you ſay, reſpecting your having advanced the 25,000 Siccas to Capt. Fiſcher, for the payment of his ſeparate detachment.——The troops muſt be paid beyond doubt, but if we are immediately laid under the neceſſity of again diſburſing the ſums we receive from the Nabob on his account, where will be the end of our expences? and how are the Company to be re-imburſed at laſt, if he is ſuffered thus to be in arrears to us? A ſtop muſt be abſolutely put to this ſyſtem, and ſoon: I therefore requeſt you will communicate this, and my laſt letter to you on this ſubject, to the Major; and that ſome effectual means may be directly adopted, to free us from this tax, ſo greatly detrimental at preſent to our affairs. If time is given to the Nabob until the campaign is cloſed, I know the inſuperable trouble we ſhall have in recovering a rupee from him. If ſomething is not done ſatisfactory to us, I ſhall be under the neceſſity of laying a repreſentation before the Board, who are, I know, very well inclined to come to reſolutions which will be moſt ungracious to the Nabob in his preſent ſituation.

Requeſt the Major will communicate to you mine of this date, on the Nabob's conteſt with the Dutch. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

To PETER AMYATT, *Eſquire.*

SIR, *Fort William*, 11th May, 1760.

I Have the pleaſure of your letters of the 23d and 25th ult.——Matters now, I think, grow critical on your ſide; the Prince in your neighbourhood, and, I fear, between Knox and the city, into which he will, I imagine, find no ſmall difficulty to throw himſelf, without fighting under many diſadvantages, though I hope you are ſtrong enough for an occaſional ſally to favour any attempt he may make for your relief.——Notwithſtanding the Prince's junction with Mr. Law's inconſiderable force, I muſt confeſs my apprehenſions for the city, are greater from treachery within, than from any attempts they can make from without, whilſt Knox and his party are ſo near them. I have no better opinion of Ramnarain's integrity in the cauſe, than I have of his ſpirit and capacity; and the moſt gracious manner his brother and Molydore were diſmiſſed by the Prince and Comgaar Khan gives ſtrong cauſe of ſuſpicion: therefore you cannot be too much on your guard againſt Ramnarain, as well as thoſe who have the chief poſts under him; and if Molydore, Donceram, and one or two more of them, were ſurpriſed, ſeized and ſecured, I doubt not but it would ſecure the ſafety of the city. Whether a ſtep of this kind would be practicable, you are a better judge than I can poſſibly be. If Knox makes his way into the city, you will be ſtrong enough to take the abſolute command of it yourſelf, which I would by all means recommend to you, and the ſame time ſecure thoſe you have reaſon to think diſaffected. Ramnarain's backwardneſs to oppoſe the advance of Mr. Law's party, which I learn from yours to the Major of the 25th ult. evinces that he intends ill,

ill, or has no command over thoſe under him; and conſequently he is, in either caſe, moſt unworthy the truſt he poſſeſſes, and the ſooner he is diveſted the better.

Let me hear from you by every poſſible opportunity, and believe me truly, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſquire.*

SIR, *Fort William*, 24th May, 1760.

LAST night a letter from the Committee was diſpatched to you, in which you had the Gentlemen's general ſentiments only on the ſtate of things, without deſcending to the particular cauſes of theſe ſentiments which require elucidations.

The ſucceſs of Capt. Knox juſtifies and does honour to your recommendation and our appointment, and gives quite a new aſpect to the late deſperate ſtate of affairs in the province of Bahar; where I think the force under Captain Knox, if continued at Patna, will, with the aſſiſtance of Ramnarain, be amply ſufficient to preſerve the tranquillity of the country and ſafety of Patna during that period, as alſo to take the field when the ſeaſon permits, to quell, or rather prevent, any commotions which may be attempted the next year by the Prince againſt the Suba's government.—— We are averſe, for two important reaſons, to you (or your troops) being farther diſtant from us than the Purnea country, each of which I will ſpeak diſtinctly to.

If we have any thing to apprehend from without, either from French or Dutch, we are to expect it from this time to the remainder of the S. W. monſoon; therefore it becomes an eſſential conſideration,

ſideration, that our forces are kept as much within call as the nature of the preſent ſervice will admit of, ſtill giving a preference to ourſelves, and the ſecond place only to the defence of the Suba and his government; he muſt himſelf concur and ſubmit to the utility of this precaution for his own ſake, his ſafety depending abſolutely on ours, and on the force we have to impede the entrance of any European power whatever in his country from any other quarter: I think he need be under no apprehenſion for theſe five or ſix months at leaſt.—And I hope there is yet time to accompliſh the Suba's juſt purſuits againſt Purnea, and for your return to us with the troops, when the rains ſet in; a circumſtance which leads me to my ſecond reaſon.

Though the Prince, by this year's invaſion, has benefited himſelf and followers no more than by the laſt, yet the conſequence has been equally fatal to the country, or rather more ſo.——The large ſhare of injury the Company ſuffers in their affairs, by the annual continuance of theſe troubles, calls for our moſt ſerious conſideration, as I ſee no end to them whilſt we ſupport the preſent ſyſtem, ſo obviouſly tending (and that not by ſlow degrees neither) to our employers ruin. To obviate this, ſome meaſures muſt be adopted; in concerting of which your preſence with us and counſels are abſolutely neceſſary, as ſoon as the preſent exigencies of things can admit of your abſence from the troops.——This moment I am interrupted by letters from Mr. Amyatt of the 14th, one to the Committee, the other to myſelf; in both which he lays ſuch ſtreſs on the neceſſity of being reinforced by Europeans and Seapoys, that I fear it muſt over-rule all I have urged in this and my laſt paragraph, and after all oblige your march to Patna, with what force you think can be ſpared

from

from the Purnea expedition; or whether you may not think it eligible to take the whole with you, and defer that expedition for the preſent. The ſeeming reſolution the Prince has taken, not to quit the province of Bahar, and the increaſe of his army, are ſtrokes we could not reaſonably have expected after the repulſes he received at Patna. By letters of the 12th from thence they adviſe us, the Prince and his army were retreated nine corſe towards Tikara; by thoſe of the 14th, only three; juſt to get clear of ſallies from the city. Mr. Amyatt ſeems to write under the greateſt apprehenſion as well for the country as the Company's inveſtment of Salt-Petre, &c. Meaſures for the ſecurity of that muſt at leaſt be entered on, though, for my own part, I fear if the Prince has really reſolved to keep on this ſide the Soan, and is proceeding, as Mr. Amyatt repreſents, ſuccours will arrive too late to prevent miſchief. I will directly ſummon a meeting of the Select Committee to reply to Mr. Amyatt's letter, and tranſmit you their ſentiments for your conduct.

Since writing the above, I have received another Phirmaund from the Prince, incloſing the original Arzdaſht of the Nabob, the truth of which appears to us to carry much probability, which is all I ſhall at preſent ſay to it. What follows are the ſentiments of the other gentlemen of the Committee, as well as my own.

Hitherto our conduct in ſupporting the Suba's government can hardly be vindicated to our employers, the more eſpecially ſince his flagrant and known breach of the treaty laſt year, not only by his invitation of the Dutch forces from Batavia, but by his ſhameful and inſincere conduct and dealing with us after their arrival, and to this hour reſpecting that people, the weakneſs and inconſiſtency of his whole politics during the courſe

of this campaign, joined to the repeated cruelties, murders, and oppreſſions, daily committed by him or his ſon on individuals,—the univerſal deteſtation of his government throughout the provinces,—the obvious certainty of theſe troubles in the country continuing without interruption, whilſt this family exiſts at the head of it; all theſe, with many other conſiderations which I could enumerate, demonſtrates, we cannot longer, conſiſtent with what we owe to the Company, to natural juſtice, and propriety, and to the Engliſh name, ſupport a ſyſtem of uſurpation and tyranny, which reflects diſhonour on it, and muſt, if perſiſted in, involve our honourable employers and our colony in a ſpeedy ruin.—The more we ſee of this government, the more is verified your own juſt obſervation at your firſt knowledge of it, That it is rotten to the core: What then can be expected from a ſyſtem rotten to the very heart of it, in every ſenſe—Ruin muſt attend the family, in ſpite of our efforts to ſave them; and we muſt as aſſuredly be partakers in a greater or leſs degree thereof—to ſay nothing of our drawing our ſword in ſupport of ſuch a ſyſtem, againſt the legal, tho' unfortunate Prince of the country, from whom every advantage and emolument we can wiſh for the Company, is tendered to us, without limitation.—This being the caſe, we are moſt anxious for two or three days conference with you, if poſſible. We think, if there appears an abſolute neceſſity for it, that you may diſpatch 150 or 200 Europeans, and 4 or 500 Seapoys, to reinforce Patna; and wiſh you could, under the pretence of ſoliciting a further ſupply of troops, or ſickneſs, or any other cover which may occur to you, leave Capt. Yorke with your detachment, and return to us, if for twenty-four hours only.——If you find this impracticable, without raiſing ſuſpicions, which may have

have conſequences we cannot foreſee, then favour me with your ſentiments as ſoon as poſſible without reſerve. I am, with the moſt perfect confidence and eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

To the Honourable J. Z. HOLWELL, *Eſq; Preſident and Governor of Fort William.*

SIR,

Camp at *Balkiſſens Gardens*, 29th May, 1760.

I AM honoured this day with your favour of the 24th inſtant. My laſt letters of the 24th, and thoſe of yeſterday, of the 28th, contain all I can urge in favour of our return to Patna with the young Nabob—you ſeem alſo convinced of the neceſſity of it, ſince the receipt of Mr. Amyatt's letters: I ſhall be glad to find it further confirmed by the ſentiments of the Select Committee.

I am not maſter enough of the ſubject, to know how the Company's inveſtment of Salt-petre will be ſo much hurt this year; and that you fear ſuccours will arrive too late, to prevent much miſchief; but this I am very confident of, that if we do not ſend ſuccours, the whole province may be loſt, and many years inveſtments to come.

I will endeavour now, Sir, to reply as fully as I can to the ſubject on which you deſire ſo earneſtly to know my ſentiments; and hope what I have to ſay will ſo fully ſatisfy you, that I need not at leaſt leave the army until the campaign is quite concluded, as I think it cannot be done without prejudice to our affairs.

Bad as the man may be, whoſe cauſe we now ſupport, I cannot be of opinion that we can get rid of him for a better, without running the riſk of much greater inconveniencies attending on ſuch

a change, than thoſe we now labour under.—I preſume, the eſtabliſhing tranquillity in theſe provinces would reſtore to us all the advantages of trade we could wiſh, for the profit and honour of our employers; and I think we bid fairer to bring that tranquillity about, by our preſent influence over the Suba, and by ſupporting him, than by any change which can be made.—No new revolution can take place without a certainty of troubles; and a revolution will certainly be the conſequence, whenever we withdraw our protection from the Suba:—we cannot in prudence neither, I believe, leave this revolution to chance—we muſt in ſome degree be inſtrumental to bringing it about.—In ſuch a caſe, it is very poſſible we may raiſe a man to the dignity, juſt as unfit to govern, as little to be depended upon, and in ſhort, as great a rogue as our Nabob; but perhaps not ſo great a coward, nor ſo great a fool, and of conſequence much more difficult to manage.—As to the injuſtice of ſupporting this man, on account of his cruelties, oppreſſions, and his being deteſted in his government, I ſee ſo little chance, in this bleſſed country, of finding a man endued with the oppoſite virtues, that I think we may put up with theſe vices, with which we have no concern, if in other matters we find him fitteſt for our purpoſe.

As to his breach of his treaty, by introducing the Dutch laſt year, that was never ſo clearly proved, I believe, but as to admit of ſome doubt; —Colonel Clive, before he left the country, ſeemed ſatisfied that what was ſuſpicious in his conduct in that affair, proceeded not from actual guilt, but from the timidity of his nature.—But if we ſtill ſuſpect him from further circumſtances, we always have it in our power to put it to the teſt at once, by making him act as he ought, whether he will or no.

With

With regard to drawing our ſwords againſt the lawful Prince of the country; no man can more pity his misfortunes than I have done, nor would any one be more willing and happy to be inſtrumental in aſſiſting him to recover his juſt right;—but ſuch a plan is not the thought of a day, nor the execution of it the work of a few months;—there is a powerful party ſtill remains;—the Vizier, with the Maharattas and Jutes, who, notwithſtanding the conſtant ſucceſs of Abdallah againſt them, ſtill make head againſt him; and ſuch are their reſources and their numbers, that I believe they will at laſt oblige the Patans to leave the country; for though they cannot beat them fairly out of the field, they bid fair to ſtarve them out of the country.

You have, no doubt, received advice from Mr. Haſtings, that Abdallah hath ſent orders to the ſeveral powers, to acknowledge the Prince King of Indoſtan, by the name of Shaw Allum;—rupees are ſtruck by his order at Bannarras and Lucknow, in that name;——orders are alſo given to Sujah Dowlatt, to accept the poſt of Vizier; and our Nabob hath got, it is ſaid, inſtructions to acknowledge him, and pay him the obeiſance due to the King of Kings, as he is ſtiled.

If we were perfectly ſure Abdallah would remain, as he ſays, until he ſaw the Prince well fixed on the throne, and the peace and tranquillity of the country reſtored, we might, I think, all joined together, be a match for the Maharattas;—but we muſt be well aſſured that Abdallah will heartily enter, and when entered, will firmly ſupport the cauſe:—for ſhould this appointment of his be no more (as it is poſſible) than a finiſhing ſtroke, to end his expedition with the eclat of having given us a Mogul, and when a certain number of the country powers had entered into the alliance,

a change, than thoſe we now labour under.—I preſume, the eſtabliſhing tranquillity in theſe provinces would reſtore to us all the advantages of trade we could wiſh, for the profit and honour of our employers; and I think we bid fairer to bring that tranquillity about, by our preſent influence over the Suba, and by ſupporting him, than by any change which can be made.—No new revolution can take place without a certainty of troubles; and a revolution will certainly be the conſequence, whenever we withdraw our protection from the Suba:—we cannot in prudence neither, I believe, leave this revolution to chance—we muſt in ſome degree be inſtrumental to bringing it about.—In ſuch a caſe, it is very poſſible we may raiſe a man to the dignity, juſt as unfit to govern, as little to be depended upon, and in ſhort, as great a rogue as our Nabob; but perhaps not ſo great a coward, nor ſo great a fool, and of conſequence much more difficult to manage.—As to the injuſtice of ſupporting this man, on account of his cruelties, oppreſſions, and his being deteſted in his government, I ſee ſo little chance, in this bleſſed country, of finding a man endued with the oppoſite virtues, that I think we may put up with theſe vices, with which we have no concern, if in other matters we find him fitteſt for our purpoſe.

As to his breach of his treaty, by introducing the Dutch laſt year, that was never ſo clearly proved, I believe, but as to admit of ſome doubt; —Colonel Clive, before he left the country, ſeemed ſatisfied that what was ſuſpicious in his conduct in that affair, proceeded not from actual guilt, but from the timidity of his nature.—But if we ſtill ſuſpect him from further circumſtances, we always have it in our power to put it to the teſt at once, by making him act as he ought, whether he will or no.

With

With regard to drawing our ſwords againſt the lawful Prince of the country; no man can more pity his misfortunes than I have done, nor would any one be more willing and happy to be inſtrumental in aſſiſting him to recover his juſt right;—but ſuch a plan is not the thought of a day, nor the execution of it the work of a few months;—there is a powerful party ſtill remains;—the Vizier, with the Maharattas and Jutes, who, notwithſtanding the conſtant ſucceſs of Abdallah againſt them, ſtill make head againſt him; and ſuch are their reſources and their numbers, that I believe they will at laſt oblige the Patans to leave the country; for though they cannot beat them fairly out of the field, they bid fair to ſtarve them out of the country.

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he ſhould think of a return to his own country, and leave us to fight it out with the other contending party, I fear the Vizier and the Maharattas would be too ſtrong for thoſe who remained of the alliance, ſuppoſing them to be the Ruellahs, and Sujah Dowlatt, and the Nabob of Bengal.—However, ſuppoſing all this ſhould take place, why may it not be done with our Nabob in our hand, ſtill his friends and his protectors?

I am this inſtant favoured with yours of the 25th; and I find by your poſtſcript, that your opinion and mine, with regard to the Prince, do not differ much. I have no objections to follow the plan you propoſe:—let Mr. Haſtings ſound the old Nabob, and I will go to work with the young one, who joins me this day.

We may continue our march on to Patna.—The rains will give us time to negotiate, to ſee we go on ſure grounds, and make ſuch a plan of the alliance, as will do us honour, and be an advantage to our country and our employers;—but let us not abandon the Nabob.—Beſides the reaſons I have urged above, one more ſtill remains, which I believe will have ſome weight, and make us cautious how we attempt, without very ſtrong and urgent reaſons, any change in the preſent ſyſtem.

You are well acquainted, Sir, with the cauſe which firſt gave riſe to the preſent ſhare of influence which we enjoy in this part of the Mogul's empire:—a juſt reſentment for injuries received, was the firſt motive which induced us to make a trial of our ſtrength;—the eaſe with which we ſucceeded enlarged our views, and made us chearfully embrace all opportunities of increaſing that intereſt and influence, both on account of the advantages which accrued from it to the Honourable Company, as likewiſe the hopes that it might in time prove a ſource

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of benefit and riches to our country.—Such were, I believe, the motives of Colonel Clive's actions during his adminiſtration; ſuch, I believe, were the views of the Honourable Company, when they ſolicited and obtained Colonel Coote's regiment from the Government; and ſuch, I am certain, is the plan which the Colonel propoſes, on his return, to purſue and to ſupport, in hopes to convince the Miniſtry and the Company, as he is convinced himſelf, that if they pleaſe to ſupport his project, it will prove of the greateſt advantage to the public.

If I have ſtated our ſituation right, it follows, I believe, of courſe, that we are bound with vigour to work on the ſame plan, to act on the ſame principles, and to keep up the ſyſtem as perfect and entire as it was left in our hands; that whatever reſolutions the Nation or the Company may come to, on Col. Clive's repreſentations, they may not be diſappointed, by finding here (at leaſt through our faults) any very material change in our ſituation, power, or credit.

One word more. All we can wiſh to do is, not to ſuffer the Nabob to impoſe on us, and to check every beginning of an independence he may endeavour to aſſume:—let us conſult and improve, on every occaſion that offers, the honour and advantage of our employers, and the increaſe of their trade and credit; and not let them ſuffer any additional expence, on account of purſuing any plan, or ſupporting any ſyſtem whatever.—By acting thus, I think we cannot err; we run at leaſt no riſk; and I believe the Company's affairs may be conducted by us under this Suba, as much to their advantage and credit, as any other whom a revolution may place in the government.

Incloſed, I have the honour to ſend Mr. Amyatt's laſt letter, received this morning. We have had, as you will ſee, another bruſh with the Prince's troops,

troops, and with great ſucceſs: however, if the other plan goes on, we muſt put an end to this fighting ſyſtem, and talk coolly on affairs.—I ſhall expect the favour of your opinion with great impatience; and have the honour to aſſure you that I am, with perfect reſpect and eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN CAILLAUD.

It is worth remarking, that in this letter we ſee many ſpecious arguments in favour of ſtill preſerving this ſyſtem; apologies are made for the Suba's cruelties and oppreſſions; and even an attempt made to extenuate his conduct in the Dutch affair, by attributing it to his timidity.—Howſoever Colonel Clive was actuated to declare afterwards, the ſentiments ſet forth in this letter, yet the Memorial ſent to the Company, (ſome time after it happened) carried the teſtimony of conviction, (to his having called in the Dutch) ſigned by Colonel Clive and his whole council. Poſſibly we may be wrong; but ſtill we will not heſitate to ſay, that neither the pen nor tongue of a Cicero ſhould influence us to think, the moſt atrocious crimes and cruelties can admit of palliation, let the complexion or principles of that government be what they will,—much leſs vindicate the ſupporting ſuch wickedneſs, let the advantages be ever ſo great to ourſelves.—But waving here theſe, and ſeveral other parts of this letter, we beg leave to refer you to our anſwer immediately following, where we think we have rendered the whole invalid.—It is more worthy remark, that all the arguments ſo forcibly urged there, vaniſhed on Governor Vanſittart's arrival at Fort William—without, as we remember, any material alteration in the face of affairs;—for, after the flight of Cuddeim Hoſſein Khan, the rains ſet in, and a ſtop was put to

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all operations of the field.—It is true, things were growing worſe and worſe;—but that was no more than was foreſeen long before, as appears from Mr. Holwell's repeated and urgent repreſentations, on his part, as well as on that of the Committee, though then without obtaining any due influence: nor will this be much wondered at, when we unmaſk the cauſe. The Major having undoubted reaſons to expect a change in the government of Calcutta, and that Mr. Vanſittart would probably arrive with us in July, or ſooner; it is but rational to think, that the Major rather choſe to be joined with Mr. Vanſittart, with whom he had been long connected in friendſhip, (than with Mr. Holwell, who was in a manner a ſtranger to him) in the ſubverſion of a government which he ſaw muſt inevitably be brought on, but at the ſame time thought would admit of delay. This muſt have been the plan of thinking adopted by him then, or his ſubſequent conduct in falling immediately into, and having ſo principal a part in depoſing Mhir Jaffier Khan, muſt appear wholly unaccountable.—Meſſrs. Holwell, Sumner, and Mac-Gwire, the majority of your Select Committee, very clearly ſaw through this diſguiſe; for they too had received intimation of Mr. Vanſittart's appointment; and convinced that nothing could be effectually puſhed by their majority in the Committee, without having a concurrence from the heart with the Commander in chief of your forces in the field, contented themſelves with remonſtrances on the unhappy ſituation of your affairs;—having no other alternative in their power. To the truth of this, we venture to refer to Mr. Sumner, now in England.

Here we will beg leave to ſay publicly, what we have often ſaid in private to ſome of your Court of Directors; If you would have your affairs conducted properly in Bengal, give your Commander

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in chief, rank, title, emoluments, any thing to make him reſpectable in the eyes of that government, and your own forces;—but give him not a vote in your Committees or Councils:—recent and melancholy proofs evince the impropriety of doing it.—There will ever be one ſet of political views in the cabinet, and another in the camp; and this inevitably muſt be the caſe:—if it had not been ſo, you would, in the month of May or June 1760, have been yourſelves Subas of Bengal, and now in poſſeſſion of between two and three millions ſterling *per annum*.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, *Eſq*;

SIR, *Calcutta*, June 14, 1760.

MANY of the various reaſons you aſſign for our ſupporting this government, at all events, I ſhould moſt readily ſubmit to, were we at the ſame time in any ſituation of ſupporting and conducting the Company's affairs with ſucceſs and honour, or indeed of conducting them at all. They are burthened with a military force at the expence of near 50,000 Rupees each month, their bare pay, beſides the immenſe charge of military ſtores, &c. The charges of their works, one month with another, amount to from 70 to 90,000 Rupees. The Company's great ſupport, at this time, will be expected from their Bengal inveſtments; and if we return them this ſeaſon one ſhip's compleat cargo, it will be the utmoſt the preſent proſpect promiſes: for ſome time the buſineſs at their different Arungs has been at a ſtand; they have in a manner loſt their ſilk inveſtment for this ſeaſon.—The balance of their treaſury, one lack and half only, without any hopes of a material ſupply, we having uſed every means in our power to borrow on their account without ſucceſs: In hourly expectation of their

their credit ſuffering further diſgrace, from our inability to anſwer the ſeveral bills drawn on us from different quarters; in leſs than the ſpace of one month a diſgraceful ſtop muſt be put to the progreſs of our new works; and I declare to you, I ſee not where we ſhall get money for the pay of our troops in garriſon, and much leſs for the ſervice of the marine, and other current expences of the Preſidency.—I have no doubt but you will give due weight and attention to the foregoing real ſtate of the Company's affairs; and from thence be convinced, that the ſupport of the preſent ſyſtem, until the Company's pleaſure is known, will reduce us to no ſyſtem at all; the more ſurely ſo, as we have ſo little foundation to expect any ſupplies at all from them, by the ſhips of this ſeaſon.

Had it ever been my wiſh or intention to have taken our ſupport from the preſent Nabob, and transfer it to any other, your arguments, in that caſe, would have all the weight with me they ſo greatly merit; but, I think, on a repreſentation of mine to you, and the copy of mine to Mr. Amyatt, you will ſee that was not my aim; for I concur minutely with your objections to ſuch a ſtep, and am very clear we ſhould not mend our ſituation by a revolution in favour of any other, who would, as you truly obſerve, prove as bad as the preſent, and probably worſe:—But my views for the Company went much higher. That the country will never be in a ſettled, peaceful ſtate, whilſt this family is at the head of it, is a poſition I lay down as inconteſtable; and that until the country enjoys that ſtate, the Company's affairs muſt, in conſequence, be daily approaching to certain ruin: I therefore judge we could never be poſſeſſed of a more juſt or favourable opportunity to carry into execution, what muſt be done, I plainly ſee, one time or other, if the Company

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have ever a ſecure footing in the provinces, to wit, Take this country into their own hands, limiting ourſelves to the province of Bengal only, or extending our views to thoſe of Bahar and Orixa, as on future debate might be thought moſt eligible. The ſituation of the Prince at preſent is ſuch, that I am ſure he would readily and thankfully hearken to an overture from us, and without heſitation, grant a Phirmaund appointing the Company perpetual Subas of the province. His two Phirmaunds to me, as I before adviſed you, offered a Carte Blanche for the Company; and I dare ſay, that to you was of the ſame tenor. With reſpect to the validity of receiving a Phirmaund from him, I cannot think it poſſibly liable to impeachment; That he is the legal heir to the empire is beyond contradiction; that Abdallah has proclaimed him Emperor, by the name of Shaw Allum, ordered Siccas to be ſtruck in his name, and called him to the throne, are truths which now I believe will admit of no doubt. But, on ſuppoſition things ſhould come to the worſt, and the iſſue of them at laſt prove in favour of Shaw Jehawn, I conceive it would very little affect us, when once in poſſeſſion of the provinces; for let the lot of empire fall to whom it will, the regular remittance of the ſtipulated revenues of the country, from which that court had hardly benefited ſince the time of Sujah Khan, would ſecure a confirmation, from whatever Prince fills the throne, if his eyes are open to his own intereſt.

The foregoing favourable circumſtances conſidered, together with the preſent ſtate of the Company's affairs, and the many juſt cauſes and provocations we certainly have againſt ſupporting this government any longer, can we, conſiſtently with our duty to the Company, diſregard an overture, which in fact came firſt from the Prince, ſo immenſely

menſely advantageous to their affairs—and redounding ſo greatly to their honour?—and by which we ſhould be ſufficiently enabled to prevent the French ever regaining a footing in Bengal, or even an entrance to the country?—Circumſtances we have moſt to apprehend from, of any thing that can poſſibly happen to the moleſtation and deſtruction of the Company's influence and concerns in India; for in ſuch an event, we can, from experience, judge the aſſiſtance we ſhould receive from the preſent government.

I have this moment received your favour of the 10th from Hybut Gunge, and think five or ſix days will bring you near the city. As nothing material has happened, your obliging apology for not writing more frequently, was needleſs, for I can very ſoon account for every moment of your time, in ſuch troubleſome and forced marches.—I obſerve the firſt freſh diſcouragements which check the Prince's hopes; and yet I think if he gives us the Subadary, promotes Mhir Jaffier and his ſon to ſome conſiderable poſts, and takes them and their troops with him, and is joined by 4 or 500 of Europeans, with 2 or 3000 Seapoys, and a good field artillery, the reſult would be in his favour; and that, with theſe helps, he would gain the throne of his anceſtors:—for though after the late ſucceſs of the Morattors againſt Abdallah's Viſier, it might be imprudent in Sujah Dowlet to advance to the ſouthward; yet when he was joined by the Prince, with a formidable force, there would be no objection to Sujah Dowlet's joining him with his whole power, in his march to Delly.—Think, Sir, how glorious a circumſtance for our Company and nation, to be aiding in ſo juſt and honourable a ſervice! and what might they not both expect, if the Prince was eſtabliſhed on the throne of Indoſtan;

an event which appears to me a moral certainty, by ſuch a coalition as is juſt hinted at above.

If matters ſhould chance to come into treaty, a ratification of Colonel Clive's Jagier muſt not be forgot. I am with real eſteem, Sir,

Your obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

How far his Lordſhip's prior and ſubſequent treatment of Mr. Holwell, merited this tender conſideration, we leave to his Lordſhip's breaſt;—and only remark, that this thought never occurred to his boſom friends, when they had it in their power to have ſcreened him from much trouble and more anxiety.

To PETER AMYATT, *Eſq*;

SIR, *Calcutta*, 30th May, 1760.

SINCE mine of the 25th, I have received a letter from Mr. Haſtings, encloſing abſtracts of one from Jugul Kiſſore, the Nabob's agent at Delly, to the Nabob, adviſing him of the Shaw Zadda being actually proclaimed King, and called to the throne by Abdallah; and that the Vizerut was ſent to Suza Dowla, who has already ſtruck Siccas in the Prince's name. If this incident is really fact, which appears probable enough from the many particulars recited in Jugul Kiſſore's letter, our proceedings will require the niceſt conduct at this conjuncture; and as we have hitherto oppoſed his arms, we muſt attone in future for ſuch oppoſition, by making our force as ſerviceable to him as poſſible,—even by joining him with ſuch part of them as we can poſſibly ſpare, to aſſiſt him in ſecuring the peaceable poſſeſſion of the throne; provided we can thereby gain ſome eſſential point,

which we muſt now moſt aſſiduouſly purſue, for the Company's benefit; the ſucceſs and accompliſhment of which will greatly depend on yours and the Major's addreſs, to whom I ſhall encloſe copy of this, that you may act in concert on this occaſion for the public good.——

On ſuppoſition that the Prince is recognized Emperor by Abdallah, I do not ſee how we can, conſiſtent with our duty to the Company, to natural juſtice, or ſound politics, ſupport this family any longer againſt the Prince, without the moſt flagrant breach and violation of the laws of nations: Whilſt his right remained doubtful, a pretext barely plauſible remained for our conduct; but this recognition of the Prince by Abdallah, and the principal Omrahs of this empire, diveſts us even of that pretext; and our perſiſting will lay us, I fear, not only liable to cenſure from the Company, but from the whole world.

That the Suba will labour to exculpate himſelf, by throwing the odium of the reſiſtance made to the Prince in theſe dominions on us, I have not the leaſt doubt; of which there needs no ſtronger proof, than his ſecreting this extraordinary event, which on the inſtant he ſhould have communicated to me, by virtue of the treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Engliſh; for all the intelligence of this affair I have from Mr. Haſtings only, who obtained the copy of Jugul Kiſſore's letter from the Moonſhee, contrary, he believes, to the Suba's intentions;—ſo that, on the whole, we may reaſonably conclude, he is well advanced by this time in making his peace with the Prince at our expence, and poſſibly at the price of the Company's ruin;—in which he muſt be countermined without loſs of time, and every piece of treachery carefully guarded againſt, which either he or his ſon, we know, are capable of projecting againſt our troops,

or us. I yeſterday received a letter from the old Nabob, deſiring me to order part of Captain Fiſcher's command to Midnapore, for the ſecurity of that place, and collection of the revenues; which in my anſwer I abſolutely refuſed, alledging for reaſon that his own people were fully equal to that ſervice, and that I could not think of making any further diſperſion of our troops, at a time when we might daily expect an enemy in the river. —We cannot be too much upon our guard againſt this government, at this very critical period, for I perfectly know it capable of the moſt ſuperlative baſeneſs and treachery.

All theſe particulars premiſed and duly conſidered, the plan for our immediate conduct obviouſly preſents itſelf. The Prince's reſentment to this family is ſuch, that I am convinced the firſt overture from us would be moſt readily embraced by him and his Miniſters, that now we ſhall have it in our own power to make our own terms for the Company; and that if we loſe this opportunity, it is evident to me we ſhall never get another; and that the Company muſt ever remain on the moſt precarious and dangerous footing in this country.

The terms to be laboured for, which now occur to me, are, 1ſt, The Subadary of Bengal, compriſing Siccli-gully, or Telliagurry, for the Company.—2d, Their Governor, for the time being, to bear the title of Suba, or Nizam of the provinces.—3d, Mr. Law and his troops to be delivered up to us.—4th, No other European power whatever to be allowed to hold or maintain a fortification or troops in the province.—5th, An abſolute grant, or phirmaund, for the ſecurity of our Saltpetre farm, free from all caveats and difficulties.—6th, A ratification of our treaties with Surajad Dowla, and the preſent Suba.—7th, Full indemnification and acquittal to the Company, for all our

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antient phirmaunds, grants, and privileges, and full confirmation of the ſame to the company.—8th, A letter to be obtained from the Emperor to the King of Great-Britain, ſetting forth the particulars of all theſe grants to his ſubjects.

On our ſide we engage, 1ſt, To make due and regular remittance to court, of the ſtipulated revenues of the province.—2d, To quit the protection of the preſent family in the government.—3d, To pay obedience to all orders iſſuing from the throne; and 4th, To join the Prince with all the troops we can poſſibly ſpare from the defence of the Company's poſſeſſions: but this laſt article to be avoided, if practicable.

If you, jointly with Major Caillaud, think the foregoing plan can be carried into execution, conſiſtent with the Company's ſafety and advantage, the ſame ſhall be laid before the Board, and proper powers tranſmitted to you if it meets with their approval. If you judge it impracticable, favour me with your ſentiments, and point out what other probable ſcheme we can adopt, to extricate the Company's affairs from the difficulties and obſtructions they labour under. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Hon. JOHN ZEPH. HOLWELL.

SIR, Camp at *Paunch-ruckee*, June 26, 1760.

SINCE I had the pleaſure to apprize you of Captain Knox's ſucceſs againſt Caudim Hoſſein Khan, I have croſſed the river with the Nabob, and have been in full purſuit of the ſame enemy for ſeveral days paſt. Encumbered by his treaſure, and a great quantity of baggage, he was very much impeded in his retreat, and retired ſo ſlow from us, that yeſterday morning, after a

march of ſix hours, we found ourſelves in ſight of his rear-guard. Adviſed of our approach, he had then juſt ſtruck his camp, wherein he left twelve very ſmall pieces of cannon; and without ſeeming to obſerve us, continued on his way about three coſs further, with our army following him. At the extremity of a large plain, bordered by a thick grove, and three or four villages, which covered part of his troops, he made a halt, and drew up his cannon. We did the ſame upon the plain, and a mutual cannonading enſued. Previous to this, I had ſent repeated meſſages to the Nabob (who remained a conſiderable diſtance in our rear) immediately to diſpatch a body of cavalry, to ſtop them and keep them in play, and not ſuffer ſo fair an occaſion to be irretrievably loſt; urging, at the ſame time, how impoſſible it was for men on foot, fatigued with a long march, to attempt to purſue horſe: but he continued deaf to my remonſtrances, and inſtead of ſending me the leaſt aſſiſtance, formed his troops above a mile in our rear, and there waited looking on until the enemy quitted the field. From the commencement of the cannonading until the firing ceaſed, it was about four hours. Little execution was done on either ſide. Two or three times they appeared in a large body, coming down upon us; but on our advancing, immediately retreated. We drove them from the villages, and they abandoned to us ſeven more pieces of cannon, and as many camels loaded with rockets. During the action, which very probably was a feint, for that very purpoſe, they found means to unload all their hackeries of their treaſure, Genanah, and other valuable effects, to place them upon camels and elephants, with which they went off, and are now far enough out of our reach. All their empty hackeries they alſo left behind them. Nothing could induce the Na-

bob, even after all was over, to ſend a body of horſe to intercept them in their retreat, which might have been effected with very little hazard. I marched ſeven coſs after them this morning, but found they had left their camp, and departed in the night. I have the honour to be, with equal reſpect and eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient, humble ſervant,
JOHN CAILLAUD.

To PETER AMYATT, *Eſq*;

SIR, July 1, 1760.

IN expectation of hearing more particularly from you, on the Major's arrival with you, I deferred hitherto replying to your favour of the 12th; but now tender you my beſt thanks for that, and another of the 19th, with its duplicate.

We may ſay, very truly, that we have not gained much by this wildgooſe campaign. The Prince and his friends have gained leſs, except we toſs them a drubbing or two into their ſcale. Knox is a brave fellow, and I dare ſay the Major will finiſh Cudheim Hoſſein Khan, as you phraſe it, if he does but ſtay, and give him as fair an opportunity. But pray, after all, what is to be the end of all theſe marches, counter-marchings, drubbings, &c.? Methinks we ſeem ſo keen after this royal game, as never once to recollect, that the Company muſt ſtarve, if we find them no other amuſement; we will ſuppoſe Cudheim Hoſſein Khan finiſhed, and the Prince driven out of the country, with all his adherents, until the rains break up; when, in all human probability, the ſame royal hunt begins again, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*, whilſt the Company have nothing but ruin in proſpect. No money, no goods, no credit even with *that government* we are ſupporting; which

on the contrary, in place of advancing, in this diſtreſſed ſtate of our affairs, obſtructs and embarraſſes us on every occaſion, in the collection of the Tunckas which are our due, and is capable of refuſing us a perwannah for a year or two's chinam to finiſh our new works. And to form to you a compleat idea of Mahomet Jaffier Aly Khan, he is now, at this very juncture, whilſt we are riſking our own throats to ſave his, in ſecret negociation with the Morattors, to introduce a body of 25 or 30,000 of them into the provinces. He has agreed to pay them 12 lack in three months; a conſiderable ſum was near being advanced to them, when he was informed I had intelligence of it, and then he dropped it. Muſſaloode Mahomet Khan was diſpatched to Cuttack, with two other Morattors, to finiſh this buſineſs.

I am ſorry the Major's ſentiments and yours ſeem to differ from my own, reſpecting the neceſſity we are under of ſupporting this government, at all events and in all circumſtances. I muſt confeſs, my reaſon is not at all convinced of this obligation. If this muſt hold until the Company's pleaſure be known, it can hold on no other terms, than the Nabob's making over ſome other parts of the country, that will fully reimburſe the expence of the troops; for by Heaven! we ſhall not be able to pay them two months longer. I am truly,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR, *Fort William*, 16th July, 1760.

YOUR obliging letter of the 12th reached me only this morning, as alſo yours to the Select Committee. The ſudden death of the young Nabob

bob is very ſtriking, and muſt, I think, occaſion commotions in the provinces. Had Providence thought proper to have appointed, by the ſame flaſh, Rajah Raagebullub to attend him to the other world, the country would have had a double benefit. Mhiran's troops, returning under his command, I think will prove bad politics. He has been at the bottom, the great cauſe of the long diſſentions between Mhiran and his father; and the young Nabob's troops, we pretty well know, have neither affection for the old Nabob, nor can put faith or confidence in him. My reign is ſhort; (I conceive Mr. Vanſittart will arrive with us in ten days the fartheſt) however, ſhort as it is, I would willingly employ the laſt hour of it for the advantage of the public: ſhall therefore tranſmit with this that advice to the old Nabob, which appears to me moſt eſſential for his ſervice at this juncture, and what will, I think, prove moſt conducive to the ſettling the peace and tranquillity of his country. Copy of my letter to the old Nabob I incloſe you; my plan, you will obſerve, is ſhort, and eaſily to be effected, now his ſon is gone—to wit, to throw himſelf into the arms of Mhir Coſſim Aly Khan and Roy Doolub; and diſmiſs from his Councils thoſe two vipers, Aga Salah of Cuttack, and Rajah Bullob, as well as that infamous inſtrument of his cruelties, Chuccon.

You will ſignify to the Nabob, that, on the receipt of your letter, I paid every cuſtomary compliment to his ſon's memory, ſuch as minute guns, colours of the fort and ſhips hoiſted half maſt, &c. and have wrote him alſo a ſeparate letter of condolance on this melancholy occaſion. I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

P. S. You will obſerve, that in my letter to the Nabob, I have as yet only mentioned Coſſim Aly Khan to him.

Thus far advanced, we think it eſſentially proper to lay the whole progreſs of this revolution before you, even to the minuteſt circumſtance.

To give governor Vanſittart a full knowledge of the preſent ſituation of the provinces, and ſtate of the Company's affairs, the correſpondence and memorial were preferred to his peruſal and conſideration, together with all letters received, as well from the country powers as others. The reſult was a declaration from him, that one or other of Mr. Holwell's plans muſt be purſued, without loſs of time, to ſave the Country and Company from impending ruin.—Colonel Caillaud was immediately ordered from Patna to join our Councils—he arrived. Three or four days produced, from the Governor, a long ſtatement of the preſent face of affairs, and the neceſſity of adopting meaſures therein propoſed, which were in a manner literally taken from the correſpondence and memorial, and obtained the ſanction and concurrence of Colonel Caillaud, and the majority not only of the committee, but of the council alſo.

At this period Mr. Holwell received frequent letters from Mhir Mahomet Coſſim Aly Khan, containing the ſtrongeſt profeſſions and aſſurances in favour of the Company, if, by our ſupport, he was promoted to the ſucceſſion of the Dewannee, and other poſts enjoyed by the late Chuta Nabob, his brother-in-law. Theſe letters were duly communicated to Mr. Vanſittart, to whom he likewiſe wrote, but with more reſerve, imagining Colonel Caillaud had ſwayed him in favour of Rajah Raagebullob, though without any real ground for

ſuch

ſuch ſuſpicion. Theſe matters being debated in committee, it was judged eligible to obtain permiſſion for Coſſim Aly Khan's paying a viſit to Calcutta; a circumſtance he himſelf had intimated, in a letter to the Governor and Mr. Holwell; the times gave good pretence for it, to wit, adjuſting the operations of the next campaign, and finally ſettling the accounts of the Tunka's. To gain this point, the Governor and Mr. Holwell wrote to the Suba with good ſucceſs; Coſſim Aly Khan had permiſſion to come to Calcutta, and left the city ſome days after, and arrived with us about the 20th of September.

The uſual ceremonies over, he had a private conference or two with the Governor; but ſtill forming doubts of his being influenced by Colonel Caillaud, kept himſelf much on the reſerve; the Governor expoſtulated with him on ſo improper a conduct. To this he replied, that he had the ſtrongeſt reaſons to conclude the new Colonel was his enemy; and therefore deſired Mr. Holwell might be deputed to have a conference with him, to whom he could open his whole heart with confidence and freedom; to which the Governor gave a ready aſſent.

Mr. Holwell being well apprized that Coja Petruſe (to whom the Company owed much in the laſt revolution, but much more in this) had the greateſt weight with, and influence over Coſſim Aly Khan, had ſecured him on the ſide of the Company; and at a private interview with him, at Mr. Holwell's garden, on the ſame day of the conference between the Governor and Coſſim Aly Khan, Mr. Holwell formed a rough plan of the terms which muſt be inſiſted on for the Company, in lieu of the protection and ſupport given to Coſſim Aly Khan; which Petruſe engaged he would promote, to the utmoſt of his power and influence.

The

The next morning, the 24th of September, Mr. Holwell communicated his conference with Petruſe, and laid the rough plan before the Governor and Select Committee, who approved of it, with little variation; and the 25th was appointed for the conference between him and Coſſim Aly Khan.—They met at ſeven, and about nine Mr. Holwell received a meſſage from the Governor, intimating, that the Select Committee was going to ſit, and would continue ſitting until he joined them with the reſult of the conference.

After the uſual compliments, and many grateful acknowledgments on the part of Coſſim Aly Khan, for the many inſtances of friendſhip he had received from Mr. Holwell, during his government, the ſcene in point opened; when, with very little heſitation, he diſcovered his views were more extenſive than had been imagined. He urged the repeated treacherous conduct of the Suba and the late young Nabob to the Engliſh, who had been not only their Creators, but their ſupport and preſervers; expatiated on their cruelties and murders, and the univerſal abhorrence of the people againſt the Suba and his houſe; dwelt much on his perſonal ingratitude to himſelf, in two attempts which he had made on his life, at the inſtigation of the late young Nabob;—exclaimed againſt the ſecret negociation he had carried on with the Shaw Zadda and the Dutch;—communicated the private orders he had received from the Suba, when he was ſent down againſt the Dutch, to favour them, in contradiction to the public ones, tranſmitted by the Suba at that time to Mr. Holwell; cloſing this introduction with ſaying, that the Suba was incapable of government; that no faith or truſt could be put in him; and that, if he was not taken off, it would never be in his power to render the

Company

Company thoſe ſervices which he had ſo much at heart.

Mr. Holwell, who little expected a preliminary of this kind, expreſſed much aſtoniſhment and abhorrence at the overture—and replied, "That "howſoever little the Suba deſerved conſideration, "yet that the honour of the Company, and the "Engliſh name, forbid our hearkening to any "attempts againſt his life or dignity; that care "would be taken, neither he nor his evil miniſters "ſhould in future have power either to injure him, "the Company, or his Country, in the manner he "had already done; but that unleſs he (Coſſim "Aly Khan) dropped all mention, as well as every "intention and attempt of the meaſure he had "intimated, the conference muſt end there." To this he acquieſced, but with evident diſſatisfaction of countenance; and only added, that as he had no ſupport but the Engliſh, he muſt ſubmit to their meaſures; but feared Mr. Holwell was not ſo much his friend as he hoped and expected.

This obſtruction being removed, buſineſs and much altercation took place; none preſent but Coſſim Aly Khan, Mr. Holwell, Coja Petruſe, and Coſſim Aly Khan's head Moonſhee (or Perſian ſecretary); and after debate on each article, the following were agreed to.

1ſt, That Coſſim Aly Khan ſhall be inveſted with the Dewannee, be declared Chuta Nabob, and ſucceſſor in the Subaſhip to Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, and enjoy all the poſts poſſeſſed by the late young Nabob.

2d, That all acts of the government ſhall run under the ſeal of, and in the name of——Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan; but the executive power ſhould reſt in Coſſim Aly Khan; the dignity of the Suba to remain inviolable in the perſon of the former, with

with an allowance of one Lack of Rupees per menſem, for the ſupport of his houſhold, &c. expences.

3d, That Coſſim Aly Khan ſhall pay and make good the balance of the Tunka's, as lately adjuſted with Omid Roy, on the part of Jaffier Aly Khan.

4th, That the Company ſhall keep up a ſtanding force, for the defence of the government and provinces, conſiſting of 8000 Seapoys, 2000 European Foot, 2000 Country Cavalry, and 500 European Horſe.

5th, That to enable the Company to keep up the above ſtanding force, the countries of Burdomaan, Midnapore, Chittygang, and half the annual produce of the Chinam at Sillet, ſhall be ceded to the Company in perpetuity.

The above five articles contain the full tenor and eſſentials of the treaty, though not a literal copy of it.—A ſixth article, preſſed by Mr. Holwell, That Coſſim Aly Khan ſhould concur with the Engliſh in acknowledging the rights of the Shaw Zadda to the throne of Indoſtan, was left dormant, and to be adjuſted as future events ſhould point out.

By one o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Holwell attended the Committee, with the articles agreed to by Coſſim Aly Khan, which met the unanimous approval of the members. At this committee it was moved and requeſted by the Governor, and backed by the Committee, That Mr. Holwell would accompany the Colonel (who was ordered to return to Patna) as far as the city, with joint powers from the Committee, to carry the foregoing articles into execution amicably, if poſſible, otherwiſe to force the Suba to a compliance. To this purpoſe they were to be accompanied by a detachment of 200 Europeans, 4 pieces of field artillery, and 5 or 600 Seapoys, under the command of

Major

Major Yorke, on pretence of reinforcing the troops at Patna.

This ſervice was peremptorily refuſed by Mr. Holwell, for the following reaſons :—Firſt, He ſaw no ſufficient neceſſity for it. Secondly, He was predetermined to reſign the ſervice as ſoon as the treaty was ſigned. Thirdly, He muſt have been ſecond only in the commiſſion with the Colonel; a character he could by no means ſubmit to, under a gentleman he had ſo lately commanded; a circumſtance which would have rendered Mr. Holwell of little weight or conſequence at the city.—On his refuſal, the Governor declared he would go up himſelf with the Colonel, on pretence of paying the firſt viſit to the Suba.

The 26th and 27th of September paſſed in conferences between the Governor and Coſſim Aly Khan, in drawing the treaty out fair, and adjuſting meaſures touching the carrying it into execution. The 27th, at night, a Committee was held at the Governor's houſe, and the treaty interchangeably ſigned by the Committee on the one part, and by Mhir Mahomet Coſſim Aly Khan Bahadr on the other. The 28th, he made an entertainment for the Governor and Council; and the 29th, in the morning, took his leave, and departed for the city.—The ſame morning Mr. Holwell took his leave of the Board, and reſigned the ſervice.

Major Yorke, with his detachment, marched a few days after, with inſtructions to arrive at the city a day or two after Coſſim Aly Khan, that he might be near enough to protect him, if there ſhould be occaſion. The Governor and the Colonel followed ſoon after, and arrived at the city with the detachment, and took up their quarters at Moradbaag, on the oppoſite ſide of the river to Moorſhadabad. —But here we will take up the thread of this

detail

detail from Mr. Vanſittart's own words, in his remonſtrance to the Board of Calcutta, of which we luckily have a copy, beginning where he leaves off, with the murder of Aly Verrdee Khan's family, already ſpoken to.——

" Executions of this kind had made the Nabob " the dread or the deteſtation of all good men; " and he neceſſarily became a prey to people of " mean extraction and abject diſpoſitions, who " knowing that a government ſo managed could " not ſtand long, ſought only to make themſelves " rich by oppreſſions of all ſorts upon the country " and inhabitants. To the heavy taxes laid by " them on markets, is aſcribed the preſent unuſual " ſcarcity and dearneſs of proviſions at the city, " the capital of a country once eſteemed the moſt " plentiful in the world. The perſons who have " had the chief ſhare in this bad management are, " Keenooram, Moniloll, and Checon, all of low " birth, and the two firſt the menial ſervants of " Jaffier Aly Khan, before he came to the Subah- " ſhip. Theſe managed ſo, as to engage him " continually in idle or vicious amuſements, keep- " ing him by that means in utter ignorance of his " affairs, and in a ſtate of indifference as to their " ſucceſs. No money came to his treaſury, at the " ſame time nothing was paid to his army, inſo- " much that his troops mutinied, and ſurrounded " his palace in a tumultuous manner, threatening " to take away his life; which they certainly " would have done, had not his ſon-in-law, the " preſent Coſſim Aly Khan, become anſwerable, " and paid them a very large ſum out of his own " treaſury. This happened laſt June: and if the " imminent danger with which his perſon was " threatened on this occaſion, awakened him for a " moment, no ſooner was it removed again to a " diſtance, than he fell back into the lethargy

" which

" which had ſo long poſſeſſed him; the ſame un-
" worthy miniſters remained ſtill his only coun-
" ſellors, and continued in the management of his
" affairs to the laſt day of his adminiſtration;
" which he left in ſo confuſed and impoveriſhed a
" ſtate, that in all human appearance another
" month could hardly have run through, before
" he would have been cut off by his own Seapoys,
" and the city became a ſcene of plunder and diſ-
" order, the Nabob having made no further pro-
" viſion for the payment of the long arrears due
" to his people, after Coſſim Aly Khan had freed
" him from his former extremity. This danger
" he could not but foreſee, and more than once
" declared his apprehenſions, yet had not the
" power to exert the neceſſary means for prevent-
" ing it, but ſunk the deeper into dejection.

" Beſides this inteſtine danger to which the go-
" vernment was expoſed, two armies were in the
" field, and waiting only the fair weather to ad-
" vance, the Shaw Zadda towards Patna, and the
" Beerboon Rajahs of Biſſenpoor, Ramgur, and
" the other countries bordering upon the moun-
" tains, were ready to ſhake off their dependance,
" and had already offered conſiderable ſupplies to
" the Beerboon Rajah. The Rajah of Carrucki-
" poor had committed open hoſtilities, and
" taken poſſeſſion of all the country about Boggle-
" poor, which entirely ſtopped the communication
" between the two provinces on that ſide of the
" river; in a word, the whole country ſeemed ripe
" for an univerſal revolt, thoſe parts only excepted,
" whoſe natural weakneſs or neighbourhood with
" the city intimidated them from taking up arms.
" To encounter all theſe difficulties, there was
" nothing but troops without pay, from whom
" therefore no great efforts could be expected:
" of this a very recent inſtance occurs in the de-

" tachment

" tachment which was ordered againſt the Beer-
" boon Rajah, three months before the Nabob's
" abdication, but never advanced more than three
" coſs from the city; in which ſituation it conti-
" nued upon my arrival there.

" All who are now in Bengal, and acquainted
" with the tranſactions of the government, will bear
" witneſs that this is a true deſcription of facts:
" and all who are convinced of the facts, will
" certainly agree, that affairs were at an extremity
" no longer to be neglected without manifeſt dan-
" ger of having the provinces over-run, and the
" trade entirely ruined. I was reſolved therefore
" to uſe my utmoſt endeavours to get theſe bad
" miniſters removed; and judging it might be dif-
" ficult to prevail on the Nabob to part with his
" favourites without ſome degree of violence, I
" brought with me a detachment of Europeans and
" Seapoys, under pretence of ſending them with
" Colonel Caillaud, to reinforce the army at
" Patna.

" I arrived, with the Colonel, at Coſſimbuzar,
" the 14th of October, and the next day the Na-
" bob paid us a viſit. The 16th we went to the
" city and returned the viſit: on the 18th, the
" Nabob came to Moradbaag, by appointment,
" to talk upon buſineſs. In the converſation which
" I had with him, in the two former meetings, I
" had taken occaſion to repreſent to him, in gene-
" ral terms, the bad management of his miniſters,
" the miſeries and univerſal diſaffection of the
" country, and the deſperate ſtate of his, as well
" as the Company's affairs. In order to give
" him a more full and clear view of the evils
" brought on through the weakneſs of his admi-
" niſtration, and to point out the means for their
" removal, I had prepared three letters, which,
" after a ſhort and friendly introduction, I deli-

" vered

" vered to him; of which tranſlations are hereunto
" annexed.

" The Nabob ſeemed much affected by the
" peruſal of the letters, but endeavoured more to
" put an end to the conference, than to propoſe a
" remedy to the evils. I, however, prevailed on
" him to ſend for his dinner to Muradbaag, and
" in a manner inſiſted on his coming to ſome de-
" termination for the immediate reform of the go-
" vernment. At length, he confeſſed himſelf,
" through age and grief for the late loſs of his
" ſon, incapable of ſtruggling alone againſt ſo
" many difficulties. He deſired he might have
" time to conſult with his friends. I told him,
" the men with whom he had lately adviſed were
" not his friends, but his greateſt enemies; that
" his returning again into the midſt of them, would
" only be the means of augmenting his difficulties;
" that he had much better take the aſſiſtance of
" one from among his relations, on whoſe true
" attachment and fidelity he might more ſafely
" rely. He named five or ſix, and amongſt them
" Coſſim Ally Cawn. I aſked him, which of that
" number was moſt fit to aſſiſt him in his preſent
" exigencies? He replied, without any heſitation,
" that Coſſim Ally Cawn was the moſt proper;
" nevertheleſs, it was with the utmoſt difficulty I
" could prevail on him to ſend for him, and ſo
" very late that, before Coſſim Ally Cawn could
" arrive, the old Nabob was extremely fatigued,
" and in ſuch a ſtate of anxiety, that I could not
" refuſe his return home to take his reſt. I was
" convinced indeed, it was to no purpoſe to de-
" tain him, for ſuch was the jealouſy he diſcovered
" with reſpect to Coſſim Ally Cawn, that I ſaw
" he never would conſent, without ſome ſort of
" force, to give the other the means of reſtoring
" order to his affairs. An hour or two after the

" Nabob's departure, Coſſim Ally Cawn arrived,
" and ſeemed to be extremely apprehenſive, that
" the Nabob, inſtead of truſting him with the
" management of his affairs, would endeavour by
" ſome means or other to get rid of him. I agreed
" therefore in opinion with him, that he ſhould
" not go to the Nabob's houſe, until meaſures
" were taken for his ſecurity. We reſolved, how-
" ever, to give the Nabob the next day, the 19th,
" to reflect upon the letters before-mentioned, in
" hopes that he would propoſe ſome means of re-
" gulation. I heard nothing from him all day,
" but found by my intelligence, that he had been
" in council with his old adviſers, Keenooram,
" Monilot and Checon, whoſe advice I was ſure
" would be contrary to the welfare of the country
" in general, and that of the Company in particu-
" lar. I determined therefore to act immediately
" on the Nabob's fears. There could not be a
" better opportunity than that the night of the
" 19th afforded, it being the concluſion of the
" Gentoo feaſt, when all the principal people of
" that Caſt would be pretty well fatigued with
" their ceremonies. Accordingly I agreed with
" Caillaud, that he ſhould croſs the river with the
" detachment, between three and four in the morn-
" ing, and having joined Coſſim Ally Cawn and
" his people, march to the Nabob's palace, and
" ſurround it juſt at day-break, being extremely
" deſirous to prevent any diſturbance or blood-
" ſhed. I wrote a letter to the Nabob, a tranſla-
" tion of which is annexed, and delivered it to the
" Colonel, to ſend in to him at ſuch a time as he
" ſhould think moſt expedient. Meaſures were
" taken, at the ſame time, for ſeizing the perſons
" of Keenooram, Monilot and Checon, my in-
" tention being only to remove theſe three un-
" worthy miniſters, and place Coſſim Ally Cawn

" in

" in the full management of all the affairs, in qua-
" lity of deputy and ſucceſſor to the Nabob. The
" neceſſary preparations being accordingly made
" with all the care and ſecreſy poſſible, the Colonel
" embarked with the troops, joined Coſſim Ally
" Cawn, without the leaſt alarm, and marched
" into the court-yard of the palace juſt at the
" proper inſtant. The gates of the inner court
" being ſhut, the Colonel formed his men without,
" and ſent my letter to the Nabob, who was at firſt
" in a great rage, and long threatened he would
" make what reſiſtance he could, and take his fate.
" The Colonel forbore all hoſtilities, and ſeveral
" meſſages paſſed between him and the Nabob.
" The affair remained in this doubtful ſtate about
" two hours, when the Nabob, finding his per-
" ſiſting was to no purpoſe, ſent a meſſage to Coſ-
" ſim Ally Cawn, informing him, he was ready
" to ſend him the ſeals and all the enſigns of dig-
" nity, and to order the Nobut to be ſtruck up in
" his name; provided he would agree to take the
" whole charge of government upon him, to diſ-
" charge all the arrears due to the troops, to pay
" the uſual revenues to the King, to ſave his life
" and honour, and give him an allowance ſufficient
" for his maintenance. All theſe conditions being
" agreed to, Coſſim Ally Cawn was proclaimed
" and the old Nabob came out to the Colonel, de-
" claring that he depended on him for his life.
" The troops then took poſſeſſion of all the gates,
" and notice being ſent to me, I immediately re-
" paired to the palace, and was met by the old
" Nabob in the gateway. He aſked, if his per-
" ſon was ſafe, which ſeemed now to be all his
" concern. I told him, that not only his perſon
" was ſafe, but his government too, if he pleaſed,
" of which it was never intended to deprive him.
" The Nabob anſwered, that he had no more

" buſineſs at the city; that he ſhould be in con-
" tinual danger from Coſſim Ally Cawn; and that
" if he was permitted to go and live in Calcutta,
" he ſhould be extremely happy and contented.
" Though I could not help lamenting his ſudden
" fall, I was not ſorry for this propoſal, as I knew
" affairs would be much better managed without
" him; and his retaining a ſhare of the authority
" (however ſmall) could not fail to cauſe ſuch
" perplexities, as might prove, in ſo critical and
" dangerous a juncture, of the worſt conſequences
" to the adminiſtration. Coſſim Ally Cawn was ac-
" cordingly ſeated on the Muſnud, and I paid him
" my congratulations in the uſual form. All the
" Jemmadars and perſons of diſtinction at the city
" came immediately, and made their acknowledg-
" ments to the new Suba; and in the evening
" every thing was as perfectly quiet, as if there
" had been no change. The people in general
" ſeemed much pleaſed with this revolution, which
" had this peculiar felicity attending it, that it was
" brought about without the leaſt diſturbance in
" town, or a drop of blood ſpilt.

" The Nabob did not think himſelf ſafe even
" for one night in the city. Coſſim Ally Cawn
" ſupplied him with boats, and permitted him to
" take away as many of his women as he deſired
" (which he did to the number of about ſixty)
" with a reaſonable quantity of jewels. I fur-
" niſhed him with a ſtrong eſcort of Europeans
" and Seapoys, and intended to lodge him at He-
" rajeel, but he would not truſt himſelf there,
" and begged he might ſleep in his boats cloſe to
" Muradbaug, which he accordingly did. He
" continued at Muradbaug the next day, and in
" the evening I viſited him with Colonel Caillaud.
" He appeared then pretty eaſy, and reconciled to
" the loſs of a power which he owned to be rather

" a burthen

" a burthen than pleaſure, and too much for his abi-
" lities to manage ſince the death of his ſon; and
" the enjoyment of the reſt of his days in ſecurity,
" under the Engliſh protection, ſeemed to be the
" chief object of his wiſhes.

" On the morning of the 22d, he ſet out for
" Calcutta, and arrived there on the 29th. He
" was met by a deputation from the Council, and
" treated with every mark of reſpect due to his
" former dignity."

And now having compleated our taſk, we think it neceſſary to requeſt your indulgence for any inaccuracies and imperfections that may appear in this haſty performance, begun only the *laſt Saturday*, and printed the Wedneſday after, under many difficulties, by the attacks againſt this revolution appearing ſo late; which has laid us under the neceſſity of omitting, for want of time, many other material vouchers: however, we think we have fully evinced the indiſpenſable neceſſity which moved your ſervants to this meaſure; and hope we have cleared it from the imputation of *unparalleled infamy*, and the many other indecent and unbecoming reflections thrown out by hot-brained reſentment againſt it.—If we have done that, and enabled you to judge, at the enſuing criſis, with candour and propriety—our labour is not in vain. —If we have not, we are ſorry we have given ourſelves and you this uſeleſs trouble.—A few ſhort reflections, and we come to a cloſe.—Had the heads of father and ſon been taken off at the period of the Dutch conteſt, in November 1760, as juſtice and honour called for; (and why it was not done, let the world judge) and that opportunity taken of acknowledging the Shaw Zadda, and receiving the Subaſhip of Bengal from him for the

Company; (or the next opportunity, when urged by Mr. Holwell)—happy would have been the iſſue to the Company and the nation! happy would it have been for thoſe individuals, who, unfortunately miſled, ſince died, butchered in your ſervice! happy would it have been for thoſe, who, in miſerable times, ſucceeded to Colonel Clive and his Council, doomed to ſupport a government that proved a diſgrace to our name and arms; and that too with inadequate reſources. On the whole, we hope we ſhall not be thought too preſuming, if we venture to draw one general concluſion for you and ourſelves, to wit—*That Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, and his Son Mhiran, were more deſerving a halter than a Subaſhip of Bengal.* Not that we would be thought, in this, to detract from the Treaty of 1757, to which we give the high merit due to it, at that fatal, melancholy period.

Mount Felix,
Walton upon Thames, Surry,
Feb. 22, 1764.

J. Z. HOLWELL.

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE closing the foregoing Addreſs, a Pamphlet is come to our hands, bearing the title of "A Letter to the Honourable the Secret Committee for Affairs of the Honourable the United "Company of Merchants of England trading to "the Eaſt Indies," ſigned by ſix Gentlemen of your Council of Fort William.

After we had taken the trouble of peruſing this piece, we made ſome inquiries how the Public came by it? and learnt that it was privately compiled abroad, and tranſmitted to England to a relation of one of the Gentlemen who ſigned it, to be delivered to the Court of Directors here; who, as we are informed, refuſed taking any notice of it, as it did not reach them by the uſual and proper channel. If our information in theſe particulars is juſt, we cannot help thinking the method taken by theſe Gentlemen was deficient in equity and generoſity; for, to lodge an accuſation when the accuſed have no opportunity of vindicating themſelves, is unprecedented. Such we conceive to be the caſe reſpecting Mr. Vanſittart; and we cannot help applauding the juſtice of your Court of Directors, for their candid behaviour in giving no countenance to a proceeding ſo irregular. With regard to the pamphlet itſelf, we cannot think the Publiſher of it a friend to the parties concerned; or if he is, he has certainly judged ill in throwing it out at this juncture. We flatter ourſelves, this performance will not have weight enough to influence you, when you compare it with the facts and evidences laid before you in the foregoing Addreſs: but this alſo we ſubmit to your impartial judg-

ment—borrowing a paragraph from the Advertiſement prefixed to that Letter, as apt to our purpoſe, with a little variation.

" But though the wiſeſt and beſt may ſometimes " differ in points of ſo intereſting a nature, yet it " is from Facts and Arguments *(drawn from " thoſe Facts)* alone, that the Impartial ought to " decide."

Mr. HOLWELL's
REFUTATION
OF A
LETTER
FROM CERTAIN
Gentlemen of the Council at BENGAL,
TO THE HONOURABLE
The SECRET COMMITTEE.
SERVING AS A
SUPPLEMENT to his ADDRESS
TO THE
PROPRIETORS of EAST-INDIA STOCK.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Letter is publiſhed to enable the Proprietors of India Stock to judge of the primary cauſe of the preſent commotions in Bengal, and of the true motives for depoſing Jaffier Aly Cawn.

The friends of the Gentleman who accompliſhed that revolution, have handed about an apology for ſo extraordinary a ſtep: It cannot then be deemed improper to make public the reaſons on the other ſide.

If names ought to have any weight in determining queſtions of this kind, there are two ſubjoined to the preſent Letter, thoſe of * Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, which have a title to command the higheſt veneration from every lover of his country. Both of theſe Officers have performed actions which might vie with the moſt brilliant of antiquity.

Nevertheleſs, it is with equal juſtice acknowledged, that after the ſtroke was ſtruck, ſome gentlemen approved of what had been done, who bear the faireſt and moſt amiable characters.

But though the wiſeſt and the beſt may ſometimes differ in points of ſo intereſting a nature, yet it is from facts and arguments alone that the impartial ought to decide.

* The firſt of theſe Gentlemen, by his able and ſpirited conduct, on the coaſt of Coromandel, did honour to himſelf, his country and her arms, and ſo we will ſuppoſe the other would have done, if Fortune had ever given him an opportunity; which ſhe certainly did not, as will appear in another place.

TO THE HONOURABLE

The SECRET COMMITTEE

For Affairs of the Honourable Uni ed Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt-Indies.

Copy.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

1. IT gives us the greateſt concern to be obliged to addreſs you, in the manner we are now under the neceſſity of doing; but as we have publicly declared our diſſent from the late revolution in the kingdom of Bengal, and expreſſed our entire diſapprobation of the meaſures purſued conſequent thereto; it is our duty to acquaint you with our reaſons for having differed in opinion from the gentlemen who were acceſſory to that revolution, leſt ill-minded people ſhould repreſent our oppoſition as a faction, inſtead of owing its riſe, as it really does, to our ſtrict regard to what we think conducive to the honour of our country, and the intereſts of our employers. Had the whole Board been conſulted, we dare aſſert, this meaſure would have been rejected by the majority; and we humbly refer to you, whether the opinion of every member thereof ought not to have been taken by the Preſident, before he ventured upon ſo bold a ſtep as the ſubverſion of a government.

REFUTATION.

1. It is very manifeſt, theſe gentlemen could be under no *concern* at all, upon this occaſion; becauſe they knew they were under no *neceſſity* of addreſſing the Secret Committee in this *clandeſtine* manner; the Board of Calcutta being always open for every remonſtrance of their ſervants; through which channel they are conveyed to their honourable employers at home: but theſe gentlemen were ſenſible, that if this regular and uſual method had been taken, it could not come home without a vindication annexed, which would have rendered this performance invalid, and have fruſtrated all the expectations they had from it; imagining ſome ſtain, from the dirt they throw at the revolution of 1760, muſt ſtick when there were none at hand to wipe it off. The ill-judged zeal of their friends in giving it to the Public, is a ſtep was never intended by the Compilers; they flattered themſelves it might poſſibly operate in the dark, but if it ever ſaw the light, they knew it was open to detection and confutation in all its parts. Here let it be remarked, that Meſſrs. Vanſittart, Caillaud, Holwell, Sumner, and M'Guire, were not only a majority of the Committee, but of the Council alſo. Pray was the Council conſulted in the revolution of 1757? We ſay—No.—Nor had they any right to expect it; for they could not be capable judges.—Nor were there any public objections made to this revolution at the board, before Meſſrs. Amyatt and Ellis took their ſeats, and Major Carnac was returned to the ſettlement.

2. You were informed, laſt year, of the ſurpriſing revolution in favour of Mhir Mahommed Coſſim

Coſſim Aly Chan, which would neceſſarily be repreſented in the moſt favourable light, by the gentlemen who promoted it. But whatever judgment you may have been led to entertain of the meaſure, from their account of it, we cannot but think you will judge as ill of it as we do, when you are truly informed of the circumſtances with which it was attended, the manner in which it was executed, and the ſteps that have been ſince taken to ſupport it: Of theſe we will give you as ſuccinct an account as poſſible.

REFUTATION.

2. The gentlemen who promoted that revolution ſtood in no need of falſe colouring to recommend it. The whole chain of events, which made the meaſure (of diveſting Mhir Jaffier of power to do greater ills) indiſpenſably neceſſary, were minutely tranſmitted to the Court of Directors: they examined, they ſaw the neceſſity, they approved, and ſhewed a needful and juſt reſentment to thoſe who roſe in oppoſition to it.

3. At a time, when there was not the leaſt appearance of a rupture or diſguſt between us and the Nabob Jaffier Aly Chan; on the contrary, a friendſhip and harmony ſubſiſted; Mir Coſſim Chan, his ſon-in-law, came down to Calcutta, on ſome pretence or other, to viſit Mr. Vanſittart; and having ſtaid a ſhort time, he returned to Morſhedabad. A few days after Mir Coſſim's departure, Mr. Vanſittart went up to Morſhedabad, on the pretence of a viſit to the Nabob. Colonel Caillaud, with a party of two hundred Europeans and ſome Seapoys, attended him; who, to remove the ſuſpicion which ſuch a force would have neceſſarily occaſioned, it was pretended were going up to

Patna,

Patna, to reinforce the army there. When Mr. Vanſittart arrived at Moradbaug, the Nabob paid him two viſits, at the laſt of which Mr. Vanſittart, without any previous notice of his intentions, gave him the three letters, mentioned in conſultation of the 10th of November, 1760; of which copies have been tranſmitted you. The abruptneſs with which theſe letters were preſented him, one cloſe upon the other, and the unexpected propoſals contained in them, terrified the Nabob; and he was entirely at a loſs how to act, but deſired time to conſider on what was to be done. Mr. Vanſittart, ſeeing his perplexity, ſtrongly inſiſted on his immediately naming ſome perſon, from among his relations, to take charge of the Subaſhip; and very particularly recommended Coſſim Aly Chan, who was ſent for, and the Nabob was deſired to ſtay till he came; but Coſſim Aly Chan delayed ſo long, and the Nabob was in ſuch anxiety of mind, and ſo deſirous to be releaſed from the viſit, being greatly fatigued, that Mr. Vanſittart was obliged, in order to ſave appearances, to ſuffer his departure to the palace, after having detained him much longer than his inclination. That night and the day following paſſed in concerting meaſures with Coſſim Aly Chan, how to put in execution the plan before agreed on in Calcutta; *a treaty having been ſigned for this purpoſe, in September, 1760, while Coſſim Aly Chan was down here.* In conſequence of theſe deliberations, our troops clandeſtinely croſſed the river, the next night, under Colonel Caillaud, and being joined by Coſſim Aly Chan and his party, ſurrounded the Nabob's palace. A letter from Mr. Vanſittart was ſent in to the Nabob, demanding his immediate compliance with what had been propoſed to him; to which the Nabob returned for anſwer, "That ſuch uſage "was what he never expected from the Engliſh;

"that

" that whilſt a force was at his gates, he would " enter into no terms; and that it was his deſire " our troops might be returned to Moradbaug." A meſſage was then ſent, informing the Nabob, that if he did not directly comply, they ſhould be obliged to ſtorm the palace. Aſtoniſhed and terrified by this menace, he opened the gates, exclaiming, " That he was betrayed; that the Eng- " liſh were guilty of perjury and breach of faith; " that he perceived their deſigns againſt his " government; that he had friends enough to " hazard at leaſt one battle in his defence; but " although no oaths were ſacred enough to bind " the Engliſh, yet as he had ſworn to be their " faithful friend, he would never ſwerve from his " engagement, and rather ſuffer death than draw " his ſword againſt them." So ſuſpicious was he of being ſold, that, " He deſired to know what " ſum of money Coſſim Aly Chan was to give for " the Subaſhip, and he would give half as much " more to be continued: he hoped, however, if " they intended to dethrone him, they would not " leave him to the mercy of his ſon-in-law, from " whom he feared the worſt, but rather wiſhed, " they would carry him from the city, and give " him a place of ſafety in Calcutta." This laſt requeſt of the Nabob's, the effect of his fear and deſpair, was immediately laid hold of, and conſtrued in the light of a voluntary reſignation. Accordingly, our troops took poſſeſſion of the palace; Mir Coſſim Chan was raiſed to the Muſnud; and the old Nabob was hurried into a boat, with a few of his women and neceſſaries, and ſent away to Calcutta, in a manner wholly unworthy of the high rank he had ſo lately held; as is alſo the ſcanty ſubſiſtence allowed him here by his ſucceſſor.

ANSWER.

3. With regard to this detail of the revolution, we refer to Mr. Vanſittart's Memorial, publiſhed in a late Addreſs to the Proprietors; by a candid comparing one with the other, you will be capable of judging which has the greateſt appearance of truth and probability.

4. Thus was Jaffier Aly Chan depoſed, in breach of a treaty founded upon the moſt ſolemn oaths, and in violation of the national faith. A Prince of whoſe friendſhip and attachment you have had many ſignal proofs; in whoſe cauſe our arms have, with much honour, been employed; and by a firm adherence to whom, the Engliſh had acquired, throughout the whole country, ſo univerſal a character of fidelity and conſtancy, that the moſt perfect confidence was placed by the natives in them.

ANSWER.

4. The miſrepreſentations of this paragraph, ſee fully confuted in the ſaid Addreſs.

5. The advantages to be reaped by the Company, from the revolution, were, the grant of the Zamindarries of Burduan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong; the payment of the balance due from Nabob Jaffier Aly Chan; with a preſent of five lack of rupees from Coſſim Aly Chan, towards defraying the expences of the war againſt the French, on the coaſt of Coromandel. Of theſe, Mr. Vanſittart, on his return to Calcutta, acquainted the Board; and, at the ſame time, in juſtification of his proceedings, laid before them a memorial; copies of which were tranſmitted to you, by the ſhips of the laſt ſeaſon.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

5. See the articles of the treaty in the Addreſs.

6. This memorial is introduced with a liſt of crimes laid to Jaffier Aly Chan's charge; which, to thoſe unacquainted with the Eaſtern governments, will appear deſerving of the higheſt reſentment from a civilized nation. Yet ſuch is the ſtate of politics in every Aſiatic court, that, through the apprehenſions of the Sovereign, and the intrigues and artifices of the great men about him, inſtances of cruelty and oppreſſion are but too frequent; and even the moſt beloved among them are too much to be taxed with committing, or at leaſt conniving at, acts of violence; but it ſhould be conſidered, that many of theſe are done by perſons in power, without their knowledge; and that, as there are no regular puniſhments for criminals of ſtation, and who may be ſo powerful that it would be dangerous proceeding openly againſt them, recourſe is often had to the dagger or poiſon to puniſh the guilty. This was the caſe in moſt of the inſtances alledged againſt Jaffier Aly Chan; none of which ſhew greater proofs of cruelty, than that which Coſſim Aly Chan diſcovered when, being in poſſeſſion of the palace, he was deſirous of making the firſt act of his power the aſſaſſination of Jaffier Aly Chan therein, and was very much diſpleaſed, when he found we intended to give him protection at Calcutta. Since his acceſſion to the Subadary, we could produce to you numberleſs inſtances of his extortions and cruelties, but that it would run us into an exorbitant length; and he ſeems to have made the more immediate objects of his ill uſage, thoſe who have been the moſt avowed friends of the Engliſh. We ſhall only particulariſe Ramnarain, whom he diſpoſſeſſed

of the Nabobſhip of Patna, in which it was always thought ſound policy in us to ſupport him, on account of his approved faith; and he now keeps him in irons, till he has been fleeced to the utmoſt, when there is no doubt he will be diſpatched. Moſt, if not all thoſe who eſpouſed the Engliſh intereſt, have been laid under the heavieſt contributions, and many have died under the force of torture to exact money from them; others have been either baſely murthered, or (which is a common practice among Gentoos) unable to ſurvive the loſs of honour, have made away with themſelves.

REFUTATION.

6. Suppoſe this to be the caſe in moſt Aſiatic ſtates, which we believe may be true; is it not equally true that moſt of Mhir Jaffier's cruelties were carried into execution from the confidence he had in our protection? And ſhall we not bluſh for this protection being granted to him ſo long? Surely if we do not, we ought; for in the trueſt ſenſe, his cruelties were our own. As to Coſſim Aly Khan's being deſirous of aſſaſſinating Mhir Jaffier, it is a charge we much doubt the truth of, as we never before heard the fact mentioned. But that Mhir Jaffier made two attempts to murder Mhir Coſſim, was a truth well known, and never even doubted; therefore ſuppoſing this charge to be really true, we will not ſay revenge and reſentment will juſtify the deſire he is ſaid to expreſs; but ſurely it will bear ſome extenuation, when the provocation is conſidered. Touching Rajah Ram Narain, the Addreſs before referred to will ſhew, that Mhir Jaffier had reſolved to remove that officer from the government of Patna, (as a perſon not truſt-worthy, nor equal to ſo great a

charge)

charge) long before Mhir Coſſim had any power or influence at the Durbar, it is very well known that Ram Narain was in treaty to deliver the city of Patna to the Shaw Zadda, when Colonel Clive's extraordinary forced marches prevented him, and ſaved the city and the province. With reſpect to Coſſim Aly Khan's putting him in irons, it is very well known that for ſome years he had rendered no account of the revenues of the provinces of Bahar, on which head Mhir Jaffier often complained to Mr. Holwell, who believes Col. Clive received complaints of the ſame kind from him, before he left India. Theſe gentlemen know nothing is more common than to put an officer of the revenues in irons, until he delivers in his accounts; nothing further being meant by it than that he ſhould not eſcape with his embezzlements. That he was not truſt-worthy, nor equal to that poſt, will appear from this very ſtriking circumſtance: That when Col. Clive was on his departure, he ſtrongly recommended Mhir Coſſim to Mr. Holwell's protection, and at the ſame time mentioning his diſtruſt of Ram Narain, told Mr. Holwell that Mhir Coſſim was the man whom he ought to put into the government of Patna. The reſt of the accuſations againſt Mhir Coſſim in this paragraph are vague and general, and without one ſingle inſtance of proof; conſequently unworthy notice.

7. It is inſinuated in the memorial, that the Nabob's avarice and cruelty had made him the deteſtation of all good men, and that he was in the hands of bad miniſters, under whoſe mal-adminiſtration the country was greatly oppreſſed: as an inſtance whereof, the ſcarcity of grain in the city is produced. To theſe miniſters are aſcribed

the great difficulties the Nabob laboured under, for want of money to anſwer the expences of the government, and to pay the army, rendered mutinous for want of their arrears; beſides which inteſtine danger, the provinces were threatened with an invaſion by the Shahzadah with a powerful army, and ſeveral of the Rajahs and Zamindars, were on the point of revolting, to encounter all which there was nothing but a diſaffected army. Mr. Vanſittart appeals to every by-ſtander for the truth of theſe facts, and of the imminent peril to which the country was expoſed; he declares his intentions were only to remove the bad miniſters, for which purpoſe he carried up with him the party of Europeans and Seapoys. He proceeds to ſet forth the manner in which the old Nabob was removed from the government, and Coſſim Aly Chan raiſed. He ſays, People in general were pleaſed with the revolution; and makes a merit of its being effected without the leaſt diſturbance in the city, or a drop of blood ſpilt. He concludes with repreſenting the anxiety the Nabob expreſſed to get from the city, through fear of Coſſim Aly Chan; and obſerves, that he appeared pretty eaſy and reconciled to the loſs of his power, which he owned to be rather a burden than a pleaſure, and too much for his abilities to manage ſince the death of his ſon: and that the enjoyment of the reſt of his days in ſecurity, under the Engliſh protection, ſeemed to be the chief object of his wiſhes.

ANSWER.

7. See Mr. Vanſittart's Memorial, and the proofs in various parts of the Addreſs in ſupport of it.

8. It is very natural for any perſon who takes an uncommon ſtep, to endeavour to vindicate himſelf by

by the moſt ſpecious arguments, and the moſt plauſible reaſoning he can deviſe; and nothing leſs could be expected from Mr. Vanſittart, after having brought about ſo unprecedented a revolution. He has told his ſtory with all the aggravations the nature of it would admit: notwithſtanding which, we do not imagine the reaſons he has given in ſupport of ſo violent a meaſure will prove ſatisfactory to the world. He takes great pains to blacken Mhir Jaffier's character, in order to prejudice men's minds againſt him; and lays great ſtreſs upon the ſcarcity of grain in the city; but we apprehend Mr. Vanſittart does not judge ſo harſhly from that circumſtance, after what he himſelf experienced laſt year; for notwithſtanding all the care, we are not to doubt, he has taken, grain was never known ſo ſcarce in Calcutta before, inſomuch that numbers daily periſhed.

ANSWER.

8. Not worthy any particular notice.

9. Want of money was the great difficulty the Nabob laboured under; but this did not proceed from any fault of his, but from the diſtracted ſtate in which the country had been ever ſince Colonel Clive's departure; ſo that a very ſmall part of the revenues came into his treaſury. The Burdwan and Nuddea countries were aſſigned over to the Company for the payment of the Nabob's debt [1]. Midnapoor, the frontier to the ſouth-weſt, was over-run by the Marattas [2]; Beerboon, and other Zamindaries, with the province of Purea, under Kuddum Hoſſein Chan, were affected towards the Shahzadah, who had under contribution the whole province of Bahar, except the city of Patna and a ſmall diſtrict round it. Chittagong, the eaſtern barrier, did little more than defend itſelf againſt

the incurſions of the Muggs, inhabitants of Aracan, who uſed every year to come into Bengal for plunder. There remained only the Dacca province, the diſtricts round Morſhedabad, the Radſhy and Dinagepoor countries, to ſupply the immenſe expence of the war. And here lay the Nabob's diſtreſs, that with one fourth part, if ſo much, of the accuſtomed revenues, he was obliged to maintain an army greater than any Nabob did before him: and the Engliſh army was not the leaſt conſiderable part of the burthen; for truſting moſt to them, he paid them firſt [3]; which preference was the cauſe of diſcontent to the country troops. And though the force we had in the field, againſt an enemy whom Colonel Clive had, but a very ſhort time before, drove out of the country, far exceeded thoſe the Colonel had with him, yet no material advantage was gained over them, but the country was over-run and ravaged by them, and by frequent marches and counter-marches, our own armies became as deſtructive as thoſe of the invaders [4]. No wonder then at the perilous condition to which Mhir Jaffier was reduced; to extricate him from which, it behoved us to exert our utmoſt abilities: inſtead whereof, he was treated with the greateſt indignity by us, and baſely turned out of his government.

ANSWERS.

9. [1] And were obſtructed in the receipts of them by every artifice and fineſſe in Mhir Jaffier's power.

[2] To what was this owing, but Jaffier Khan's irreſolution and puſillanimity? —— See the Addreſs.

[3] How he paid them, ſee the Addreſs.——

[4] The ſole cauſe very well known to theſe Gentlemen, to wit, defection, cowardice and

treachery in Mhir Jaffier and his ſon, ſet forth in the Addreſs in three remarkable inſtances, in any of which, a period might have been put to the troubles, as well as diſtreſſes of himſelf, his allies and his country.

10. To remove bad Counſellors from a Prince is certainly meritorious; but it does not ſeem to us that any thing was ever deſigned againſt the Nabob's miniſters; on the contrary, that the ſole intent was to diſplace the Nabob himſelf, is pretty evident, by the treaty before-mentioned, made in Calcutta [1]. Had there been the leaſt attempt to convince him in a friendly manner of any errors in his adminiſtration, or of the neceſſity of diſmiſſing from his preſence thoſe who ill-adviſed him, it is not to be doubted that he would have hearkened to reaſon. That he was not obſtinate againſt good advice, may be concluded from the extraordinary influence which Colonel Clive had over him; in proof whereof we need only call to mind how violently he was incenſed againſt Rajah Ram Narain, and Roy Dulub; yet the Colonel, by gentle methods, without having recourſe to any other force than that of perſuaſion, perfectly reconciled him to the former, and obtained his permiſſion for the latter to reſide at Calcutta, and bring thither with him his family and effects.

ANSWER.

10. [1] See the treaty in the Addreſs, by which it will be pretty evident it never was intended to diſplace him, but to diveſt him only of power to bring on the *intire* ruin of the country—and us his allies.—

11. The people in general, very far from being pleaſed with the revolution, (as alledged in the Memorial) were extremely diſſatisfied thereat. Had

Coſſim Aly Chan been before in eſteem among them, or poſſeſſed any ſhare of influence or power, they might perhaps have overlooked the circumſtance of his riſe, and a ſeries of popular actions might in time have reconciled them to the uſurpation. But he was deſpiſed and diſliked before he came to the Muſnud, and his behaviour ſince has been ſo oppreſſive and tyrannical, that it could not fail confirming the public hatred of him.

REFUTATION.

11. This man who is ſaid to be in no eſteem, but deſpiſed and hated, had a Nabobſhip in the province, was deemed worthy of the Subah's daughter, and by Colonel Clive of the government of Patna; and ſurely we may, without any offence to theſe Gentlemen, ſay, that Colonel Clive was a ſuperior judge in this matter. On the whole, we may juſtly ſay, the inſinuations thrown out in this paragraph are without foundation, and reflect more diſhonour on the authors themſelves, than on Mhir Coſſim.

12. The little diſturbance at Morſhedabad upon the occaſion, proceeded from the apprehenſions all degrees of people were under, from ſo large a force being brought into the city in the dead of night; and Mhir Jaffier, no ways ſuſpicious of the faith of the Engliſh, had taken no precautions for his own ſecurity. Such is the ſuperiority of our arms, and ſo great the dread of our forces in this country, that had we gone openly to work, we ſhould have met with little or no difficulty; which renders our having proceeded by ſtealth and treachery the more inexcuſable: and we are truly ſorry to have occaſion to obſerve, that the means by which this meaſure was brought about, have thrown an indelible ſtain upon our national character,

racter, and injured us as much in the opinion of the natives, as it has of all the European colonies in this part of the world.

ANSWER.

12. Let Mr. Vanſittart's Memorial reply to this.

13. It is aſſerted in the Memorial, that Mhir Jaffier was eaſy under the loſs of his power, which he is ſaid to have owned to have been rather a burden to him: but it is evident, on the contrary, from his declarations ſince, and his letters to the Company and Colonel Clive, that he was very unwilling to part with his government; and that he greatly regrets the deprivation of it. He was neceſſitated, indeed, to ſubmit; and in hopes of being redreſſed ſome time or other by the Company, judging that ſuch a ſtep could never be approved at home, he very wiſely choſe, rather than truſt himſelf with his ſon-in-law, to wait patiently for that redreſs in ſafety at Calcutta. So far he might appear reſigned to his fate; yet this can never be conſtrued as an abdication of his government, though it has been induſtriouſly endeavoured to make the world look upon it in that light.

REFUTATION.

13. What letters Mhir Jaffier might ſubſequently be influenced to write, we know not—Mr. Holwell, the day after Mhir Jaffier arrived at Calcutta, paid him a viſit, and had a private conference of two hours with him,—in the courſe of which "he often lamented pathetically the "loſs of his ſon; that ſince he received that "ſtroke, he found himſelf incapable of govern-"ment, or the things of this world; that the "exemplary manner in which God had deprived "him of a ſon and ſucceſſor, had convinced

"him

" him their ſins were great, and required ex-
" piation; that he was reſolved to expiate them
" at the Tomb of the Prophet, and begged Mr.
" Holwell would interceed with Mr. Vanſittart
" for a paſſage to Judda.—At times, he ſaid his
" enemies had injured him in the opinion of the
" Engliſh, from whom he thought he had met
" with hard treatment." In ſhort, the man who was ſo lately and juſtly the object of deteſtation, was now as real an object of commiſeration.—Mr. Holwell applied to Mr. Vanſittart for his paſſage to Judda, and in the ſtrongeſt terms enforced the propriety of complying with his requeſt; foreſeeing, that if he remained in Bengal, he would ever be an object for a diſaffected party to work with. Mr. Vanſittart gave his aſſent;—but ſome time after, on a repreſentation from the Judda Supra-cargoes, that complaints from him to the Baſhaw might involve their ſhip in troubles, the aſſent was unhappily withdrawn.

14. We have now, Honourable Sirs, laid before you a true account of the revolution. The projectors perhaps thought the advantages it was to bring the Company, would be a ſufficient atonement for the meaſure, and enſure them the approbation of their maſters. It is true the Company have a conſiderable addition of territory, and do now receive a large yearly revenue; but as great, if not greater advantages might have been procured by more honourable means: and the preſent tranquil ſtate of the country, which ſecures to the Company, as well as the Nabob, the full enjoyment of their revenues, is not the effect of Mhir Coſſim Chan's Nabobſhip, but of an event which would equally have happened, had Jaffier Aly Chan been continued on the Muſnud, as can be eaſily made to appear.

ANSWER.

14. There appears a myſtery at the cloſe of this paragraph totally unintelligible: poſſibly we may have it explained by-and-by—We will not attempt it here.

15. Soon after Coſſim Aly Chan was fixed in the Nabobſhip, the Company were nominally inveſted with the Zamyndaries of Burdwan, Midnapoor and Chittagong: and only nominally; for our firſt demands upon the two former of theſe, for the payment of the revenues, were refuſed.

REFUTATION.

15. This paragraph ſeems to be a flat contradiction of part of the 14th—for if the Company "now receive a large yearly revenue," it cannot be properly called a nominal inveſtiture; beſides, we know the Company, at the laſt diſpatch of their ſhips from Bengal, had received for two years revenues from Burdomaan only, 70 lack, or eight hundred ſeventy-five thouſand pounds.

16. So bad an impreſſion of us did the revolution create in the minds of the country people, that the Burdwan Rajah, who, in Jaffier Aly Chan's time, had often expreſſed his earneſt deſire that the Company might continue to collect the revenues of his diſtrict, as they had all along done, on account of the Tunckaws, and that they would procure the Zamyndarie for themſelves from the Nabob; yet after the breach of our faith to the old Nabob, concluding no reliance was to be placed in our engagements, he immediately flew off from his former declarations, and inſtead of acquieſcing under our government, he began to act in open rebellion; he ſtopped our trade, raiſed a large

a large force, invited the Marattas into his country, with-held the payment of his revenues, and acting in conjunction with the Beerboon Rajah, he eſpouſed the cauſe of the Shah Zaddah, with whom he entered into correſpondence.

ANSWER.

16. The Burdwan Rajah was yearly fleeced by Mhir Jaffier, therefore no wonder he wiſhed to be rather under the juriſdiction of the Engliſh.—His rebellion was of ſhort continuance, being preſently reduced, as well as the Beerboon Rajah, by our troops under the command of Major Yorke;—but theſe two Rajahs defection proceeded from a cauſe very remote from what it is here aſcribed to; and which theſe gentlemen ſeem wholly ſtrangers to, as we ſhall make appear preſently.

17. Several other Zamyndars who had remained quiet whilſt Jaffier Aly Chan was Nabob, now finding the government overſet, thought themſelves at liberty to withdraw their allegiance, and would not acknowledge Mhir Coſſim, but joined the Shah Zaddah; whoſe party, by theſe frequent defections, was ſtrengthened with ſupplies both of troops and money, and whoſe followers were greatly encouraged by his having been able to maintain his ground, and continue in our dominions the whole preceding campaign, in defiance of the Engliſh army.

REFUTATION.

17. Here it is but juſt to apologize for theſe Gentlemen's ignorance in affairs, for Meſſrs. Coote, Ellis and Carnack were not in Bengal, during the progreſs of thoſe events which occaſioned the unavoidable neceſſity of diveſting Mhir Jaffier of further power;—and coming to the

the board with an unhappy diſpoſition to oppoſe every thing that had been done, becauſe they had no hand in the doing them, they had no methods to pick up materials but from the Bazars and public reporters of detraction. As for Meſſrs. Batſon and Verelſt, they were not of the Committee, and conſequently could know nothing of the political ſyſtem; ſo that amongſt the ſix gentlemen who ſign this letter, one only of them could poſſibly know any thing of the matter; and he but imperfectly, by being ſo far abſent from the center of our Councils.—

18. The Nabob's troops were rendered quite mutinous by the news of the revolution. They declared they knew nothing of Coſſim Aly Chan, and that now they had loſt their old maſter, they were without hopes of being paid any part of the immenſe arrears due to them; and nothing leſs than the extraordinary aſſiduity and influence of Mr. Amyatt, who was then chief at Patna, could have prevented them from proceeding to extremities.

REFUTATION.

18. No wonder the troops grew mutinous on the news,—though not out of affection for their old maſter, as is here unjuſtly inſinuated; for it is very well known his troops would have taken his head long before this, if he had not been protected by ours. The truth is, Mhir Jaffier was in large arrears to them, which they imagined they ſhould loſe by the revolution; but as they were ſoon ſatisfied in this point, all diſturbance ſubſided.—

19. In this ſituation were things when Colonel Caillaud left Patna, and Major Carnac received the command of the army from him. The Major

ſaw

ſaw it was impoſſible for the country to ſupport itſelf againſt ſuch a combination of difficulties, and that if a deciſive blow was not ſoon ſtruck, the Shah could not fail to have immediate poſſeſſion of all. He therefore determined to bring the Prince to an action as ſpeedily as poſſible; and after ſecuring Patna by a garriſon, to prevent its being plundered by that rabble of troops whoſe duty it was to defend it, he puſhed on with the Engliſh army as faſt as he could towards the Prince. He came up with him three days march from the city, the conſequence of which brought on an action wherein he gained a compleat victory *, and reduced the Shah in a few days after to the neceſſity of putting himſelf under the protection of the Engliſh. The Major's ſucceſs, as it put an end to the hopes of all the rebellious Rajahs and Zamyndars, ſo it at once quelled all commotions, and eſtabliſhed the ſo long wiſhed for tranquillity in the country; and the different provinces were now brought into order, and rendered in a condition to pay their reſpective revenues; the Nabob's treaſury was enriched, and he was enabled to diſcharge the arrears of his army, and to advance the money he had engaged to pay the Company.

REFUTATION.

19. This paragraph ſeems big with importance:—We have ſeen, in many parts of this letter, unjuſt inſinuations thrown out to the prejudice of the then commander in chief of your troops, as if all had not been done which ought, and might have been done with the force he had under his command. We have already, in the Addreſs ſo often referred to, pointed out

* This battle was the moſt remarkable of any which has lately been fought in India, Plaſſy not excepted; and may even be compared to that of Alexander againſt Porus.

out the miſcarriages of the campaign he commanded, as in truth owing to the cowardice and treachery of the two Nabobs, when, at three critical junctures, a deciſive ſtroke might have been given; but you ſee it was neceſſary to depreciate and leſſen one character, as introductory to the exaltation of another. Let us ſee how it will anſwer the purpoſe: Major Carnack received the command of the troops from Colonel Caillaud, and with great penetration, "ſaw it was impoſſible for the country "to ſupport itſelf, unleſs a deciſive *ſtroke* was "ſoon *ſtruck*. He puſhed on the Engliſh army "towards the Prince, came up with him, "brought him to an action, and—obtained a "compleat victory."—We have marched ourſelves out of breath, and will pauſe a little to let you enjoy the victory——Though your enjoyment will be ſhort; for know, that when the Shah retreated from Burdomaan by the way of Beerboon and the hills, he paſſed ſome days with the Rajah of the former, and there concerted the operations of the next campaign, as follows: The Prince was to march to Bahar, and ſettle himſelf if poſſible there, to draw the greateſt part of the Engliſh forces that way; early in the next ſeaſon the Morattors were to enter the province of Bengal, and the Rajah of Burdwan and Beerboon were to riſe at the ſame time, and join the Morattors; the Prince was to take the field ſomething earlier, to amuſe the Engliſh, to avoid coming to any pitched action with them, and watch his opportunity of ſlipping by them, as he did the year before, and by forced marches (having only horſe) join his friends in the Burdomaan; the rendezvous being fixed at Burdwan the capital:—but unfortunately for the unhappy Prince, the two Rajahs premature

mature motions fruſtrated this well laid plan; for intelligence arriving at the city of this defection, the Subah Mhir Coſſim, in conjunction with Major Yorke and the troops under his command, immediately took the field, marched to Boodgaam the frontier of Beerboon,. drove a body of the Rajah's troops from thence, and took the place. Here the Subah ſtayed, and detached Major Yorke to reduce Beerboon, which was ſoon accompliſhed, and Nagur the capital taken;—the Burdomaan country reduced alſo to obedience, and the Morattors drove to the ſouthward.—Whilſt theſe ſtrokes were given, almoſt as ſoon as thought of, the Prince was amuſing our army in Bahar; and juſt as he was meditating his ſudden march to the ſouthward, a ſpy who had made incredible ſpeed (from Major Yorke's camp at Nagur,) reached the Prince, and gave him a particular detail of the diſaſters attending his friends in that quarter; he immediately retreated from the neighbourhood of our troops, and advanced towards the Sone. Before his retreat he ſtood a few minutes cannonading, and this was the only ſemblance of an action, that is to "vie with "the moſt brilliant of antiquity, and com-"pared with that of Alexander againſt Porus." —So far was this from a battle, that it was not even a ſkirmiſh; the armies were not within muſket ſhot of each other, nor a muſket fired on either ſide, nor a ſingle man killed or wounded, but about eight or nine poor Laſcars killed by the blowing up of a tumbril. The Prince, the night after his retreat, called a council of war of his miniſters and chief officers; and debating on the deplorable ſtate of his affairs, came to a reſolution to treat with the Engliſh, which he accordingly did; induced

to

to it chiefly, by the information he had received of Mhir Jaffier's being depoſed, to whom he had ſo fixed a hatred, that he ſwore by his Prophet, he would never quit the purſuit of him whilſt he had ſtrength to draw a ſword; and in a Phirmaund he wrote upon the young Nabob's death by lightning—he had this remarkable expreſſion,—"that the wickedneſs of the "father and ſon was ſo great, God would not "truſt their puniſhment to any hand but his "own." Thus you have ſeen, that the defection of the two Rajahs, &c. and the Prince throwing himſelf under our protection, were due to other cauſes than of this boaſted victory without a battle; cauſes which theſe gentlemen did not or would not know, as they did not make for their purpoſe. It is alſo pompouſly ſet forth—"That the Major determined to "bring the Prince to an action as ſoon as "poſſible." If there is any merit in this determination, it was due to the board of Calcutta, who had ſent *peremptory orders to fight him at all events.*

20. Whatever merit there is then in the preſent tranquillity, is to be aſcribed to our ſucceſs againſt the Prince, which, by putting an end to the war in the country, reduced it to a ſtate of perfect obedience. And as all the old Nabob's difficulties proceeded from his dominions being the ſeat of war, and the default of his revenues on that account, there is not the leaſt doubt, had our arms met with the ſame ſucceſs during his government, but that he would have extricated himſelf with equal eaſe.

ANSWER.

20. That there is no truth in the whole of this paragraph, is proved in the laſt remark.

21. After what has been ſet forth, we believe few will imagine that Mhir Jaffier was depoſed by reaſon either of a want of ability to rule, or of his bad principles. We would willingly indeed ſuppoſe, that it proceeded rather from the want of a true knowledge of the country policy, and from an error of judgment, than from lucrative views, had not Mr. Vanſittart, and others of the projectors, made no ſecret that there was a preſent promiſed them by Coſſim Aly Chan of twenty lack: 'tis true, they make a merit that this was not to be delivered till the Company's debt was paid, and his army ſatisfied. We have to obſerve on this occaſion, that ſeveral of us have had offers from the Nabob of very conſiderable ſums to join in his meaſures, which we have conſtantly made public, as well as refuſed; and if we, who have always oppoſed thoſe meaſures, have been thus tried with pecuniary temptations, what may be concluded of thoſe Gentlemen who have ſupported the Nabob on every occaſion?

REFUTATION.

21. The malicious inſinuations of this paragraph, are *unworthy Gentlemen.*—We allow this offer (not promiſe) was made, and unanimouſly rejected by Mr. Vanſittart, and the Committee. —Mr. Holwell was charged with the delivery of this refuſal, in theſe terms—"That we were "labouring for the peace and ſafety of the "country only; and could not, in honour, "receive the offer; but that when the country "was ſettled, the Company's debt paid off, "and the arrears paid to his troops, if he then "thought there was aught due from him, he "was at liberty to gratify his friends in what "manner he pleaſed."—This is a fact, which we were not aſhamed ſhould have a place on the Committee

Committee proceedings.—As to the offers made, and refuſal of theſe Gentlemen, we have their *ipſe dixit* only; and we may chuſe whether we will believe it.

22. If the Nabob has purchaſed the power he is inveſted with, it is to be expected he will of courſe make the moſt of it, by extorting money from his ſubjects, and oppreſſing every province as much as he can; and as the fate of Jaffier Aly Chan muſt have convinced him how little we regard the moſt ſacred engagements, he will of neceſſity endeavour to ebabliſh himſelf on a foundation leſs precarious than the friendſhip of the Engliſh. That he already begins to do ſo, is evident from his ſtill increaſing the number of his troops (notwithſtanding the preſent tranquillity) and to render them the more formidable, he is arming and diſciplining as many Seapoys as he can procure, in the European manner: and to ſecure himſelf as much as poſſible from us, eſteeming his capital Morſhedabad (the ſcene of his predeceſſor's fall) too near our ſettlements, he is about erecting a large fort at Rajahmaul, which he propoſes to make his place of reſidence, where he hopes to be out of our reach.

REFUTATION.

22. This paragraph firſt begs the queſtion, and proceeds to draw concluſions not warranted by it.—Is it to be wondered at, that he ſhould think of ſecuring himſelf, when he ſaw a formed oppoſition in our Committee and Council, from the beginning of his government, which hourly ſhewed a diſpoſition to affront and inſult him, contrary to the repeated remonſtrances of Mr. Vanſittart, for obſerving more temperate and pacific meaſures?—Is it not a

known truth, that at the tables of the leaders in this oppoſition, the very boys in your ſervice were taught to huzza, "Jaffier Aly Khan for "ever;" and did not Amyatt publicly declare, "that the moment the breath was out of Mr. "Vanſittart's body (who then lay dangerouſly "ill) he would proclaim Mhir Jaffier?"—— Could theſe things be notorious,—and Mhir Coſſim not be alarmed for his ſafety?

23. When any Member of the Board ſuggeſts, that the Nabob's behaviour argues a ſuſpicion of us, for that if he really confided in, and ſincerely regarded us, he would not put himſelf to the unneceſſary expence of keeping ſo large an army in pay, nor treat ſo ill thoſe who are avowedly our friends; it is replied, "That the Nabob is maſter "of his country; and being independent of us, is "at liberty to rule and act as he pleaſes." But ſurely Coſſim Aly Chan cannot be more ſo than his predeceſſor was: and if it be true that the Nabob of Bengal is independent of the Engliſh, and maſter of his own actions, how can the Gentlemen juſtify their proceedings againſt Mhir Jaffier, whom they called to ſo ſevere an account for the adminiſtration of his own government, as to depoſe him, though he had not been guilty of any offence to our nation, nor ever deviated from his treaty?

ANSWER.

23. Not worthy notice. See it confuted in a hundred places of the ſaid Addreſs.

24. Inſtead of checking the overgrowing power of the preſent Nabob, it is daily promoted; and he has even the abſolute command of our army at Patna, the Chief there having directions to let him have what number of our troops he pleaſes to demand, without being allowed to judge of the nature

of

of the ſervice for which they are demanded. This you will obſerve, Honourable Sirs, in the inſtructions given to Mr. Ellis, dated the 22d September laſt, and in the conſultation of the ſame day, where ſome of our opinions on that procedure are entered. We cannot help expreſſing how much we fear that an ill uſe will be made by him of this power over our forces, and that they will ſooner or later be employed for ſuch purpoſes as will render us more odious to the whole country, bring greater diſcredit upon our arms, and reflect farther diſhonour upon our nation.

ANSWER.

24. If the aſſertions are true that are ſet forth in this paragraph, we will not attempt to juſtify what the Gentlemen here complain of; but if *Mr. Vanſittart had ſeen* this accuſation, we muſt ſuppoſe he had it in his power to give ſufficient reaſons for the meaſure.

25. Notwithſtanding this zealous attachment to Coſſim Aly Chan, there can be no reaſon to hope he will act the part of a faithful ally towards us. What dependance can be had on a perſon who ſo readily entered into the ſcheme of depoſing not only his lawful maſter, but his patron, under whoſe immediate care he was brought up? who ſhewed ſo much diſloyalty to his natural Sovereign *, the King of Indoſtan, as to evade even acknowledging him,

* Formerly the Shaw Zadda, who was defeated by Major Carnac †, in that famous battle near Patna, as related above, and who, on the death of his father, became King of Indoſtan, and conſequently Sovereign of Bengal, which is one of the provinces of his empire.

† The Shaw Zadda never was defeated by Major Carnac, nor was there any famous battle between them, or any battle at all, as related above.

him, till he was in a manner obliged to it by our repeated deſires? and who betrays a continual diſtruſt of thoſe who have appeared any way attached to us?

REFUTATION.

25. The inſinuation, inference and charge againſt Mhir Coſſim, in this paragraph, are equally extraordinary. Surely they here forget the man whoſe cauſe they have all along been defending, or they would never have laid themſelves open in ſo palpable a blot. Pray, Gentlemen, did not Mhir Jaffier betray his maſter in the treaty of 1757, and at the battle of Plaſſey; not only his lawful maſter, but the grandſon of his patron, who had raiſed him from obſcurity to the firſt poſts in the Subaſhip? Did he not alſo draw his ſword againſt his Sovereign, and infamouſly project the aſſaſſinating him?

26. The Nabob's undutiful behaviour to the King, proceeded in great meaſure from his jealouſy of the regard we profeſſed for him, and his fears that we ſhould reduce his authority, by ſubjecting the Subaſhip to its primitive dependency on the Mogul, and obliging him to pay the royal revenues. He therefore ſet every engine to work to create a rupture between us; he endeavoured to make the King uneaſy, and to inſtil notions into him of his being in danger from us, in order to get him out of the country. He excited a mutiny in the King's camp, which, had it not been for the timely aſſiſtance ſent by Major Carnac, might have proved fatal to his Majeſty. He repeatedly urged Mr. Vanſittart to diſmiſs him; and forged letters to himſelf and the Preſident, as from the King, complaining of being forcibly detained by the Major, and expreſſing his anxiety by not being allowed to leave the country. That theſe letters were forged,

forged, his Majeſty hath ſolemnly declared, by an atteſtation under his own hand; and teſtified his abhorrence of ſo infamous a proceeding. The Nabob, however, at laſt, ſo far prevailed, by corruption and intriguing with ſome of the courtiers, as to bring about what he had ſo much at heart, the King's being ſent away without receiving any aſſiſtance from us, or being paid any part of the revenues of this Subaſhip. This rebellious behaviour of the Nabob juſtly incenſed the King, who declared that he would not ſuffer him to continue in his Subaſhip, whenever he had power ſufficient to prevent it.

Refutation.

26. That the Nabob ſhould be anxious to get the King out of the provinces as ſoon as poſſible, we can account for, and juſtly vindicate, from cauſes very obvious. But how this laboured paragraph will agree with the violent behaviour of Major Carnac, upon his imagining there was *too great and ſuſpicious an intimacy between the King and the Nabob*, you ſhall judge from the following recital. When the King was on his viſit of leave at the Subah's tent, where a grand entertainment was made for him, ſome little time before his departure, he withdrew with the Suba into the inner tent, where they held a private conference, and, as afterwards appeared, wrote interchangeably in each other's Koran, which, by the bye, is the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſolemn engagement of amity and friendſhip in the world amongſt Muſſelmen. The Major, on their coming out, expreſſed in moſt loud and vehement terms his diſſatisfaction at this private conference, and ordered the interpreter to tell the King his high diſpleaſure; inſomuch that the Suba thought it neceſſary to check his paſſion,

and desired him to recollect he was speaking to the King: To which he replied, that WHEN HE WAS OFFENDED, KINGS AND NABOBS WERE TO HIM THE SAME.

27. His Majesty, before his departure, gave the most unquestionable proof of his hatred to Cossim Aly Chan, and of his esteem for the English, by the voluntary offer he made them of the Dewanny of Bengal. This post is the collection of the revenues of all the provinces subject to the Nabob, which are to be accounted for with the court of Delhy. It differs from the Subadaree; the latter being the command of the troops, and the charge of the jurisdiction in the provinces, the expences whereof are paid out of the revenues by the Dewan. It was formerly a separate office, but the Nabobs of Bengal, taking advantage of the late commotions in the empire, have assumed it to themselves. From the nature of the office, it is evident that the King, distrusting the Nabob, intended that we should be a check upon him, and be answerable for the revenues, no account of which he could get from Cossim Aly Chan, who detained them for his own use. This appointment would have brought the Company about fifteen lacks yearly, exclusive of the lands of Burdwan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong, which his Majesty also offered to confirm to them; and to establish their interest and influence, not only in these provinces, but as far as the city of Delhy itself, to which place our commerce might then, with the utmost safety, have been extended.

ANSWER.

27. Touching the first part of this paragraph, we refer to our last remark. With regard to the offer of the Dewanee, the objections against receiving

ceiving it were ſtrong and unanſwerable, unleſs we could have been inveſted with the Subadaary likewiſe.

28. It is hard to conceive why ſo honourable and advantageous an offer ſhould be rejected: it is alledged it would be the ſource of continual diſputes between us and the Nabob, and occaſion too great a diminution of his power; but ſurely this conſideration, admitting it to be true, ought not to ſtand in competition with the honour and intereſts of the Company, which would be greatly promoted by ſuch an appointment; what renders this refuſal the more extraordinary is, that it is well known application was made to the King, ſoon after Mr. Vanſittart's arrival, in Jaffier Aly Chan's time, for the ſunads or grants of the province of Bengal, which were actually drawn out to be ſent to us; but the revolution, in favour of Coſſim Aly Chan, taking place in the interim, an entire ſtop was put to the negociation.

ANSWER.

28. The firſt part of this paragraph is ſpoken to above. Concerning the laſt part, we can only ſay, no grant of that kind was ſolicited for, whilſt Mr. Holwell had a ſeat at the Board of Calcutta, though it certainly would have been puſhed for, and doubtleſs obtained, if his remonſtrances on that head had been hearkened to.

29. The Nabob was ſo inveterate againſt all thoſe natives who were known to be in our intereſt, that he uſed his utmoſt endeavours to prevail on Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, to conſent to his proceeding to the moſt unjuſtifiable ſeverities againſt them, particularly againſt Rajah Ramnarain, having offered the Colonel five lack of rupees, provided he would concur in the deſtruction of

that unhappy man, who has ſince been given up to him by the Board. The Colonel's refuſal of this money, we are well convinced, was the motive of his (the Nabob's) unjuſt ſuſpicion and reſentment againſt him, which appears not only by the Colonel's letters on the face of the proceedings of the Board, but alſo by Coſſim Aly Chan's own declaration to him, that he could not be his friend unleſs he received his preſent.

REFUTATION.

29. Not one ſingle or particular inſtance of theſe inveteracies againſt the natives in our intereſt, but that of Ram Narain, already exploded.

30. The ſame ſpirit of reſentment, which actuated the Nabob againſt Colonel Coote, was equally ſtrong againſt Major Carnac, whom he alſo endeavoured to buy over to ſerve his ends, but in vain. The Nabob ſaw, with a jealous eye, the many diſtinguiſhing marks of favour the King conferred on him, and would fain have made a breach between them, which not being able to effect, he wrote ſeveral letters of complaint againſt him to the Preſident, who from prejudice was too much inclined to believe them, and ſought all opportunities of blaming his conduct at the Board, and of putting the worſt conſtruction upon all his endeavours for the public ſervice, of which many inſtances could be produced.

ANSWER.

30. Theſe large offers and *conſcientious* refuſals ſpeak an exalted *integrity:* they are poſſibly true too, at leaſt for ought we know: but we think it would have been better if ſo much had not been ſaid about it; for though we may have implicit

implicit faith in theſe aſſertions, the wicked world may not.

31. A flagrant injuſtice was done Major Carnac in calling him away from Patna, when the detachment ſtill left there, was large enough to render the command adequate to his rank, and where he might have been of ſervice: whereas his preſence was unneceſſary at Calcutta, as the Colonel was going down.

32. A very ſignal inſult offered by Coſſim Aly Chan to the Engliſh nation, was the intercepting, by his order, a letter which Major Carnac, when commanding the army, had wrote to the King, which the Nabob opened and ſent to the Preſident. This letter, with others from the Nabob, was minuted in conſultation of the 5th of Auguſt, and it was inſinuated to contain proof of a plot, concerted between the Colonel, Major, Ramnarain and Shitabray, to create a freſh revolution. Much pains were taken to find out myſterious meanings in the letter, and hints were thrown out to prepoſſeſs the Board, that ſuch a combination was actually on foot; however, after the cloſeſt ſcrutiny into the letter, and the ſtricteſt examination of Shitabray, who was called down from Patna for that purpoſe, the Board gave it unanimouſly as their opinion, that there were not the leaſt grounds to ſuppoſe any ſuch combination, the ridicule whereof was ſo conſpicuous, that we do not imagine even thoſe who ſo ſeriouſly promoted the enquiry could ever have believed it.

33. The material part of this letter related to an application, which the Major (by Col. Coote's directions) made to the King, to be put in poſſeſſion of ſome fort in Shuja Dowlah's country upon the Ganges; which, had our troops attended his Majeſty, as we muſt have marched through

Shuja

Shuja Dowla's territories, would have been abſolutely neceſſary for a place of arms, and to keep up our communication. The ſtopping ſuch a letter, or indeed any one from a perſon in ſo public a character as the Major then was, might be of the moſt fatal conſequence, was alſo a public affront, and one that never was before offered by any Nabob; yet no ſatisfaction has ever been obtained from him, although wrote too publicly on that head.

ANSWER.

31, 32, and 33. To theſe paragraphs Mr. Vanſittart muſt anſwer, *when he has it in his power.*——Until then, we hope the world will ſuſpend their judgment: but if they cannot ſtay ſo long, they may form a verdict on the veracity of theſe, and various other parts of this performance, we believe pretty juſtly, *from the manner in which it has been tranſmitted hither.*

34. You will now, Honble Sirs, be able to compare the preſent with the preceding government. So momentous a ſtep as ſubverting the former one, we conceive, ought not to have been undertaken till after the moſt mature deliberation, and from a thorough knowledge of the country, its connections and intereſts. But this was far from being the caſe. Mr. Vanſittart had only been three months in Bengal, and in ſo ſhort a ſpace of time can hardly be ſuppoſed to have acquired ſo perfect a knowledge of matters as to be able to determine, that it was abſolutely neceſſary to annul a treaty which had been ratified, in the moſt ſolemn manner, by Admiral Watſon and Colonel Clive, together with a regularly-authorized Select Committee, guarantied by the credit of the Company, and the honour of the nation.

REFUTATION.

34. The credit of the Company, and honour of the nation, would have been ſunk, the one to ruin, and the other to proſtitution, if protection had been longer granted to that monſter of iniquity, Mhir Jaffier. See the Addreſs.

35. The gentlemen, who were the promoters of this revolution, have coincided remarkably in each others opinion during the laſt year's conſultations: in return, the Preſident has not failed to ſhew them partiality, of which we will give you a remarkable inſtance: notwithſtanding, in your letter to this preſidency, dated 21 Jan. 1761, you were pleaſed, in the moſt poſitive terms, to order the diſmiſſion of Meſſieurs Sumner, Playdell and Mac Guire; yet, on the 10th of Auguſt, when, in conſequence of Mr. Mac Guire's diſmiſſion, Mr. Ellis was appointed chief at Patna, Mr. Vanſittart propoſed in Council, that Mr. Mac Guire ſhould remain in the chief-ſhip till Mr. Ellis's arrival, which could not be effected in leſs than two months. The queſtion was abſolutely put to the Board, but carried in the negative; the other gentlemen not chuſing to be guilty of ſo glaring a deviation from their maſters orders: and at Mr. Vanſittart's deſire, this propoſal of his own was not entered on the face of that conſultation. Here it will be neceſſary alſo to obſerve, that Mr. Holwell, after the Honble Company had ſhewn him ſo plain a mark of their diſpleaſure, as to remove him from the Chair to ſeventh in Council, at firſt wavered, whether to continue in the ſervice or not, till (as he declared) he had a private conference with Mr. Vanſittart; after which he remained in both Council and Select Committee till the very day on which Mr. Vanſittart took leave of the Board to proceed to Morſhedabad,

ſhedabad, in order to execute the plan which had been formed; and then Mr. Holwell reſigned.

ANSWER.

35. Why it was *neceſſary* to bring Mr. Holwell in upon this occaſion may not be quite clear: We will therefore elucidate this paſſage—It was not enough that Mr. Holwell was included in the many dirty inſinuations thrown out in different parts of this elaborate work, againſt the *projectors of this revolution*, &c. but it was thought *neceſſary* that *he* ſhould be particularly pointed at, with ſome invidious mark of their malice; though they had not art enough among them to make it at all poignant.—Mr. Holwell thanks them for affording him this *firſt* favourable occaſion of acknowledging all they ſay (of him) in this paragraph *is moſt ſtrictly true.*

Mr. Holwell confeſſes, that, ſtimulated by reſentment at the ingratitude of his employers, he reſolved to quit the ſervice immediately, on Mr. Vanſittart's arrival—but preſſed by him and the committee to alter his reſolves for ſome time at leaſt—he wavered—and ſoon after ſeeing an appearance of ſome ſalutary turn to the Company's affairs, he determined to remain, and give his helping hand to it.—This was accompliſhed—and then Mr. Holwell reſign'd.

36. The Armenian miniſters of the revolution, Cojah Petruce and Kojah Gregory, are in the higheſt degree of favour with the Nabob and his adherents; the former reſides in Calcutta, retained by Coſſim Aly Chan, a known ſpy upon every tranſaction of the Engliſh, of which he never fails to give his maſter the moſt regular intelligence, as was too apparent to both Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, when they were at Patna. The latter

latter of theſe Armenians has poſts of the greateſt truſt near the Nabob's perſon; and through the means of theſe men, the Armenians in general are ſetting up an independant footing in the country, are carrying on a trade greatly detrimental to our inveſtments in all parts, and commit daily acts of violence, which reflect no ſmall odium on the Engliſh, who are ſuppoſed to encourage their proceedings.

REMARK.

36. This paragraph requires no anſwer from us.

37. It is this ſyſtem of adminiſtration which we have conſtantly oppoſed, as thinking your affairs could not poſſibly proſper under it. And you will now be able to account for many differences at the Board, which will appear through the courſe of our conſultations, and which will doubtleſs ſurpriſe you till the real cauſe is known. As we have hitherto denied our aſſents to meaſures, becauſe we deemed them contrary to your intereſts, though the adopting them would have turned out greatly to our private emoluments; ſo you may reſt aſſured it ſhall ever continue an invariable maxim with us, to make your honour and advantage the ſole object of our attention.

REMARK.

37. Nor this.

38. You have been acquainted, Honourable Sirs, that the King has applied for your aſſiſtance, to ſettle him on the throne, and to recover ſuch parts of his territories as are ſtill in the hands of rebels. It is our opinion, that we have troops enough to form an army for the enterprize; and as we have no European enemy to fear, the forces requiſite for this ſervice can without danger be

ſpared. The Nabob's large army, which is now a burden upon the provinces, and only kept up to ſcreen him from the King's power, and through his jealouſy of us, would afford a conſiderable addition, and at the ſame time eaſe the country of an immenſe expence. Shujah Dowlat, one of the moſt powerful men of the empire, would join with his forces; beſides many other conſiderable powers, friends to the King, from different parts, would flock to the royal ſtandard, ſhould we ever take the field; and our army moſt probably (as the King himſelf has frequently declared) would march to the gates of Delhy without oppoſition. We moſt humbly ſubmit to you, whether ſo glorious an opportunity of aggrandizing the Company in Indoſtan ſhould not be embraced; and leave it to yourſelves to judge of the reputation and advantages which would reſult to them, if through the means of the Britiſh arms, his Majeſty ſhould be eſtabliſhed on his throne. For want of our aid, he is now actually at a ſtand, and unable to proſecute his journey to his capital.

But ſhould you be unwilling to extend your connections further up the country, and inſtead of accepting the Dewanny of Bengal, chooſe to confine your views to your new acquiſitions, and to the trade of Bengal alone, we beg leave to offer it as our opinion, that we ought to maintain an intereſt in the country, independent of the Nabob, by ſupporting in power ſuch men as have proved themſelves our friends: This will ſerve as a balance againſt him, ſhould he entertain evil deſigns againſt us.

ANSWER.

38. This has been already ſpoken to, in a detached Piece, by another hand, intitled, A Supplement, &c.

39. We

39. We have now given you a fair relation of things, and, conſcious of the goodneſs of our intentions, we cannot but flatter ourſelves, we ſhall meet with your approbation in the part we have taken. We ſhall therefore conclude with the aſſurance, that our endeavours ſhall never be wanting to promote the honour and intereſts of our employers, their ſucceſs being the object of our moſt fervent wiſhes.

We are, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honoured Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
And dutiful Servants,

FORT WILLIAM,
11th March, 1762.

(Signed)
EYRE COOTE.
P. AMYATT.
JOHN CARNAC.
W. ELLIS.
S. BATSON.
H. VERELST.

ANSWER.

39. We will cloſe our remarks with one Reflection only.—If the matters and things here ſet forth were facts, and eſſential for the knowledge of their employers, why were they ſo long concealed from them? And why has the whole of it ſo much the appearance of *pretences* framed *a priori*, to extenuate a conduct and oppoſition, they have (at leaſt five of them) ſubſequently carried into action? *and for which their friends, at this critical juncture, thought an apology abſolutely neceſſary?*

J. Z. HOLWELL.

IMPORTANT FACTS

REGARDING THE

EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S AFFAIRS in BENGAL,

From the Year 1752 to 1760.

This TREATISE contains

An exact State of the COMPANY's Revenues in that Settlement;

WITH

COPIES of ſeveral very intereſting LETTERS:

SHEWING PARTICULARLY,

The *Real Cauſes* which drew on the PRESIDENCY of BENGAL the dreadful CATASTROPHE of the Year 1756;

AND

Vindicating the Character of Mr. HOLWELL from many ſcandalous Aſperſions unjuſtly thrown out againſt him, in an anonymous Pamphlet, publiſhed March 6th, 1764, intitled,

"REFLECTIONS

ON THE

Preſent State of our EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS."

TO

The PROPRIETORS

OF

EAST-INDIA STOCK,

AND

The PUBLIC.

THE anonymous Pamphlet, publiſhed Tueſday the 6th of March 1764, under the title of "*Reflections* on the preſent State of our Eaſt-"India Affairs," being plainly calculated to anſwer the purpoſe of a day only; it ſhould ſeem hardly worthy your notice: nor indeed ſhould we have thought it worth ours, did it not afford us a favourable opportunity of laying open ſome material facts, which we think claim your attention, and will deſerve your thanks.

The title-page of this Pamphlet ſays it is wrote "By a *Gentleman* long reſident in India;" but ſurely no Gentleman could fall ſo much below that character, as this anonymous author does, in low perſonal abuſe and ſcurrility; though the obvious venom of the heart that dictates through the whole, will defend againſt its influence and intended impreſſions.—We rather think, from the mixed ſtyle, that this production is the joint efforts of *two ſmall geniuſes*; the *one*, pert, coxcomical, affecting wit and metaphor; the *other*, of meagre, duſky aſpect, *ſtalking* forth with pompous diction! ſounding epithets! long-winded, metaphorical bombaſt! and tedious declamations! ——From the *bilious*

complexion of this Shakeſpear's Caſſius, what can flow, but envy, rancour, and *bittereſt reflections?* Whether theſe *things* clubbed their geniuſes, or transfuſed each to other his ſpirit for this paltry taſk, is not very material; — none but *they*, or *ſuch-like*, could ſurely be capable of *ſuch* a performance.

Whatever may have been the Author's intention by the exordium, laboured progreſs, and concluſion of this anonymous Pamphlet, the whole of this unconnected piece ſeems huddled together, more particularly to introduce the perſonal attack in the centre; againſt this attack we ſhall chiefly raiſe our batteries, — previouſly demoliſhing ſome of their ſcattered out-works, (unſupported by each other) as they fall in our way, and intercept our march.

The falſe and ſcandalous lights which Anonymous throws on the motives that induced Col. Clive's ſucceſſor to form ſome change in the political ſtate at Bengal, are ſo fully confuted in that Gentleman's Addreſs to you, that nothing more is wanted here, to enforce conviction to honeſt impartiality. The partial and malicious are not to be convinced by facts or argument; indeed it makes not for their preſent purpoſe to own it, tho' they are: To theſe we do not write. Theſe are hardy enough to charge this Gentleman (page 37) with forming a ſcheme to depoſe Mhir Jaffier, in favour of Mhir Coſſim, "almoſt as ſoon as he "came to power;" though he has proved, beyond contradiction, that he ſupported Mhir Jaffier with ſpirit and perſeverance, as long as there was a remaining poſſibility of doing it, almoſt to the ruin of your affairs; ſo tenacious was he of the treaty ſubſiſting between the Engliſh and Mhir Jaffier, even though *he* had violated every article of it, in effect, by the ſingle ſtep of bringing the Dutch

troops into his dominions. This Gentleman has alſo undeniably proved, that his views for the Company's benefit extended much higher than the ſyſtem of "*Nabob changing*," which, he ſaw, could produce no ſolid and laſting advantage, either to the Company or the Provinces. And he has likewiſe demonſtrated, that he had neither any hand in, nor intention, or wiſh, to depoſe Mhir Jaffier in favour of Mhir Coſſim; but on the contrary, took every precaution, which his *then* ſcanty power gave him, for the ſecurity of the dignity, perſon, and property of the former, however little he deſerved it.

The partizans of Mhir Jaffier have very ſtudiouſly evaded owning the charge againſt him, of bringing in the Dutch forces, foreſeeing *that* would ſilence every attempt urged in juſtification of him; but here truth and conſcience for *once* ſteps in between *them* and their machinations, and makes them unwarily give up the point, in the following words, page 30, "He was not unacquainted with "the deſigns of the Dutch, and would not have "been ſorry to have ſeen an European force intro-"duced into his dominions, to prove a check on "the power of thoſe, likely to become his maſters "inſtead of his allies. However, his deep reſpect "and awe of Colonel Clive, prevented his acting "openly upon this occaſion." Here, let it be alſo remarked, that theſe partizans, in page 19, ſet forth, that "This Nabob was *ſupported with* "*honour* by his *maker*, ſo long as *he* continued in "India." The battle of Plaſſey gave this man the Subaſhip in June, 1757. In October, 1758, or thereabouts, he muſt have planned his iniquitous ſcheme with the Dutch; as about this time a ſmall veſſel was diſpatched expreſs to Batavia, and our armament for the Southward was on its departure. That the Dutch would have meditated a

ſcheme of this kind, without the encouragement and participation of the Suba, no one in his ſenſes can believe. Here we ſee this man hardly eſtabliſhed in his government, planning to deſtroy and countermine *that power* which raiſed him; and this without any ſhadow of complaint againſt us, for he had been *ſupported with honour*. His being only *acquainted* with the deſigns of the Dutch, without communicating thoſe deſigns to us, his allies, was virtually a breach and violation of that whole treaty he had ſo ſolemnly entered into. That he did not *act openly* on this occaſion, was owing only to his fears, and the *deepeſt* treachery both to the Dutch and us. If the Dutch had proved ſucceſsful in the river, and on the plains of Bederra, we ſhould ſoon have felt the effects of his *open* conduct, and not an individual of the colony had eſcaped ſlaughter. Let it be remembered too, that by Colonel Clive's orders, Coja Wazzeed (a man of family, character, and rank) was taken priſoner, on his paſſage from Moorſhadabad to Chinſura, brought under a ſtrong guard to Fort William, impriſoned there, and died under his confinement. So extraordinary a ſtep would want juſtification, had not the Colonel received the fulleſt proof and conviction, that this man (though a pretended friend to the Engliſh) was the negotiator with the Suba, on the part of the Dutch, in the treaty for bringing in their forces. In ſhort, let the whole of this tranſaction be viewed in any light whatever, it would, if theſe partizans had a grain of modeſty and candour among them, utterly ſilence every plea they have urged in his defence, and pretended commiſeration for his misfortunes, thrown out at this period only to anſwer a poor unworthy purpoſe.

Page 31 of this Pamphlet exhibits the following: "The ſuperiority of this extraordinary genius,

" (Col.

" (Col. Clive) predominated ſo far over that of the " Nabob, that when he quitted India, he left this " Prince in ſuch a ſtate of dependance, and the " affairs of the Engliſh in ſuch an exalted and " powerful ſituation, that even the *Kites* and " *Owls* that followed, had it in their power to " gorge themſelves with that prey (M. J.) which " being beat down, was at the mercy of, though " ſpared by, this generous Eagle." — Oh! metaphor! how art thou tortured! how art thou proſtituted! Let us examine a little what *mercy* this poor *prey* found, and how *ſpared*, by this *generous Eagle?* It is confeſſed, page 19, " that " Mhir Jaffier diſtributed among his new allies " *all the treaſures* of his predeceſſor, and mort- " gaged two of his *richeſt* provinces to them, for " the payment of a farther ſum," beſides " *large* " *tracts* of land to the Company;" the rents of which were firſt paid by the Company to him, and ſubſequently given to this *generous Eagle.* Such was the *mercy* he found, and thus was he *ſpared.*

It may be ſaid, this Eagle *raiſed the game*, and had a right to *beat it down* as low as he pleaſed. Suppoſe it ſo; let us ſee the conſequences.

Mhir Jaffier, thus ſtripped, had better never been born, or at leaſt never raiſed to this dignity; for having no treaſures of his own, and but ſmall preſent reſources from the revenues of his country, the foundation was here laid of all his future miſfortunes. His ſupplies not being equal to the ſupport of his extravagancies, the pay of his troops, and other abſolutely-neceſſary calls of his government, and he finding himſelf incapable of relinquiſhing or retrenching his licentious expences, his affairs fell into that ſtate of ruin and confuſion ſo juſtly painted by Mr. Holwell in his Addreſs. So that (to purſue this notable metaphor) you ſee,

after

after all, if the poor *Kites* and *Owls* that followed this *generous Eagle* had been an hungred, there was nothing left for them to *gorge*, but the *bare bones* of the prey.

With regard to the exalted and powerful ſituation of the Company's affairs, as pompouſly recited in the foregoing quotation, the real fact ſtands thus: When Col. Clive left Bengal, your Treaſury was at a very low ebb, and further ſupplies cut off, before he was well out of the river; but of this you have been ſufficiently informed in the Addreſs above referred to. And as to "Col. Clive's extra-"ordinary genius *predominating* ſo far above that "of the Nabob's," we think Mhir Jaffier's introduction of the Dutch forces affords no proof of it.

Leaving the other parts of this Pamphlet to the plain and natural concluſions and ſentiments of the Public, we proceed, purſuant to our Title-page, in our promiſed juſtification, from materials left with us by this Gentleman on his laſt departure for India, and others tranſmitted by him after his arrival there; in the courſe of which many important circumſtances and facts will occur, worthy your conſideration, which will throw a new light on ſome intereſting periods in your affairs, and at the ſame time manifeſt and illuſtrate the great and eminent ſervices this Gentleman has rendered you; ſervices ſo ſtriking, that, though they never obtained common juſtice or gratitude, from your Court of Directors at home, yet gained him the public thanks of your Bengal Preſidency on your behalf, even after he was ſuperceded in the government of your affairs. This Pamphlet is not the only inſtance of *party rage*, whereby this Gentleman has been baſely traduced, and by ſome even of thoſe in your Direction, who had ſet their hands to higher encomiums on Mr. Holwell's integrity

and

and abilities, than had ever before been beſtowed on any one in your ſervice, and without any the leaſt ſhadow of cauſe to impeach his conduct, or alter theſe favourable ſentiments of him. Mr. Holwell himſelf diſdains a reply to the ſeveral low attacks, made by malice and envy on his reputation: but on us, his friends, it is incumbent; and we hope hereby to atone for our neglect of not doing it long ago, and own our obligation to this anonymous writer, for giving us ſo favourable an opportunity.

To clear up, and explain many paſſages, touching men and things, we think it neceſſary to introduce our defence, with an account of the diſputes in Leadenhall-ſtreet, at the latter end of the year 1757, and beginning of 1758; when this Gentleman unhappily (for himſelf) became the object of contention between two parties in your Court of Directors, and fell a ſacrifice to the perſeverance of his (and we may truly ſay your) *friends*. This juſt detail was *then* drawn up by one, minutely acquainted with the *concealed*, as well as *open* ſprings of action at that period, in manner following:

NARRATIVE of the Domeſtic Wars in Leadenhall-Street, from October 1757, to the 20th of April, 1758.

LIKE Homer, and other recorders of battles, we will begin with a liſt of the combatants; it will ſave ſome trouble in the courſe of the engagement.

Meſſrs. PAYNE, Chairman.

2 Burrow
3 Jones Raymond
4 John Raymond
5 Sir James Creed
6 Saunders
7 Weſtern
8 Jones
9 Browne
10 Dorrien
11 Stevens
12 Manſhip

12 Manſhip
13 Hadley
14 Chambers
15 Impey
16 Sullivan, *Deputy*
17 Godfrey
18 Plant
19 Dudley
20 Savage
21 Tullie
22 Gough
23 Phipps
24 Rous

It was not without much previous debate, heat, and animoſity, that the above Gentlemen came unanimouſly into a ſcheme for the government of Bengal, by a rotation of four, to wit, Meſſrs. Watts, Manningham, Becher, and Holwell. The plan was deſigned as a temporary expedient only, until further advices from Calcutta; the Hardwick carried out theſe determinations, ſigned by the whole court, under date the 11th of November, 1757, and harmony ſeemed again to be eſtabliſhed. A general reform of the ſettlement of Fort William was next taken into conſideration, planned and adjuſted at various meetings, conſiſting only of the two chairs, Mr. Holwell and the Secretary. During theſe operations, Diſcord again began to exert her influence; and entering the breaſts of the Bombay faction, who ſhe knew were ripe for her purpoſe, urged them to move and inſiſt that another Gentleman ſhould be appointed to ſucceed to the rotation of four, in caſe of death or abſence. The Bombay faction, conſiſting of the Deputy Chair, and the eight immediately following him on the above liſt, (acting under their General L—w) carried their point in the Committee of Correſpondence, by a majority of 6 to 3, Sir James Creed and Governor Saunders being abſent. The next Court-day Mr. Payne brought the affair before a full court, where the reſolution of the Correſpondence was over-ruled by a majority of 15 to 9, as being not only contrary to the determinations

minations unanimouſly ſigned to by the Hardwick, but alſo to the very principle and motives, which urged thoſe determinations. From this hour Peace took her flight from Leadenhall-ſtreet, Civil War took place, and Diſcord reigned with uninterrupted ſway.

This defeat of the minority was far from diſcouraging them. They now, under the auſpices of their General, (who was moſt active behind the curtain) planned a ſtroke at the rotation itſelf, which they intended to execute at the next Quarterly General Court; but advices of the revolution in favour of Jaffier Aly Cawn arriving about this time, gave them a plauſible opportunity to attempt aboliſhing the rotation in the Court of Directors, without waiting for the Quarterly General Court. Accordingly, when the Court of Directors met to confer on the advices they had received of the revolution, and unanimouſly determined to make a compliment of the government of Bengal to Col. Clive during his reſidence in India, the Bombay faction moved, "that the "important change in their affairs at Bengal, made "the expedient of the rotation no longer needful, "but that Mr. Watts ſhould be appointed to "ſucceed the Colonel."

The majority of 15 (as they ſtand prior on the liſt) urged on the contrary, "that as the change regarded the ſituation of their affairs only, without any ſufficient proofs tranſmitted to them, that gave any more favourable impreſſion of individuals in their ſervice, they judged it premature to make as yet any further alterations in the government of Bengal, the ſame cauſes ſtill ſubſiſting which firſt urged the expedient of the rotation."

This difference of views and ſentiments occaſioned debates to run to the moſt violent heights, in the courſe of which the minority loſt all regard to decency

decency and manners; to put a ſtop to which the Chairman put the queſtion, "Whether Col. Clive "ſhould be appointed to the government of Bengal, "and the rotation of four take place on his ab-"ſence, as before appointed?" On this, freſh feuds aroſe; the Bombay faction inſiſting that the queſtion ſhould be divided. This was oppoſed by the Chairman, and brought on the previous queſtion, which being put, it was carried againſt a diviſion of the queſtion 15 to 9. On this the minority no longer obſerved any meaſures; Meſſrs. Sullivan, Godfrey, Phipps, and Plant, quitted the Court, and the reſt of the faction refuſed to ballot.

The majority, however, proceeded to buſineſs, and unanimouſly appointed the Colonel to the government, and the rotation to take place on his abſence. The general letter containing this reſolution, and the other general reform of the ſettlement, was ſigned the eighth of March, by the 15 only, the minority refuſing to ſign.

The faction, not a whit diſmayed at theſe repeated defeats, "but, like Anteus, gathering "ſtrength from blows," had now recourſe to their expedient of the Quarterly General Court, and began to beat up for volunteers amongſt the Proprietors. Their General took up his reſidence, in a manner, for many days in the city, and went about begging ſingle votes, in which he was moſt induſtriouſly followed by his Mirmidons; whilſt the majority of 15, conſcious of the propriety and integrity of their own conduct, made it a point not to ſpeak to a Proprietor on the ſubject: A maxim (in politics) founded on a falſe principle; for when a body of men in power are conſcious of the rectitude of their intentions, in any meaſure adopted for the good of the community, it is incumbent on them to ſecure that meaſure by every means poſſible. This error in judgment of the majority,

majority, gave the greateſt advantage to the minority. The majority likewiſe reſted in a falſe ſecurity, that a Quarterly General Court, which was not ſummoned on ſpecial affairs, could not go into any matters, but what were regularly brought before them and ſpecified in their ſummons, the ſame having no precedent, and being contrary to all propriety, as well as the eſtabliſhed laws of the Court; in which, however, they found themſelves miſtaken. Thus the minority came to the Quarterly Court fully prepared, and with their united force; whilſt the majority came totally unprepared, and without any force at all.

Here it is neceſſary to recite a circumſtance, which greatly favoured this attempt of the minority. The rotation was as little reliſhed by the bulk of the Proprietors, without knowing why, or wherefore, as by themſelves: It was (as before hinted) with much difficulty that the Bombay faction were brought to aſſent to it at firſt, and they were now determined to aboliſh it, though, with it, they aboliſhed the power, and every effectual authority of a Court of Directors.

The indefatigable activity of the minority, and inactivity of the majority, produced each their adequate effects at the Quarterly Court. The uſual buſineſs and forms over, Mr. Law began the attack by an invective againſt the rotation, as being a ſtrange, motley, many-headed monſter, in which he was ſeconded by Mr. Phipps, ſupported by Mr. P. Godfrey, in a written ſpeech, which he deſired permiſſion to read.

The Chairman, in a ſhort, but ſtrong ſpeech, urged "The irregularity of the Quarterly Court's "entering into ſpecial affairs, for which they were "not ſummoned; and that a procedure of this "kind muſt have fatal conſequences, and end in "the utter ſubverſion of the government of the "Company's

" Company's affairs; that the Court of Directors, " not ſuſpecting ſuch unprecedented attempts, were " not prepared to lay before the Court the reaſons " which moved them to adopt the expedient now " objected to. That the Proprietors had a right " to demand a General Court, which he was ready " to ſummon on the ſhorteſt warning, and that " ſuch their reaſons ſhould then be ſubmitted to " their conſideration."

When the Chairman had ended his ſpeech, Mr. Alexander Hume took up the ſame ſide of the queſtion, and moved to adjourn; in which he was ſeconded by Sir Alexander Grant and a few others, and the queſtion for adjournment being put, it was carried in the negative almoſt unanimouſly, but with unheard of clamour and indecency. They then proceeded, in the ſame temper, to demand the queſtions ſhould be put, " Whether the rota- " tion of four ſhould be aboliſhed, and the govern- " ment of Bengal be conducted by a ſingle Gover- " nor and Council as heretofore?" And both queſtions were in like manner carried in the affir- mative, Mr. Law and the Court declaring, it was not their intention to interfere in the appointment of ſuch Governor and Council, which they left intirely to the choice of the Court of Directors; and with this gracious indulgence the Quarterly Court broke up: and the minority, as they thought, gained a compleat triumph.

Thus a meaſure adopted and aſſented to at the beginning by the whole Court of Directors, and ſubſequently ſupported and confirmed by a majo- rity of fifteen, became condemned and aboliſhed, from the minds of the Proprietors being poiſoned by every artful inſinuation againſt it, without once hearing a ſingle reaſon or plea in its defence.

The minority, notwithſtanding their triumph at the Quarterly Court, apprehenſive they ſhould gain little

little by it, whilſt the majority of the Court of Directors were againſt them, began to work with other tools; and agreed to make any conceſſion to Mr. Payne and his friends, provided they would relinquiſh the ſingle point of Mr. Holwell's having a ſhare in the government of Bengal: It was propoſed that he ſhould have rank next to Mr. Becher, with the Chiefſhip of Coſſimbuzar; be one of the Select Committee, and have any emoluments appointed for him, that himſelf or friends would deſire; or if theſe were not acceptable, that he ſhould be ſent to Bombay to ſucceed Mr. Bourchier, or be appointed Deputy-governor of Fort St. David, and to ſucceed next to Mr. Orme, who was appointed to ſucceed Mr. Pigot.

Theſe alternatives were at different times intimated to Mr. Payne and the Majority, (the firſt before the rotation was fixed, the others after it was aboliſhed) who were ſtedfaſt in this reply, "That "however Mr. Holwell's ſervices and ſufferings "merited the notice of the Company, the real "intereſt of their affairs was their firſt object, and "not Mr. Holwell's emoluments: That his abili-"ties would be of more uſe to the Company at "Bengal than elſewhere; and that the exigencies "of their affairs required his having a ſhare in "the government of them."

The Majority of fifteen thinking themſelves moſt injuriouſly treated by the Minority, and proceedings of the quarterly general Court, were loud in their reſentments; and having reſolved on a plan for their future conduct, the Chairman ſummoned a full Court for the appointment of a ſucceſſor to Colonel Clive, to meet on the 23d of March. The minority, in the mean time, were aſſiduous to take off a ſufficient number of the Majority, and thought they had ſucceeded.

It is not difficult to conceive in what temper the Court met. As ſoon as the Chairman had opened the cauſe of their meeting, the merits of their ſervants at Bengal became the ſubject of debate, and much altercation enſued, not worth reciting. Mr. Peter Godfrey moved, that their ſervants ſhould be balloted for according to their ranks in the ſervice, beginning with Mr. Watts; in which he was ſeconded by Mr. Sullivan, and ſome others of the Minority. This motion was oppoſed by Mr. Robert Jones, or Mr. Jones Raymond, (which we cannot recollect) who moved that Mr. Holwell ſhould be firſt balloted for. Both motions being ſeconded, brought on the previous queſtion, which was carried in favour of the laſt motion. Accordingly they proceeded to the ballot, and Mr. Holwell was elected to ſucceed Colonel Clive in the government of Bengal, fifteen to nine.

This proved a thunderbolt to the Minority, who now found that their violences had promoted, in a higher degree, the very man they had ſo much laboured to debaſe. The Deputy Chairman, with the reſt of the Minority, made a motion as if they intended to quit the Court; but the former being requeſted by the Chairman to ſuſpend his reſolution and *judgment*, produced the following letters, which Mr. Holwell had ſent into Court to him.

To JOHN PAYNE, Eſq. Chairman.

" Sir, 23d March, 1758.

" SOME of my friends flatter me, that the " appointment of a ſucceſſor to Colonel Clive " in the Government of Bengal, may probably " fall on myſelf: Should this be the caſe, I then " take the liberty to requeſt, you will pleaſe to " preſent the incloſed Addreſs to the Honourable " the Court of Directors. Should the information

" of

" of my friends prove groundleſs, the incloſed " then becomes *impertinent* and uſeleſs; and as " ſuch I beg the favour you will return it to, Sir, " Your, &c.

" J. Z. H."

To the Honourable the Court of Directors, &c.

" May it pleaſe your Honours,

" UNDERSTANDING this day is appointed for the election of a Preſident and Governor of Bengal, in ſucceſſion to Colonel Clive, and learning from the information of my friends, there is a probability your choice may fall upon myſelf; that ſteady zeal for the Company's intereſt, which has ever been the guide of my actions and ſentiments, ſince I had the honour of your ſervice, now urges me to addreſs you with that humble freedom, which my duty dictates, at this critical conjuncture of your affairs in that part of the world.

" During the heavieſt weight of my misfortunes and diſtreſſes, I had yet comfort in the reflection of having done my duty in the truſts repoſed in me, but more ſo, that my conduct was honoured with the repeated approbation and ſanction of your Honourable Court.

" In the execution of truſt, it has ever been an inviolable maxim with me, that private intereſt ſhould ever give way to the public utility; a maxim I have often ſealed to, in your ſervice, though to my own coſt; a maxim which now leads me, contrary to my own private weal, to prevent, if poſſible, your taking any meaſure which may, in its conſequences, deprive you of one of the moſt valuable ſervants you have abroad.

" In the courſe of your affairs, although I have ſometimes differed in opinion from Mr. Manningham, yet I have ever had the higheſt opinion of

that gentleman's integrity and abilities, and have not failed doing honour to both on every occaſion; for the truth of which I can appeal to ſome gentlemen who conſtitute your Honourable Court, and to many others, who were lately members of it.

" Permit me, Gentlemen, to repreſent to you, that a ſervant of Mr. Manningham's character and capacity is not every day to be met with, nor can be parted with at this period, without a certain injury to your affairs: A diſregard of his merits, will, in all likelihood, determine his return to Europe; the contrary will as probably determine his ſtay; and may not only lay a foundation for harmony at home, but for ſucceſs abroad.

" Theſe conſiderations, and theſe only, move me humbly to requeſt, that ſhould the voice of your Honourable Court be in my behalf, I may then be permitted, with thanks and gratitude, and without offence, to decline the honour you intend me, in favour of Mr. Manningham, under whom I am moſt ready and willing to ſerve the Honourable Company, as long as his reſidence in India may be conſiſtent with his health or inclination.

I am, May it pleaſe your Honours, &c.

Wedneſday,
March 23, 1758. J. Z. H."

When Mr. Holwell's Letter was read, the Minority attempted to look wiſe, ſhook their heads, and declared they would ballot no more. The Chairman put the queſtion, " Whether the Court " ſhould proceed to a new ballot in conſequence " of Mr. Holwell's letter?" which being agreed to, without a ballot, they proceeded, and Mr. Manningham was elected to ſucceed Colonel Clive, by fourteen only, one of the fifteen having thrown in a negative. The fifteen then balloted for a ſucceſſor to Mr. Manningham, when Mr. Holwell

was

was unanimouſly choſen; and Mr. Becher to ſucceed him: And here the Court ſtopped.

From the whole tenor of the proceedings of the Minority, it muſt appear to an impartial eye, that they were actuated by pride, violence, perſonal connections, and perſonal reſentments, and by their conduct ſtruck at the very principle and foundation of all government; hence they acquired the title of "the Faction," (a circumſtance we thought neceſſary to explain, leſt we ſhould be thought to have beſtowed it on them in this our narrative only.) They ſeemed to think they had a right to over-rule the ſentiments and reſolves of a majority of near two to one againſt them; or failing here, to throw the affairs of the community they had in truſt, into the utmoſt confuſion and difficulties; and this at a time, when diſpatch, harmony, and unanimity, were eſſential to the well-being (we may ſay, the very being) of the Company: and when examples of this kind were ſo neceſſary at home, to influence the ſame ſalutary conduct in their ſervants abroad, which they themſelves had, in their letter by the Hardwick, inculcated and commanded in the moſt lively and enforcing terms that language could dictate. The Minority, in conſequence of their late defeat, had ſeveral private meetings with their General, where it was reſolved, as their laſt reſource, to form a Proprietors liſt of Directors for the enſuing year, in oppoſition to the Houſe liſt. Conſiſtent with this reſolution, the Deputy Chair and the Minority agreed, that they would not meet the Court, nor aſſiſt at forming the Houſe liſt as uſual. The Majority, on this meſſage, met immediately, formed their liſt, and had it publiſhed a day before the Proprietors liſt came out.

Had the Majority continued the ſame vigilance in ſecuring the election of their liſt, they could not

have failed effecting it; but here they continued in the ſame error, and falſe punctilio of honour, which had occaſioned their defeat at the Quarterly General Court; until rouzed by the activity both public and private of the Minority, they thought it neceſſary to exert themſelves, when it was too late. Had they begun twenty-four hours ſooner, they would have carried their whole liſt, and the Minority, to a man, had quitted the direction. The laſt defeat they received was on the 23d of March, from which time they had laboured, without ceaſing. The election was to come on the 5th of April, and it was the ſecond, before the Majority attempted to ſolicit a ſingle vote.

Mr. Holwell arrived the 2d of April at Portſmouth, where he received the reſult of the General Court, which did not break up until two in the morning of the 6th, when the following Gentlemen were declared duly elected:

Meſſrs. W. Barwell *,	John Manſhip,
H. C. Boulton *,	N. Newnham *,
John Boyd,	H. Plant *,
John Brown,	T. Phipps *,
Chr. Burrow *,	F. Pigou,
Sir James Creed,	John Raymond,
Charles Cutts *,	Giles Rook,
Roger Drake, Deputy *,	J. Rous *,
John Dorrien,	H. Savage,
George Dudley,	G. Stevens,
H. Hadley,	L. Sullivan, Chairman *,
John Harriſon,	T. Tullie *.

By the election of this liſt, the late Minority gained a ſure Majority, both in the Court and in the Committee of Correſpondence, the members of which are marked *: They loſt no time in exerciſing their new acquired power, in a manner quite conſiſtent with their former violence: They met the

the 6th, when, after electing their Chairman and Deputy, and appointing the ſeveral Committees, Captain Tullie moved, that an expreſs ſhould be immediately diſpatched to Portſmouth, to ſtop the Warren and London, until further orders. This was ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by Mr. Drake and others; but was however carried, on a ballot, in the affirmative, fourteen to eight; upon which the following gentlemen entered a ſtrong proteſt on behalf of the Company, againſt the injurious detention of their ſhips ſo late in the ſeaſon, and when convoy for them were procured with ſo much difficulty, *viz.*

Meſſrs.	Drake,	John Raymond,
	Burrow,	Hadley,
	Newnham,	Dorrien,
	Brown,	Stevens.

Theſe Gentlemen would have been joined by Sir James Creed and Mr. Manſhip; but the one was confined by the gout, and Mr. Manſhip's ſiſter lay dead in his houſe. The expreſs reached Portſmouth the 7th, in the morning, juſt as the Warren and London were going to ſail, under convoy of the Eagle man of war, and Bonetta ſloop. It was pretty obvious that Mr. Holwell needed not any very great foreſight to predict what would follow, with reſpect to himſelf, expecting the utmoſt effect of united malice and power.

The reſolution of detaining the ſhips being carried, the Chairman propoſed proceeding immediately to buſineſs; this was oppoſed and objected to by Meſſrs. Drake and Newnham, who urged, that as they could not poſſibly be ſuppoſed acquainted with the grounds, which had occaſioned the diviſion between the late Court of Directors, they inſiſted on reaſonable time being given them to conſider the ſubject. This requeſt was, after

very high debate, granted, and the 11th appointed for taking into conſideration the Bengal diſpatches by the Warren and London. Accordingly, like ſo many Cæſars, they came, they ſaw, they conquered: For the Chairman, as ſoon as they were met, produced a ſhort general letter, which he had already prepared for the purpoſe, conſiſting of four or five paragraphs only: High oppoſition aroſe to this letter from the eight proteſtors, but it availed little, for the whole received the ſanction of the fourteen, and paſſed into a law, and arrived at Portſmouth the 12th of April. The purport of this general letter take as follows.

" That having maturely weighed and conſidered the conduct and merit of individuals, they annul and make void every appointment by the Hardwick's letter of the 11th November, with thoſe by the Warren and London, of the 8th and 23d of March, (Colonel Clive excepted) and do now conſtitute and appoint the eſtabliſhment of their Preſidency of Calcutta. To wit,

Colonel Clive, Preſident and Governor,
William Watts, Eſq. 2d, and to ſucceed Colonel Clive,
Major Kilpatrick, 3d.
Charles Manningham, Eſq. 4th, and to ſucceed Mr. Watts,

Mr. R. Becher, -	5th,	Each to riſe and ſucceed in turn.
Mr. P. R. Pearkes, -	6th,	
Mr. William Frankland,	7th,	
Mr. M. Collett, -	8th,	
Mr. J. Z. Holwell,	9th,	
Mr. William Macket,	10th,	
Mr. Peter Amyatt,	11th,	
Mr. Thomas Boddam,	12th,	
Mr. Richard Court,	13th,	

" They

" They likewiſe revoke and annul all and every nomination to Chiefſhips, Poſts, &c. in their letter of the 8th of March, leaving ſuch appointments to the Board; with this caution, that capable and faithful ſervants be ſent to Coſſimbuzar, beſt known and moſt agreeable to the Nabob.

" They appoint the Select Committee to conſiſt of Meſſrs. Clive, Watts, Manningham, Becher, and Major Kilpatrick for the time being. Vacancies in this Committee to be filled up by the Preſident and Members. They alſo adviſe that the Secret Committee at home, conſiſts of Meſſrs. Sullivan, Drake, Burrow, Newnham, and Plant, any three of whom are a quorum.

Signed,

Sullivan,	Boulton,	Tullie,
Cutts,	Dudley,	Plant,
Harriſon,	Phipps,	Rooke,
Boyd,	Pigou,	Barwell.
Rous,	Savage,	

N. B. The other ten refuſed to ſign.

Reflections.

The Colonel, in all probability, has, or is near upon leaving India; Meſſrs. Watts, Manningham, and Becher, by the reſtitution of private property, and their other late extraordinary acquiſitions, will, it is likely, ſoon follow him; in which caſe it is worth remarking, where the ſucceſſion takes place, by the foregoing deſtination; and we leave it to the world to form natural and obvious concluſions therefrom.

With reſpect to Mr. Holwell, we cannot help obſerving, that the Majority of the preſent Court have not preſerved even that maſk of equity, which they pretended was the rule of their actions: They have given every writer that remained with him in the

the fort when Calcutta was attacked, two years of his time in recompence of his perſeverance and ſufferings. His perſeverance was ſurely equal to theirs, and his ſufferings eminently ſuperior, and merited ſome diſtinction and favour, though ever ſo ſmall; in place of which they have ſtripped him of the poſt and emoluments they had before appointed him to.

The raſh proceeding of the preſent Majority, in detaining two of the Company's ſhips, "to gratify private reſentment," made a great clamour in the city, and alarmed their beſt friends amongſt the Proprietors; and when their other alterations became public, that not only Mr. Holwell was ſet aſide, but Mr. Manningham alſo, and that the late Majority had reſolved to demand a general Court, the clamour ſtill encreaſed, at the other end of the town, as well as in the city.

The phraſe of "gratifying private reſentments," came originally from the Miniſtry; upon the applications of Meſſrs. S——n and B——n, for other convoy, which was refuſed for ſome time, Lord Anſon telling them, that "in place of labouring "for the intereſt of the Company and the Nation, "their ſole aim ſeemed to be the gratifying their "private reſentments, diſtreſſing his Majeſty's "ſervice, and embroiling their conſtituents affairs."

How theſe inteſtine feuds in Leadenhall-Street muſt affect the public weal of the Company, and in them the Nation, is but too obvious. The future authority of a Court of Directors can have no eſtimation, as their orders and reſolutions for the government of their affairs and ſettlements abroad, will be now liable to be canvaſſed and controuled by every quarterly General Court; and ſtill worſe conſequence is, that no Gentleman of independent fortune, worth and character, will ever, on theſe terms, accept a ſeat in the Direction,

IT is extremely remarkable, how great the reſemblance between the tranſactions of thoſe times, and the preſent is: the reflections at the cloſe of the foregoing narrative ſuiting the one, as well as the other, prove the compiler of it a moſt judicious prophet, foretelling that the government of your Court of Directors, would be brought to nought by their own ſelf-intereſted and inteſtine broils; a prediction now pretty well accompliſhed. What then can enſue, but the moſt alarming confuſion in your affairs? But to reſume our ſubject. You here ſee the moſt unfortunate of your ſervants fallen the ſacrifice of party fury; and you will alſo ſee him in the ſequel perſecuted, ſlandered, and ſuperceded in that rank they then allotted him, by every following diſpatch, and all from the ſame rancorous cauſe, as we ſhall make appear, when we have done with the pamphlet before us; to which we now return.

In page 37, are the following paſſages. "After "the departure of Colonel Clive, the delicacy that "he had uſed towards him (the Nabob) was "intirely thrown aſide. His ſucceſſor in the go-"vernment, who had been *particularly inſtrumental* "*in bringing down Sou Rajah Dowla, and conſe-*"*quently, in occaſioning the firſt revolution in Bengal,* "had arrived at his dignity, contrary to the inten-"tion of his conſtituents, and intirely through the "accident of a number of his ſeniors going home "at this time in diſguſt. Being bleſt with a "genius, uncommonly fertile in expedients for "*raiſing money*, and further unclogged by thoſe "ſilly notions of punctilio, which often ſtand in "the way betwixt ſome people and fortune, he "had projected and put in practice ſeveral *inferior* "*manœuvres*; but this *chef d'Oeuvre*, this maſter

"ſcheme,

" ſcheme, though formed almoſt as ſoon as he " came to power, time did not allow him the " honour of executing." Again page 39, " It " muſt here again be acknowledged, that the " Gentlemen in the direction ſhowed ſo little inten- " tion, that the accidental governor ſhould have " ever come to that truſt, that *they now removed* " *him to be the ſeventh in council.* Being endued " however with a very high degree of what, in " ſome, is called addreſs, enforced by a great " ſhare of plauſibility in argument, he found theſe " talents of ſingular uſe to him on this occaſion. " His *grand plan* being now almoſt ripe for execu- " tion, could not be concealed from his ſucceſſor: " he wavered ſome days about continuing in the " ſervice of his maſters in that *degraded rank.*" Again, lower down in the ſame page and page 40. " But it does not redound much to the honour of " *this degraded governor*, nor plead greatly in " favour of the diſintereſtedneſs of his views, that " after *ſuch a ſtigma*, *ſuch a mark* put upon him " by his ſuperiors, he could (though during his " ſhort government he had acquired a handſome " fortune) ſubmit to ſerve in the ſeventh place, " after having been in the firſt."

The laſt quotation we ſhall trouble you with from this anonymous author, is where he makes a blundering abuſive apology, for all the abuſes he has ſo laviſhly beſtowed, almoſt throughout pages 37 to 41, excluſive of thoſe parts we have already noticed.

Page 40 exhibits as follows, " I ſhould not " have dwelt ſo particularly, on theſe ſeemingly " trifling incidents, nor ſhould I have deſcended " ſo low as to touch individuals, had I not found " it abſolutely neceſſary towards drawing one " *material inference*, which is, that this ſcheme of " Nabob-changing borrows no luſtre from the

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" character of it's original projector." Quere, Who does this pamphleteer mean by the term *original projector?* It cannot be the gentleman we are defending, for he has moſt fully proved he never projected any ſcheme of the kind: therefore this intended abuſe, can only touch the projectors of the revolution of 1757, as they only were the original ſchemers of *Nabob-changing*. He pleads *abſolute neceſſity* for drawing one material *inference*, which is no intelligible inference at all, and only proves his ungovernable appetite to ſlander, but unluckily miſtakes the object.

Leaving the continued indecent ſtrain of this author to revert on himſelf, we ſhall confine ourſelves to thoſe charges againſt Mr. Holwell, which, with Corinthian front, the author makes to bear the ſemblance of facts: Theſe are,

Firſt, (Page 37.) that " Mr. Holwell was par-
" ticularly inſtrumental in bringing down the Sou
" Raja Dowla; and the cauſe of the firſt revolu-
" tion, &c.

" 2dly, That his fertile genius in expedients
" for raiſing money, unclogged with any checks
" or punctilios of honour, or honeſty, (for this is
" plainly implied, though not ſo plainly expreſſed)
" had projected and put in practice ſeveral *inferior*
" manœuvres."

3dly, (Page 39 and 40) It ſeems objected to this gentleman as a crime, that he was *removed to the ſeventh in Council*, and the terms following, of *degraded rank*, *ſtigma*, and *mark* put upon him by your Court of Directors, are all very well framed to enforce the opinion, that Mr. Holwell muſt aſſuredly have been guilty of ſome atrocious breach of truſt, or other iniquitous conduct in your ſervice, to have deſerved being thus *removed* and thus *degraded*; for Anonymous himſelf, allows him abilities and addreſs, therefore he could not have been

been degraded for want of capacity to conduct your affairs; the uninformed, though impartial among you, will very naturally conclude there muſt have been ſome blemiſh, ſome crime, ſome unfaithfulneſs in this your ſervant, that drew on him the high diſpleaſure of your Court of Directors, for they are *honourable men*, and would not, you may ſuppoſe, *degrade* any of your faithful ſervants without ſufficient and juſt reaſon, becauſe therein they would be guilty of a breach of THAT TRUST, with which they are inveſted BY YOU.

Now that this gentleman was ſo ill treated, is fact; and herein Anonymous for once ſpeaks truth. To be removed, degraded, ſtigmatized, and marked by our ſuperiors, when done with reaſon and juſtice, carries its own vindication; but when done from partial and unjuſt motives, ſtimulated by party rage, theſe ſtigmas, marks and degradations, reflect not on the *degraded*, but on the *degraders*.

Thus have we inverted the order of our reply, and ſpoke *firſt* to the *laſt* charge; we ſhall perſiſt in our method, and ſpeak next to the ſecond, which is plainly levelled at this Gentleman's conduct in your Zemindarry, (or Court of Cutcherry at Fort William, Bengal) which has been aſperſed, particularly in the year 1758, and never ſufficiently cleared up. In order to this, it becomes neceſſary to give you a ſhort account how it came to paſs, that this Gentleman was appointed to this poſt of Zemindar, and likewiſe to explain to you the nature of the poſt itſelf.

Your Court of Directors, about the year 1748, coming to the knowledge of ſundry abuſes and depredations, made in your annual revenues of the Zemindary at Bengal, by one Govindram Mettre, (who had been for twenty-eight years the ſtanding Black Deputy in that office, whilſt the head of it was continually fluctuating and changing) and being

ing alſo totally ſtrangers to the nature of the office; a leading Director of your then Court, having more curioſity concerning this branch of your affairs than the reſt, wrote in ſtrenuous terms to a Gentleman of high rank in your ſervice there: this Gentleman having never paſt through the office, could not give the ſatisfaction required; but knowing that Mr. Holwell was on his departure for England, with whom he was upon the ſtricteſt footing of friendſhip, he communicated to him the letter he had received from his patron at home; and being ſenſible that Mr. Holwell by his knowledge in the language, (and having been many years a member of, and two years at the head of your Mayor's Court at Calcutta, where frequently ſuits were commenced and brought to iſſue between the natives) had acquired a deeper inſight into the nature and frauds of this office, than any other perſon in the ſettlement; requeſted his permiſſion, to refer his friend and patron to him for information, on his arrival in England, which was readily aſſented to.

In the courſe of the voyage, Mr. Holwell threw into ſome form, the many materials he had by him reſpecting this office, and on his arrival communicated them to the Director before mentioned, and to another Gentleman, your Chairman, without any view, but that of benefiting the Company, as he then, and for many months after, had no intention of ever ſeeing India again; but finding (as many others who return from India with ſmall fortunes do) that money does not go ſo far in England as he fondly imagined, he thought it neceſſary to return and increaſe his capital, then lying at intereſt only, in your caſh at Fort William.

Thus determined, he applied to the leading Gentlemen in your direction to be ſent out in your ſervice; his application met with ſucceſs, and he was

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in January 1752 appointed to the poſt of Zemindar, and twelfth in council at Fort-William, not to be removed from that poſt without expreſs orders from home, nor to riſe higher in your Council. Theſe two reſtrictions, peculiar to this gentleman, were adopted at his own mere motion and requeſt, for the following reaſons; firſt, as he was ſenſible no reform could poſſibly be made in the office, whilſt the head of it was fluctuating by rotation as heretofore, by which cuſtom it ſometimes happened that there were two or three Zemindars within the ſpace of one year; by this ill-judged meaſure, they were unavoidably kept in the dark as to the real ſtate and nature of this office, and a power in perpetuity devolved to the ſtanding deputy, who was always ſtiled the Black Zemindar: and ſuch was the tyranny of this man, and ſuch the dread conceived of him in the minds of the natives, that no one durſt complain or give information againſt him, howſoever oppreſſed; and this conſideration made it neceſſary for Mr. Holwell to inſiſt on this perſon's being diſmiſſed that ſervice the moment he arrived in Bengal, which was accordingly complied with, and orders ſent out to commence a proſecution againſt him. To give you an idea of this proſecution, and the infinite labour it occaſioned Mr. Holwell, we ſhall in its place inſert three of his letters to the Board of Calcutta on the ſubject.

It was thought a ſeat at the Board of Calcutta was neceſſary to give a proper weight to this officer, in the reform he had propoſed making; he deſired his rank might be *fixed* youngeſt in Council, as thereby he did not carry out with him the odium of ſuperſeding any Gentleman in your ſervice.

When this Gentleman was ſent out your covenanted ſervant, under the patronage of William Baker, Eſq; (now Sir William) and William Mabbot,

bot, Eſq; your Court of Directors conſiſted of the following Gentlemen, *viz.*

Roger Drake, Eſq; Chairman
William Baker, Eſq; Deputy
William Mabbot, Eſq;
William Braund, Eſq;
Chriſ. Burrow, Eſq;
Charles Cutts, Eſq;
Peter Ducane, Eſq;
Sam. Feake, Eſq;
Abel Fonnereau, Eſq;
Peter Godfrey, Eſq;
Charles Gough, Eſq;
John Hope, Eſq;
Mich. Impey, Eſq;
Stephen Law, Eſq;
Nich. Linwood, Eſq;
Nathaniel Newnham, jun. Eſq.
John Payne, Eſq;
Henry Plant, Eſq;
Jones Raymond, Eſq;
William Rider, Eſq;
Thomas Rous, Eſq;
Timothy Tullie, Eſq;
William Willie, Eſq;

Here it becomes needful to add a ſhort explanation of the nature of this officer's duty, in quality of Zemindar.

The Zemindar acts in a double capacity, diſtinct, and independant of each other, (with very few exceptions) the one as Superintendant and Collector of your revenues, the other, as Judge of the Court of Cutcherry, a tribunal conſtituted for the hearing, trying, and determining all matters and things, both civil and criminal, wherein the natives only, ſubjects of the Mogul, are concerned. He tried in a ſummary way, had the power of the laſh, fine, and impriſonment; he determined all matters of *meum* and *tuum*; and in all criminal caſes, proceeded to ſentence and puniſhment immediately after hearing, except where the crime (as murder) requires the laſh to be inflicted until death, in which caſe he ſuſpends execution of the ſentence, until the fact and evidence are laid before the Preſident, and his confirmation of the ſentence is obtained. He has alſo the power to condemn thieves, and other culprits, to work in chains upon

the roads, during any determinate ſpace of time, or for life. In all cauſes of property, an appeal lay to the Preſident and Council againſt his decrees.

Such was the power annexed to this office, when this Gentleman was appointed the head of it, and ſuch had it been for a long term of years preceding that period; a power by much too great for any *one man* to be intruſted with. Therefore in the year 1758, at the recommendation of Mr. Holwell, a ſtop was put to it by the Court of Directors, who appointed three Judges of this Court, Members of the Board, in monthly rotation. Before this Gentleman took charge of this important poſt, there never had been any regiſter of cauſes or decrees kept in Engliſh; but from that time, a regiſter of the proceedings was monthly laid before the Board at Calcutta, for their inſpection, and annually tranſmitted to your Court of Directors. Here permit us to remark, that though this Gentleman was, for the ſpace of four years, (that is, from the beginning of July 1752, to the capture of your ſettlement) ſole Judge of this Court, not a ſingle complaint was ever preferred againſt him in his judicial capacity in criminal cauſes, and *but one appeal* from his judgments and decrees in matters of property, and *of that*, only the half reverſed, and the reſt confirmed. But the conduct and merit of this Gentleman, in this, as well as the other branches of this laborious office, you ſhall not take upon truſt from us his friends, who may be deemed partial, but ſhall, in good time, have them from ſtronger vouchers, and ſuperior judges.

We proceed next to the three letters beforementioned, touching the proſecution of Govindram Metre, and then to convey an idea to you of the duty of the Zemindar, relative to the revenues; and this we ſhall do in this gentleman's own words, without

without any abridgment, in a work which he entitled A STATE OF THE REVENUES, tranſmitted to your Court of Directors in a letter to the board of Calcutta. The work is long, and to ſome may appear unintelligible and tedious, but to others intereſting and curious; howſoever this may be, our plan of defence calls for it, in proof of Mr. Holwell's talents, and his indefatigable and unwearied exertion of thoſe talents in your ſervice.

To the Honourable Roger Drake, *Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Council.*

Fort William, Aug. 13, 1752.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

THE 20th ult. I thought it neceſſary to move you that Govindram Metre ſhould give ſecurity to the Board for his appearance, on account of ſome frauds I had traced, regarding the Company's Revenues under his management; and though the ſhort time I have been in the office, and my neceſſary attendance to the current buſineſs of it, will not at preſent ſufficiently enable me to digeſt all the informations that have reached me, wherein I think the Company have been heavily injured during the twenty-eight years of this man's adminiſtration; yet, as far as I am able, my duty tells me I ought to lay before you, without loſs of time; the more ſo, as I am well informed, he is diſtributing and ſecreting his ill-got wealth in various places, and by various methods.

The farms, and monthly charges Jemmidaary have firſt drawn my attention, as they are firſt in conſequence to the Honourable Company: my remarks on the duties on exportation of rice, etlach, fines, &c. I muſt reſerve for a ſubſequent addreſs; but as Govindram Metre may have the ſubterfuge to plead, of all accounts of the revenues being paſſed

under the hands of the Zemindars, and leſt his glaring frauds ſhould ſeem tacitly to cenſure the neglect of thoſe gentlemen, I beg your Honour, &c.'s leave, previouſly to obviate that, both by ſaying, that the accounts, frauds as well as errors, are excepted; and that whilſt the poſt of Zemindary was tranſitory and fluctuating, and this man inveſted with power, a retroſpection into the ſtate of the Company's revenues with any material ſucceſs, would have been morally impoſſible, as not one of the natives, from the higheſt to the loweſt, durſt with impunity have given the leaſt umbrage to him; and it is they only that could have explored the dark and intricate mazes, in which he has ſo long concealed himſelf from the eyes and ſtroke of juſtice.

Two of the principal farms, viz. the Rice Farm, and Buzar Calcutta, commonly called the Great Buzar, I muſt likewiſe reſerve for the ſubject of another letter, and proceed now to the others, whoſe annual Pottahs, or grants, bear date the firſt of November; and here I muſt begin with confeſſing to your Honour, &c. an error of my own. I always imagined the farms were ſold at public outcry, or auction, in the Cutcherry, in the preſence of the Zemindar; and think I told as much to ſome of our Honourable maſters, as believing it impoſſible to be otherwiſe; but am ſorry to ſay no ſuch eſſential and neceſſary method has been practiſed for theſe ten years; a circumſtance I ſhould not mention here, did not what follows make it abſolutely neceſſary: for, on the contrary, Govindram Metre's houſe, I find, has, for that ſpace, been the place where the prices have been affixed to each farm, not by auction to the higheſt bidder, but privately at the prices he choſe to take the beſt of them himſelf at, under fictitious names; that is, thoſe that would yield the beſt and

moſt

moſt certain profit; and diſpoſed of the others that were more precarious, to his friends and dependants: theſe prices he reports to the Zemindar for his confirmation, and the ſeveral Pottahs are ordered to be drawn out accordingly. Of the farms which he has uſually taken to himſelf under fictitious names, I ſhall now ſpeak only to the following, viz.

Soota Nutty Haut, and Suba Bazar	In the name of his ſervant Perethram Huzzurah.
Baug Buzar Haut and Buzar Charles Buzar and Haut Haut Cola Buzar Douba Parrah Suttanutty's Dour Beckry and Koora Pocha	All theſe in the name of Nilmony Goſe, his Brother Sookdeb Metre's grandſon.

It may be objected in his favour, that there might be loſs on theſe farms as well as gain; but this objection will avail him little, when I make it appear to your Honour, &c. that he ſecures his gain as ſoon as, or rather before, he takes them to himſelf, by farming them out again to third perſons; ſo that the caſe ſtands exactly thus:—This man has an abſolute truſt and confidence repoſed in him, in the diſpoſal of the Company's farms, the beſt of which he farms at an under rate to himſelf, in a fictitious name, and at the ſame time farms them out again at an immediate gain; a fraud than which I know not a greater. Your Honour, &c. muſt be ſenſible how difficult it muſt be, to inveſtigate a ſeries of accounts and tranſactions for twenty-eight years paſt; the forming vouchers for which, have, without controul, remained ſolely in the power of this man; and whatever evidence might have been againſt him, as to former times, does poſſibly now not exiſt; therefore the utmoſt that

can be done in this caſe, is to fix him in frauds as near as I can to the preſent time; and equitably to recommend to your Honour, &c. on behalf of our Honourable Maſters, a judgment on the whole of his conduct, from the few ſpecimens I am now going to lay, in as clear a light as poſſible, before you: and firſt, I ſhall prove his having taken the ſeveral farms above-mentioned to himſelf at an under rate, in the years 1749, 1750, and 1751, and farm'd them out again at an immediate advance, Soota Nutty Haut and Suba Buzar being farm'd out in the different articles to different people.

Anno				Gains per annum	
SOOTA NUTTY HAUT.					
1749	Farmed at	3525	Farmed out again at 4851		1326
1750	- -	3600	- - - - - - - - - -	5315	1715
1751	- -	3600	- - - - - - - - - -	5385	1785
SUBAH BUZAR.					
1749	- -	1325	- - - - - - - - - -	2271	946
1750	- -	1400	- - - - - - - - - -	2381	981
1751	- -	1400	- - - - - - - - - -	2672	1272
BAUG BUZAR and HAUT.					
1749	- -	775	Farmed to Kitteram Paul	1200	425
1750	- -	765	to Purpuram	1000	235
1751	- -	765	to ditto	1000	235
DOOBA PARRAH SAYAR.					
1749	- -	208	to Harry Kiſſon Coyal	437	229
1750	- -	400	to Terra Chund Dutt	474	74
1751	- -	468	to ditto	542	74
KOORA PACHA and DUAR BECKRY SOOTA NUTTY.					
1749	- -	162	Farmed to Satoo Maſtry	250	88
1750	- -	152	to Bechue Mundell	270	118
1751	- -	152	to ditto	270	118
CHARLES BUZAR and HAUT.					
1749	- -	378	Farmed to Kitteram Paul	416	38
1750	- -	240	to Purpuram Sircar	331	90
1751	- -	240	to Harry Kiſſon Coyal	335	95
					9844

From the foregoing ſtatement, your Honour, &c. may readily judge, how immenſely the Company have been injured in the whole of their revenues during this man's long adminiſtration; but if we ſhould ſuppoſe he has only made this advantage during the ten years laſt paſt, that the farms have been in a manner abandoned to his conduct, we ſhall, by parity of reaſon, find the Company defrauded, in that ſpace, of no leſs than the principal ſum of Rupees 32813 15 6 in theſe farms only; but this favourable concluſion he has no right to expect, as I think I ſhall be able to demonſtrate, there is not any one branch of the Revenues wherein he has not been conſiſtent in defrauding, to the utmoſt extent of his power.

Before I quit this ſubject, I think it needful to inform your Honour, &c. that Govindram Metre has, this year, by his own authority, levied a tax from the farmers of 2 ½ per cent. on the amount of their ſeveral farms (over and above the 10 per cent. uſually taken from them, as the allowed perquiſite of the Zemindar) which he has converted to his own uſe.

The monthly charges Zemindary, is the next article I ſhall at preſent ſubmit to your Honour, &c.'s conſideration and cenſure, under three diviſions, viz. ſervants in monthly pay, charges making and repairing Cutcherries and Chowkey houſes, and charges.

In regard to the ſervants in the Cutcherry, I find the Company has been, time out of mind, defrauded by Govindram Metre, in the monthly ſum of 166 Rupees, excluſive of his monthly allowance of 112 8; the particulars of which are, viz.

27 Pikes, 17 always employed in his own ſervice, 3 whoſe pay he has always received, and 7 his menial ſervants under this denomination; 27 at 2 Rupees per menſem —		54
19 Buckſerrias, 14 nominal only, and 5 at his town of Kiſſen-Poor; for theſe he receives monthly — —		59
Boncheram receives no wages, yet charged at		8
Kiſſen Goſe, Rogu Metre's Cotta ſervant		5
Ramchurnd Tagoor, another ſervant of Rogu Metre — —		3
Barnaſa Scatdut, Metre's Maulda Gomaſtah		5
Tilluckram, under the name of Bredju Mahone — — —		10
6 Gwallers — —		12
Munkindram Mundell, at Metre's Gottabarry — —		3
Nunderam Goſe, a gratuity —		7
Rupees per menſem —		166

In this particular your Honour, &c. obſerves the Company has been defrauded of Rupees 1992 per annum; and as we cannot reaſonably imagine, he was leſs ſcrupulous when he was more indigent, ſo I think it will not be deemed unjuſt to charge him with this fraud for 28 years laſt paſt; and then it will appear, we have here another manifeſt claim on him, on behalf of our Honourable Maſters, for the principal ſum of Rupees 55776.

I am next to repreſent to your Honour, &c. that I have extracted from the monthly charges Zemindary, the expences account, making and repairing the ſeveral Cutcherries and Chowkey houſes, from February 1747, to March 1752; and find in that ſpace no leſs a ſum to that account, than

Rupees

Rupees 9018 8; a charge moſt infamous, and ſelf-evident to every member of this Board, when I further inform your Honour, &c. that 5184 8 of this ſum is under the head of repairing the great Cutcherry, on which a tythe has not been expended in that time, as I will prove, if needful, from a thouſand witneſſes; and the ſame as to the other ſtraw houſes, under the denomination of Cutcherry and Chowkey houſes; but as I would rather leſſen than exaggerate every charge againſt him, I will ſuppoſe the Company defrauded in this period of five years 7000 Rupees only, which, during his adminiſtration, will amount to the principal ſum of Rupees 39,200.

The charges in repairing the roads, drains and bridges, within the ſame period of time, I find ſwelled to the enormous ſum of Rupees 7884 15 9; out of which there ſtands to the account of repairing the Dumdum and Barraſut roads, Rupees 2819; of which, 1036 7 are appropriated to the years 1750 and 1751. Now, to give your Honour, &c. a ſpecimen of his frauds in this part of the monthly charge, I will obſerve, that the Company is debted by him in October 1751, Rupees 520 4, for the repairs of the Dumdum and Baraſut roads; whereas, by the accounts I have laid before me, it appears there were really no more expended on theſe roads in the years 1750 and 1751, than 342 cound, 6 pund and 10 gundas of Cowries; and theſe collected from the neighbouring riots or tenants, which has always been practiſed towards repairing the out-roads of the town (though where a Rupee has been collected, not more than ſix Annaes have been expended) and the Company beſides conſtantly charged for this article at an immenſe rate; a double fraud, that merits the higheſt cenſure and puniſhment. From the conſideration of theſe particulars, it is manifeſt the Company has yearly been defrauded

of

of almoſt the whole that has been charged on this account, a ſmall expence on building and repairing two or three bridges excepted; which, with the utmoſt indulgence to Govindram Metre, cannot reduce the fraud within the five years above ſpecified, to leſs than 6000 Rupees; and, on the whole of his adminiſtration, to the principal ſum of 33600 Rupees.

Laſt year I obſerve a charge continued for ten months, at the rate of 32 Rupees per menſem, on account of looking after Cutmah's houſes: the ponſways and guard employed for this ſervice, were the monthly ſervants of the Company; and yet the Company is not only by Metre debted on this account, but I am very credibly informed, he likewiſe levied the ſame from the Cutmahs. I mention this article chiefly with a view of demonſtrating to your honour, &c. that every intervening bye-path to knavery, has been as regularly traverſed and infeſted by him as the high road of iniquity, in which he has ſo long and unmoleſted raiſed contributions from the Company, as well as from every one of the inhabitants that have unluckily fallen within his gripe, or that of his ſon Rogu Metre. Inſtances of this laſt nature are ſo many, that by what I have already heard, I fear if I had as many ears as Argus had eyes, they would be much too inſufficient to receive them; but thoſe, with the proofs I am poſſeſſed of, touching his connections with the common murderers and robbers of the town, I muſt reſerve for a volume by themſelves, and cloſe this preſent remonſtrance againſt him with recapitulating and throwing into one total the foregoing principal ſums, for which, I am of opinion, the Company has an immemdiate and ſpecific claim on him, with intereſt that may be due thereon; juſt premiſing, that as wages are, or at leaſt ought to be, deemed the reward of ſervice

and

and faithfulneſs; and as this man, in the place of promoting the ſervice of the Company, has, in breach of his truſt and duty, injured their affairs by every wicked practice in his power, ſo I think he has very juſtly forfeited whatever wages he has received, and therefore ſubmit it to your Honour, &c. whether he ſhould not be mulcted in a ſum equal thereto; and as I cannot doubt but I ſhall meet your concurrence in ſo equitable a charge, I will add it to the others, viz.

9 years, at 30 Rupees per menſem	3240		
12 ditto, at 50 — —	7200		
GOVINDRAM METRE	Dr.		
To frauds on the farms held himſelf -	32813	15	6
To ditto in the monthly charge of ſervants	55776	0	0
To ditto account charges repairing the Cutcherrys - - -	39200	0	0
To ditto account charges repairing the Roads, &c. - -	33600	0	0
To ditto account the guard on Cotmah's houſe	320	0	0
	161709	15	6
To the mulct of his wages -	-		

I beg leave to repreſent to your Honour, &c. that when the intereſt which is ſtrictly due to the Company, is calculated on the firſt total, it becomes a ſum of no ſmall importance; and therefore I humbly inſiſt, on the behalf of our Honourable Maſters, that Govindram Metre be immediately committed to cloſe confinement, until the ſame is diſcharged; and that a ſufficient military guard be, without loſs of time, placed on his ſeveral houſes; and that his ſon Rogu Metre be obliged to give good ſecurity for his appearance.

On entering my office, I found it heavily burthened with ſinecures, perquiſites, and unneceſſary ſervants, which I have the pleaſure to inform your Honour, &c. ſtand reduced for this month of Auguſt,

Auguſt, to the amount of 550 Rupees, amongſt which the charge of Pykes was a very needleſs and conſiderable one; for of the 143 retained in the ſervice, I found 64, (excluſive of Metre's 27) ſtationed as a nightly guard to the ſeveral inhabitants houſes; as I ſaw no propriety in the Company's bearing this expence (trifling to each individual, but a heavy one to them) I thought it reaſonable to retrench that amongſt the reſt, having ſtill retained the Head Pyke, his 11 Niabs or deputies, and 35 Pykes only, as needful for the ſervice; the Head Pyke ſtill remaining, as uſual, ſecurity for any night guard he ſends, at the requeſt of the inhabitants; and further than this, they are of no uſe towards the guarding or ſafety of the town; for, on ſtrict review and muſter of the whole body, I could not pick out more than 30 that were trained Pykes, or had any pretenſion to that title, further than as they (occaſionally to paſs muſter) were loaded with their uſual arms. I am, moſt reſpectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

To the Honourable ROGER DRAKE, *Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council.*

Fort William, Aug. 17, 1752.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

AS it appears to me beyond a doubt, that Govindram Metre will not only make every delay in his power, in giving in his anſwer to the charge contained in my letter, addreſſed to your Honour, &c. under date the 13th inſtant, but will by every art and means, endeavour to take off the evidence againſt him; I think it extremely neceſſary now to lay before you the nature of the proofs

I have

I have to ſupport the charge exhibited againſt him; which I requeſt may now be examined before the Board, or a Committee appointed, without loſs of time, for that purpoſe; of which (as this affair is of no ſmall conſequence to the Company) I beg leave to move that the Preſident may be one.

In regard, firſt, to the farms taken to himſelf, and farmed out at an immediate advance, the particulars, as laid before your Honour, &c. I think he will not conteſt or deny; but if he ſhould, I have the ſeveral accounts thereof ready to be laid before you.

Touching the overcharge of ſervants in monthly pay, I need only refer your Honour, &c. to the Buxey's roll of the Pykes and Buckſerrias, and to the Cutcherry Podar, or Shroff, who is at hand with their ſeveral accounts.

The overcharge account repairing the Cutcherrys is ſo ſelf-evident, that I need only refer your Honour, &c. to your own judgments, but more particularly to the gentlemen who have preceded me in the office.

In regard to the double fraud and exorbitant charge of repairing the roads, I have ready to lay before this Board the Banian's books, employed on this ſervice, and the Head Peon attending him.

Touching the article of Cotmah's guard, I have now this further circumſtance to add, that in place of 320 Rupees charged the Company, and collected from the Cotmahs, I am well informed, he exacted from them on this account, October 26, C. Rs. 654. viz.

On account Bolly and Perith Cotmah		327	0
On account Duloll Cotmah	-	163	8
On account Ponchu Cotma	-	163	8
	C. Rs.	654	0

For

For proof of this article, your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to order the Cotmahs to appear before you, and declare, on their oaths, if this fact is or is not as I have repreſented it.

On the whole of theſe five articles, I can ſcarcely think he will be hardy enough to deny or conteſt any of them, as they each of them almoſt prove themſelves; however, if he ſhould, the proofs, I may ſay, are now in a manner in the hands of your Honour, &c. and you will doubtleſs take ſuch reſolutions therein, as will equitably conduce to the intereſt of our Honourable Maſters.

It is ſome concern to me, that I ſhould have ſo far differed in judgment from ſo great a majority of this Board, when I thought the charge exhibited againſt Govindram Metre was ſelf-evident enough to enforce the neceſſity of his confinement; but though my remonſtrance had not weight ſufficient, either to procure that, or even a guard for the ſecurity of his effects, yet that muſt not ſlacken my endeavours in ſearch of the Company's rights; as I will ſtill hope I ſhall not always be ſo unlucky, or ſo far miſtaken in my judgment as to want the approbation and concurrence of your Honour, &c. in what I ſhall lay before you.

On taking charge of my office, I found the laſt monthly account of revenues delivered into council, was the month of March; on which I thought it expedient to haſten the accounts of April, May, and June, as much as poſſible, but found the delays in Metre without end; when ſending for him into the public Cutcherry, and aſking him the reaſon of theſe delays, his anſwer was, That it was occaſioned by ſome articles that he had recollected, which ought to have been brought to the credit of the Company ſooner, an account of which he then gave me, to the amount of C. Rs. 2809 3 9, telling me he wanted to bring them

them to credit in the account of revenues for April; to which I objected, that as he was ſenſible I had traced thoſe very frauds, and that ſome of them were five years ſtanding, I could not admit of more being brought to credit in April, than were really the tranſactions of the preceding year, which I likewiſe repreſented to Mr. Manningham, and met with his approval; accordingly, in the accounts revenues for April, laid before your Honour, &c. the 13th inſtant, Rupees 842 8 of the above ſum are brought to credit, ſo that according to his account delivered me, there remains a ballance due to the Company of C. Rs. 1966 11 9, account frauds confeſſed, in the ſeveral articles of duty on Rice Salliſnammah, (or arbitration bonds) Ruſſey Sallamy, (or meaſuring conteſted grounds) Gur Huzreys (or ſervants wages forfeited) and Mooriannoes, from April 1747, during the ſeveral Zemindaries of Meſſrs. Kempe, Eyles, Cruttenden, and Watts; I juſtly call theſe frauds confeſſed, not only as he knew I had traced them, but becauſe I have this convincing argument to alledge, they never would have been brought to credit, but as a conſequence of the ſcrutiny I had begun to make into his conduct; for he had as early as the 29th of June, adjuſted the account revenues for the month of April, and cloſed the credit ſide of the account; and the whole was wrote fair, and wanted only balancing and ſigning, and not one of theſe recollected articles brought to credit. But as almoſt every hour comes freighted with his frauds, it is my duty to lay them before your Honour, &c. as they occur.

Unteram Dut ſtood, during Mr. Forſter's government, a penſioner on the Cutcherry books, at 20 Rupees per menſem, which he received till Mr. Eyles ſtruck him off. In the beginning of Mr. Rooper's Zemindary he was again reſtored, and received

received one month's allowance; but ſince that it has been received by Metre or Rogu Metre, on pretence of a balance due from Unteram to the latter, 24 months at 20 Rupees, which is 460: for proof of which the Cutcherry Podar, and Unteram are in waiting.

The 15th, Goſebeg Jemmautdaar complained to me, that he had not received a Cowrie of the wages due to him and ten Peons, that were placed as a guard at Govindpoor Gunge in March laſt, to look after the rice. Recollecting a charge of this kind, I turned to that month's account revenues, and found the Company debted for Rs. 232 10 for this ſervice, account 20 Buckſerrias and two Ponſoys, whereas there were in truth only the Peons above mentioned, and 10 of the Company's Buckſerrias from the different Chowkeys on board the Ponſways, and the expence of the Ponſways I find was paid by Moideb Huzzarah; and though the charge is continued to the Company for two months and four days, yet they were actually no longer on this ſervice than one month and ſeven days,—as Goſebeg, Sowanny, Ponſwaar, and Lallmun Mangu are now in waiting to prove.

By complaint from Nour Cawn, I find, that in a long family diſpute between him and his brother Haſſein Cawn's widow, the amount of 2107 C. Rs. has been collected from them both, 200 Sicca Rupees of which were received by Metre on account of duty on raw ſilk, and the reſt in fines, neither of which has been brought to the Company's credit. The particulars of this infamous affair are too prolix to enumerate to your Honour, &c. at preſent, therefore ſhall only requeſt he may be interrogated as to the fact.

The next article I have to ſubmit to your Honour's, &c. judgment, is of a moſt flagitious nature, and at the ſame time will prove as well his perfidiouſneſs to the Company, as his connection with

with the common robbers, and murderers, that have ſo many years infeſted the ſettlement: I may too juſtly ſay under his wing and protection, to the laſting ſtain I fear of our name and government: About the latter end of April 1750, the Head Pyke informed Govindram Metre, that he had taken a notorious Decoyt, named Diaram, (commonly called Dia) in the houſe of one Moideb Cuſſarry, who was likewiſe known to be connected with theſe Decoyts. To give your Honour, &c. the reſult of this affair in as few words as poſſible, the Head Pyke was ordered by Metre, to ſell Moideb's houſe and effects, which was accordingly done the firſt of May, the former for 300 Rupees, and the latter for two, and the amount C. Rs. 500 paid by the Head Pyke by Metre's order to Diaram Goſe, his relation, and head writer in the Cutcherry, and the murderer ordered to be releaſed. The proof of theſe facts are now in writing, and more inſtances of this nature, I have ready to produce againſt him, when your Honour, &c. has more leiſure than you have at preſent to receive them, or than indeed I have at preſent to enumerate them.

I have a ſingle obſervation to make to your Honour, &c. on two articles contained in Metre's account frauds confeſſed; Gurr Huzreys from 1747 to 1751, in that ſpace he brings to the credit of the Company on that account 392 8 Rupees: now from the nature of things, this deduction muſt have been always made, more or leſs, from the wages of the Buxerries, Pykes, &c.—But what is become of it? for, with the utmoſt diligence, I can trace no credit given on account of this article.

The article Moorianoes, I believe, may need ſome explanation, as introductory to my obſervation on it. On every complaint where a Peon is ordered, he receives from the delinquent or defen-

dant three punds of Cowries a day, one pund of which he keeps to himſelf, one pund 14 gundas belongs to the Company under the head of Etlack, and the remaining ſix gundas is daily collected apart, out of which the Etlack Mories or writers are paid their wages, and the overplus remains to the Company; on account of this article, Metre in his account frauds confeſſed, brings to credit 370 Rupees from 1749 to 1751, but as I find no credit given ſince Auguſt and September 1743, on this account, I muſt conclude a farther fraud in this, as well as the laſt mentioned article: both which I ſubmit to your Honour, &c. judgment.

GOVINDRAM METRE Dr.

To account Cutmah's guards	——	334	
To account frauds confeſſed	——	1966	11 9
To account Unteram Dutt	——	460	
To account the guard at the Rice gunge		232	10
To account Nour Cawn, and Hoſſein Cawn's widow	— —	2107	
To account Moideb's houſe and effects		500	
Principal C. Rs.		5600	5 9

I am, moſt reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

To the Honourable ROGER DRAKE, *Eſq; Preſident and Governor, &c. Council.*

Honourable Sir and Sirs, Fort William, Auguſt 27, 1752.

I Obſerve that Govindram Metre has (in two letters under date the 17th and 24th inſtant) put in anſwer to the two firſt charges I have exhibited againſt him, on which I beg leave to remark, that if he is thus permitted to anſwer in a long and

fallacious narrative, to every ſingle charge, I foreſee a ſcrutiny into his conduct may become a work of ſome years; and will be ſuch a heavy tax on my time, that the needful, and I may ſay hourly attention to my office, will by no means admit of; becauſe my replying to ſuch anſwers will be abſolutely neceſſary, or our honourable maſters may be impoſed on, by the ſpeciouſneſs of their appearance; and my replies may occaſion his rejoinders, to the end of the chapter. The charges I lay againſt him conſiſt not in argument, but facts, which it is only incumbent on him to admit or deny. If my informations are wrong, and I fail in the proof of them, he will thereby become ſufficiently vindicated; therefore, effectually to put a ſtop to this tedious method, I will only give your Honour, &c. the trouble of this reply, and in future barely lay before the Committee whatever facts occur to me, ſubſequent to my preſent information.

I admit his appeal to the Gentlemen that have filled the ſtation of Zemindar, to be ſtrictly true; and I have long known ſuch application to them, on the ſale of the farms, to be his conſtant method of blinding them, as he well knew none durſt give them intelligence of their real worth: His impoſition on your Honour, &c. in this argument, I cannot help calling extremely audacious; he ſays, "he always adviſed the Zemindars a month before "the time of ſale, of the utmoſt price he could get "for the farms."—Why, Gentlemen! the Pottahs, by which he farmed out on his own account the farms now under conſideration, and which carry an advance (ſome of them) of 70, 80, and 100 per cent. bear date the ſame day with thoſe, whereby he calls them to himſelf, in a fictitious name, at that loſs to our honourable employers: can your Honour, &c. want a ſtronger proof of matchleſs fraud and iniquity than this? I think not, I dare

ſay I ſhall meet your concurrence in giving it theſe juſt appellations. He further ſays, he gave more for the ſix farms in 1749, than was given the year before; this I admit; and muſt remark his advancing ſometimes, in a trifling degree, the prices of the farms, as another artful means of blinding his maſters: but his aſſertion, that he gave more for the ſix farms the two next years, than he gave in 1749, is far from truth; for I have only to refer your Honour, &c. to my letter under date the 13th inſtant, and you will obſerve, for three of them he gives leſs, nay though he farms two of the three on his own account at a higher rate in 1750 and 1751, than in 1749. As to the deduction of the duſſutary, or 10 per cent. for the Zemindar, it does not appear to me in any degree probable, that he would neglect levying this fee from thoſe to whom he rented the farms on his own account; which he might do as juſtly as he levied the 2½ per cent. the laſt year, notwithſtanding the reaſons by which he attempts to palliate that act of power and oppreſſion. He inſinuates my leaving out Haut Cola Buzar in my ſecond liſt with deſign, as knowing he loſt by that Buzar: that I was not capable of ſo unworthy a deſign, is manifeſt from my mentioning it in my firſt liſt; and 2dly, becauſe I know, and will prove, he neither loſt or gained by it in the year 1749 and 1750; but that he gained 40 Rupees by it in 1751, when he took it at 177 Rupees, and farmed it out again to Purpuram at 217 Rupees. He may with equal truth ſay, it is with deſign, in the calculate of his wages, where I charge him 9696, inſtead of 8484; which is as manifeſt a miſtake, as my leaving out the other Buzar in my ſecond liſt. "He ſays, that every Rajah's "and Zemindar's Duan, over the whole king-"dom, is indulged with ſome farms for his own "profit; as he cannot, from his wages, keep up

"the

"the equipage and attendance neceſſary for an "officer in his ſtation." This is calculated to deceive elſewhere, as he muſt know your Honour, &c. is better acquainted with the nature of this government. We know it is a very uſual thing for a Duan, or a Duan's Niab, to repreſent to their principal, that ſuch or ſuch a farm or portion of land produces ſuch an annual profit, and ſolicits that he may hold it himſelf; but it is as well known, that if he is detected in concealing the real profits, or holds them clandeſtinely in others names, or is found guilty of oppreſſing or exacting from the people more than the eſtabliſhed duties, the laſh, fetters, impriſonment, and confiſcation, are the immediate conſequence; one crime fully proved againſt him implies the whole, and he is treated accordingly. To inſtance one that Metre is perfectly acquainted with.—About 15 years ago, Sahib Ray was Duan to Kritichund Raja; this Duan had a Niab, or deputy, named Gopee Sing, who was convicted of holding farms clandeſtinely, of oppreſſing the people, and of perpetrating other crimes now laid to the charge of Govindram Metre: his puniſhment was very remarkable; for after ſeverely ſuffering the laſh, chains, impriſonment, and confiſcation, he was fixed in the public highway, and an order iſſued for every paſſenger to kick him on the head, under which miſerable ſituation he expired. As Metre's own confeſſion ſpeaks his having plundered agreeably to the maxims of his own nation, ſo he himſelf has pointed out, that the laws of his own nation ought to be the meaſure of his puniſhment; and I am much deceived, if your Honour, &c. will not find in the end, that his crimes are in no ſhape inferior to thoſe of Gopee Sing's. As to his inſinuations touching equipage and attendance, I know not, that from the nature of his employ in

this ſettlement, he was intitled to either, in the ſenſe he would imply: How and by what means he had accumulated a judicial power in the place, ten times greater than nine-tenths of his maſters, is a point I will not diſcuſs; but certain it is, that his acquiring any was foreign to his ſtation, which ſtrictly was no more than a head ſervant of the Zemindar's, and a ſuperintendant of the writers and other ſervants imployed in the revenues; which ſtation ſome one or other muſt fill, without the leaſt neceſſity of his gaining power, name, or equipage; at leaſt I will venture to aſſure your Honour, &c. none ſhall, whilſt I have the honour of being at the head of the office.

Metre objects to my charging him ten years on the ſix farms; to which I ſay, that where a fraud of three years is proved upon him, I ſee no injuſtice in concluding, that fraud was extended further, when the means were equally in his power, though perpetrated, poſſibly, by different methods. In this, I am ſure, I treat him ſtrictly conformable to his own laws, which himſelf has pleaded in his favour; but this charge I will further illuſtrate to your Honour in ſimilar inſtances, where his clandeſtine gains have been much greater than thoſe already laid before you. The Nimmuck Mahal, or Salt Farm, was farmed by Narratun Biſwaſs, at 1651 10 6 in the year 1751, under a ſtrict ſtipulation and order of the Zemindary, that he was to levy a duty on that article only of 15½ annaes per cent. when his year expired. Metre ſent for one Ramram Boſe, whom he took into his ſervice, and placed in the management of that farm, telling him, the duty was now to be collected on the Company's account, with orders to let him know, at the end of two or three months, what it produced: this produce amounting, in the months of November, December, and January, to between

900

900 and 1000 Rupees, Metre takes the farm to himſelf, in the name of one Conju Boſe; and as an inſtance of his merit and vigilance, advances to the Company 152 4 3 more than it farmed at the year before; this farm has ever ſince been in his hands, in fictitious names, at a ſmall annual advance; and he has, according to my information, made in theſe ten or eleven years, a profit of at leaſt 40,000 Rupees on this farm: the proofs of this muſt in ſome degree reſt with your Honour, &c. by ſtrictly ordering the Amdanny and Ruffstanny accounts, or imports and exports of that article, to be laid before the Committee. When this farm was laſt year put up to public ſale, by order of Mr. Burrow, your Honour, &c. may remark, it roſe from 2400 to 4034 Rupees; a ſtrong proof of the frauds committed in it.

The Vermillion Farm produced in 1738, Rupees 412; in 1739, Metre takes it at 200; and it has been in his hands clandeſtinely, in the names of his ſervants, ever ſince, and only raiſed to 225. His profits on this farm, I am informed, during theſe thirteen or fourteen years, amount to Rupees 30,000 at leaſt: the proof of which muſt likewiſe, as in the laſt article, reſt on your Honour, &c. by ordering him to lay the accounts of both, on his oath, before the Committee.

In the duty on Chinam, timbers, and ſale of boats, I find, by extracts from the ſeveral Aſſammees Books, Rupees 960 2 collected by Connuram Tagoor, from November laſt to June inclusive, of which there is only brought to credit annually about 300 Rupees; ſo that there has been an annual fraud in it at leaſt of 1000 Rupees: and I think no body will ſay or believe, that this ſervant of Metre's can have ſecreted this annual ſum.

After all; it might have been imagined, that, ſince the Company had been thus defrauded in the annual ſale of their farms, thoſe ſums for which they were ſold (howſoever leſs than their real value) would at leaſt have been brought to their credit; but on the contrary, I am ſorry to adviſe your Honour, &c. that has not been the caſe; for having ordered the beſt Moories I could employ, to draw out, by way of account current, a ſtatement of the yearly amount of the Pottahs and the credits, as they ſtand in the monthly account revenues, from 1738 to November 1751, I find no leſs a ſum than Rupees 7219, not brought to credit; ſo that it is too ſtrictly verified, what I have before aſſerted, that there has been no method uneſſayed by this man, where there was a poſſibility of his injuring the truſt repoſed in him.

I have nothing more to trouble your Honour, &c. with in reply to his anſwer of the 17th, than to aver, he has never been debarred inſpecting any book whatever in the Cutcherry, that he might think neceſſary for his defence; and I have given orders, that he may take any copies from thence he pleaſes. His letter of the 24th needs no reply, as the confuting it wholly depends on proofs to be laid before the Committee: for my own part, I muſt once more repeat my opinion, that his frauds are too obvious to afford a doubt; but the moſt convincing proof of them will appear in the increaſe of the revenues, which points out to me an expedient for your Honour, &c.'s deliberation, that in my own judgment carries great equity with it, and would ſave us from a moſt tedious taſk, which muſt reſult from a particular enquiry into every article of his frauds.

I believe it can hardly be imagined, that, with our utmoſt vigilance and attention, we ſhall be able to make ſo much of the Company's revenues, as has

has been made of them whilſt under his management; notwithſtanding which, I would propoſe, that he give good and ſufficient ſecurity to refund two-thirds of the medium of the increaſe on two years revenues, commencing from the firſt of July laſt; and the better to eſtimate in what ſum he ſhall be obliged to give ſecurity, I will ſuppoſe a medium increaſe of 30,000 Rupees, (and leſs, I will venture to ſay, will not be, and yet the poor in many circumſtances relieved) two-thirds of which ſhall be deemed the ſum the Company has been annually defrauded of, whilſt the revenues have been under his conduct; hence the ſecurity will be in the ſum of 560,000 Rupees. I am afraid your Honour, &c. will think me too indulgent to Metre in this propoſition, as there will be ſo conſiderable a loſs of intereſt to the Company: however, I will ſubmit it, as it is, to your determination. Touching the examination in council of Anderam Dut, and Rogu Metre, I beg to be indulged a few words more, juſt to obſerve that the conteſted accounts between them are foreign to my charge; it is enough that it is ſupported by the confeſſion of Rogu Metre, and the depoſitions of Anderam Dut, and Bulram Podar; ſo that I muſt ſtill be of opinion, the Company have an undoubted claim on Roju Metre for the 460 Rupees, as neither he, nor any one elſe, in my judgment, can be juſtified in making a property of the Company to reimburſe themſelves, even ſuppoſing he had any juſt demand on Anderam, which I have too much reaſon to believe was not the caſe. I remain, moſt reſpectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

P. S. Since my cloſing the above, my Moories have brought me in their report of the deficiencies in the duty on exportation of Rice, by which I find the Company defrauded of Rupees 8605 8 6 from

from Anno 1738, to April 1752, including 1175 15 6 Rupees, which ſtand in his account frauds confeſſed. Permit me to remark, that as Metre has been hardy enough to embezzle ſuch conſiderable ſums on the farms, and on this laſt-mentioned article of duty on Rice exported, though both under the check of an Engliſh regiſter, what bounds can we ſuppoſe reſtrained him during the preceding 14 years on the whole of the revenues, when he had no check at all upon him: for I can trace no Cutcherry accounts prior to 1738. If I aſk for the accounts of the Gunge before it was farmed, I am told they were waſhed away in the great ſtorm; and if I enquire for any other accounts relative to the revenues, antecedent to the above year, I am told the White Ants have deſtroyed them. I am, (ut ſupra.)

To the Honourable ROGER DRAKE, *Eſq; Preſident and Governor of* Fort William, *&c. Council.*

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

1ſt. IN obedience to your commands touching our Honourable Maſters letter of the 16th January 1752, I now lay before you, the reſult of my enquiries into the ſeveral particulars relative to the office of the Zemindary, and ſtate of the Company's revenues; but as a ſcrutiny of this kind is intirely new, and accompanied with very few traces to guide me in the ſearch, your Honour, &c. I hope will not think I have been tardy in the execution of your orders. As the taſk aſſigned me has really been a very heavy, though neceſſary one, yet I have had this ſatisfaction attending it, that thereby the Company's revenues will in future be put on ſuch a footing, that it will be ſcarcely poſſible for further depredations to be made on them of any conſequence, as not only the board, but

but every ſucceeding Zemindar, may at any time, and at one view, acquire a knowledge of every branch of the Company's duties. The accounts of which, to the minuteſt article, are now kept in Engliſh, by which means the Preſident and Council will have it in their power, to be a conſtant check upon the Zemindar, as collector of the revenues, and the Zemindar on the ſubordinate ſervants of the Cutcherry, to whoſe management (from the fluctuating poſt of the Zemindar, his deficiency in the language, and the want of ſome work of this kind) the revenues have in a manner been abandoned, though unavoidably ſo, from the above cauſes.

2d. A reply to the latter part of our Honourable Maſters firſt paragraph will with more propriety come from your Honour, &c. however I muſt beg leave juſt to give you my thoughts on the ſubject, which poſſibly may coincide with your own, otherwiſe you will doubtleſs reply to it more fully, and correct me where you think I may have erred. As to a rehearing of any matter determined in the Cutcherry, to a certain value, I ſubmit it to your Honour, &c. whether an eſtabliſhed order or rule of Cutcherry to this purport, would not be attended with the utmoſt inconvenience; for as theſe people are beyond doubt the moſt litigious people exiſting, it is as certain that no cauſe to that value would ever be determined without a rehearing. At the ſame time, permit me to obſerve, that it is hardly to be imagined a Zemindar would refuſe to rehear any cauſe, upon proper repreſentations made to him; but our Honourable Maſters will be convinced, from copy of the judicial proceedings tranſmitted them, that the Zemindar who purſues the ſame method, will need little check on his judgments regarding property; for it will there appear an invariable rule, to have every cauſe determined

termined by arbitrators of the parties own chuſing, unleſs in claims ſo obvious as to admit of no conteſt, ſuch as thoſe ariſing on mortgages, &c. or thoſe of very ſmall value, where the parties are ſo indigent as not to be able to pay the fees on the arbitration bonds. And when the arbitrators happen to be equally divided in their judgments, the Zemindar interferes no farther than in nominating an umpire, who ſhall be acceptable to both parties; but if objected to by either, then each to nominate an umpire, and chance to determine; but an inſtance of this laſt kind has not happened ſince I have been in the office. Wherever it appears that the Zemindary embezzles the Company's revenues, oppreſſes the people, or is guilty of corruption in his judicial proceedings, our Honourable Maſters have left it to your Honour, &c. the redreſſing theſe evils, by ſuſpending him from his poſt; but an appeal from his judgments I do not think the nature of the office will admit of, as they are put in execution as ſoon as pronounced; but if your Honour, &c. think otherwiſe, I ſhall moſt chearfully ſubmit to any orders you ſhall tranſmit me on that head. Our Honourable Maſters, by ordering an Engliſh regiſter of the proceedings and fines to be regularly kept, and from time to time to be laid before you, and directing the aſſiſtants to attend on Cutcherry days, appear to me to have been the beſt checks on the Zemindar that could have been deviſed; to which permit me to recommend to your Honour, &c. that you iſſue an order from the board, that no Zemindar in future preſume to determine any cauſe privately at his own houſe, but in public Cutcherry, as the contrary practice may give a latitude to much iniquity.

3d. Under your Honour's, &c. influence and orders, the intentions of our Honourable Maſters as ſet forth in their ſecond paragraph, are already

in

in part put in execution. The farms have been ſold at public outcry, agreeable to their inſtructions, and the poor are relieved by remitting ſix of the loweſt farms, as producing little more to the Company than diſcredit. The ſeaſon being now arrived for meaſuring the ground, my utmoſt care and attention ſhall be employed in putting our Honourable Maſters orders on that head in execution. In conformity to your Honour, &c. orders, I have made the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny into the ſeveral charges of Banians, writers, and other ſervants of the Cutcherry, under the denomination of Pikes, Peons, and Buckſerries; alſo the charge of Chowkey Boats; and for the reduction made in theſe articles, I refer you to the ſeveral monthly accounts revenues for July, Auguſt, September, and October, ready to be laid before you, as ſoon as the months of May and June are paſſed in council: I have alſo made the like ſcrutiny into the heavy charge of repairing the roads, drains, &c. and making and repairing the ſeveral Cutcherry, and Chowkey houſes, the exorbitancy of which will beſt appear from the future charges in theſe particulars. And to illuſtrate the benefit ariſing to our Honourable Employers from your orders touching the monthly charges Zemindary, I beg leave to inform your Honour, &c. that I have taken the medium of the laſt three years nominal and real current charges of this office, as being the loweſt, and find it amount to Current Rupees 29818 per annum: the charge of ſervants under every denomination, and Chowkey Boats, ſtands for October reduced to 1567 Rupees per menſem, (or thereabouts, for it is impoſſible to ſpecify within five or ten Rupees) or 18804 Current Rupees per annum; to this I will add the large allowance of 1200 Rupees per annum, account repairing the roads,

roads, &c. and making and repairing the ſeveral Cutcherries and Chowkey houſes, and other incidental charges; which makes the whole annual charges Zemindary amount only to 20,004 Rupees, from which I think it cannot vary 200 Rupees. Thus I have the pleaſure of demonſtrating to your Honour, &c. an annual ſaving of near 10,000 Rupees. And if the preſent charge can in any ſhape, with propriety, be further reduced, my utmoſt endeavours ſhall not be wanting. In regard to the laſt part of this paragraph, and part of the third, I have only to obſerve to your Honour, &c. for the information of our Honourable Maſters, that the Duſſutary, or 10 per cent. on the annual ſale of the farms, from the beſt intelligence I can acquire, has been exacted from the farmers, (I believe with the knowledge of the board) by every Zemindar (Mr. Jackſon excepted) as an eſtabliſhed fee or perquiſite; but how this cuſtom obtained, or by what appointment it became eſtabliſhed, I cannot learn. Be this as it may, it will require very few words to demonſtrate, the Company have ſuffered this deduction on their farms for thirteen or fourteen years, and that they, and not the farmers, have been the loſers. The value affixed to each farm has been in Current Rupees; but the Duſſutary collected has been always in Madraſs Rupees, (the Gunge excepted) which is adding 10 per cent. upon the Duſſutary. This article is now brought to the credit of the Company, and points out another gain of Current Rupees 6457, as per account ſales of the farms 20th October, already before you. I have only to add, that every Cutcherry allowance, fee, and perquiſite, formerly appropriated to the Zemindar, are now alſo duly brought to the Company's credit.

4th,

4th, Our Honourable Maſters 5th paragraph remains now only to be ſpoke to, wherein we are directed to tranſmit them a particular deſcription of the ſeveral branches of duty belonging to the Zemindary, with the ſeveral articles of revenue, under the inſpection of the Zemindar, and explain the nature of them. To make this deſcription the more intelligible, I think it expedient to divide the whole of the Company's revenues under three heads, *viz.* Ground-rent, Farms, and the ſeveral duties ariſing on articles not farmed, but collected daily, and ariſing from the current tranſactions of the Cutcherry. Touching the firſt head, I imagine I ſhall have occaſion to addreſs your Honour, &c. largely, when I have compleated the meaſurement of the ground; ſo that what I lay before you now on this ſubject, I take as ſtanding at preſent on the Cutcherry books, and would only have it eſteemed as a ſhort introduction to that period.

The town of Calcutta is divided into four principal diſtricts, under the denominations of *Dee Calcutta* (under which *John Nagore* is included) *Govindpoore*, *Soota Nutty*, and *Bazar Calcutta*; to each of which, and to the great Bazar, are appropriated a diſtinct Cutcherry, whoſe accounts are all tranſmitted to, and center in the great Cutcherry of Dee Calcutta. Theſe four diſtricts contain 5472½ Bega of ground, (each containing 20 Cotta) on which the Company receive ground-rent at 3 Sicca Rupees per Bega per annum, ſome few places excepted, hereafter to be ſpecified, which pay a leſs rent. Excluſive of the above 5472½ Bega, the Company poſſeſs 733 Bega, which pay no ground-rent. The diſtribution of ground that pays rent, and that which pays none, is as follows, viz.

Ground-rent received on	Bega	Cotta.
Dee Calcutta	1704	3
Soota Nutty -	1861	5
Govindpoore	1044	13
Bazar Calcutta	560	2
John Nagore -	228	1
Baag Buzar -	57	17
Lott Buzar -	10	9
Santoſe Buzar -	5	8
	5472	0
	733	
Total of the Company's Ground -	6205	0

Containing houſes	
- - - - - -	3422
- - - - - -	2374
- - - - - -	1753
- - - - - -	989
- - - - - -	606
- - - - - -	173
- - - - - -	81
- - - - - -	53
Potta's, or houſes	9451

Each potta or houſe poſſeſſing on an average ſomething ſhort of 1 Bega and 15 Cotta of Ground, *i. e.* 1¼ B.

Ground on which no Rent is received.	Bega	Cotta.
Ground occupied by the Company - - - - -	310	5
Donations - - - - - -	16	11
Churches - - - - - -	7	19
Moors Moſques - - - - -	15	7
To Gentoo Idols - - -	13	13
Given to ſundry Bramins	242	
Ditto to the Gentoo Poor	14	12
Ditto to the Moors ditto	30	15
Grounds bought by devout perſons to make Tanks -	62	18
Indulgences - - - -	18	10
Bega	733	

Within the Company's bounds, there is alſo ground poſſeſſed by proprietors, independant of our Government, to the amount of about 3050 Bega, according to the exacteſt eſtimate I can at preſent make, *viz.*

The

The diſtrict of	Simlea -	1000
	Molunga -	800
	Mirzapoor	1000
	Hogulcourea	250
	B.	3050

Theſe 3050 Bega, calculated agreeably to the foregoing proportion, will be found to contain 5267 houſes; which, added to thoſe under the Company's protection, will make the whole amount of houſes 14718. I add them together, becauſe they equally contribute to the conſumption of thoſe articles, on which the Company's revenues ariſe. The independence of the above four diſtricts aroſe from the towns originally belonging to different proprietors; and when the Phirmaund gave us a grant to purchaſe theſe towns, with the reſtriction of ſatisfying the Zemindars, ſome of them could not be prevailed upon to alienate theirs: ſo that in conſequence they have remained diſtinct and independant ever ſince. The proprietors of the above 14718 houſes, for diſtinction ſake, I will call Principal Tenants, or Holders of Pottas; who have again their lodgers or under-tenants, within the limits of their reſpective Pottas, in the following proportion on an average, agreeably to the exacteſt judgment I can make, as well as the beſt information I have acquired, *viz.* each principal Potta-holder, who poſſeſſes 1 Bega of ground, has five under-tenants who hold of him; therefore, adding the 3050 Bega contained in the four independant towns, to the 5472 Bega, the property of the Company, the whole amount of Bega's will be 8522; and this again multiplied by ſix, will give the number of houſes that are properly in Calcutta, *viz.* 51132; and this ſum again multiplied by 8, a very moderate eſtimate of the inhabitants contained in each houſe, it gives the number of ſouls, in Calcutta, *viz.* 409056 conſtant in-

 habitants,

habitants, without reckoning the multitude that daily come in and return, but yet who add to the conſumption of the place. I will trouble your Honour, &c. at preſent on this ſubject, no farther than juſt to reduce the Bega into Engliſh meaſure, and point out to our Honourable Maſters the extent of ground they poſſeſs in this ſettlement. The Bega is in length 126 ½ feet, which, multiplied into itſelf, gives 16,002 ſquare feet in a ſquare Bega; an acre contains ſquare feet 43,560: therefore a Bega is to an Acre, as 367 to 1000, or as 11 to 30 the neareſt.

5th. The farms come next under conſideration; and firſt of the Gunge, or Mondy Bazar, ſituated in the diſtrict of Govindpoore. Touching this article, I can obtain no accounts prior to the year 1738, all preceding accounts of it being (as I am told) deſtroyed in the great ſtorm. This farm has produced to the Company, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738	— 6501	Brought forward,		Rs. 62641	
1739	— 6505	1746	— 13201		
1740	— 9025	1747	— 17002		
1741	— 6655	1748	— 18203		
1742	— 6655	1749	— 14004		
1743	— 7600	1750	— 10100		
1744	— 8500	1751	— 12010		
1745	—11200	1752	— 22760		
	62641	Current Rs.		169921	The medium 11328 per ann.

The ſeveral articles on which a duty is collected at the Gunge, are, Rice, Paddy, Gram, and all other kinds of Grain; as alſo on Tobacco, Gee, Matts, Poultry, Bay Leaves, Thread, Beeds, Cloth, Oil, Gunnys, Copoſs, Seeds, Beatlenut exported: in ſhort, on every article that comes within the denomination of common food, or the common neceſſaries of life. The duty collected by

by the Farmer of the Gunge on Rice, at 1 Maund per Rupee, is the neareſt 8 per cent. and on every other article 3 Pices Sicca per Rupee, or 1 Rupee 9 Annaes per cent. Concerning this farm, I ſhall trouble your Honour, &c. with nothing more here, as I ſhall again ſpeak to it in ſome general remarks on the farms, after I have particularized each of them, to which I ſhall now proceed in the order of their ſales the 20th of October laſt.

6th. Soota Nutty Market, and Suba Buzar, have yielded, ſince they were firſt farmed, as follows, viz.

A° 1738	— 3504	Brought forward, Rs.	30115		
1739	— 3589	1746	— 4172		
1740	— 3397	1747	— 4370		
1741	— 4012	1748	— 4422		
1742	— 3532	1749	— 4599		
1743	— 3758	1750	— 4849		
1744	— 3991	1751	— 5000		
1745	— 4332	1752	— 7510		
	30115	Current Rs.	65037	Medium per ann.	4835 12½.

Soota Nutta Market is held twice a Week, viz. on Thurſdays and Sundays, on which a duty is collected by the Farmer, viz.

Retailers of Cowrees		Chinam -	Shops
Cotton Thread		Tobacco -	ditto
Apothecaries Shops		Fire-wood	ditto
Oil -	ditto	Straw	
Hard-ware	ditto	Matts	
Tyar -	ditto	Bamboos	
Milk -	ditto	Braziers Shops	
Jaggree -	ditto	Beetlenut ditto	
Sweetmeat	ditto	Greens	
Smiths -	ditto	Sugar-canes	
Silverſmith	ditto	Plantien Shops	
Beetle -	ditto	Tamarind ditto	

Cucumber's Shops		Salt	- Shops
Fiſhmongers		Cloth	- ditto
Trees		Rice	- ditto
Roaſted Rice Shops		Veniſon	- ditto
Weavers	- ditto	Shoe-makers	ditto
Potters	- ditto	Paddy.	

Theſe ſeveral articles have an eſtabliſhed charge or rate, from one Gunda of Cowries to 6 Pund *per diem*, on each ſhop, bundle, bag, or piece, according to the different value and ſpecies of goods.

Gram, Horſe ditto, Muſtard Seed, Wheat, } Imported from Houghley, and other places up the River, pays 6 Gundas of Cowrees on each Rupee.

Oil, Ghee, Gram, Wheat, &c. imported from Arung Gotta, each boat 3 Madraſs Rupees. Gram imported from the country round, pays 6 Pice on each Sicca Rupee, or 3 R. 2 *per cent.*

Sugar, on each Bag,	-	2 Annaes,
Ghee, on each Dupper,	-	6 Ditto,
Honey, on each Ditto,	-	2 Ditto.

Coarſe Ps. goods pay a duty from 4 to 15 Gundas on each piece. Rice retailers pay 15 Chitants, or $\frac{15}{16}$ of a Seer, on each Rupee worth.

I have been the more particular on this market, that I may not be under the neceſſity of ſpecifying ſo minutely the articles on which the duty is collected in the other markets and bazars, as they are nearly the ſame; and the ſame eſtimation of duty will in general hold with very little difference; only, for the information of ſuch of our Honourable Maſters as have not been converſant with theſe parts, I will add, that a Gunda is 4 Cowrees, 20 Gundas 1 Pund, 16 Punds 1 Cowand, and 2 Cowands 10, 12, or 13 Punds, (according to the value of Cowrees) make one Rupee Arcot. Soota

Nutty

Nutty market, and Suba Bazar, have been generally held by the ſame perſon, as the one may be called the key to the other: and if in different hands, would occaſion endleſs diſputes; the articles on which a duty is collected in Suba Bazar are nearly the ſame as in the market, though in a leſs quantity, and in more retail way.

7th. Connected with the foregoing Market and Bazar, are the following ſeven farms; for they have been generally, for the above reaſons, held by the ſame perſon, as being all in the diſtrict of Sooty Nutty, though ſold ſeparately, and now in one lot; viz. Baag Bazar Market, Baag Bazar, Charles Bazar Market, Charles Bazar, Doobaparrah Bazar, Hautcolla Bazar, and Soota Nutty's burthened oxen. Theſe different Markets and Bazars have produced, from their being firſt farmed, as follows, viz.

A° 1738	— 1255	Brought forward,	Rs.	11389	
1739	— 1364	1746	— 1560		
1740	— 589	1747	— 1519		
1741	— 627	1748	— 1612		
1742	— 1891	1749	— 1697		
1743	— 1845	1750	— 1732		
1744	— 1879	1751	— 1761		
1745	— 1939	1752	— 2001		
	11389	Current Rs.		23271	Medium
					1551 6 4 per ann.

The duties levied in theſe Bazars and Markets, as well as the articles on which they are levied, ſo nearly reſemble thoſe already ſpecified, that it is needleſs troubling your Honour, &c. with the particulars. Soota Nutty's Koora Pacha, or burdened Oxen, is levied as follows:

Every tenant who keeps oxen, to convey merchandize out and into the town, pays the farmer, 8 a. 6 p. per each oxen per annum; with theſe exceptions, that thoſe employed in

the Salt Trade pay only 6 A. 6 P. per annum each; and thoſe employed to import and export Meal, to pay only 3 Annaes Sicca each, per annum.

8th. The Great Bazar, under the diſtrict of Dee Calcutta, is farmed out in three partitions, (but generally held by the ſame perſon) under the heads of, firſt, Jow Bazary, or duty on greens, fiſh, roots, pans, &c. common neceſſaries of life, as to food and utenſils. 2dly, Iron, gee, ſugar, beetle-nut, &c. merchandize. And 3dly, the duty of Koyally or Jouldary. The firſt of theſe is farmed in November with the reſt of the farms, but the 2d and 3d in April. The Jow Bazary has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, viz.

A° 1738	— 1650	Brought forward, Rs.	15536		
1739	— 2029	1746	— 2185		
1740	— 1980	1747	— 2185		
1741	— 1765	1748	— 2285		
1742	— 1804	1749	— 2400		
1743	— 1994	1750	— 2400		
1744	— 2007	1751	— 2600		
1745	— 2307	1752	— 3500		
	15536	Current Rs.	33091	Medium	2206 1 per ann.

The duties collected by the farmer on the above mentioned articles are nearly in the ſame proportion as ſpecified in my ſixth paragraph.

9th. The 2d partition of the Great Bazar is the duty on iron, gee, ſugar, &c. the Pattah for which, as well as for the Jouldary, does not expire till April next. This farm has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, viz.

A° 1738	— 1101	Brought forward, Rs.	4568	
1739	— 1155	1742	— 1250	
1740	— 1156	1743	— 1150	
1741	— 1156	1744	— 1200	
	4568	Car. forward Cur. Rs.	8168	

Brought forw. Rs.	8168	Brought forward, Rs.	13525
A° 1745 —	1320	1749 —	1367
1746 —	1347	1750 —	1662
1747 —	1345	1751 —	2100
1748 —	1345	1752 —	2100
	13525	Current Rs.	20754 Medium 1383 9 7 per ann.

	R.	A.	P.	
Iron pays a duty of	1	15	3	both when imported & exp.
Ballasore stone dishes pay	16	0	0	per 100 dishes.
Ditto, ditto, cups,	8	0	0	per 100 cups.
Beetlenut pays a duty of	1	15	3	per cent. both imports & exp.

Pepper, Copper, Tootenague, Lead, Dammer, Cotch, Chanks, pay a duty of 2 per cent. on imports and exports.

Sugar pays 4 Annaes, per each Oxen Load of 2 Bags.

Gee pays 8 Annaes, 6 Punds per each Oxen Load.

Honey, Wheat, and Wax, 2 per cent. on imports and exports.

Oil and Jaggree, 2 Seer per each Oxen Load, and 5 Pund for each Ox.

Ophirim, 2 per cent.

Rice and Grain imported, 2 Seers, 8 Chittack, per each Oxen Load.

Ditto, Ditto, exported, 1 Seer, 4 Chittack, per Rupee.

Gram, imported, pays 6 Punds, 1 Cowrie, per Rupee.

Turmerick, Ginger, Sandle Wood, Red Lead, Long Pepper, Saltpetre, Lack, Gunnys, &c. sundries, pay a duty 2 per cent.

Tobacco imported, pay 2 Annaes, 3 Ps. per Oxen Load.

Ditto, exported, 2 per cent. and 2 Punds of Cowries for each Ox.

Braſs plates pay a duty of 8 Annaes per Maund, on both imports and exports.

10th. The third partition of the Great Buzar, farmed in the month of April, is the Jouldary, or Weighman's duty, of 1 Seer 4 Chittacks, per Rupee, levied on all Rice, Paddy, Gram, Wheat, &c. Grain imported in the Great Buzar. This duty has produced to the Company, ſince the firſt farming, viz.

A° 1738 —	726	Brought forward, Rs	6873		
1739 —	717	1746 —	1164		
1740 —	716	1747 —	1164		
1741 —	731	1748 —	1180		
1742 —	1108	1749 —	1219		
1743 —	700	1750 —	1337		
1744 —	1036	1751 —	1900		
1745 —	1139	1752 —	1900		
	6873	Current Rs	16737	Medium	1115 12 2 per ann.

11th. *Govindpoore Market*, *Beggum Bazar*, and *Goſtollob Bazar*, are ſold in one lot, and have been generally held by the ſame perſon, as lying nearly contiguous to each other. They have produced to the Company, ſince their being firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738 —	992	Brought forward, Rs	9906		
1739 —	1058	1746 —	1567		
1740 —	1150	1747 —	1708		
1741 —	1096	1748 —	1868		
1742 —	1106	1749 —	2048		
1743 —	1468	1750 —	2100		
1744 —	1468	1751 —	1905		
1745 —	1568	1752 —	2305		
	9906	Current Rs	23407	Medium	1560 6 4

Govindpoore Market is held twice in a week, *viz.* on Tueſdays and Saturdays; and the articles on

on which a duty is levied by the Farmer are nearly the ſame as in Soota Nutty Market; the duties from 4 Gundas to 6 P. 10 G. on each piece, bundle, baſket, or ſhop, per diem, according to the different value, conſumption, or eſtimation of the goods.

12th, *Loll Buzar*, and *Santoſe Buzar*, ſituate in the diſtrict of Dee Calcutta, have yielded to the Company; *viz.*

A° 1738	— 1584	Brought forward, Rs		14823	
1739	— 1780	1746	—	1635	
1740	— 1857	1747	—	1560	
1741	— 1640	1748	—	1720	
1742	— 1792	1749	—	1840	
1743	— 2255	1750	—	2000	
1744	— 2255	1751	—	2090	
1745	— 1660	1752	—	1855	
	14823	Current Rs		27523	Medium 1834 12 9 per ann.

The articles and duties nearly the ſame as already particularized in the other Bazars.

13th, *Nimmuck Mohul*, or the *Salt Farm*, ſituated in Sooty Nutty, has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed: *viz.*

A° 1738	— 316	Brought forward, Rs		10498	
1739	— 607	1746	—	1900	
1740	— 723	1747	—	2001	
1741	— 1651	1748	—	2025	
1742	— 1651	1749	—	2100	
1743	— 1825	1750	—	2400	
1744	— 1825	1751	—	4030	
1745	— 1900	1752	—	5150	
	10498	Current Rs		30104	Medium 2006 14 11.

The duty levied on Salt imported and exported, at 3 Pice Sicca per Rupee, or 3 Rupees 2 Annaes per Cent.

Jouldary,

Jouldary, or Weighman, 6 Annaes Sicca per Maund.

On Oxen employed in this ſervice, 1 Rupee per 20 Oxen.

Retailers of Salt pays 2 Annaes Sicca per $\frac{8}{8}$ Maund.

There is an exemption on all Salt imported on account of Cojar Wazeid, who pays only 1 Rupee per $\frac{8}{8}$ Maund, both on Salt imported and exported.

The whole duty levied on Salt amounts to 3 Rupees 15 Annaes per cent.

14th, *Dee Calcutta's Market*, and the Duty on the Loads, and Salt in Baſkets, have produced, ſince it was firſt farmed; *viz.*

A° 1738 — 578	Brought forward, Rs 4652				
1739 — 577		1746 — 513			
1740 — 605		1747 — 597			
1741 — 605		1748 — 648			
1742 — 412		1749 — 682			
1743 — 700		1750 — 703			
1744 — 475		1751 — 715			
1745 — 700		1752 — 620			
4652	Current Rs	9130	Medium	608	10 8

Dee Calcutta Market is held in the Chourangey Road, leading to Collegot. Articles and Duties as in other Markets already ſpecified. The duty on the Roads had its riſe on this occaſion: Collegot Market and Govindpoore Market being held both on a Saturday, numbers of the tenants reſorting to Collegot Market, to the injury of that at Govindpoore, it was found neceſſary to check this reſort, or counterbalance it, by levying a tax on every article imported from Collegot, in proportion to that levied on the ſame articles at Govindpoore Market. The Duty on Salt imported in baſkets on Cooleys heads,

is

is 7 G. ½ of Cowries, and one handful of Salt: and when resold or exported, it pays a duty to the Salt Farm, of 3 Pice Sicca, per Rupee.

15th, *Sam Buzar*, and *New Buzar*, both situated in Dee Calcutta, and now thrown into one lot, have produced to the Company, since they were first farmed, as follows; *viz.*

Aº 1738 —	1237	Brought forward, Rs		13304	
1739 —	1340	1746 —		2233	
1740 —	1391	1747 —		2434	
1741 —	1427	1748 —		2483	
1742 —	1450	1749 —		2483	
1743 —	1805	1750 —		2833	
1744 —	1993	1751 —		4600	
1745 —	2571	1752 —		4500	
	13304	Current Rs		34920	Medium
					2328 Ann.

16th, *John Buzar*, and *Burtholla Buzar*, situated in Dee Calcutta, and from their neighbourhood, united in one Farm, have produced as follows, *viz.*

Aº 1738 —	550	Brought forward, Rs		4586	
1739 —	577	1746 —		600	
1740 —	576	1747 —		602	
1741 —	576	1748 —		725	
1742 —	576	1749 —		624	
1743 —	577	1750 —		1324	
1744 —	577	1751 —		1124	
1745 —	577	1752 —		1836	
	4586	Current Rs		11421	Medium
					761 6 4

Articles and Duties as in other Bazars.

17th, *Glass-Makers* Farm has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows; *viz.*

A° 1738	— 142	Brought forward, Rs		2598	
1739	— 149	1746	—	380	
1740	— 287	1747	—	380	
1741	— 478	1748	—	400	
1742	— 220	1749	—	400	
1743	— 5 6	1750	—	500	
1744	— 396	1751	—	550	
1745	— 420	1752	—	865	
	2598	Current Rs		6073	Medium
					404 13 10.

To the Farmer is granted the ſole right of manufacturing this Article; and whoever is proved to ſet up any ſhop, or otherwiſe interfere in it, without his licence, is liable to fine and impriſonment.

18th, The *Vermilion-Farm* has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738	— 225	Brought forward, Rs		1775	
1739	— 200	1746	—	225	
1740	— 225	1747	—	225	
1741	— 225	1748	—	200	
1742	— 225	1749	—	200	
1743	— 225	1750	—	200	
1744	— 225	1751	—	200	
1745	— 225	1752	—	900	
	1775	Current Rs		3925	Medium
					823 1.

The ſole manufacturing this Article is alſo granted to the Farmer, as above.

19th. The *Caulker's Farm* has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738	— 863	Brought forward, Rs		7691	
1739	— 864	1746	—	800	
1740	— 991	1747	—	800	
1741	— 991	1748	—	800	
1742	— 991	1749	—	500	
1743	— 1100	1750	—	500	
1744	— 991	1751	—	525	
1745	— 900	1752	—	730	
	7691	Current Rs		12346	Medium
					823 1.

The right of exerciſing the Ship-Caulker's buſineſs is ſolely inveſted in the Farmer, who gives his licence to the Workers, and receives a ſtated tax from them of 1 Pund of Cowries per diem, and 10 Gundas on each Rupee their labour produces.

20th. The *Tobacco Shops* were not farmed till the year 1740, ſince when they have yielded as follows, *viz.*

A° 1740	— 150	Brought forward, Rs		1008	
1741	— 143	1747	—	143	
1742	— 143	1748	—	143	
1743	— 143	1749	—	123	
1744	— 143	1750	—	148	
1745	— 143	1751	—	123	
		1752	—	200	
	1008				
		Current Rs		1888	Medium
					125 13 6

The Farmer has the ſole right of vending this article in the Bazars, and no ſhop can ſell it that is not licenſed by him.

21ſt. *Bang Shop's Farm* has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738	— 1101	Brought forward, Rs		12742	
1739	— 1101	1746	—	1900	
1740	— 1521	1747	—	1900	
1741	— 1599	1748	—	1700	
1742	— 1700	1749	—	1700	
1743	— 1980	1750	—	1700	
1744	— 1840	1751	—	1725	
1745	— 1900	1752	—	1730	
	12742	Current Rs		25097	Medium
					1675 2 1 An.

This farm is conducted on the reſtrictions with the Tobacco Shops.

22d. The *Farm of the Cheſt-Makers* commenced not till the year 1748, and has yielded as follows, *viz.*

Aº	1748	— — —	50
	1749	— — —	60
	1750	— — —	70
	1751	— — —	72
	1752	— — —	75
		Current Rs	327

Medium per Ann. 65 6 4

Every perſon employed in this buſineſs, is in the ſervice of the Farmer, or works by his licenſe.

23d. The *Red-Lead Farm* has ſubſiſted only ſince 1746. The article of Lapis Tutiæ is now, for the firſt time, added to it; the Farm of the Red-Lead has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

Aº	1746	— — —	201
	1747	— — —	201
	1748	— — —	251
	1749	— — —	121
	1750	— — —	121
	1751	— — —	130
	1752	— — —	245
		Current Rs	1270

Medium per Ann. 181 6 10

The ſole right of this Manufacture is appropriated to the Farmer, nor can any one engage in it without his licence, for which he receives 2 Rupees per Menſem for each Furnace.

24th. The *Dammur* and *Oakum* was firſt farmed in the year 1746, and has produced, *viz.*

Aº	1745	— — —	336
	1746	— — —	400
	1747	— — —	424
	1748	— — —	436
	1749	— — —	500
	1750	— — —	540
	1751	— — —	680
	1752	— — —	940
		Current Rs	4256

Medium per Ann. 523

The ſole right for vending theſe articles is inveſted in the Farmer, and none can deal in them without his licence.

25th. *Dee Calcutta* and *Govindpoore*'s burdened oxen have produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738	— 192	Brought forward, Rupees		1554	
1739	— 133	1746	— 230		
1740	— 192	1747	— 230		
1741	— 192	1748	— 240		
1742	— 175	1749	— 300		
1743	— 220	1750	— 350		
1744	— 220	1751	— 192		
1745	— 230	1752	— 575		
	1554	Current Rupees		3671	Medium 244 11 8

Every perſon who keeps oxen for burden, within the diſtricts of Dee Calcutta and Govindpoore, pays annually a tax to the farmer, of ſix Annaes each.

26th. *Dee Calcutta* and *Bazar Calcutta*'s ferry-boats have produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738	— 153	Brought forward, Rupees		1233	
1739	— 154	1746	— 155		
1740	— 155	1747	— 155		
1741	— 155	1748	— 155		
1742	— 155	1749	— 155		
1743	— 155	1750	— 168		
1744	— 151	1751	— 164		
1745	— 155	1752	— 105		
	1233	Current Rupees		2290	Medium 152 10 8

The farmer of the ferry-boats of Dee Calcutta and Bazar Calcutta receives,

For each paſſenger, four Gundas of Cowries.

For

For each baſket of greens, &c. ten Gundas.
For each cow, calf, horſe, &c. one Pund.

27th. *Fire-Work* farm has produced, ſince it was firſt farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A° 1738 — 64		Brought forward, Rupees		517	
1739 — 70			1746 —	56	
1740 — 72			1747 —	65	
1741 — 72			1748 —	66	
1742 — 75			1749 —	42	
1743 — 56			1750 —	59	
1744 — 59			1751 —	42	
1745 — 49			1752 —	150	
	517	Current Rupees		997	Medium 66 7 5

The manufacturing and vending all fire-works are inveſted in the farmer, who gives his licence to others, on receiving a conſideration ſatisfactory to the parties.

28th. Connected with Suba Bazar, were two ſmall Bazars, the one ſituate at Harry Naut Duwan's ſtairs, and the other at Patrea Got, or the Stone ſtairs; theſe were always the perquiſite of the Zemindar's Banian, and produced annually to the Company from 95 to 99 Rupees; they have now, by your Honour, &c's permiſſion, been thrown into one farm, under the title of Ram Bazar, and produced, the 20th of October, 510 Rupees for the preſent year.

29. The duty on chinam and timbers imported, is now, for the firſt time, by your permiſſion, farmed out, on repreſentation of the frauds committed by the collectors of this duty, (vide proceedings Zemindary, under date the 8th inſtant) it has ſold this year for Current Rupees 437, more than double what has ever been brought to credit. The farmer levies two per cent. on all chinam and timbers imported.

30th. The

PH
MVSEVM
BRITANNICVM

30th. The purchaſing and vending old iron, tea-cattys, and old nails, was firſt farmed Anno 1751, for Rupees 60; its pattah expired the firſt inſtant, and then ſold for Rupees 5651.

I have now gone through the ſeveral branches of the Revenues, contained under my ſecond head of the farms, and beg leave to lay before your Honour, &c. at one view, in what degree they have increaſed, from the year 1738.

Anno	1738	22865
	1739	24236
	1740	27495
	1741	26143
	1742	26196
	1743	30222
	1744	31547
	1745	35764
	1746	36721
	747	41154
	1748	43129
	1749	39166
	1750	37666
	1751	44941
	1752	60599

And ſuppoſing the remaining two partitions of the great Bazar ſell in April next for 5000 (which is the leaſt I will ſuppoſe) your Honour, &c. will have the pleaſure of ſeeing the farms under your influence produce 65599 Rupees, a further gain to our Honourable Maſters (for this year at leaſt) of 20658. We ſee above, the farms, ſince 1738 to 1751 incluſive, have increaſed (within a trifle) in a duplicate proportion; and how the net balance of the revenues annually paid into the treaſury will anſwer this proportion, is a circumſtance I will beg leave to diſcuſs, when I have gone through my third head of thoſe articles not farmed out, ariſing from the current tranſactions of the Cutcherry.

32d. The third head of the revenues conſiſts in the following articles, *viz.*

1. Duty on piece goods.
2. Fines.
3. Etlack.
4. Sale of boats and ſloops.
5. Sale of ſlaves.
6. Pottahs.
7. Arbitration bonds.
8. Commiſſions on recovery of debts.
9. General releaſes.
10. Mortgage bonds.
11. Marriages.
12. Ruſſey Sallamy.
13. Sallamy on ſloops.
14. Mooriannoes.
15. Duty on exportation of liquors.
16. Licence for a treat.
17. Order for beat of drum.
18. Duty on exportation of rice.

All which I ſhall explain to your Honour, &c. as diſtinctly as poſſibly I can: as there is not one of them, in which there has not been manifeſtly very conſiderable frauds committed by ſome body or other; and muſt unavoidably be ſo, without the utmoſt vigilance of the Zemindar.

33d. The Company levy a duty of two per cent. on all piece-goods ſold in the Bazars, which are not imported under their duſtick. To point out the frauds committed by the collectors of this duty, I ſhall take the produce ariſing from May 1749, to April 1752, as they exceed former credits.

ABSTRACT of the duty on Piece-Goods, as taken from Account Revenues.

1749.	May	—	—	75	0	0		
	June	—	—	75	0	0		
	July	—	—	35	0	0		
	Auguſt	—	—	52	0	9		
	September	—	—	35	15	3		
	October	—	—	71	8	3		
	November	—	—	174	11	6		
	December	—	—	116	3	6		
1750.	January	—	—	35	14	9		
	February	—	—	77	0	6		
	March	—	—	40	11	0		
	April	—	—	163	7	6		
							952	9 4
1750.	May	—	—	21	8	0		
	June	—	—	77	3	0		
	July	—	—	30	2	9		
	Auguſt	—	—	31	2	9		
	September	—	—	59	7	3		
	October	—	—	75	10	0		
	November	—	—	171	5	6		
	December	—	—	44	9	6		
1751.	January	—	—	66	11	9		
	February	—	—	43	3	0		
	March	—	—	60	11	6		
	April	—	—	270	7	0		
							951	19 3
							1904	8 3
1751.	May	—	—	27	3	9		
	June	—	—	33	10	0		
	July	—	—	28	15	9		
	Auguſt	—	—	33	14	0		
	September	—	—	55	4	9		
	October	—	—	85	8	3		
	November	—	—	175	5	6		
	December	—	—	45	14	6		
1752.	January	—	—	76	12	6		
	February	—	—	40	6	3		
	March	—	—	56	5	6		
	April	—	—	275	3	6		
							934	8 3
						Current Rupees	2839	0 6

By the above abſtract from the monthly account revenues, we obſerve only 2812 0 6 brought to credit in three years; whereas, in the laſt five months there has been collected and brought to credit 1127 12 3; and I am not free from ſuſpicion of ſome frauds yet in this duty, notwithſtanding the ſtricteſt eye I have been able to keep on thoſe intruſted with the levying it.

Anno 1752.	July	—	—	58	9	9
	Auguſt	—	—	252	11	9
	September	—	—	191	10	3
	October	—	—	321	5	3
	November	—	—	303	7	3
	Current Rupees			1127	12	3

34th. The article of fines is a very important one in the Company's revenues, if duly brought to their credit; this method of puniſhing, as well as the laſh, is ſo eſſential a one, in the nature of the country government, that there would be no order or rule preſerved amongſt the natives without them. The original inſtitution of fines in all countries was doubtleſs with a deſign of correcting the manners of the people; of being a check on ſuch kind of rogueries as did not require the laſh or other corporal puniſhments; and conſequently, of being a defence to the property of honeſt men: but I am ſorry to ſay, I have too much reaſon to think theſe intentions have been kept very little in view; and a power aſſumed to inflict fines, and oppreſs the people, where by no means it ought to have been allowed; and which has been raiſed from motives much worſe, and applied to baſer uſes, than were the crimes for which it was impoſed. Your Honour, &c. have had ſome inſtances of this kind laid before you; and I do not want materials to point out many more to you; but to what end? The nature of this branch of the revenues will not admit

mit of an annual eſtimate to be made on it, with any degree of exactneſs, as will, pretty nearly, the foregoing article of piece-goods; whoſe yearly imports, I believe, do not vary greatly. However, I ſhall lay before your Honour, &c. the produce ariſing on this article, from May 1746, to April 1751, incluſive.

ABSTRACT of FINES, as taken from the monthly Account Revenues, *viz.*

1746.	May	— —	157	5	0		
	June	— —	115	15	0		
	July	— —	27	10	3		
	Auguſt	— —	1116	1	3		
	September	— —	146	2	0		
	October	— —	97	11	0		
	November	— —	8	2	3		
	December	— —	10	4	3		
1747.	January	— —	0	0	0		
	February	— —	22	7	9		
	March	— —	51	4	9		
	April	— —	47	3	6		
						1800	3 0
	May	— —	349	4	3		
	June	— —	232	0	0		
	July	— —	103	1	0		
	Auguſt	— —	97	15	9		
	September	— —	58	12	6		
	October	— —	132	10	9		
	November	— —	131	11	6		
	December	— —	100	8	3		
1748.	January	— —	10	1	9		
	February	— —	31	4	3		
	March	— —	0	0	0		
	April	— —	0	0	0		
						1247	5 6
						3047	8 6

	Brought forward, Rupees						3047	8 6
1748.	May	—	—	151	10	6		
	June	—	—	338	13	0		
	July	—	—	33	9	0		
	Auguſt	—	—	52	11	9		
	September	—	—	45	8	9		
	October	—	—	141	13	9		
	November	—	—	109	11	0		
	December	—	—	122	4	9		
1749.	January	—	—	25	8	3		
	February	—	—	109	6	9		
	March	—	—	10	2	0		
	April	—	—	37	3	9		
							1178	7 3
	May	—	—	173	7	9		
	June	—	—	59	0	9		
	July	—	—	33	12	6		
	Auguſt	—	—	141	2	0		
	September	—	—	102	10	6		
	October	—	—	114	15	0		
	November	—	—	151	15	9		
	December	—	—	10	13	6		
1750.	January	—	—	25	7	0		
	February	—	—	222	2	6		
	March	—	—	0	0	0		
	April	—	—	36	2	6		
							1062	9 9
							5188	9 6
	May	—	—	7	1	0		
	June	—	—	0	0	0		
	July	—	—	0	0	0		
	Auguſt	—	—	60	9	3		
	September	—	—	6	1	9		
	October	—	—	112	3	9		
	November	—	—	50	11	0		
	December	—	—	0	0	0		
1751.	January	—	—	8	0	3		
	February	—	—	0	0	0		
	March	—	—	18	2	0		
	April	—	—	137	12	3		
							400	9 3
							5588	18 9

	Brought forward, Rupees					5588	18 9
1751.	May	—	—	36	11 3		
	June	—	—	73	7 6		
	July	—	—	18	12 9		
	Auguſt	—	—	80	1 6		
	September	—	—	409	15 0		
	October	—	—	197	0 0		
	November	—	—	201	6 6		
	December	—	—	92	6 3		
1752.	January	—	—	37	1 9		
	February	—	—	6	7 6		
	March	—	—	132	12 3		
	April	—	—	917	9 3		
						2203	11 6
	Current Rupees					7892	14 3

By the foregoing abſtract, there appears to be fines brought to credit in the account revenues, current Rupees, 7892 14 6, in the ſpace of ſix years. I will ſubmit it to your Honour, what proportion this bears to the fines that have really been impoſed and levied in that time. I will ſuppoſe by other authority than that of the Zemindar for the time being; who, in a multitude of inſtances, I dare ſay, was totally a ſtranger to this piece of iniquity; and when I inform your Honour, &c. that I have brought to the Company's credit on this article, the laſt five months, current Rupees 3171 14 6, I muſt not appear before you as having acted with greater ſeverity than any of my predeceſſors; as this is an article I would by no means ſhould increaſe the Company's revenues: but the cauſe of this very extraordinary difference ariſes from this, that what fines are impoſed, are now in truth brought to credit. They are before your Honour, &c. I think I have been ſtudious to obſerve as much lenity in them, as the nature of the offence could with propriety admit of. If it ſhould bear a different aſpect, it lies in your breaſts to remit and relieve any whom you may judge to merit your indulgence.

ABSTRACT from the Regiſter of Fines, *viz.*

Anno 1752.	July	— —	166	9	9
	Auguſt	— —	339	1	9
	September, 19 days	—	341	2	9
	October	— —	1035	9	6
	November	— —	1289	6	9
	Current Rupees		3171	14	6

35th. Though I have already explained what is meant by that branch of the revenues called Etlack, in my addreſs to your Honour, &c. under date the 17th of Auguſt, 1752, I yet think it neceſſary to repeat here what I then ſaid on the ſubject, that in this work every article of the revenues may have due regard paid to it. On every complaint regiſtered in the Cutcherry, a Peon is ordered on the defendant, in caſes of debt; or on the delinquent, in caſe of aſſaults, or other abuſes. The Peon receives three Punds of Cowries per diem; one Pund, fourteen Gundas of which are brought to the credit of the Company, under the head of Etlack: one Pund is the Peon's fee, and the remaining ſix Gundas were ſet apart; out of which the Etlack Moories, or writers, were paid their wages; and the overplus, called Mooriannoes, ſequeſtered to uſes I am a ſtranger to. The article of Etlack has always been a heavy tax on the poor, from whom it has chiefly been collected; whilſt thoſe who could by any means obtain favour were excuſed, though well able to pay it. The contrary method I have purſued, as much as poſſible; and your Honour, &c. will obſerve in the Zemindary, how frequent occaſions I meet with to remit this fee to the poor, as well to thoſe who are releaſed from the priſons, as thoſe whoſe diſputes are determined without impriſonment. The Cutcherry priſon Etlack fees, and Catwall priſon Etlack fees, amount each to

three Punds of Cowries per diem, from each priſoner; the whole of which is brought to credit. The Etlack fees have, by ſome Zemindars, been raiſed to four Pund per diem, and by others reduced to two; the preſent eſtabliſhment appears to me the moſt eligible medium, as the former would be a very heavy oppreſſion on the poor, and the latter would too much tend to keep up that litigious ſpirit in the people, which poſſibly is not equalled by any race exiſting. What injury the Company may have ſuſtained in this branch, I ſhall ſubmit to your Honour, &c. judgment, by the following abſtracts of the former and preſent credits.

ABSTRACT of ETLACK FEES, from May 1746, to April 1752, incluſive.

1746.	May	—	—	187	2	9			
	June	—	—	160	13	3			
	July	—	—	182	0	6			
	Auguſt	—	—	162	6	9			
	September	—	—	128	11	9			
	October	—	—	214	0	6			
	November	—	—	175	2	0			
	December	—	—	146	7	6			
1747.	January	—	—	191	3	9			
	February	—	—	136	4	3			
	March	—	—	146	14	9			
	April	—	—	205	5	3			
							2036	9	0
	May	—	—	164	5	3			
	June	—	—	147	2	0			
	July	—	—	238	10	9			
	Auguſt	—	—	255	3	0			
	September	—	—	176	14	0			
	October	—	—	140	2	3			
	November	—	—	150	5	0			
	December	—	—	217	15	0			
1748.	January	—	—	143	15	0			
	February	—	—	142	5	6			
	March	—	—	129	15	0			
	April	—	—	184	9	3			
							209	6	
							4127	15	0

	Brought forward, Rupees					4127	15	0
1748.	May	—	—	114	9	3		
	June	—	—	116	1	6		
	July	—	—	135	6	9		
	Auguſt	—	—	273	4	6		
	September	—	—	285	5	6		
	October	—	—	329	6	9		
	November	—	—	349	15	3		
	December	—	—	265	10	3		
1749.	January	—	—	379	1	3		
	February	—	—	273	1	3		
	March	—	—	296	12	3		
	April	—	—	364	15	9		
							3183	10	3
	May	—	—	334	14	3		
	June	—	—	356	5	9		
	July	—	—	259	8	0		
	Auguſt	—	—	407	15	9		
	September	—	—	401	0	6		
	October	—	—	341	10	0		
	November	—	—	484	1	0		
	December	—	—	375	13	6		
1750.	January	—	—	406	6	6		
	February	—	—	373	12	6		
	March	—	—	390	13	3		
	April	—	—	371	12	6		
							4504	1	6
	May	—	—	429	11	6		
	June	—	—	377	12	6		
	July	—	—	387	11	9		
	Auguſt	—	—	375	8	9		
	September	—	—	315	3	0		
	October	—	—	357	3	6		
	November	—	—	370	13	0		
	December	—	—	377	3	6		
1751.	January	—	—	386	1	9		
	February	—	—	299	12	9		
	March	—	—	290	11	0		
	April	—	—	386	14	9		
		—	—				4354	11	3
							1617	6	0

	Brought forward, Rupees				16170	6	9
1751.	May	—	—	310	5	9	
	June	—	—	189	8	3	
	July	—	—	208	1	0	
	Auguſt	—	—	150	5	6	
	September	—	—	23	9	6	
	October	—	—	34	0	0	
	November	—	—	34	11	6	
	December	—	—	79	8	6	
1752.	January	—	—	80	2	9	
	February	—	—	54	8	3	
	March	—	—	106	11	0	
	April	—	—	136	2	9	
					1407	13	9
	Current Rupees				17578	3	9

Abstract of Etlack Fees, from July to November, 1752.

Anno 1752.	July	—	—	—	208	5	6
	Auguſt	—	—	—	424	15	9
	September 19 days	—	—	—	262	2	3
	October	—	—	—	427	12	9
	November		—	—	453	9	3
	Current Rupees				1776	23	6

On the ſale of houſes, boats, ſloops, and all ſums recovered by decree or award in the Cutcherry, the Company draw a commiſſion of five per cent.

On every ſlave brought and regiſtered in the Cutcherry, the purchaſer pays duty to the Company of four Rupees four Annaes.

On every Pattah granted, the Company receives a ſalamy of four Rupees four Annaes.

On all arbitration bonds entered into by appointment, in the Cutcherry, each party pays 20 Punds of Cowries.

On every general releaſe executed by order of Cutcherry, each party pays eight Annaes.

For

For every licence of marriage, the Company receive three Rupees Sicca from each party; but the poor are often remitted this fee.

On all diſputes between the Company's tenants, touching the property of ground; where there appears cauſe for meaſuring their reſpective grounds, each party pays a ruſſey ſalamy of one Rupee.

On every new ſloop built by the natives, the Company receive a ſalamy of 50 Rupees to 100 Rupees, according to her burden.

On every mortgage-bond regiſtered in Cutcherry, the Company receive from the mortgager five per cent. on the ſum advanced by the mortgagee.

On all rice exported, the Company's duty is 1 Seer 8 Che. per Maund, and has produced for the laſt ſix years, from Rupees 1129, to Rupees 4557, per annum: total on the whole ſix years, 18979 Rupees. The uſual ſeaſon for exportation, are the months of Auguſt, September, December, January and February.

The whole amount of the Mooriannoe Cowries is now brought to credit, diſtinctly from the Etlacks; and at a medium produces the neareſt four Rupees per diem, or 120 Rupees per menſem, or 1440 per annum; the ſervants wages employed on monthly pay, in the branch of Etlacks, comes to Rupees 44; ſo that here is a demonſtrative gain of Rupees per annum 912, and points out a very conſiderable ſum the Company have been injured in this ſeeming trifling article of Mooriannoes, which I can trace only brought to credit to the amount of 20 Rupees in two months, anno 1742.

On importation of Batavia and Armenian Arrack, not again exported, the Company receive a duty of two Rupees and four Annaes, per leager.

On every order for public notice by beat of drum, account the loſs of ſlave, cow, horſe, &c.

the

the Company receive one Cowand and one Pund of Cowries, from the party requeſting ſuch public notice.

36th. Thus, I think, I have laid before your Honour, &c. every branch of duties and revenues relative to the Zemindary, John Nagore excepted, but if my future knowledge in this intricate branch of the Company's buſineſs ſhould point out to me wherein I have been defective, I ſhall beg leave from time to time to repreſent it to the Board, as well as every other method whereby the revenues may ſtill be improved or put on a better footing. The produce ariſing on the daily current buſineſs of the Cutcherry, you will obſerve to ſpring from articles, that in their nature are ſo precarious, as to make it impracticable the forming any exact eſtimation of the gain that may reſult from them, ſo that I will only compare the credits of laſt year, in the ſame months with thoſe ſince I have had the honour of filling this poſt.

DAILY COLLECTIONS.

Anno 1751.	July	—	—	474	15	0
	Auguſt	—	—	482	11	0
	September	—	—	724	13	3
	October	—	—	788	0	0
	November	—	—	634	5	0
	Current Rupees			3105	2	3
Anno 1752.	July	—	—	717	8	0
	Auguſt	—	—	1556	8	3
	Sept. 19 days		—	1607	7	6
	October	—	—	2245	13	9
	November	—	—	2798	11	3
	Current Rupees			8986	0	9

Your Honour, &c. are ſenſible I began not to act in the office till near the middle of July, and that my attentions to the frauds of the under ſervants

vants in the Cutcherry muſt have been greatly taken off by the ſcrutiny you ordered into the conduct of Govindram Metre, ſo that for the firſt month or two, it muſt not be wondered at, if I could not arrive at a proper knowledge of the current buſineſs. However, it is now clear to me, that the advance on the daily collections Cutcherry, at the loweſt eſtimate, will conſiderably exceed 1000 Rupees per menſem, or 12000 Rupees per annum; and I ſhall beg leave to cloſe this head, with throwing into one total, the demonſtrative future annual gain to the Company, reſulting from your Honour, &c. ſalutary orders and influence.

By charges Zemindary reduced	Rupees 10000	per Annum.
Advance on the ſale of the farms –	20658	for this year
The duſſutary paid into the treaſury	6457	
Daily collections Cutcherry increaſed	12000	
Current Rupees	49115	

37th. The out towns of Banian Pooker, Pugg la Danga, Tenggra and Dullond, obtained firſt a place in the revenues, June anno 1746, under the general head of John Naggore; they contain 228 Bega, 1½ Cotta of ground, for which the Company pay one Sicca Rupee per Bega per annum. John Naggore ſeems to have produced annually to the Company, ariſing on the different articles of ground-rent, ſalamys on Pottas, burdened oxen, markets revenues from June 1746, to May 1752 incluſive, viz.

Anno 1746 — — —	674	14	9	
1747 — — —	1010	3	9	
1748 — — —	1249	5	3	
1749 — — —	1182	5	9	
1750 — — —	1354	5	9	
1751 to May 1752	1500	11	9	
				6971 15 0

Deduct

Brought forward, Rupees			6971 15 9
Deduct ground-rent paid the Rajah, and other Zemindars,	1506 6 9		
—— Charges repairing John Nagore's roads, Cutcherry and Chowkey houſes, for which the Company are only debted in their account revenues.	311 14 0		
—— Further charges, as per Metre's letter to the Board, under date 3d November, account Salamys and preſents made the Rajah for his 42 Bega of ground, which, as Metre aſſerts, is thrown into the charge of repairing roads and bridges.	964 0 0		
		2782	4 9
Current Rupees		4189	10 3

That the Company have had equal juſtice done them in this, with every other article of their revenues, will appear to your Honour, &c. beyond a doubt, from the following produce during the five laſt months, without any new tax or impoſts laid on the tenants; and I will venture to promiſe theſe towns ſhall be more beneficial to our Honourable Maſters, as ſoon as the more important concerns of the office will give me leiſure to viſit them, and make a more particular ſcrutiny into them.

Net produce of John Nagore, Anno 1752.

July — — —	152	15	3
Auguſt — —	175	10	9
September 19 days — —	129	0	6
October — —	548	9	9
November — — —	118	4	6
Current Rupees	1124	8	9

I cannot

I cannot with propriety quit John Nagore, without adviſing you that application has been made to me, by one of Rajah Kiſſen Chund's Gomaſtahs, for an annual Salamy, or preſent (excluſive of the ground-rent) paid on account of the 42 Bega of ground the Company hold of him, in the out-towns; to which I have given for anſwer, that no ſuch charge appears on the Company's books, and that I could by no means admit of it, as it was highly derogatory to their honour, in which I hope I meet your approval; and ſubmit it to your Honour, &c. whether this charge of Govindram Metre's, is not demonſtratively calculated only to make up his fallacious accounts of repairing the roads; for himſelf holds of the Rajah, to the amount of about 2000 Bega of ground, in his different poſſeſſions at Charnock, Kiſſenpoor, Balegoſſy, and Hocul Koorea, for which an annual ſalamy from him, may have been neceſſary; but I truſt your Honour, &c. will not ſuffer the Company to be ſaddled with a charge, that I am convinced was never paid on their account, and which would be ſo extremely diſhonourable for them to ſubmit to. To which permit me to add, that if this annual Salamy and preſent had been actually paid, there is not a ſhew of reaſon why the Company was not openly charged with it, which they have not been.

I muſt now carry your Honour, &c. back to my 31ſt paragraph, in which I give you, at one view, the annual increaſe on the ſales of the farms from 1738, by which it appears they were increaſed in anno 1751, in very near a duplicate proportion, and from thence it might naturally have been expected, the annual net balance paid into the treaſury, would have increaſed in the ſame proportion, as the ſame cauſes which influence the advance on the farms, muſt from the nature of things

equally

equally influence every other branch of the revenues, viz. the increaſe of inhabitants, and conſequently the greater conſumption of every article on which the revenues ariſe, demonſtrable from the immenſe difference in the Bazar prices of them, even to the loweſt root or herbage, which enter into the food of the common people; but how unaccountable muſt it appear, when we find that ſo far are the annual net balances paid into the treaſury, from being increaſed in their duplicate proportion, that, by the following abſtract from the general books, we find they have not increaſed in any proportion at all, but the contrary.

ABSTRACT of the net balances of the Revenues, paid annually into the treaſury, from April 1738, to April anno 1752, incluſive.

1737, to 1738—	26206	6	6	1744, to 1745—	39202	14	0
1738, to 1739—	39273	13	3	1745, to 1746—	32858	11	0
1739, to 1740—	42518	1	3	1746, to 1747—	34755	7	9
1740, to 1741—	38062	13	0	1747, to 1748—	30124	13	6
1741, to 1742—	35656	13	0	1748, to 1749—	37679	7	3
1742, to 1743—	37267	10	0	1749, to 1750—	46461	1	0
1743, to 1744—	44249	13	6	1750, to 1751—	39449	13	3
				1751, to 1752—	34506	15	0
	263235	6	6		295039	2	9

By caſting out the middle year 1744 to 1745, your Honour, &c. will obſerve that the net produce of the revenues in the firſt ſeven years, exceeded the net produce in the latter ſeven years by Rupees 7399 2 9, which at firſt ſight would appear an incident very amazing, when we ſee the farms increaſed in a duplicate proportion; but when you conſider the foregoing ſheets, and the ſcenes ſo lately laid before you, I believe the cauſes will be too obvious longer to occaſion any great wonder, or to require my giving you the trouble of a farther explication; therefore ſhould now relieve you by cloſing this very long addreſs, did not a letter laid before the Board by Govindram

Metre, under date the 20th November, loudly call for a reply from me, which I cannot more properly convey to you than in the channel of this work, as it is ſo pertinent to my ſubject. Your Honour, &c. was pleaſed the ult. on motion from a member of the board, to order Metre to be called before the Council, and aſked how it came to paſs, the farms ſold ſo much higher this year than they did the laſt? I will not enquire what motive urged this queſtion at this particular juncture, only with all ſubmiſſion ſay, it never could have been moved for, or granted with leſs propriety; for theſe reaſons: It is no longer ago than the 11th October, that a majority of the Board voted (in my humble judgment, contrary to the very nature and eſſence of truſt and ſervitude, as well as to Metre's own conceſſion) that Metre was not from the nature of his office in truſt for the Company; then, to what end this queſtion? for as he was deemed not in truſt, he conſequently could not be deemed accountable: Why, Gentlemen, was not this queſtion aſked him the laſt year, when on Mr. Barrow's knowledge of his being the farmer, the Salt Farm was ſold at public outcry, and produced 1600 Rupees more than it did the year before? Why was he not aſked the like queſtion, when, on the ſame intelligence, Mr. Manningham, by previous and public notice given of the ſale of the two latter partitions of the great Bazar to the higheſt bidder, obtained 1000 Rupees more for it than it produced the preceding year? Had you, Gentlemen, been leſs attentive to whatever cauſes urged this motion and queſtion, you would have been more ſo to what has been before you, and would have been ſenſible that the farms (the Gunge excepted) were ſo far from ſelling at an advanced rate this year, that in truth they have ſold for leſs than they did the preceding one, though Metre, and not our Honourable Maſters, was the gainer; which gain the majority voted

voted he was not accountable for. Had due regard been paid to my letter of the 13th Auguſt, your Honour, &c. would have recollected that Soota Nutty market, and Suba Buzar, with their dependant ſeven farms, ſold in 1749, 1750, and 1751, (the years Metre confeſſes he held them in fictitious names) as follows, wherein I ſhall beg leave to remind you at one view of the Company's credits, Metre's gain, and the ſales for the preſent year.

Company's credits. Soota Nutty Haut, and Suba Bazar, bought by Metre.		Confeſſed to be reſold by Metre on his own account for		Sales 20th October 1752. Soota Nutty Haut, and Suba Bazar.	
Anno 1749	Rupees 4850		Rupees 7122		Rupees 7500
1750 — —	5000		7696		
1751 — —	5000		8057		
Seven dependant farms.		Seven dependant farms.		Seven dependant farms.	2001
1749 — —	1523		2303		
1750 — —	1557		2075		
1751 — —	1625		2147		

It is pretty plain, I believe, now to your Honour, &c. what little real foundation there was for this queſtion at the juncture it was moved for, and granted; and I wiſh it may not appear ſomething ſtrange to our Honourable Employers, that, inſtead of it, Metre was not aſked, how the above farms the three laſt years came to ſell for ſo much more on his own account than he favoured the Company with? Had you, Gentlemen, done me the honour of aſking me the queſtion you put to Metre (to whom I muſt think it more properly belonged) I ſhould, in few words, have informed you of two very obvious cauſes, which I conceive occaſioned ſo much more to be brought to the Company's credit on their farms this year than was the laſt, or any heretofore, viz. 1ſt, Public and unbiaſſed ſale to the beſt bidder. 2dly, Metre not having it in his power to keep the Salt Farm, the Great Bazar, the Vermillion Farm, Soota Nutta Haut, Suba Bazar, the ſeven Dependant Farms, &c. in his own hands, at what price he pleaſed. Your Honour, &c. muſt ſmile when you reflect on the labour Govindram Metre has taken in his ſaid letter of the 20th November, to account for a fact that does not exiſt, ſince I have proved, and he has confeſſed, the above farms ſold laſt year in reality for Rupees 693 more than they have this; which verifies a concluſion I have made elſewhere, that notwithſtanding our utmoſt aſſiduity, it will hardly be in our power to make that gain on the Company's revenues, that he has done whilſt under his conduct: the above farms were thoſe only I was then enabled fully to detect him in; but I will conclude ſimilar methods were uſed in the diſpoſal of the reſt, as they have ſold this year at a proportional advance on the credits of laſt year. To conclude, I will ſuppoſe the fact which Metre would account for; and yet the ſolution which he

has

has ſo artfully and ſpeciouſly drawn out, muſt appear to have no ſolid foundation on the ſlighteſt examination; for it is impoſſible the dearneſs or cheapneſs of grain can much influence the riſe or fall of the revenues, though the duty is collected on the groſs ſales; for if this is enhanced by a year of ſcarcity, a year of plenty will make the balance nearly equal to the farmer, by the larger quantity imported: for his poſition, that the conſumption muſt be nearly equal, is alſo very fallacious, or we ſhould not have beheld the multitude we have this ſeaſon dead, and dying in our ſtreets, or the many thouſands of walking ſkeletons this ſcarcity has produced; nor ſhould I have been witneſs to ſo many afflicting inſtances of parents ſelling their children for a Rupee a-piece, or giving them away for want of food to ſupport them, if the conſumption had been nearly equal. But facts ſpeak themſelves: it is evident this ſcarcity has not influenced the revenues, or if it has, that in truth it has influenced them in a ſenſe oppoſite to what he would prove, as the farms produced more laſt year, though grain, at the time they ſold, was more than as plentiful again than it has been this year; that the Gunge ſhould ſell for ſo much more this year than ever it did, is to me not ſo aſtoniſhing, as that it has not always produced it very nearly, at leaſt for many years laſt paſt. The annual imports of rice to the Gunge, from the beſt information I can acquire, amount at leaſt to 400,000 Maunds, on which the farmer's duty on the importer of 9 Pice Sicca per Rupee, and his duty from the buyer of Koyally of 1 Seer. 4 Ch. per Rupee, comes to 7 Rupees 13 Annaes 1 per cent. eſtimating 1 Maund per Rupee; and if we add the Poudary, Foorea, and the duty of 3 Pice Sicca per Rupee on the articles ſpecified in my 5th paragraph, we ſhall find, on an average, that the

farmer collects above 9 per cent. on the whole of the imports at the Gunge; but if we eſtimate only on the 8 per cent. the neareſt which he collects on rice, we ſhall find his duty on 400,000 Maunds, at 1 Maund per Rupee, will yield 32,000 Rupees. Eight years out of fifteen that the Gunge has been farmed, it has been held by Metre wholly or in part: and further, to diſprove his reaſons in the abovementioned letter, he pays for it in 1747, Rupees 17,002, though rice was from Auguſt to December, from 1 Maund to 1 Maund 15 Seer. per Rupee; and the year following he pays 18,203 Rupees for it, and rice from 33 Seer. 1 Maund 10 Seer per Rupee; and though I believe there never was a greater proſpect of plenty than the enſuing year promiſes, yet it has ſold for Rupees 22,760, which is quite ſufficient to evince, that other cauſes than dearneſs or cheapneſs of grain, &c. have influenced the riſe and fall of the revenue. What thoſe were, and the farther inveſtigation of them, I muſt ſubmit to your Honour, &c. as well as the redreſs I muſt humbly inſiſt is due on the behalf of our Honourable Employers. That injurious advantages have been made of their revenues, I have proved beyond a doubt; on you, Gentlemen, it lies to determine where, and to what uſes they have been ſequeſtered. I am moſt reſpectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Fort William,
15th December, 1752. J. Z. H. *Zemin.*

BY the foregoing ſtate of your revenues Zemindary, you ſee, that in the very infancy of Mr. Holwell's reform, an increaſe in this branch to the amount of 5000 l. is demonſtrated; which, year by year, ſtill ſwelled, and produced in April preceding

preceding the capture of Fort William, 10,000 l. per annum gained and ſaved to the Company, by the fair ſale of the farms, reduction of unneceſſary charges, and the collections of their Cutcherry being duly brought to credit. Mr. Holwell, in his ſentiments laid before your Directors, only pointed out an increaſe of 30,000 Rupees per annum; but on his arrival in India, and diſmiſſion of the ſtanding Deputy, (againſt whom now every mouth was opened) every day produced diſcoveries of frauds committed in every branch of this complicated office for 28 or 30 years preceding; for proof of which we need only mention to you, that under this Gentleman's adminiſtration, there was paid net money into your treaſury 114,000 Rupees for every 12 months, and that there was a moral certainty the credits of the year 1756, (when your preſidency was taken) would have yielded net 120,000 Rupees; a ſtriking difference, when you ſee this office never before, on a medium, produced you more than 40,000 Rupees per annum.——Here was a very important addition to your eſtate, when conſidered (as it really was) an addition in perpetuity.—Let us only eſtimate it at 10,000 l. per annum for 30 years, you ſee an acceſſion of 300,000 l. and at the ſame time you will ſee how immenſe the loſs you have ſuſtained, whilſt that arch plunderer Govindram Metre was entruſted with the executive power of this office.—After all, the term ſo often made uſe of, *increaſe of the revenues*, has been improperly applied; for as Mr. Holwell very juſtly obſerves in ſeveral of his letters to us, he cannot ſo properly be ſaid to have increaſed your revenues Zemindary; for, on the contrary, he rather reduced them by aboliſhing ſix of your farms, which, he thought, diſhonoured you, and oppreſſed the poor under your protection; his merit conſiſted only in the reform of the

office, and taking care that the real produce of the revenues arising from it, were honestly and duly brought to your credit.—

Hear the sense of your Court of Directors on this acquisition, and their sentiments of this Gentleman's integrity and abilities, in their several general letters to the board of Calcutta.

GENERAL LETTER *per Ship* Pelham, *under date* 23*d* January, 1754.

PAR. 69. "Mr. Holwell has fully answered "our expectations, in regulating and con-"ducting the office of Zemindar; and has, by the "considerable increase of the revenues, resulting "from his good management, and by transmitting "to us, such a clear and intelligible account of "the nature and state of them, convinced us of "what we long suspected, that we have been most "grossly imposed on in this branch of our affairs."

Par. 74. "Mr. Holwell's whole conduct in this "affair has been entirely to our satisfaction; and "his abilities, zeal, and application to serve us are "so sufficiently apparent, that we are satisfied it "will be in his power, if no obstructions are "thrown in his way, to prove himself a very valu-"able servant to the Company; we shall therefore "expect, as you value our future favour, that you "give him not only all necessary countenance and "assistance in his particular station of Zemindar, "but also in whatsoever he shall point out, or inti-"mate, may be of service to the Company in any "other branch of our affairs."

Par. 76. "We must here remark, that the office "of Zemindar is of so complicated a nature, and "the business so various and burthensome, that "it is almost impossible it should be conducted "under the direction of one person; you are there-

"fore

" fore to conſider, whether it may not be divided " into ſeveral branches, to be managed by different " perſons; and, if you think ſuch an alteration " may be of general utility, you are to point out " the proper methods of carrying it into execution. " In propoſing ſuch a diviſion, we have a view not " only to the general utility, which may be the " reſult, but likewiſe to eaſe Mr. Holwell, as far " as is conſiſtent, from the heavy load of buſineſs " he labours under, that we may have the benefit " of his abilities, in other material branches of " our affairs."

When this letter, and that of the 31ſt, which immediately follows, were diſpatched to Bengal, your Court of Directors conſiſted of the following Gentlemen, viz.

William Baker, Eſq; Chairman,
Richard Chauncey, Eſq; Deputy,
William Braund, Eſq;
Robert Booth, Eſq;
Chriſtopher Burrow, Eſq;
Charles Cutts, Eſq;
Peter Ducane, Eſq;
Abel Fonnereau, Eſq;
Peter Godfrey, Eſq;
Charles Gough, Eſq;
John Hope, Eſq;
Michael Impey, Eſq;
Stephen Law, Eſq;
Nicholas Linwood, Eſq;
William Mabbot, Eſq;
John Payne, Eſq;
Henry Plant, Eſq;
Thomas Phipps, Eſq;
Jones Raymond, Eſq;
Thomas Rous, Eſq;
Whichcot Turner, Eſq;
Timothy Tully, Eſq;
William Willy, Eſq;
James Winter, Eſq;

GENERAL LETTER *per Ship* Eaſtcourt, *under date the* 31*ſt* January, 1755.

PAR. 75d. " We have, with great attention, " peruſed and conſidered Mr. Holwell's ſtate " of our revenues at Calcutta, Mr. Frankland's " remarks, Mr. Holwell's reply, and the other " papers relative thereto; and we muſt, in juſtice " to Mr. Holwell, acquaint you, that he accounts

" for

" for the miſtakes which have happened in that " ſtate, in a manner that convinces us they were " mere inadvertencies, and no ways calculated to " impoſe upon us;—that he has evidently increaſed " our revenues to a very conſiderable amount, " without impoſing any new duties, or oppreſſing " the poor, but on the contrary, ſeveral old duties " have been aboliſhed, and the poor in many " inſtances relieved. And we muſt, as a further " piece of juſtice to him, add, that the inſinua- " tions of his raiſing his own character with us at " the expence of the reputations of other Gentle- " men who preceded him in his office of Zemindar, " are entirely without foundation. In ſhort, his " integrity, capacity, and application, have ren- " dered him ſo well worthy our notice, that we are " determined moſt heartily to countenance and " protect him in all his endeavours to ſerve the " Company."

Par. 74. " It was very natural to expect, when " a piece of ſuch importance as Mr. Holwell's " State of Revenues was laid before you, which " was ſo long ago as the 17th of December, 1752, " that you ſhould have given it a ſpeedy and ſerious " conſideration, in order to have informed us of " your ſentiments, upon an affair of ſuch a com- " plicated nature; but how great is our diſappoint- " ment and ſurprize to find you have not, from " that time, to the diſpatch of the Falmouth in " the beginning of March laſt, conſidered it at a " board, ſo as to come to any reſolution or " opinion for our information; but have tranſ- " mitted to us the remarks of one member only; " who, notwithſtanding what you ſay in your " letter of the 4th January, 1754, does not " appear upon the face of any of your con- " ſultations, to have been authoriſed to collect " and make remarks for your information, as

" ought

" ought to have been done, if you intended to " have proceeded with any regularity in an affair " of ſuch conſequence; and it is very obſervable, " that thoſe remarks were deſignedly, as we have " reaſon to believe, delivered in ſo late in the ſeaſon, " as rendered it extremely difficult for Mr. Holwell " to reply to them in time, to obviate the impreſ- " ſions they might have made on us, to his pre- " judice. But however well qualified Mr. Frank- " land may be, to execute a work of ſuch a nature, " it ought to have been the buſineſs of a com- " mittee, regularly appointed for the purpoſe, " and not the reſult of the voluntary enquiry of one " perſon only; and we ſhall be greatly diſap- " pointed, if we do not find you took that method " upon the departure of the Falmouth, ſo as that " we may receive, by the next ſhip at fartheſt, a " full and ſatisfactory account of your proceedings " and ſentiments upon this affair."

Par. 94. " Mr. Holwell has highly merited our " particular notice and encouragement, and the " leaſt that we can do for him, is to let him riſe " in our ſervice, equally with the reſt of our ſer- " vants; we do therefore hereby annul and make " void the reſtriction of our commands, of the " 8th January, 1752, by which he was fixed as " 12th and laſt in council, and to remain ſo with- " out riſing to a ſuperior rank therein; and we " direct, that on receipt of this, Mr. Holwell " take rank, and his ſeat at the board, according " to the time of his arrival at Bengal, in the ſame " manner as if no ſuch reſtriction had been made; " that is to ſay, next below Mr. Matthew Collet; " but however, it is our meaning and direction, " that Mr. Holwell do ſtill continue Zemindar, " and that he is not to quit that poſt without our " leave."

GENERAL LETTER *per Ship* Ilcheſter, *under date the 25th* March, 1757.

PAR. 156. "Having with great attention conſidered the ſtate of our Zemindary, during the time it has been under the management of Mr. Holwell, it is apparent to us from the accounts you have tranſmitted, that our revenues in Bengal have been greatly increaſed, and that this has been done without impoſing any new duties, or oppreſſing the poor; if it had been otherwiſe, you would, and ought to have given us the neceſſary informations. With reſpect to the judicial part of his office, we muſt take it for granted, that he has acted with the greateſt integrity and lenity; as there appears nothing to the contrary upon the face of your conſultations, where we muſt have found it, had there been any reaſons to have appealed from his decrees."

Par. 157. "Conſidering therefore the great ſervice Mr. Holwell has already done, and the further ſervice we have the greateſt reaſon to believe he will ſtill render to the Company; we do agree to allow him an additional ſalary of four thouſand current Rupees per annum to his former one of two thouſand Rupees, making together the ſum of ſix thouſand current Rupees a year, to commence from the date of this letter; this ſalary is to be paid him ſo long as he continues in the poſt of Zemindar, and is to be in lieu of all fees and perquiſites whatever; but it is our pleaſure he continue in the rank and ſtanding in council he ſhall be in at the time this letter ſhall come to your hands, and not riſe to a higher ſtation therein without our further orders."

The

The Gentlemen who compoſed your Court of Directors at the Ilcheſter's Diſpatch were as follows, viz.

Roger Drake, Eſq; Chairman,	Robert Booth, Eſq;
Peter Godfrey, Eſq; Deputy,	Chriſtopher Burrow, Eſq;
William Barwell, Eſq;	Charles Chambers, Eſq;
H. C. Boulton, Eſq;	Sir James Creed,
John Boyd, Eſq;	John Dorrien, Eſq;
Nath. Newnham, jun. Eſq;	John Manſhip, Eſq;
Thomas Phipps, Eſq;	Henry Plant, Eſq;
Which. Turner, Eſq;	Thomas Rous, Eſq;
Charles Gough, Eſq;	Henry Savage, Eſq;
Robert Jones, Eſq;	Lawrence Sullivan, Eſq;
John Payne, Eſq;	Timothy Tullie, Eſq;
Jones Raymond, Eſq;	Maxim Weſtern, Eſq;

You have already ſeen in the Narrative before inſerted, what various fortunes and difficulties Mr. Holwell had to encounter towards the end of the year 1757, and beginning of 1758, and how at laſt he was diſpoſed of, and appointed, by 14 of the new Directors ſucceeding in April 58, 9th in Council at Bengal; diveſted of his poſt, and the ſalary to which in March 1757 he had been allotted by 10 of theſe very 14 who now degrade him.—

Meſſrs. Baker, Chauncy, and Mabbot, who had particularly patronized and ſupported him, had already quitted the direction of your affairs; Meſſrs. Payne, Jones Raymond, Newnham, Jones, Drake, with moſt of the 15 who had promoted him in 1758, ſoon after diſqualified themſelves; ſo that Mr. Holwell found himſelf abandoned to the rage and power of that faction, who had ever ſhewn the ſtrongeſt propenſity to his ruin, though every man of them had repeatedly given the ſanction of their hands to his acknowledged *zeal*, *integrity*, and *capacity*.

Thus circumſtanced was Mr. Holwell, when the neceſſity of recovering a loſt and broken fortune, as well as conſtitution, forced ſubmiſſion; he returned

turned in the Warren, Captain Glover, for Bengal, where he arrived with unabated zeal for your intereſts: and with this noble and elevated ſentiment, (frequently expreſſed in his letters to us) "that it "would be cruel and unjuſt, a whole body of "people, and many among them widows and "orphans, ſhould ſuffer for the ingratitude, partial "and ſelf-intereſted views of their *truſtees*; and "that he had in his heart (and hoped ever ſhould) "always made this juſt diſtinction between the body "of Proprietors, and their Directors."—A ſhort period gave him an opportunity of manifeſting this principle.

The lands ceded to the Company by Jaffier Aly Khan, diſtinguiſhed by the name of the 24 Purgunnahs, had been held in the Company's hands, and in the ſpace of 16 months had produced net about 384,000 Rupees, excluſive of 222,000 for Colonel Clive's Jagire.——This ſmall produce, from ſo large a territory, drew Mr. Holwell's attention; he reflected, that if the trifling diſtrict of the Zemindary of Calcutta was capable of yielding a net profit of 120,000 Rupees a year, that of the 24 Purgunnahs ought to yield more than double what it appeared to do.—Upon this reflection, he laboured to acquire the real value of thoſe lands, which, after about three months indefatigable private ſearch, he effected, and found the ſame chain of rogueries here, that he had traced in the Zemindary Calcutta; and that their ſpecific worth greatly exceeded his firſt conjecture.

The board of Calcutta ſeemed ſenſible that ſome other meaſure muſt be adopted, than that of keeping theſe lands in the Company's hands, but were greatly divided in opinion which to chuſe, among the many expedients propoſed.

Mr. Holwell, thus fully armed, threw the following letter into the board.

To

To the Worſhipful Charles Manningham, *Eſq*; *&c. Council.*

Worſhipful Sir and Sirs, Calcutta, June 11, 1759.

I Beg leave to trouble you with a few ſentiments on the diſpoſal of the Company's lands, which has for ſome time paſt been the object of our councils; the ſubject is of importance to our Honourable Employers, and cannot be too much deliberated upon.

I believe we are all unanimous in ſome circumſtances which more particularly require our attention in this affair, to wit, the honour of the Company, the acquiring a perfect knowledge of the value of the lands, the making this branch of the revenues leſs complicate and intricate, as well as leſs expenſive in the collecting;—but with reſpect to the means, we ſeem not quite ſo clear.—Any one gentleman declaring fully his opinion on your conſultations, may poſſibly make us unanimous here alſo.

The ſtep we are already determined in, of diveſting the farmer of all power in the royalties and judicial authorities of the Purgunnahs, bids fair for the ſecurity of the Company's honour; as theſe articles heretofore, being alſo farmed, became the ſource of heavy cruelties and oppreſſions on the tenants.——But ſtill there ſeems to be ſomething wanting, to give us a perfect ſecurity in this particular;—and that is, to take the utmoſt care in our power, that the whole body of the lands do not, by any junto or private confederacy, fall into the hands of people with whom we ſhould not truſt any part of our own fortunes or confidence. I am urged to this precaution, from the propoſal laid before you the fourth inſtant, by ſix or ſeven conſpicuous natives of the ſettlement, of an advance of 110,001 Rupees on the whole lands.

With

With reſpect to their propoſal, I will only add an offer of 10,000 Rupees more per annum, on their terms:—Not that I wiſh myſelf, or any one elſe, in poſſeſſion of them on terms ſo vague and artful.

That keeping the lands in our hands will never lead us to a knowledge of their real value, is now (to me) proved beyond contradiction.—Some of thoſe who ſigned the propoſal of the fourth are well converſant in the nature of their undertaking; and better judges ſtill (as I am informed) are concerned, though, as yet, they act behind the curtain; and to me it is inconceivable, that theſe Eaſtern Machiavels in fineſſe would offer ſuch an annual advance, without a moral certainty of adequate gain. In this poſition I am ſtill more confirmed, by the advance offered from other quarters, on diſtinct and garbled parts of the Purgunnahs, which in fact exceeds the others.

If we have been hitherto kept ſo far from the knowledge of the real value of theſe lands, after 16 months poſſeſſion, what are we to expect, when, from the courſe of the ſervice, they are no longer under the conduct of the preſent collector, whoſe knowledge in this branch muſt be greatly ſuperior to any gentleman that ſucceeds him; and whoſe vigilance in the execution of this truſt cannot be exceeded. From the experience I have had in infinitely a leſs, though ſimilar object, I know it is impoſſible for any one gentleman, with the moſt extenſive talents and integrity, to ſuperintend this revenue in ſuch manner as to prevent the Company being injured; his attention cannot be every where; confidence muſt be placed in a multitude; and it happens moſt unluckily, that this confidence centers from neceſſity in a race of people, who, from their infancy, are utter ſtrangers to the very idea of common faith or honeſty.

The other plan of diſpoſing of the lands to the multitude of people who have offered an advance on particular parts of each Purgunnah, I have ſtrong and equal objections to. I am ſenſible theſe objections ſhould have been laid before you ſooner; and would, had I thought myſelf ſooner maſter of the ſubject.—We know not what or who theſe people are. I foreſee a very great riſque of deficiencies in the rents, as well as much confuſion and needleſs expence entailed on this expedient, and ourſelves removed as far as ever from gaining a knowledge of the real value of this new and important acquiſition. On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that there is no effectual method to arrive at this knowledge, and make the lands yield every advantage to our Honourable Employers; but by putting them up to public auction, in ſingle Purgunnahs, under the reſtrictions already publiſhed.—People of ſubſtance will be the only bidders for an entire Purgunnah; the bad and unprofitable parts will go with the good and valuable, and the riſque of deficiencies in the rents be guarded againſt; the expences of collecting will, in a manner, be reduced to nothing, and this branch of the ſervice be rendered leſs complicated and intricate, by our having 25 purchaſers only to account with us, in place of 5 or 600.

I am, with reſpect,
Worſhipful Sir and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
J. Z. Holwell.

This letter lay for conſideration, the Board ſuſpending their final reſolution until they were joined by Governor Clive, who was then abſent. On his arrival Mr. Holwell communicated to him the reſult

of his reſearches, touching the Purgunnahs; and at the ſame time laid before him the following eſtimate he had formed of their real value, and the means by which he had acquired his knowledge.

A moderate ESTIMATE of the value of 24 PURGUNNAHS.

Magra and Satull —	Sicca Rupees	130,000
Azeemabad —	—	90,000
Mora Goſſee —	—	90,000
Mydon Moll, Ekubberpore,	Pycha Koolee	90,000
Burridge Hotee, Ektearpore	—	75,000
Gurr — —	—	15,000
Hotteagur, Myda —		55,000
Ballea, Buſſundree —	—	70,000
Calcutta, Am'rpore, Maanpore, Pykon		65,000
Shawpore, Shawnagore, Karry Juree, Duccan Sagur —	—	28,000
Coſſpore —	—	10,000
Northern Purgunnah —		52,000
	Sicca Rupees	750,000 per ann.

The firſt time the council met, the debate upon the Purgunnahs was reſumed, and Mr. Holwell's letter of the 11th of June read a ſecond time, when Governor Clive did him the honour to declare the reaſons he gave for putting thoſe lands up to public ſale were unanſwerable; which concurring with the ſentiments of the Board, it was unanimouſly reſolved to throw the Purgunnahs into 15 lots, and farm them out for three years certain to the higheſt bidder at public auction, reſerving to the Company the royalties of the lands, as the judicial power, fines, confiſcations, buried treaſures, &c. &c.—They were accordingly ſold, and produced ſeven Lack, ſixty-five thouſand, ſeven hundred Sicca Rupees, 15,700 Rupees beyond what Mr. Holwell had eſtimated they would produce per annum. Let us add the produce of the royalties, very moderately eſtimated at one Lack and a half

a half a year; the whole gives 9 Lack 15,700, beſides the value and produce of a large tract of land, taken from the Purgunnahs next adjoining to Calcutta, to enlarge its bounds. We will not ſay what thanks were due, on this occaſion, to the zeal, integrity, and capacity of the gentleman we are defending; we leave that to your candour.—Theſe were the *inferior Manœuvres* which the anonymous propagator of ſcandal in his pamphlet of March 6th, ſarcaſtically mentions as reflections upon this gentleman's character.—But we do not ſtop here:—We proceed to ſhew you, his attention and capacity was not confined to this branch of your revenues and lands only; in order to which, we ſhall inſert the following letter from Mr. Holwell, to a gentleman who, a few years paſt, was at the head of your affairs at home; to whoſe integrity, abilities and application you ſtand, we will be bold to ſay, as highly indebted, as to any gentleman that ever ſat in your direction—We have his permiſſion for this liberty; and indeed, the inſerting it is, in ſome ſort, neceſſary to confirm and explain facts juſt now recited, that you may not think we have picked them up to anſwer any preſent purpoſe.

To JOHN PAYNE, *Eſq.*

Dear Sir, Calcutta, Dec. 30, 1759.

TO ſhorten my remarks on the important ſubject of your lands, I incloſe you copy of my letter to the council, of the 11th of June, when the Colonel was upon the Patna expedition; it then produced no other effect than poſtponing our reſolves until his arrival; when the affair being reſumed, he did me the honour, with the reſt of the board, of thinking my reaſons for a public ſale of the lands, by auction, unanſwerable, and the

ſame was reſolved on unanimouſly; the event more than anſwered my expectation. I had taken great pains in ferreting out the real value of the lands, which was covered with almoſt impenetrable obſcurity and difficulties; and by an eſtimate I gave the Colonel at his return, ventured to pronounce they would yield at leaſt ſeven Lack and a half; and the total of their ſales, on the 31ſt of July, amounted to ſeven Lack, ſixty-five thouſand ſeven hundred Sicca Rupees, excluſive of ſeveral reſerves in favour of the Company, ſuch as a conſiderable tract of land taken from the Purgunnahs adjoining to Calcutta, to extend its bounds; and all advantages reſulting from holding the royalties and judicial proceedings, &c. in our hands, on the Company's account; ſo that I judge, the whole produce of theſe lands (the before-mentioned reſerves included) will be annually between nine and ten Lack, the ſum I think I gueſſed they would produce, when once in conference with you upon this ſubject. From this the Colonel's Jaggier, of two Lack twenty-two thouſand Rupees being deducted, there will remain a net annual revenue to the Company of about ſeven Lack eighty thouſand Sicca Rupees per annum, on the ſame lands which yielded net to the Company, the laſt year when the revenues were collected on the government's plan, only three Lack, eighty-four thouſand, or thereabouts, as you will learn from the accounts of this revenue, now tranſmitted to the Company. I ſee the Court of Directors ſtare with aſtoniſhment at this increaſe; you will ſtare too, my dear Sir, as a proprietor.—Methinks I hear them and you cry out, What the devil became of this difference the laſt year, as it muſt have been collected, beyond the poſſibility of a doubt; or from whence can this advance anſwer to the preſent farmers? The anſwer is eaſy and obvious—the difference fell ſhort in its way to the

Company's treaſury, by the ſelf-ſame roads your former revenues were diſſipated, prior to my beginning the reform in your Zemindary—by the harpies employed in collecting. It may be farther aſked, as the difference is ſo important and ſtriking, How comes it to paſs, that no retroſpection ſeems to have been thought of? Here, I anſwer for myſelf:—I fought the Company's battles for a ſeries of five years, and what encouragement and reward I received for it in the end, you and the world have ſeen; the old farms producing an advance, on an average, of 46 per cent. at their firſt fair ſale, was proof enough of former frauds, the more ſo, as this advance encreaſed every year, and the other branches in proportion. As your former Zemindars could not juſtly be deemed culpable in that caſe, from the frequent changes in the poſt; ſo in the preſent, no blame properly falls on your collector, the truſt being too extenſive and complicate for the due execution and attention of any one man exiſting; though the frauds here are equally obvious from the extraordinary increaſe at a fair and public ſale, where the farmer was laid under every poſſible check and reſtraint, that can either prevent his debaſing the lands, or oppreſſing the tenants; and yet there is a moral certainty of profit to him at the expiration of the three years; and that they will then yield a further increaſe to the Company.—But not to loſe ſight entirely of a retroſpection; I, for my own part, think, that at preſent the operators are too well prepared for a ſcrutiny they muſt for many months have expected; they have been in abſolute poſſeſſion of all accounts and papers relative to the lands, and have cunning enough to take care thoſe accounts ſhall tally with the credits: beſides, ſhould we even ſucceed in our proofs, we ſhould find this plunder divided into ſuch a multitude of hands, our

gain at laſt would be only our trouble for our pains. That I ſhould have no ſtomach to take the lead in an enquiry of this nature, you will readily account for; and if I do not, I am ſure no body elſe will. It appears incumbent on Mr. Frankland, if on any body, to account to the Company for the extraordinary difference between the preſent ſales and his laſt year's collections; but this I conceive he will hardly think worth his while ſo near his departure; and no body knows better than himſelf the ſmall probability of its being attended with ſucceſs, or credit, or thanks from his employers, who have, I believe, pretty well cooled the zeal of their ſervants for attempts of this kind. The very detection of frauds, and increaſe of the Company's revenues, though founded on the principles of faithfulneſs, honour, equity, and humanity, were (by fools, influenced by knaves) brought in bar againſt my receiving the reward and commiſeration, which juſtice extorted from them in favour of the moſt junior ſervant in the Preſidency.

Before I entirely quit my ſubject of the lands, I muſt clear up to you a circumſtance that may poſſibly be cauſe of wonder to you, viz. by what means I arrived at their real value.——In the firſt place, I had long and full conviction that the ſame ſyſtem of frauds and chicane ran through every Zemindary of the provinces; and from a general knowledge of the countries granted to us, it appeared to me moſt aſtoniſhing, they ſhould yield no more than was brought to the Company's credit, at the cloſe of the year, in April laſt; when ſo ſmall a territory as Calcutta produced, on a ſcrutiny and reform, an increaſe of 73 to 80,000 Sicca Rupees per annum.—I tried various means to trace out a ſatisfactory reaſon, and to account to myſelf for it, but without ſucceſs, until I learnt, by accident, that three or four of the old ſtanders, employed

ployed as tax-gatherers and writers in the Purgannahs, had been diſmiſſed, at the inſtigation of the new operators. I ſent privately for one or two of the moſt creditable of them, and enquired into the cauſe of their diſmiſſion; and this brought on an opening of the whole ſcene, and gave me ſufficient foundation for forming my letter of the 11th of June: had that failed in bringing the lands to a public ſale to the higheſt bidder, I had formed my reſolution to lay the lights I had received before Mr. Frankland (from which I knew, on the whole, he was kept in the dark) and if this had fallen ſhort of my views, I ſhould then have laid them before the Council; but by the iſſue I have the pleaſure of ſeeing the Company in poſſeſſion of pretty near the value of this princely acquiſition, without being myſelf involved in debates and contention. Thus, Sir, having made you maſter of this ſubject in as ſhort a detail as poſſible, I ſhall cloſe it with this remark, that the ſame chain of frauds runs thro' the revenues of the whole empire, but more particularly in theſe three provinces, to the heavy annual loſs of the crown, a circumſtance which may, in a future favourable conjuncture, be well worth conſideration; at preſent we have but to aſk and have, a more eaſy acquiſition of the Subadary than that we have already obtained of the Purgunnahs; but the times are not yet ripe for ſo great a graſp, nor have we ſufficient ſtrength to hold it; though it is certain, were we Subas of the provinces, the emperor would regularly receive more than double the revenues theſe provinces ever produced to him; and the Eaſt-India Company become, in a ſhort time, the richeſt body of ſubjects in the world.

Little need be ſaid with reſpect to your Import Warehouſe. On my taking that charge, I found my predeceſſor, Mr. Becher, had left me little or nothing to reform or regulate; for which the Com-

pany and I owe him thanks. That you may be convinced the ſales of their imports have not ſuffered under my conduct, I incloſe you copies of the only two made ſince my being at the head of this office; the ſecond ſale's falling ſomething ſhort of the firſt, muſt be attributed to the quantity of goods of the firſt ſale laying on the merchants' hands, at the period appointed for the ſecond, occaſioned by the long alarm of the Shaw Zadda's advance into the provinces, which put a total ſtop, for ſome months, to the trade of the country; and for ſome time to the proviſion of your arung inveſtments.

You will find by this ſhip's advices, the board have made pretty free with your orders, touching the ſea cuſtoms; the preſent times, in fact, not admitting the carrying them to a greater height, without a riſque of the total loſs of trade to your ſettlement. As the cuſtoms and duties are now ſtipulated, I judge they will, with vigilance, produce a very acceptable revenue to the Company. It is the very worſt policy in the world to load trade with the utmoſt duty it will bear, or to puſh up the ſales of either your lands or imports to their greateſt value; an opening for a fair profit ſhould ever be left to the merchant and farmer, or the conſequence, in the firſt inſtance, will be an illicit trade, oppreſſions on the tenants, and no ſales at all of your imports of woollen goods, &c.

I really want courage to touch, or animadvert on your immenſe ſtanding expences, as I ſee not any preſent plan we can fall on for the reduction of them.

You will remember, Sir, that, from a rough calculate I made at home of receipts and diſburſements, I pronounced the gentlemen here had been too haſty in their advice to the Court of Directors, that they ſhould want no ſupplies of money for

three

three years. We have felt the conſequence of that precipitate paragraph, and were reduced to the neceſſity of opening the treaſury doors, in Auguſt laſt, for the ſupply of Madraſs and our current ſervice. We took this opportunity of reducing the uſual intereſt of nine per cent. to eight; it was propoſed to reduce it to ſix per cent.; but had we perſiſted in that, we might have ſhut our doors again; for ſince the large ſums remitted the laſt year, money has recovered its former value from its ſcarcity, as every thing elſe does.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant.

We ſhall add one remark only on this ſubject of the Purgunnahs, and that from good authority, viz. that there was a moral certainty of yet a very conſiderable advance upon the next ſale, for they were not at the firſt ſale, puſhed up to their utmoſt value, but a latitude left for the farmer to make a handſome profit, which we have good aſſurance was the caſe, one lot excepted, which was purchaſed too high by a ſpiteful competition between two of the natives. The farmers, for their own ſakes, will improve the lands and revenues; and conſequently their value at the next ſales muſt be inhanced, which we hope has ſo proved for your ſakes; and we doubt not but the *Manœuvres* of our friend hitherto, will reflect honour upon his character, in place of the inſinuated reproach of this *anonymous ſlanderer*; and that his firſt charge, which for certain reaſons we ſpeak to laſt, will appear to be equally falſe and ſcandalous.

This charge, ſo boldly aſſerted againſt Mr. Holwell, is, in its nature, of ſo black a dye, that did we think there was a ſhadow of foundation for it,

it, we ſhould bluſh to take up the pen in his defence.—Leſt you ſhould have loſt ſight of it, we think it needful to preſent it again to your view. (*Anon.* page 37.) "His (Colonel Clive's) ſucceſſor "in the Government, *who had been particularly inſtrumental in bringing down Sou Rajah Dowla, and conſequently in occaſioning the firſt revolution in Bengal:*"—that is, neither more nor leſs, than without reſerve, charging Mr. Holwell with being the cauſe of all the deſolation and miſery which overwhelmed your ſettlements in 1756. Let *this Prober*, as he ſomewhere calls himſelf, anſwer this charge to the *Prober of all Hearts*, whilſt we, from the materials in our power, proceed in our defence againſt it.

And here it is with the deepeſt grief and concern we find ourſelves obliged to open a wound, which we hoped had been cloſed for ever; but thus preſſed, thus ſtimulated, what can we do? Shall we abandon our friend to the impreſſions of this infamous accuſation, when we know the rectitude of his heart and conduct? Forbid it, Truth! forbid it, Juſtice! The real cauſes of that calamity and ruin have been long hid from the public, under the *veil* of ſecrecy, in Leadenhall-ſtreet. We will unfold no more of it than friendſhip exacts from us.—There was a period when juſtice to individuals ſhould have moved your Court of Directors to have laid the whole before you, but partial views forbad it. It has plainly appeared to you, by the Letter of the 25th of March, 1757, that Mr. Holwell was then marked for deſtruction; the force of evidence and facts could not withhold the applauſes and acknowledgments due to his merit and ſervices, but the clogg in council was again put on, which was ſo politely and juſtly taken off in 1755. This was a favour not much coveted by him; but, when granted, did him honour. Greater diſhonour was the conſequence, when this reſtric-

tion

tion was again impoſed upon his riſing. It did, as was plainly intended, leſſen him in the eye of the natives and your ſervants abroad, and ſufficiently declared the ſentiments of that Bombay Faction, which ſoon after obtained the lead in your Direction. But to reſume our ſubject.

Mr. Holwell obtaining his liberty at Moorſhadabad, promiſed, (in a ſhort letter he wrote to the two other Preſidencies of Bombay and Madraſs) that he would tranſmit to the Company a particular account of the *real cauſes*, which drew on your Preſidency of Bengal ſuch fatal calamities. Accordingly, at Fulta, he made good that promiſe in the following letter, addreſſed to your Court of Directors, through the channel of your Council there. Little did he then think he ſhould ever have occaſion for, or be under a neceſſity of producing it in his own vindication.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England, *trading to the* Eaſt-Indies.

Honourable Sirs, *Fulta*, 30th *Nov.* 1756.

IMmediately on my being releaſed from my impriſonment and fetters at Muxadabad, I addreſſed your two Preſidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George, on the ſubject of the loſs of your poſſeſſions in theſe parts, under date the 17th of July laſt, and again on my arrival at Houghly, under date the 3d of Auguſt, when I duly forwarded to them duplicates of thoſe I diſpatched from Muxadabad, and requeſted the advices I gave there might be tranſmitted to you by the moſt expeditious conveyance; and at the ſame time referred to a particular narrative of the cauſes, and various accidents, which brought on the heavy loſs you have ſuſtained: this I promiſed to forward as ſoon

as

as my health would enable me. The ſlow recovery of my ſight, much impaired by the ſhock and injury my nerves ſuffered that fatal night in the Black Hole, and from being expoſed to the ſun on my paſſage to Muxadabad, muſt plead my pardon for your not receiving the narrative I promiſed, by the ſhip diſpatched, I underſtand ſome time this month, from your Preſidency of Fort St. George, and by which I am ſenſible you will receive many different narratives and accounts of the cauſes of our misfortunes; leaving thoſe to your impartial conſideration—I ſit down to diſcharge this part of my duty, humbly intreating you will believe me determined to pay the ſtricteſt regard to truth, to the beſt of my knowledge; and that I will not, by any repreſentation, either in reaſoning or facts, endeavour to miſlead your judgments, or influence them either in favour of myſelf, or to the diſfavour of any one elſe, further than juſtice to myſelf, and the ſtate and nature of things, will make it unavoidable; ſhunning, as much as poſſible, any repetition of matters already tranſmitted you in my letters of the 17th of July, and 3d of Auguſt laſt, which I requeſt may be kept in your view, as I do not find cauſe to retract any eſſential part of them.

2d. Mahabut Jung (better known by the name of Ally Verdi Cawn) demiſing on the 9th of April laſt, was ſucceeded in the government of the Subaſhip by his grandſon Surajud Dowla, without oppoſition, excepting from the young Begum, relict of Shaw Amet Jung, uncle of Surajud Dowla. This Princeſs, foreſeeing her liberty and the immenſe wealth of her lately-deceaſed huſband, would fall a ſacrifice to the new Suba, had meditated for ſome time the raiſing another to the Subaſhip, and with this view retired, before the death of the old Suba, to her palace, (ſome diſtance from the city)

named

named Mootee Giel, with Raagbullob, the Dewan of her late huſband, Nazzur Aly Cawn, and others the moſt faithful of her officers and domeſtics; where ſhe fortified herſelf, and raiſed ſome troops to oppoſe the ſucceſſion of her nephew. When the diſpute was near coming to extremities, the old Begum, relict of Ally Verdy Cawn, interpoſed with her mediation, by which, and the promices of Surajud Dowla, that the Princeſs ſhould remain in full poſſeſſion and ſecurity of life, liberty, and property, ſhe was prevailed on to diſband her troops, ſubmitted to the baniſhment from the provinſes, Nazzur Aly Cawn, and two other officers, and returned to the city; where ſhe was no ſooner arrived than ſhe was made a priſoner, and her palaces and poſſeſſions ſeized and confiſcated to the Suba's uſe.

3d. The new Suba having, on his ſucceſſion to the government, ſent advice thereof, with a ſeerpaw, (or dreſs) to Shoucutjung, his couſin, the Nabob of Purranea: this latter returned the ſeerpaw, and diſavowed ſubmiſſion to him as Suba of the provinces; aſſerting his government of Purranea to be left by Ally Verdy Cawn independant of him. This occaſioned the reſentment of Surajud Dowla, who reſolved to reduce him by force; and after he had laid the ſtorm the young Begum had attempted to raiſe againſt him, he immediately marched againſt Shoucutjung with a ſtrong army, which had been raiſed by the old Suba, foreſeeing the difficulties his grandſon would have to encounter after his death. Here I muſt leave the Suba on his march, and go back in point of time to matters no leſs neceſſary to inveſtigate the real cauſes of his ſubſequent march to Calcutta; which is ſo blended with ſome incidents attending the late change and government at Muxadabad, that it is impoſſible

impoſſible to give a diſtinct view of the one, without a ſhort recital of the others.

4th. On the death of Shaw Amet Jung, (more generally known by the name of Newaris Mahomet Cawn) and during the life of the old Suba, Surajud Dowla, who had in effect the reins of government in his hands long before the deceaſe of his grandfather, ſeized on Raagbullob abovementioned, the chief officer of Shaw Amet Jung, and by impriſonment and other deſpotic and ſevere methods, endeavoured to force from him a confeſſion and diſcovery of Shaw Amet Jung's riches; but the miniſter, faithful to his deceaſed maſter, could not be brought to any confeſſion injurious to the intereſt of his ſurviving family, and after a few days ſufferings, obtained his liberty by the interceſſion of the young Begum, with her father and mother, Ally Verdy Cawn and his Begum: but Raag Bullob being ſenſible the reſolution he had ſhewn for the intereſt of the family of his deceaſed maſter, (between whom and Surajud Dowla there had been a long hatred and animoſity) would never be forgiven by Surajud Dowla, thought it incumbent upon him to provide as well as he could for the ſafety of himſelf. And in reſentment for the uſage he had unjuſtly received for his integrity to the young Begum, readily entered into her councils to oppoſe the ſucceſſion; and finding the death of the old Suba was near at hand, and recollecting his own family and greateſt part of his wealth were expoſed to danger at Dacca, his firſt care was to draw them to a place of ſecurity; in order to which he applied to Mr. Watts, your Chief at Coſſimbuzar, telling him his family were going from Dacca to worſhip at Jaggernaut, and ſhould take Calcutta in the way; requeſting at the ſame time, that they might there find a proper reception. Mr. Watts accordingly wrote to the Preſident, and

I think

I think to Mr. Manningham, to much the ſame effect. Theſe letters arrived during the abſence of your Preſident at Balliſore, and much about the time that Kiſſendas, the eldeſt ſon of Raagbullob, and the family reached Calcutta, from Dacca; at leaſt I know no otherwiſe, for in the evening, I think, of the 13th of March, my people at the Waterſide Chowkeys brought me intelligence, that Raagbullob's family was arrived from Dacca, and that they had received orders from Mr. Manningham for their admittance, who having occaſion to ſummon a Council the next morning, for the diſpatch of the Negrai's ſupplies, ſhewed me Mr. Watts's letter to the Preſident, who likewiſe communicated the ſame to me on his return to the ſettlement. This letter, I now underſtand, the Preſident has loſt amongſt the reſt of his papers; tho' I often ſince the commencement of our troubles, as he muſt recollect, urged to him the neceſſity of preſerving it in his own and our vindication: however, as I had twice peruſed it, and had ſince occaſion enough to retain in my memory the firſt impreſſions I had received of it, I can venture to aſſert it was near the following purport:

" That he, Mr. Watts, had been applied to by " Raagbullob, the Chuta Begum's Dewan, who " adviſed him that his family had left Dacca with " intention to go to worſhip at Jaggernaut, and " ſhould take Calcutta in his way, and requeſted " he would write to their Governor touching their " reception there, and that they might be ſupplied " with boats, or ought elſe they might have occaſion " for on their expedition; that in compliance with " Raagbullob's intimation and requeſt, he wrote, " and recommended his family's being received " with all poſſible reſpect and regard, not only on " account of his influence with the Chuta Begum, " but as his power at Dacca might be of the ut-

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" moſt conſequence to our Honourable Maſters " affairs there."

In conſequence of this recommendatory letter, and the reaſons urged by Mr. Watts, they were received in the ſettlement, and treated with all poſſible regard. Whether Mr. Watts knew, or can be ſuppoſed to have judged, that Raagbullob's family going to Jaggernaut to worſhip, was a pretence only to facilitate their obtaining a protection in Calcutta, I cannot ſay; but I recollect the Preſident's communicating to me another letter he received from Mr. Watts, about the time that the death of the old Suba was deemed inevitable, wherein he recommended it as expedient, " That " Kiſſendaſs, and the reſt of Raagbullob's family " ſhould have no longer protection in Calcutta, as " it was very uncertain what turn things would " take after the deceaſe of the Suba." The Preſident will, I doubt not, do me the juſtice of acknowledging I enforced this ſalutary advice, and preſſed more than once the diſmiſſion of this family, foreſeeing they would be demanded; and Mr. Manningham and myſelf had many uneaſy conferences on the protection being continued to them, fearing it might be productive of troubleſome conſequences, and poſſibly embroil us with the new government, ſhould they remain in the ſettlement until the Suba's deceaſe. Why the Preſident delayed their diſmiſſion, I am at a loſs how to account for; but certain it is, had they been obliged to quit the place, a handle would have been taken away from many, who have been too ready to urge and maintain the protection given to this family as the greateſt, nay, the ſole cauſe that drew on us the Suba's reſentment; which I doubt not of convincing your Honourable Court is very diſtant from the truth. Their diſmiſſion, however, would have ſaved us from a moſt difficult ſituation which

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we preſently fell into; for we no ſooner received advice of the death of Ally Verdy Cawn, than we had notice alſo of the ſtand made againſt Surajud Dowla's ſucceſſion, by the young Begum and her party, of which Raagbullob was the chief miniſter and favourite of his miſtreſs; ſo that it became at that juncture a dangerous ſtep to the Company's intereſt to turn his family out of the ſettlement, the more eſpecially as for ſome days advices from all quarters were in favour of the Begum's party. Notwithſtanding which, as the new Suba had been proclaimed in the city, the Preſident wrote the uſual congratulatory letter to him, which was favourably received.

5th. Here it becomes needful to recite, that ſome little time before the old Suba's death, the Preſident received a private letter from Mr. Watts to the following purport: "That there was a "multitude of the government's ſpies at Calcutta; "that the ſmall ſtrength of its fortifications and "garriſon, and the eaſy capture of it, were the "public diſcourſe of the city and durbar; and "that it behoved Mr. Drake to be upon his guard, "and by ſome means prevent the government's "ſpies bringing daily intelligence to the durbar of "the weak ſituation of the place." This letter the Preſident communicated to me, and gave me orders, as Zemindar to make a ſtrict enquiry after ſuch as might juſtly be ſuſpected, and that had no real call of buſineſs in the place; and alſo that I would iſſue orders to the ſeveral Chowkeys, or places of guard, to admit none to land, or be admitted into the town without his orders. Theſe inſtructions I immediately obeyed, and ſeveral ſuſpected perſons were, in conſequence of them, turned out of the place, and none admitted without a ſtrict examination.

6th. On Raagbullob's withdrawing himſelf, with the young Begum, to Mootee Giol, Surajud Dowla diſpatched Naran Sing, brother to Rajaram, the Fowzdaar of Midnapore, to Calcutta, with a perwannah, the contents of which were, to demand Kiſſendaſs and his family to be delivered up between eight and nine in the evening of, I think, the 14th of April. The Preſident being at Baraſut, and Mr. Manningham at his country reſidence, Omychund came and adviſed me that Naran Sing had got, in the diſguiſe of a European dreſs, into the ſettlement, and had the Suba's perwannah to demand Raagbullob's family, and was at his houſe aſking, Whether I would permit his bringing him to viſit me? As he had got entrance into the place, I thought it adviſeable to ſee him, and Omychund brought him accordingly in about half an hour. I received him with the reſpect due to a brother of Rajaram, an officer in much truſt and confidence with both the late and preſent Suba; he tendered me his perwannah, but I excuſed myſelf from receiving it, as it was addreſſed to the Governor, who I told him would be in town in the morning, on which he took his leave well ſatisfied. In the morning early I ſent for the Jemmautdaar of the Chowkey where Naran Sing landed, and was going to puniſh him for admitting any one in the ſettlement without orders, when he informed me that Naran Sing came in the diſguiſe of a common Bengal Pykar; that he oppoſed his landing, but that ſoon after Omychund's ſervants came to him with a meſſage, ſignifying that he was a relation of his houſe, and that he might admit him. Soon after, on advice that the Preſident was returned to town, I waited on him with the report of this tranſaction, and found with him Meſſieurs Manningham and Frankland; we were all a good deal embarraſſed how to act on this occaſion, that the

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ſame reaſons that before forbid the family's being turned out of the place, after the Suba's death, ſtill ſubſiſted equally ſtrong againſt delivering them up, as the conteſt was yet undecided between Surajud Dowla and the young Begum. The reſult at laſt of our deliberations was, that as Naran Sing had ſtole like a thief and a ſpy into the ſettlement (and not like one in the public character he pretended, and as bearing the Suba's orders) the Preſident ſhould not receive him or his perwannah; which reſolution was put in execution, and the Preſident ſent one of his Chubdaars to him, with orders to quit the ſettlement, which he did: and inſtantly letters were diſpatched to Mr. Watts to adviſe him of the affair, with inſtructions to guard againſt any ill conſequence which might ariſe from it.

7th. The foregoing is, Honourable Sirs, a faithful narrative of the protection given to Kiſſendaſs, the ſon and family of Raagbullob, which has been induſtriouſly and maliciouſly by ſome, and erroneouſly by others, circulated as the principal cauſe of the loſs of your ſettlements in Bengal; an event which, I will ſoon demonſtrate, had much deeper and more remote foundation: for on your Chief's at Coſſimbuzar making a proper repreſentation of this affair at the Durbar, it hardly occaſioned any emotion or diſpleaſure in the Suba, nor ever had a place in any of the ſubſequent complaints forwarded to us, through the channel of that ſubordinate.

8th. The probability of a breach with France had been the ſubject of diſcourſe for ſome time, before it was confirmed to us by the arrival of your letter on the Delawar; and as about the ſame time we received news of the taking Gyria by his Majeſty's ſquadron, both became the ſubject of much ſpeculation at the Durbar, where the military and naval ſtrength of the Engliſh in India

were greatly exaggerated, and no ſmall pains taken to inſtil a dread of it into the government; and if the agents for the French Eaſt-India Company (whoſe garriſon at Chandanagore did not, at this period, amount to 50 men) were not at the bottom of theſe reports, it is at leaſt, I hope, no breach of charity to conclude, they uſed every means in their power to confirm them; at leaſt ſuch was our information, when it was confidently aſſerted in the Durbar at Muxadabad, and gained belief, that the Engliſh had ſixteen ſhips of war, and a ſtrong land-force coming to Bengal.

9th. On the receipt of your letter by the Delawar, we began to put the ſettlement into as good a poſture of defence as we could; and as the parapet and embrazures, as well as the gun carriages of the line to the weſtward of the fort, were much out of repair, they became the firſt object of our attention; a number of workmen were employed, and I believe the parapet and embrazures (the greateſt part of which we were obliged to pull down) more than half run up, when the Preſident was ſurprized with a perwannah from the Suba, to the following purport:

"That he had been informed we were building
"a wall, and digging a large ditch round
"the town of Calcutta: That he did not
"approve of our carrying on theſe works
"without his permiſſion: And ordered Mr.
"Drake to deſiſt immediately, and deſtroy
"what he had already done."

10th. The French having ſtrengthened their fort by an additional baſtion, which they had at this time compleated, received, at the ſame juncture we did, a perwannah to the like effect; both of them having been diſpatched by the Subah, as he was on his march againſt the Purranea Nabob; and the anſwers to them reached the Suba on the ſame day

day at Rajamaal, a city about three days march from Muxadabad; and the French, by the completion of their baſtion, being enabled to deſiſt immediately, anſwered him accordingly; aſſuring him at the ſame time, that they had built no new works, and had only repaired one of their baſtions which had been injured by lightning: With which anſwer he appeared ſatisfied.

11th. The reply your Preſident returned to the Suba's perwannah, was, to the beſt of my remembrance, as follows:

"That the Suba had been miſinformed in reſpect
"to our building a wall round our town,
"and we had dug no ditch ſince the invaſion
"of the Moratters, at which time we exe-
"cuted ſuch a work at the particular requeſt
"of our inhabitants, and with the know-
"ledge and approbation of Ally Verdy
"Cawn; that in the late war between our
"nation and the French, they had attacked
"and taken the town of Madraſs, contrary
"to the neutrality we expected would have
"been preſerved in the Mogul's dominions;
"and that there being at preſent great appear-
"ance of another war between the two
"crowns, we were under ſome apprehenſions
"they would act in the ſame manner in Ben-
"gal; to prevent which we were only re-
"pairing our line of guns to the water-ſide."

It is fruitleſs now to wiſh this anſwer had been debated in Council before it was ſent, where I think much impropriety would have appeared in it, as the whole of it had a tendency to confirm the Suba in a belief of thoſe inſinuations, which had been already conveyed to him, that the war between us and the French would probably be brought into Bengal, beſides its carrying a tacit reflection on the Suba's want of power or will to protect us. The

conſequence was adequate, for he was much enraged at the receipt of it, and immediately ordered your factory at Coſſimbuzar to be inveſted; which was accordingly done on the 22d of May, by Roy Dullob, of which we received advice from the gentlemen there the 25th, and ſeveral other ſubſequent letters, informing us of additional forces being added on the factory, from time to time, and that they expected every moment to be attacked, and that the Suba was on his march to Muxadabad. The ſubject matter of complaint, aſſigned in every letter, ſtill regarded the new works we were carrying on in Calcutta.

12th. On the firſt advice received from the gentlemen at Coſſimbuzar, we forwarded to them a copy of the Preſident's anſwer to the Nabob's perwannah, and in our ſeveral diſpatches recommended to them to uſe every ſalutary means in their power to put a ſtop to the Suba's reſentment, and obtain a currency to our buſineſs, (which was now obſtructed at every ſubordinate and arung). We directed them to aſſure the Suba we were carrying on no new works; that we had dug no ditch that our enemies had miſrepreſented us; that if he gave no credit to our aſſertions, we intreated any one he could conſide in to inſpect them, and wrote the Suba repeated letters to the like purpoſe. We likewiſe gave the gentlemen inſtructions to remonſtrate and expoſtulate ſtrongly againſt this hard treatment, and to endeavour to trace out, if poſſible, whether one or other of the European nations was not at the bottom of it, with intent to embroil the Company's affairs, and benefit thoſe of their employers, and to uſe all means of knowing from his miniſters if the Subah's intentions were to extort a ſum of money from us (conformable to the unjuſt and uſual method of his predeceſſors;) withal giving them poſitive orders to make no conceſſion, or

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give any promiſe touching the demolition of our fortifications.

13th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, you ſee us reduced to the neceſſity, either of reſiſting the arbitrary orders of the Suba, or of abandoning and leaving open your Preſidency to the mercy of the French, contrary to your orders and intimation to us by the Delawar; for to all our remonſtrances we could receive no ſatisfaction from the gentlemen at Coſſimbuzar, but was ſtill adviſed, the Suba inſiſted on our demoliſhing our new works, (when in fact we had made none) and fill up a ditch we had never dug.

14th. Under date, I think, the 1ſt of June, we received a letter from your Chief and Council at Coſſimbuzar, adviſing, that Roy Doolob had told Doctor Forth, that the Suba's reſentment was cauſed only by the draw-bridge and works we had built at Baagbazar, and the octagon which Mr. Kelſall had rebuilt in his garden: And that if we would write the Suba we would demoliſh thoſe works, the forces would be immediately withdrawn: And the gentlemen likewiſe inforcing this as a neceſſary and effectual expedient to put an end to the troubles, we in full council took it into conſideration; and reflecting on the heavy loſs and diſadvantage you would ſuſtain in your inveſtment, by the continuance of the ſtoppage of your buſineſs, and judging theſe works and draw-bridge at Baagbazar ſo far detached, as to be of little uſe in the defence of the place againſt an European enemy, we unanimouſly agreed and determined, to promiſe the demolition of them, and the octagon at Mr. Kelſall's garden; and to that purport, as ſoothing a letter as could be indited was inſtantly drawn up, to the Suba, from the Preſident, and incloſed to Mr. Watts and his Council, to whom we alſo wrote, adviſing them of our compliance and readi-

neſs to demoliſh thoſe works which had given him diſpleaſure. Triplicates of this araſdaſs and letter we diſpatched in four hours, to arrive in thirty-ſix hours; and ordered a large reward to the Coſſids if they arrived in the time.

15th. We received another ſhort letter under the ſame date, *viz.* the 1ſt of June, wherein the gentlemen informed us, the forces on the factory amounted to 12,000, with a train of artillery, and that poſitive orders were arrived to attack it, requeſting they might be reinforced with an hundred men; on which a council was ſummoned, their requeſt taken into conſideration, and the five Captains called in, and deſired to give their opinion, whether it was poſſible this reinforcement could be thrown into the place? They withdrew, and after debating it amongſt themſelves, gave us their opinion in writing, declaring the thing impracticable, and that the force the gentlemen had in the fort was, in their judgments, ſufficient to defend it againſt the troops brought againſt them. This opinion we immediately diſpatched to them, directing them, if they were attacked, to make as good a defence as they could; and when they found they could defend the factory no longer, to make the beſt retreat in their power: but I believe neither this letter, nor ſome of our preceding ones, reached the gentlemen, the Suba having for ſome days cut off all correſpondence between us; a plain indication that an accommodation was not the mark he aimed at.

16th. On the 6th of June we had a rumour of Coſſimbuzar's being taken by the Nabob, which was confirmed to us the 7th, by a letter from Mr. Matthew Collett, your ſecond at that factory; which, according to my beſt recollection, expreſſed as follows:

"That

"That upon the Nabob's repeated orders to his "Generals to attack the factory, unleſs the "Chief went in perſon to him, Mr. Watts, "by the advice of his Council, thought it "more adviſeable to go to the Nabob, than "riſk involving the Company in a war with "the Government; that he accordingly did ſo "on the 2d of June, and on coming to his "preſence was made a priſoner, and orders "ſent for Mr. Collet, (and I think Mr. "Batſon) to attend him; likewiſe to ſign, "jointly with Mr. Watts, a machulkah, (or "obligation, with a penalty annexed) which "order they obeyed; but in place of being "ſet at liberty, upon ſigning the machulkah "required, Mr. Collet was ſent back to the "factory, with directions to deliver it up to "Roy Doolob, which he was obliged to "comply with, and was then giving up the "account of the cannon, ammunition, and "military ſtores; that the factory was not "plundered, and the Nabob was determined "to march to Calcutta with his whole army, "eſtimated then at 50,000 men, beſides a "large train of artillery."

The reaſons which ſwayed Mr. Watts to quit his government at ſuch a juncture as that, and truſt himſelf in the hands of the Suba, (on whoſe character or principles no reaſonable faith could be had) without any proper ſecurity, hoſtage, or ſafeguard for his perſon; or thoſe which urged Mr. Collet to follow his example, when he knew his Chief was made a priſoner; and that conſequently the truſt, command, and government of the factory, fort, and garriſon, devolved upon himſelf; or why this your ſettlement was thus given up, without a ſingle ſtroke being ſtruck for it, I am totally a ſtranger to, and can only hope, for their

ſakes,

ſakes, and the honour of their country, they have, or will juſtify their conduct to you in thoſe particulars. I will not ſubſcribe to the opinion of our five Captains, as already recited, and ſay their force was ſufficient to reſiſt and defend the place for any long time againſt the Suba's army; but had it been defended at all, he could not have attacked and taken it, without the loſs of time, many of his people, and probably ſome of his principal officers. A ſtroke of this kind might have had happy conſequences to your affairs; it might have inclined the Suba to an accommodation, by cooling ſtill more the zeal of his miniſters, generals, officers and people, who almoſt to a man were averſe to this expedition againſt the Engliſh, as well knowing the conſequence would be as fatal to his country as to us, though he ſucceeded in it. A defence of only twenty-four hours would, in its conſequences, have retarded, in all probability, his march to Calcutta for many days, and would have been a point gained to us of the utmoſt importance, by having more time for the completion of many requiſites, which for want of it we were obliged wholly to neglect, or they remained unfiniſhed at the time we were actually inveſted. A detention of his army before Coſſimbuzar for two or three days, would have brought on dirty rainy weather in his march towards us, and incommoded him greatly, as well in the paſſage of his troops and cannon, as in the attack of our ſettlement; whereas, by the eaſy poſſeſſion he acquired of Coſſimbuzar, he was enabled to march againſt us without loſs of time, or obſtruction from the weather, which afforded not a drop of rain through the march and attack of Calcutta; but on the 21ſt, at night, whilſt I was priſoner in the camp, it rained heavily, and dirty weather ſucceeded for many days after, during which his muſquetry, being all matchlocks,

would

would have been rendered in a manner uſeleſs. We ſhould alſo have had an important ſuccour, in the arrival before the fort, of the Succeſs galley, the Speedwell, and Bombay frigate; theſe veſſels having paſſed Tanners the 19th and 20th, and joined the Dodaly and the reſt of our fleet about Govindpore, after they had fell down from the fort, tho' before it was ſurrendered. Many more are the advantages I could enumerate, which would have reſulted from the ſmalleſt defence and reſiſtance made at Coſſimbuzar, and can only regret now its not having been done; repeating my hopes, the gentlemen in truſt there will give you ſufficient reaſons why it was not done. Their treatment could hardly have been worſe, had they been obſtinate in its defence; they themſelves being continued priſoners in the Suba's camp, under many hardſhips, until, I think, the latter end of June; their effects plundered, and the gentlemen in the factory, *viz.* Meſſrs. Hugh, Watts, and Chambers, with the whole garriſon, put in irons, and ſent to the common priſon at Muxadabad; the fate Meſſrs. Batſon, Sykes, Haſtings, and Marriot, would have undergone, had not luckily the two former made their eſcape, and the two latter been at the Arungs.

17. On Coſſimbuzar's being inveſted, we wrote to the ſeveral ſubordinates, and to all our Gomaſtahs at the ſeveral armies, adviſing them of the ſeveral proceedings, and to be upon their guard, and hold themſelves in readineſs to retreat with the Company's effects, &c. and on intelligence of the capture of the place, and the Suba's march to Calcutta, we ſent them orders to withdraw, and join us with all expedition. But theſe orders were too late, excepting with reſpect to your factory at Luckypore, as I have already intimated in my letter of the 17th July. Mr. Boddam, your Chief

at

at Balliſore, received our orders in time to withdraw himſelf, with the few ſoldiers he had there, and about 6000 Rupees of your effects; the remainder, to the amount of about 40,000, were ſequeſtered, and your factory-houſe in part only demoliſhed at Ballaſore; but Bulramgurry, by its ſituation, having eſcaped the government's notice, and by the prudent conduct of Mr. John Briſtow, (left reſident at Ballaſore by Mr. Boddam) is ſtill retained. Myſelf and Mr. Boddam were diſpatched to take a formal poſſeſſion of it the 18th September, and to negociate other matters, which will be tranſmitted on the face of our Fulta conſultations; and we have thought it neceſſary to nominate Bullramgurry your Preſidency, being diveſted of every other poſſeſſion you had in theſe provinces. But to reſume my narrative: Diſpatches were likewiſe forwarded expreſs to Bombay, Fort St. George, and Vizagapatam, the 8th of June, for a reinforcement of troops, ſtores, &c. and ſuccours demanded of the French and Dutch ſettlements on this river; the ſucceſs of which laſt negociation you have likewiſe in my ſaid letter of the 17th July. The militia were under arms for the firſt time the 7th June, ſomething too late, I am afraid you will ſay, to be of much ſervice, juſt coming to action.

18th. I am now, Honourable Sirs, come cloſer to the unravelling the real cauſes which ſtimulated the Suba to the lengths he has proceeded againſt us: How far my conjectures and aſſertions will be ſupported by a probable ſyſtem of politics in him, and by the tenor of his own conduct conſidered together, I humbly ſubmit to your judgments. And firſt, I beg leave to remark on the three articles contained in the machulkah, which your Chief and Council were obliged to ſign in the Suba's camp,

camp, when before Coſſimbuzar; the terms of which were, *viz.*

" That we ſhould not protect the King's ſub-
" jects.—That we ſhould not miſuſe the li-
" berty of our duſticks, by covering the trade
" of the native merchants.—And that we
" ſhould refund and make good whatever
" ſum it ſhould be proved the King had been
" defrauded of in his revenues and duties by
" this practice; and that we ſhould demoliſh
" our fortifications."

Theſe, Honourable Sirs, are the purport of the three articles of the machulkah, howſoever I may have varied the wording of it, by not having it before me. Had the Suba any intention of being ſatisfied with our conceſſion to theſe articles, he certainly would have reſted here; your Chief, Council, fort and garriſon of Coſſimbuzar were in his poſſeſſion; the Gentlemen had ſigned and executed the obligation demanded of them; he knew their ſigning of it was not valid or binding without our approval; and if he had ever inclined to an accommodation, he would have tranſmitted the terms they had complied with, and at leaſt have deſiſted until our reply could have reached him, in place of cutting off, for ſome days, the means of all correſpondence or intelligence between us and your factory; and marching directly againſt us, without ever replying to, or taking notice of many araſſdaſſes received from us: But the truth is, his jealouſy of the independant power of the Europeans in his country was at this juncture confirmed, which he was determined to reduce; and being ſenſible ours was the moſt formidable to him, we became the firſt objects of his juſt politics. To ſupport this my concluſion, I muſt here refer to three letters, which Wazeed's Gomaſtah in my preſence read your Preſident, (copies of which, I believe,

believe, are in Mr. Drake's poſſeſſion) addreſſed to his maſter Wazeed, from the Suba, all three, to the beſt of my remembrance, bearing date in May laſt. In each of theſe, he avows his intention to reduce the power of the Engliſh, forbids his interfering on their behalf, aſſerting his having long intended it, and ſwears by God and his Prophets, that he will drive them out of his country, unleſs they are ſatisfied to trade in it on the footing they did in Jaffier Cawn's time (by which he meant before the time the Honourable Company obtained their Phirmaund). Your fort at Coſſimbuzar, (eſteemed by all judges more regular and tenable than that at Fort William) ſo near his capital, appeared too dangerous a hold, at a time he was influenced to believe our ſtrength in India was four times more formidable than it really was; and that we were on the eve of a French war, which would be probably brought into his country: Conſiſtent with this was his expreſſion of reſentment, at Rajamaal, on receipt of your Preſident's letter: "Who ſhall dare to think of commencing hoſtilities in my country, or preſume to imagine I have not power to protect them?" And it was current in the mouths of all degrees, when I was at Muxadabad, that Mahabut Jung had long meditated to deſtroy the forts and garriſons of the Europeans, and to reduce their trade on the footing of Armenians. And here I hope it will not be deemed impertinent, if I recite, verbatim, the laſt diſcourſe and council which Mahabut Jung gave his grandſon, a few days before his death; and which I had from very good authority at Muxadabad, after my releaſement.

"My life has been a life of war and ſtratagem:
"For what have I fought, for what have my
"councils tended, but to ſecure you, my
"Son, a quiet ſucceſſion to my Suba-dary?

" My fears for you have for many days rob-
" bed me of ſleep. I perceived who had
" power to give you trouble after I am gone
" hence. Hoſſein Cooley Cawn, by his re-
" putation, wiſdom, courage, and affection
" to Shaw Amet Jung, and his houſe, I
" feared would obſtruct your government.
" His power is no more. Monichund Dewan,
" whoſe councils might have been your dan-
" gerous enemy, I have taken into favour.
" Keep in view the power the European na-
" tions have in the country. This fear I
" would alſo have freed you from, if God
" had lengthened my days.—The work, my
" Son, muſt now be yours: Their wars and
" politics in the Telinga country ſhould keep
" you waking: On pretence of private con-
" teſts between their Kings, they have ſeized
" and divided the country of the King, and
" the goods of his people between them:
" Think not to weaken all three together.
" The power of the Engliſh is great; they
" have lately conquered Angria, and poſſeſſed
" themſelves of his country; reduce them firſt;
" the others will give you little trouble, when
" you have reduced them. Suffer them not,
" my Son, to have fortifications or ſoldiers:
" If you do, the country is not yours."

19th. How conſiſtent the Suba has been in his adherence to this laſt counſel of his grandfather, we have woefully felt; but that we were not ſolely the objects of his reſentment and deſigns, is evident: His perwannah to the French was diſpatched the ſame day with ours: When he marched againſt us, he ſent perwannahs to both French and Dutch, with orders to provide, and join him with ſhips, men, and ammunition, to attack us by water, whilſt he attacked us by land: They refuſed; in-

conſequence

conſequence of their refuſal, he inveſted their ſeveral forts and factories, and demanded an exorbitant ſum from each. The French were glad to accommodate matters for the payment of three Lack and half of Rupees; the Dutch for four Lack and half, after having had, for a day and a half, a body of the Suba's troops in their ſettlement, waiting orders to attack it, and a man ſtationed with an ax in his hands, to cut down their flag-ſtaff and colours. The French had not money to pay the mulct laid on them, but gained Roy Doolob to become their ſecurity: The Dutch were reduced to immediate payment; and both did then, and ever ſince have been obliged to endure the moſt audacious and exaſperating inſults, from the loweſt Peon in the ſervice of the government. That there was this difference in the ſum extorted from them has been accounted for, (how juſtly I will not ſay) by the ſupplies of ammunition given the Suba privately by the agents of the French at Chandanagore. The thing, however, was verified by two of our ſhips, who brought us intelligence, that the French, by night, croſſed over 200 cheſts of powder to the Suba's army, lying near Banka Bazar.

20th. Still conſiſtent with the laſt advice of Mahabut Jung, he appeared at Rajamal ſatisfied with the anſwer from the French Directeur; tho' no one can imagine his intelligence was ſuch, that he was really impoſed on as to the pretence of repairing the damage they had ſuſtained by lightning; he manifeſted ſufficiently his reſentment and intentions againſt both French and Dutch; but their time was not yet come; it was not his buſineſs to have the three nations to encounter at once, but to compromiſe, at the preſent, for as much as he could get from them; but that the French were, and ſtill are, the next object of his arms, will not

admit of doubt, no more than that he would have proceeded immediately againſt them, had not his advices from court obliged him to proceed againſt Shocut Jung, the Purranea Nabob, as an object more important; for when I was twice conducted into his preſence, after the ſurrender of the fort, his firſt queſtion to me was, "Will you all engage "to join me againſt the French?" Uniform has been the conduct of the government to another part of Mahabut Jung's advice; for though liberty of trade is granted to the Danes and Pruſſians, yet they are prohibited fortifications or garriſons. And in further proof of the reſolution of the government to diveſt the Europeans of their forts and garriſons, and that we were the objects of his policy, and not of his reſentment only (from either one particular private cauſe or other, that may be tranſmitted you) I may juſtly add, the apprehenſions of the French and Dutch themſelves, who, on the firſt approach of our troubles, ſent ſtrenuous diſpatches to their Principals at Batavia and Pondicherry, for the moſt expeditious ſupplies of men, ammunition, &c. and I doubt not it will be ſoon their turn to regret the having ſo quietly given us up as a ſacrifice, unleſs the Suba ſhould be vanquiſhed in his preſent expedition againſt Shocut Jung.

21ſt. The 3d inſtant (November) a Perwannah reached the Dutch, from the Suba's camp—demanding them to join him againſt us, with threatnings if they refuſed; and the ſame day, a Perwannah came to the French factory, purporting that the Suba was informed they were carrying on their fortifications, and if they did not immediately deſiſt, he would paſs through the Dutch factory and ſettlement, and with their (the Dutch) ſoldiers deſtroy their fort, and drive them out of the country, as he had done the Engliſh; and the govern-

ment has already obliged the French to take down their colours erected on the bounds.

22d. I believe, Honourable Sirs, it will by this time appear clearly evident to you, that the governing principle in the Suba was political, and the real object of his proceedings the demolition of your forts and garriſons, as his demands always expreſſed; not that I will be hardy enough to aver, he had no concurring ſubordinate cauſes, that had a ſpecious colour of reſentment; and this reflection leads me to conſider the other two articles of the Machulkah, as their being inſerted carry the appearance of complaint, though never before urged by him in any of his demands, as tranſmitted us by your ſervants at Coſſimbuzar.

23d. That the abuſe of Duſticks ſhould be one cauſe of complaint, I am not ſurprized at: the face of your conſultations juſt before the diſpatch of your laſt year's ſhips, will give you, Honourable Sirs, my ſentiments of the ill uſe made of this indulgence to your ſervants; my motion and minutes on this ſubject were, after the diſpatch of your ſhips, taken into conſideration, and ſuch remedies and checks reſolved on, as were judged might put a ſtop to the abuſe.

24th. That we ſhould not protect the King's ſubjects, is an article will bear a much larger diſcuſſion. This prohibition, in the extent it might have been carried by the government, whenever it was inclined to obſtruct your buſineſs or plunder your merchants, would have rendered your trade moſt precarious; had the article been explained ſo as to prohibit our giving protection to thoſe who were actually ſervants to the government, or others not born in or for a term of years ſettled under our colours, it would, I think, have carried nothing unjuſt or unreaſonable in it; but that was by no means the real intention of it. The article had

a latitude

a latitude in expreſſion, that would include your merchants and inhabitants whenever the Suba or his miniſters were pleaſed to call on them; a call they would never fail in, on ſome pretence or other, whenever they had got any thing worth taking; ſo that in truth it would have been as impoſſible for us, conſiſtent with your intereſts, to have ſubſcribed to this article, as to the other, regarding the demolition of your fortifications; and the moſt favourable terms intended for us (which I could with the utmoſt diligence learn when at Muxadabad) were, that if we had paid an implicit obedience to the Suba's commands, by delivering our forts, and diſmiſſion of our garriſons, we ſhould then have been permitted to trade, on paying Armenian duties; admitting a Fowzdaar into your ſettlement on the part of the government, and relinquiſhing to them all duties of conſulage, revenues, &c.——Terms ſcandalous and injurious to your honour as well as commerce; terms which we could never have ſubmitted to, even if we had received no alarm from the ſide of France, without ſacrificing the rights of your Phirmaund, giving up every part of our truſt, and breaking through your repeated ſtanding orders for more than 30 years paſt.

25th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, it will appear to you, that ſubmiſſion could not have been paid by us to two articles of the Machulkah, executed by your Chief and Council of Coſſimbuzar, and that we had many months before guarded againſt (as much as in us lay) the complaint laid in the third; if the honours and conſciences of men were to be influenced by checks the moſt binding and ſolemn: But it is plain the two articles of complaint were at the laſt inſerted, to give a colouring for enforcing the third and only one (our fortifications) the Suba until then inſiſted on, and had really in view. I

am ſenſible, no ſmall pains will be taken to throw the riſe of your misfortunes here, on every cauſe but the right.

26th. From the appearance of the Suba's letter to Governor Pigott, your Preſident ſeems to be ſolely culpable in drawing on his reſentment; but neither juſtice nor probability will juſtify the concluſion. Angry he certainly was, at the terms of this letter; but had not his reſentment been much deeper founded, the terms of this letter, or the error of one of your ſervants, would never of itſelf have provoked him, or can vindicate the cruel deſtruction both public and private, attending his proceedings, which fell equally heavy, as well on the natives, ſubjects of the Mogul, as on yourſelves and us; and the immenſe plunder of Calcutta, we know, was one no ſmall ſubordinate motive (inſtilled into him by one or two harpies in confidence about him) for his march againſt us, at a time when he was rapaciouſly plundering wherever he could; amaſſing wealth to enable him either to buy at Court his confirmation in the Subaſhip, or keep ſuch a ſtanding force on foot, as would ſecure it to him, in ſpight of any oppoſition or orders from thence.

27th. That matters might have been accommodated with the Suba, for a ſum of money, as was effected by the French and Dutch, I am likewiſe ſenſible will be ſtrongly alledged againſt us; but by whomſoever it is, I will be bound to ſay, they are either ignorant of the chain of politics and circumſtances which influenced and led him on, or never reaſoned or thought upon them. The Suba's whole conduct oppoſes this allegation; his miniſters were by our orders founded on the alternative, and your Chief and Council of Coſſimbuzar aſſured us, that he had declared money was not the thing he wanted, but that we ſhould deſiſt

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from our fortifications, and deſtroy our new works, &c.

28th. The protection granted the family of Raagbullob, (of which I have already given a faithful account) will, I alſo know, be urged with circumſtances that never exiſted, as matter of heavy complaint againſt us, though the Suba never (that came to our knowledge) made complaint about it. I will not vindicate the protection being continued to them until the deceaſe of the old Suba; I have already, and I think juſtly condemned it; but (this excepted) I will hope the circumſtances attending and urging it, will be ſufficient to extenuate that part of our conduct.

29th. I am informed it has been cruelly aſſerted, and publiſhed by the French, that the bringing down the Nabob and his army, and the deſertion of the fort, &c. had been long a concerted ſcheme of the Preſident and the reſt of the Gentlemen of Council who went off in the ſhipping, and they mention in proof, as a corroborating circumſtance, myſelf and the other Gentlemen of Council being left a ſacrifice behind, (who they ſay uſed generally to oppoſe their meaſures) with this addition, that they had embarked and carried off with them the greateſt part of the wealth of the ſettlement. Howſoever little right theſe gentlemen have to expect a vindication of their conduct from me, yet here common juſtice to them forbids my ſilence, and urges me to defend them from a charge, which I believe from my heart to be infamouſly falſe, not only as to the act but the intention; nor would I even repeat a libel ſo ſcandalous and untrue, had I not received information that ſome of your own ſervants had forwarded from your ſubordinate (for want of a better) the public narrative the French in Bengal ſent to their ſuperiors, of the capture of Fort William; in which narrative I hear the

above cruel charge has a place in nearly the ſame terms I have recited it, with many other cauſes aſſigned for this misfortune, equally void of probability or truth.

30th. It will by ſome, I doubt not, be repreſented to you that Omychund was at the bottom of all the Suba's councils and proceedings againſt us; the part he really acted under cover, in this affair, is difficult to diſtinguiſh and point out; that he was much chagrined at the little influence he had in the ſettlement for a few years laſt paſt, is moſt certain; in applications to the Durbar, (wherein he uſually was the acting perſon between the Company and the Government) little uſe had been made of him, poſſibly more had been better.—Be this as it will, it is moſt certain, he had no general weight for theſe four or five years, beyond what his wealth gave him, ſo that his name and reputation became leſſened in the eye of the government as well as in Calcutta. Picqued at this, and implacable in his reſentment, it is not improbable he worked with ſome inſtruments of the Durbar, to embroil us in ſuch a manner as would make his mediation and aſſiſtance neceſſary, and thereby regain his credit and influence with both; little imagining things would go the length they did; in which it muſt have been moſt evident to him, his own large poſſeſſions would be equally the Suba's prey, with yours: that he adviſed the diſpatch of Naran Sing, to demand Raagbullob's family, and introduced him into the ſettlement, will not I think admit of doubt, no more than that he deeply reſented his being turned out of it again. His endeavours with Wazeed, to mitigate things, when he really found they were coming to extremities, was I believe ſincere enough until his impriſonment by the Preſident, an act of his power and ſole authority, for which the pretence made uſe of was, in

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my judgment, by no means ſufficient; the correſpondence detected between him and Rajaram Harkarah, (the Suba's head ſpy) which was read in the preſence of many of us, contained in our opinions nothing to vindicate it, nor had your Preſident even the conſent or approbation of his Council for this ſtep, or did he, that I remember, ever require it. On his impriſonment, his head Jemmautdaar Jaggemant Sing ſtabbed himſelf, and ſet fire to his maſter's houſe, and ſome of his women either butchered themſelves, or were butchered by others in the family, which became a ſcene of much horror and confuſion. It can hardly be doubted that Omychund became deſperate in his reſentments, and it is probable enough he expedited the march of the Suba's army, then advanced, I think, as far as Banka Bazar; and it is likewiſe probable, that he then ſent him the real ſtate of the fort and garriſon, and afterwards might (as has been generally ſuſpected) from time to time have given him intelligence; but this is all conjecture; we only know, that his Jemmautdaar juſt now mentioned, ſurviving the wounds he had given himſelf, was put upon his horſe, and joined the Suba, whom he informed of the tranſaction relating to his maſter's impriſonment; and when the enemy was repulſed at Baagbazar, he led the van of the army to the eaſtward, and directed them to the avenues by which they entered the next day.

31ſt. From others, I believe, you will be told, that the diſmiſſion of your Dadney Merchants was one cauſe of our misfortunes, ariſing from their endeavours at the Durbar to embroil your affairs at the Arungs, as conducted by your own Gomaſtahs, hoping thereby to get the Dadney readmitted, and themſelves reinſtated; nay ſome, I have been informed, have been hardy enough to urge and aſſert that the large increaſe of your revenues Zemindary was another very principal cauſe, which

drew the Suba's attention on the ſettlement, though themſelves, your Preſident and Council, and I believe the greateſt part of the Subadary, as well as my Honourable Maſters, know the credits of that branch were only increaſed without any innovations made in the branch itſelf; but to its loſs and diſadvantage. Many more cauſes and reaſons equally ſubſtantial will, I doubt not, be aſſigned and tranſmitted to you by ſuch buſy and very ſhort-ſighted politicians as theſe: ſtrangers to real ones they think they ſhall not appear of any importance, unleſs they aſſign ſome, no matter how incongruous: but you will now have materials enough before you to form your own judgments. I think my concluſions on every cauſe that can be alledged for the extraordinary and unprecedented conduct of the Suba, have facts and probability to ſupport them: To you, Honourable Sirs, I humbly ſubmit them, with this one concluſion more, that your ſituation in theſe provinces on a re-eſtabliſhment will be ſuch as to admit of only two alternatives; that you muſt in future, either keep ſuch a fortification and garriſon, as will at all times be ſufficient to force your trade againſt the oppoſition and extortion of the government; or reduce your commerce to the footing of the Pruſſians and Danes, *&c.* without forts and garriſons at all, and on payment of the loweſt duties that can be ſtipulated.—The immunities and privileges granted you in your Phirmaunds, you find now are of no validity without a military expence (more, I fear, than equivalent) to put them in force; but on this ſubject it will be my duty, to give you my ſentiments on another occaſion more at large, whilſt at preſent I reſume the thread of my narrative, broke off at the ſurrender of your fort and factory of Coſſimbuzar; the eaſy capture of which, concurring with the Suba's intentions beyond his expectations, not only

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gave the finiſhing ſtroke to his reſolves, but expedited and facilitated his march to Calcutta; which leads me to a conſideration of the immediate cauſes of its ſudden reduction, moſt needful to be known to my Honourable Maſters; as the rocks and quick-ſands on which we have unhappily ſtruck and ſplit, being fairly and candidly laid down, may prevent a ſecond wreck of your eſtate and trade.

32d. Theſe cauſes I will beg leave to inveſtigate under three general heads:—1ſt, The ſtate of our fortifications and garriſons: 2d, The ſtate of our ammunition, guns, and military ſtores: and, 3d, the ſeveral errors and miſcarriages ariſing from a deficiency (or rather a total want) of military knowledge or order.

33d. To the firſt article of my firſt general head, it will not become me to add much more than I ſet forth in my letter before you of the 17th July, addreſſed from Muxadabad to your other two Preſidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George. The nature and extent of the power given to the Committee of Fortifications, Meſſrs. Drake, Watts, Scot and Manningham, we have ever been kept ſtrangers to; but I will venture to conclude, that had the money which was expended on the redoubt, drawbridge, *&c.* erected at Baagbuzar, and that which was meditated to be ſpent on the circuit of the ditch beyond our bounds, as alſo that which was diſburſed on the batteries, &c. raiſed on the Suba's approach, been timely appropriated to the demolition of the houſes round us, to have given a proper eſplanade to the northward, eaſtward and ſouthward of your fort, the ſinking a ditch round it well paliſaded, it had been employed to a more important uſe and purpoſe, and have been a ſufficient diſcouragement to the government to have prevented any project or hopes of attacking it, with

any probability of ſucceſs.—I am ſenſible it will be urged, the government would have never ſuffered theſe meaſures; a reaſoning ex poſt facto will not invalidate my concluſion; for had it been thought of, or carried into execution, at the commencement of the old Suba's ſickneſs, when every thing at the Durbar was in confuſion, and both parties there employed on their own ſchemes and deſigns, the work might have been effected without let or hindrance; a Perwannah might poſſibly have reached us, to prohibit our proceeding, but no troops could have been ſent againſt us, whilſt the attentions of the claſhing intereſts at the Suba's court were taken up in ſecuring each their own ſafety on his demiſe. What might have been done during that favourable interval is ſufficiently evident, from the almoſt inconceivable uſeleſs works which we accompliſhed during the ſpace of a few days only: and the ſame plea which your Preſident urged in his letter to the Suba, ſubſiſted equally at the beginning of the old Suba's ſickneſs, when we had reaſon enough to be alarmed by the approach of a war with France. The ruinous ſtate of the line to the weſtward of the fort, had been a reproach to our ſettlement, and to every thing bearing the name of fortifications for more than two years, and was in juſt and ſtrong (I will not ſay in very decent) terms repreſented in a letter to the Board, by Mr. Jaſper Leigh Jones the Captain of your train, I think in April or May 1755, but no ſteps were taken to repair it until we had reaſon hourly to expect the enemy at our doors. The whole eaſterly curtain had been for many years in ſo ruinous a condition as not to bear a gun; one we fired from it, a three or four pounder, as I remember, which made its way through the terrace; through this curtain from the principal gate to the north-eaſt baſtion, were ſtruck out five or ſix large windows,

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ſo many breaches made for the enemy, in a quarter too where we were moſt liable to be attacked; and to ſum up the whole, the new Goodowns to the ſouthward, had rendered your two ſoutherly baſtions uſeleſs to each other, and to the whole ſoutherly face of the fort, which could not be flanked by a ſingle gun from either baſtion:—From a conſideration of theſe circumſtances, joined to the incumbrance of the church and houſes round us, and the other wants and diſadvantages mentioned in my letter of the 17th July, it is ſelf-evident, the place could not have held out an hour againſt an European enemy.

34th. The ſtate of your garriſon comes next under view; a ſubject on which I could wiſh my duty to your ſervice would permit my ſilence, as truths diſagreeable to me in the recital, and very unpleaſing to you to hear, muſt ariſe from the ſmalleſt ſcrutiny made in it. It is moſt ungrateful to a benevolent mind, to rehearſe the faults which may be juſtly charged even againſt the living, much more ſo againſt the dead, become ſo in a great meaſure by their own errors, and want of knowledge in the duties of their profeſſion; but the choice and appointment of commanding officers in your garriſon, is now become ſo important a conſideration to the well being of your ſervice, that none who would have any claim to your favour, or would be deemed faithful to the truſt you have repoſed in them, can be vindicated in concealing the truth from you.

35th. Your five commanding officers were Commandant Minchin, Captains Clayton, Buchanan, Witherington, and Grant; each of theſe gentlemen (Captain Clayton excepted) had ſeen ſervice, either in Europe or on the Cormandel coaſt: Touching the military capacity of our Commandant, I am a ſtranger. I can only ſay, that we

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were unhappy in his keeping it to himſelf, if he had any; as neither I, nor I believe any body elſe, was witneſs to any part of his conduct, that ſpoke or bore the appearance of his being the commanding military officer in the garriſon. Whether this proceeded from himſelf, or his not being properly ſupported in his rank, I cannot ſay; but ſuch, I have heard, has been his allegation and plea for his ſupine remiſſneſs, at a juncture which required the exertion of every quality he could have been maſter of. Your Preſident, I remember, ſpoke to me more than once with much uneaſineſs, at the beginning of our troubles, on the indolence of the Commandant, and ſeemed to think of breaking him; had this meaſure been carried into execution, it had been better for the ſervice, and, I think, for that gentleman too; the diſgrace would have been leſs, I believe, in the opinion of all mankind, than that which falls on him by his quitting the fort and garriſon in the manner he did, whilſt he bore the character of commanding officer in it; but the miſchief was, we could not have ſtopped here: the next gentleman in command to him had never ſeen any ſervice, and I am ſorry to ſay, demonſtrated his want of the moſt eſſential requiſites of a ſoldier. Had both theſe gentlemen been ſet aſide, and the next in command preferred to the commandantſhip, it would have promiſed a happier iſſue for them and us; and moſt aſſuredly, this was not a time to have regarded forms or ceremony. Remiſſneſs, or a deficiency of military knowledge in commanders, when coming to action, are equally fatal in their conſequences, and are ever the parents of neglects, confuſion and diſorders; and troops, I believe, are hardly ever known to do their duty, unleſs where they have an opinion of, as well as love for their commanders. That neither was the caſe, with regard to the two gentlemen

men above-mentioned, I believe the whole ſettlement can witneſs with me; and they were in no higher degree of eſteem with their ſubalterns than with their ſoldiers. The preferring Captain Buchanan, who was next in command to them, would have obviated all the diſadvantages we labour under in this particular; a gentleman whoſe character as a man, and a ſoldier, deſerved a better fate than the unhappy one which befel him, by the errors and miſconduct of others: the vacant companies would have been filled up with thoſe, we had good reaſon to think (and who indeed proved themſelves) brave officers.—The next in command to Captain Buchanan, in the battalion, would then have been Captain Grant; a gentleman who had, during his ſtay in the garriſon, remarkably exerted himſelf in every duty which could have been expected from him, and demonſtrated no want of either ſpirit or military ſkill, but much the contrary. The Captain of your train was a laborious, active officer, but confuſed; and would, I believe, have few objections to his character, diligence or conduct, had he been fortunate in having any commander in chief to have had a proper eye over him, and to take care that he did his duty. Here we had a fatal inſtance of a remiſſneſs in command; for that we had neither a ſufficiency of ammunition, &c. nor that good, was doubtleſs as much the fault of thoſe above him, (whoſe duty it was to have inſpected his conduct) as his; but as this poor gentleman fell a ſacrifice, as well to his own, as to the errors of others, they ſhould be touched as lightly as poſſible.

36th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, I have given you as faithful a picture of the commanders of your five companies as I can draw, or as I believe can be drawn by any body elſe: three of them, my wretched companions in the Black-hole, periſhed there,

there, as did alſo all your brave ſubalterns (Enſigns Walcot and Carſtairs excepted) where I will leave them, and proceed to conſider your troops in garriſon; conſiſting, as already mentioned in my letter of the 17th July, by the muſter-rolls laid before us, about the 6th or 8th of June, of 145 in battalion, and 45 of the train, officers included, and in both, only 60 Europeans. We were taught to believe, there were at all your ſubordinates, at leaſt 200 men, the beſt of our garriſon, viz. at Coſſimbuzar 100, at Dacca about 40, at Luckypore 30, and at Ballaſore about the ſame number; but it is certain the numbers there barely exceeded one hundred: Whether two hundred ought to have been there, I am not maſter enough of the ſubject to declare; ſo am obliged here to refer to your Preſident, for your further ſatisfaction; who (or in his abſence your ſecond) had always the inſpection of the rolls, and muſtering the men. Of theſe handful of troops in garriſon, there were not five that had ever, I believe, ſeen a muſket fired in anger. Had the militia of the place been (agreeably to your orders per Godolphin, anno 1751) regularly trained to arms, they might at this juncture have been a moſt ſeaſonable ſupply: but this eſſential regulation, I am ſorry to ſay, was totally neglected, ſo that when we came to action, there were hardly any amongſt the Armenians and Portugueſe inhabitants, and but few amongſt the European militia, who knew the right from the wrong end of their pieces. From the militia, about 65, chiefly Europeans, entered volunteers in the battalion, (moſt of them your own covenanted ſervants) in whoſe juſt praiſe, I can hardly ſay enough. They ſuſtained every hardſhip of duty, greatly beyond the military themſelves; their addreſs in the uſe of their arms was aſtoniſhing, the ſhort time there was to train them conſidered; and though their bravery

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may have been equalled, I am ſure it has not been exceeded, by any ſet of men whatſoever. A conſiderable body of theſe, were on the Saturday morning relieved from duty, and were gone on board the ſhips to depoſit their papers, or on other occaſions relative to their private affairs; as were likewiſe on the like call, many of the militia, with four of their officers, to wit, the reverend Mr. Mapletoft Captain-lieutenant, Captain Henry Wedderburn, Lieutenant of the firſt company, and Enſigns Sumner, and Charles Douglas, all of them gentlemen who had failed in no part of duty, either as officers or ſoldiers, in the defence of the place; ſo that there is no reaſon to doubt the veracity of their own aſſertions, in which they are joined by the volunteers: "That they had no "intention, but to return to the defence of the "place, until they ſaw your Preſident, Command-"ant Minchin, Captain Grant and Mr. Macket, "quit it (Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland "having quitted it before) and a general retreat "rumoured:" and indeed, immediately after, all means of returning were cut off from them, by the falling down of every ſhip, veſſel, and boat. Thus, Honourable Sirs, you ſee our garriſon, ſmall as it was, reduced and weakened, both in its ſtrength, officers and councils, in a very important degree, to the diſheartening thoſe who ſtayed, and encouragement of the enemy; and when it is conſidered, thoſe remaining, including officers, volunteers, ſoldiers and militia, did not exceed one hundred and ſeventy men; and that of thoſe there were twenty-five killed, and about ſeventy wounded, before noon the 20th, and the whole exhauſted of their ſtrength, by continual duty and action, and our people of the train reduced to fourteen only; it would not, I hope, have been wondered at, had we ſurrendered your fort without parley or capitu-

lation, though it is certain we ſhould not have ſurrendered ourſelves, had not our own people forced the weſtern gate during the parley; for having no dependance on the clemency of the enemy we had to deal with, we had meditated, in caſe the St. George with her boats failed us, the forcing a retreat that night, through the ſoutherly barrier by the river-ſide, and to have marched until we came under cover of the ſhips, then lying before Surman's gardens; imagining the enemy would be too much employed on the plunder of the fort, to have moleſted us greatly in our retreat.

37th. On the ſecond general head I ſhall have little to ſay. That we had not powder ſufficient, and that we had, not good; that we had hardly any ſhells fitted, or fuzees fitted to them; that there was hardly a carriage that would bear a gun; that the fifty fine cannon you ſent out three years ago, 18 and 24 pounders, lay neglected under your walls; and that we were deficient in almoſt every kind of military ſtores, are all truths, will not admit of any diſpute; but who is properly accountable for theſe defects, or under whoſe immediate care or inſpection they were, or ought to have been, muſt, Honourable Sirs, be determined by yourſelves.

38th. I am come now to my third and laſt general head, Our own errors; a ſubject, I am ſorry to declare, too fruitful of matter, though bearing great extenuation, when it is conſidered, we had in truth no military head to guide us; and that I may be as little tedious as poſſible, I will wave the rehearſal of our ſmaller errors, and keep to thoſe more capital ones, which variouſly, in my judgment, contributed to the loſs of your ſettlement, and were the cauſes of embarraſſing and preventing our general retreat, with the public and private effects depoſited in your fort; and I ſhall recite

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theſe in order of time as they happened, that if due heed be paid to them, the like misfortune may be avoided in future.

39th. Our firſt capital error was, the neglecting taking poſſeſſion of Tanner's Fort, on our proviſions being prohibited the ſettlement, and when there was no force or troops there to have oppoſed us; this meaſure in our firſt council of war, I moved and urged, with every argument in my power, ſhould be done with 25 or 30 men, and a party of Buxerries, and that a battery of ſix guns ſhould be immediately erected there towards the northward or land-ſide. In this motion I was ſtrongly ſeconded by Monſ. la Beaume, and I think Captain Grant only, and conſequently it was overruled. The utility I thought evident; it would have ſecured proviſions from the other ſide of the river, or the Suba muſt have divided his force; it would have ſecured the retreat of the ſhipping; it might have been a retreat to ourſelves, or if at laſt drove from it, we had it ſtill in our power to deſtroy it, in ſuch a manner as to have rendered it uſeleſs, and prevent its proving a troubleſome thorn in our ſides, which it may poſſibly yet be, if ever we advance again to retake your ſettlement, as our ſhips muſt paſs within almoſt piſtol-ſhot of it. The Gentlemen ſaw the utility of this meaſure too late; our ſhips were ſent down to attempt the poſſeſſion of it; a great deal of ammunition was fruitleſsly thrown away againſt it; our ſhips received much damage, and were obliged to make an inglorious retreat, to the no ſmall encouragement of the enemy and our diſgrace: and to ſum up all the misfortunes attending this error, our ſhips in their flight, with that part of the colony who left the fort, were, from the fire they were obliged to ſuſtain from this fort, and the little order obſerved amongſt themſelves, thrown into

ſuch confuſion that ſeveral ran a-ſhore, and ſome, the richeſt in the fleet, fell into the enemy's hands, and were plundered.

40th. Our ſecond capital error, with our ſmall and untrained garriſon, was, I conceive, raiſing the three advanced poſts and batteries to the northward, eaſtward, and ſouthward, and the gaol, which anſwered no purpoſe, but exhauſting, harraſſing, and deſtroying the few people we had. If we, in place of this meaſure, had kept our force more united, withdrawn Picard and his party from Baagbazar, and taken poſſeſſion with our muſquetry of the church, the Company's, Meſſrs. Cruttenden's, Eyres's, and Omychund's houſes, the enemy could not have approached us without infinite loſs, and with hardly any probability of ſucceſs. From theſe poſts, cloſe under the cover of our guns, our troops could hardly have been attacked, much leſs been diſlodged, as we had ſufficient proofs afterwards when the out-poſts were withdrawn; or if there had appeared a neceſſity of abandoning them, their retreat to the fort was ſecure; conſiderably leſs than half the troops ſtationed at the out-poſts would have been ſufficient for this ſervice, and this important conſequence had followed, a regular relief for duty, of which we had none, as things were unhappily conducted, nor would that infinite confuſion and diſorder in the fort have enſued, which did on withdrawing theſe batteries; the fort had been in a manner left defenceleſs for the ſupport of them, and little benefitted by the return of troops, fatigued and hardly able to ſtand. ——You have, Honourable Sirs, an exact plan of your ſettlement, and of every houſe in it, on inſpection of which, you will, at one view, ſee the inutility of theſe three principal out-poſts. That to the northward was erected to defend the paſs between the corner of Mr. Griffith's houſe and the river-

river-ſide, a precaution totally uſeleſs, as you will find Mr. Griffith's houſe, your ſalt-petre Godowns, and the whole ſtreet were commanded by the guns on the north-eaſt baſtion, within leſs than muſket-ſhot of your fort. That to the eaſt-ward, at the Court-houſe, you will find commanded by the battery over the eaſtern gate, and from the old and new ſouth-eaſt baſtions within muſket-ſhot. That to the ſouthward was not indeed commanded by any gun from the fort, but field-pieces advanced a few paces without your eaſtern gate, would not only have commanded that, but the other two principal avenues to the fort, if the battery on the gate, and the north-eaſt baſtion had not been deemed a ſufficient defence againſt the approach of the enemy; and had they advanced by the ditch to the ſouthward of the burying-ground, and up the avenue between that and my houſe, or penetrated through the burying-ground, we ſtill had nothing to apprehend from them, as the whole ſquare between the ſoutherly face of the fort and the hoſpital, and gate of the burying-ground, was commanded not only by the new ſouth-eaſt baſtion, but by ſeven four pounders on the new Godowns, and our ſmall arms from thence and the Company's houſe. Had the diſpoſition I have mentioned been made, and the walls of the Loll Baag and thoſe oppoſite the Company's houſe been levelled, it is more than probable the Suba at laſt would have been obliged to retreat with his army; for it is plain he had none with him capable of erecting any battery that could have hurt us, (that which did us moſt damage being our own 18 pounders turned againſt us from the Court-houſe) and with their ſmall arms, there was hardly a poſſibility of approaching near enough to have affected us.—My concluſions, Honourable Sirs, are on this head, the reſult of reaſon, and a late fatal experience, and not of art, for I am no

ſoldier; but I cannot help thinking ſuch would have been the ſalutary diſpoſition, had we been happy enough to have had a ſoldier at the head, or a chief commanding officer in any degree ſkilled in the art of defence; but, in place of it, lines were formed, which required ten times the number of men to defend: lucky we were in having an enemy who had as little ſkill and addreſs in the attack, as we in the defence, and much leſs reſolution, or on the night of the 16th or 17th, they might have entered at four different poſts, and cut off the retreat to the fort of each of the five advanced batteries (including Baagbazar and the gaol) for not a gun could have been fired to cover their retreat, but muſt have been equally levelled at our own troops as at the enemy. In the avenues between Meſſrs. Coale's and Omychund's houſes we ſunk a ditch and threw up a bank within, which poſt, for want of people, was truſted to the guard of four pykes only. The importance of this poſt will appear in a moment, (from the plan of your ſettlement before you) through which the enemy might have thrown ten thouſand men into the very center of our lines, before, or as ſoon as we could have known any thing of the matter. In the avenue north of the Court-houſe Tank or pond was another ditch ſunk, which, from the ſame cauſe, was little better defended than the former. From the ſouth-eaſt angle of the park, to the corner of Mr. Laſcell's houſe, was a third, defended by a corporal and ſix men. The fourth was at the entrance into the ſquare of the Leſſer Tank, Mr. Putham's houſe, and defended by a detachment from the ſouth advanced battery; at neither of theſe four intermediate poſts were planted a ſingle cannon, and they might have been forced in the night, without the loſs of ten men to the enemy, and the neglect of it coſt them ſome thouſands. I am the more

more particular on this ſubject, in proof of the error I have here cenſured, becauſe, from the plan before you, you will be convinced, that the forcing any one of them in the night, would have intercepted the retreat to the fort of the troops ſtationed at all the advanced batteries, and cauſed the immediate ſurrender of the fort; and points out, not only the danger and inutility of theſe batteries, but the impropriety of forming an extent of line we had not men to defend. And to compleat our blunders in engineering, a trench was ſunk thro' your park, from North to South, within little more than half muſket-ſhot of your baſtions, the earth of which proved (after the advanced batteries were withdrawn) a ſecure breaſt-work to the enemy, and from whence they did us the greateſt injury with their ſmall arms. We were, it is plain, engineers in theory only, with the additional misfortune, that thoſe in ſuperior command either had no judgment in the direction, or did not chuſe to ſhow it, whilſt others who had probably better, could not with propriety interfere; to which I may add, we had neither time for projection or execution; a ſtill further proof we ſhould have remained ſatisfied in occupying the houſes round us, and truſted to our fort only.

41ſt. A third error, and which I eſteem a capital one, was the neglecting to attack the rear of that body of troops which ſupported the enemy's 12 pounder, in the attack of the gaol the 18th. This body conſiſted of 5000 choſen men and officers. The troops that defended this poſt ſuſtained the enemy's attack for ſome time in the open road, before the gaol, with two field-pieces and their ſmall arms; but being entirely open to the enemy, and having ſome killed and ſeveral wounded, they were obliged at laſt to retreat under cover into the gaol with their field-pieces, having before prepared two

embrazures for them in the wall, which commanded the avenue through which the enemy was advancing, and the poſt was obſtinately and gallantly defended for a great while, under the command of Monſ. la Beaume and Enſign Carſtairs. During the attack of this poſt, and juſt after the troops retreated into the gaol, we projected at the center advanced battery, the attacking the enemy in the rear, with 25 or 30 men and two field-pieces, to be marched from the North battery, whilſt we advanced two more from our poſt, with all our infantry and militia, and joined the troops at the gaol to make one general ſally and attack on them in front, whilſt the detachment from the northward fell on the rear by order of Captain Clayton, who commanded at the center advanced battery. I wrote ſtrenuouſly to the Preſident, to let him know our intentions, and requeſted he would inſtantly order the detachment, with a couple of field-pieces, to advance into the middle road on the enemy's rear; to which we received anſwer, "That it was impoſſible, there "were not men to ſend." The error I cenſure on this incident, is the not ſufficiently conſidering the importance of it, and the troops that might have been without danger or inconvenience detached on this ſervice, had the North advanced battery been diveſted entirely of the muſketry ſtationed there, and with the volunteers ſent out, the poſt would have run no riſque, whilſt there remained only a ſingle officer, and people of the train ſufficient to attend the battery; or on the march of the detachment, (if it had been judged neceſſary) that battery might have been reinforced with a detachment of the militia from the fort, as ours at the center battery had been the 17th at night, under Enſign Charles Douglas, when Captain Clayton was ordered on a piquet of 50 men, to ſecure the retreat of Lieutenant Blagg, and the troops from Baagbazar; or ſome people might have been draughted

draughted off from the ſouth advanced battery, which had not once been (nor was likely to be) attacked: the misfortune of this neglect will beſt appear from the almoſt certain conſequences which would have attended the carrying it into execution. There was no impediment that could have obſtructed the detachment's arriving directly cloſe on the back of the enemy, who would have been between two fires, without hardly a poſſibility of a tithe of the whole body eſcaping a repulſe and ſlaughter, which, I am convinced, would have ſtruck ſuch a panick into the enemy, as, in all human probability, had obliged the Suba to have retreated, and dropt his deſigns againſt us.—Touching this error, I am far from blaming the Preſident; I only regret his misfortune of having no commanding military officer near him, who could have ſeen at firſt ſight, and convinced him of the important uſe this ſally would have been to the ſervice.

42d. The abandoning the center advanced battery, at the Court-houſe, has by ſome been aſſerted as the cauſe of the loſs of the fort, and conſequently comes under the head of our errors, and requires conſideration in the fourth place, the more ſo as I am convinced much ſtreſs will be laid on this cauſe, by thoſe who are totally ſtrangers to the ſituation of things at that battery, or the reaſons which made it needful to abandon it.—This poſt was commanded by Capt. Clayton as eldeſt Captain (next to the Commandant) myſelf as Captain of the firſt company of militia, was ſtationed under him. At this battery, with a detachment of the militia, we had on the whole, including officers, battalion volunteers, militia, and train, about 90 men and 15 Buxerries, two ſix pounders mounted on the battery, two field-pieces, and two 18 pounders,—From the moſt ſuperficial view of this poſt, it was evident, to any capacity, that the enemy

would never venture to make an open attack againſt it; our muſketry, for this reaſon, became uſeleſs at the battery; the manifeſt and only ſervice that could be made of them, was ſtationing them in the houſes round us which commanded the battery, and the leſſer avenues leading to it; but this very important ſtep not ſeeming to be attended to by Captain Clayton, myſelf, and Captain Henry Wedderburn my Lieutenant, took the liberty to repreſent to him, the utility and abſolute neceſſity of this meaſure. Piqued, I fear, that a thing ſo obvious did not occur to himſelf, he replied, there were not men enough; he would not weaken his poſt; though this moſt certainly was the only means of ſtrengthening it. As often as we urged it, he perſiſted in his error; the conſequence was natural; the enemy benefited by our neglect, took poſſeſſion of every houſe round us, and of the play-houſe alſo, after the gaol was abandoned in the afternoon, and from thence by half paſt four in the afternoon, were breaking out ſeveral loop-holes bearing on our battery. About this time the enemy had forced the paſs by Mr. Putham's houſe, and had got in multitudes within our lines; they had obliged the detachment from Captain Buchanan's poſt, under Lieutenant Blagg, to retreat to the South battery. They had alſo obliged the guard by Mr. Laſſell's houſe (which we from our poſt had reinforced with two Serjeants and 20 men) to retire, and were ſeemingly advancing to attack our poſt in flank, through the Lell Baag, and intercept our retreat; but having brought one of the 18 pounders to bear upon them, and ſweep the whole eaſterly ſide of the leſſer great Tank, we ſtopped their career with much ſlaughter; the fort at the ſame time keeping a warm firing upon them from the baſtions. Thus circumſtanced, Capt. Clayton ordered me (I think

about five in the afternoon) to go down to the fort, and repreſent the ſtate of the battery, and receive orders, whether the poſt ſhould be withdrawn or maintained. The orders were to withdraw it immediately, and ſpike up the cannon we could not bring off. I returned with theſe orders, and, to my aſtoniſhment, found the two 18 pounders, and one of the ſix pounders on the battery ſpiked up, and the poſt in ſuch confuſion as bars all deſcription. There was nothing could have prevented our bringing off the cannon, and making the moſt regular and ſoldier-like retreat, had we been commanded by an officer of reſolution and judgment; but as it was, our retreat had more the appearance of a confuſed rout, bringing off only one field-piece, and the cannon ſpiked with ſo little art, that they were eaſily drilled and turned againſt us. The orders for withdrawing this poſt circumſtanced as it then was, carried the utmoſt propriety with it (the enemy having then made lodgments in the theatre and houſes cloſe round us) for though with our cannon and cohorn ſhells advanced without the battery, we diſlodged the enemy from two of the houſes, to wit, Mr. Bourchier's, and that formerly belonging to Mr. Twiſs; yet, in an hour more, not a man could have appeared on the battery, or ſtirred in or out of the Court-houſe, without being a dead-mark to the enemy; to ſay nothing to our people's having been needleſsly fatigued and harraſſed, to ſuch a degree, that I believe, in two hours more not a man of us would have had ſtrength enough to have walked to the fort. On the orders being iſſued for abandoning our poſt, precipitate orders were ſent to Captain Buchanan, and Captain-lieutenant Smith, immediately to withdraw from the other two advanced batteries, and ſpike up their cannon. The reaſon pleaded and urged in defence of this haſty ſtep,

was

was the abſolute neceſſity of doing it as ſoon as the center battery was withdrawn. To this I am obliged to object, as a reaſon very inſufficient: if any reaſons at all ſubſiſted, for their being erected and maintained prior to the withdrawing the center battery, they ſubſiſted as much, if not more, afterwards; at leaſt, there was no cauſe in nature for the order for ſpiking up the cannon. The South advanced battery had never been attacked, the northerly had, in the morning, and repulſed the enemy; the only circumſtance to be apprehended, was the retreat of the troops being cut off, which was eaſily guarded againſt, as we knew the enemy was within our lines. A reſerve battery had been thrown up acroſs the principal ſouth avenue, juſt oppoſite to the Company's houſe, and cloſe under the cover of the guns from the two ſoutherly baſtions, with intention that Captain Buchanan's command ſhould retire to it with its cannon, in caſe he was obliged to retire from the advanced battery at the bridge; but this was never thought of. At this reſerve battery they could not be attacked, without infinite loſs to the enemy; nor flanked from the entrenchment cut through the park or Loll Baag, which, in its whole length, was ſcoured by our ſmall arms from the church; that and Mr. Eyre's houſe being taken poſſeſſion of on abandoning the center battery, which likewiſe ſecured the retreat of Captain-lieutenant Smith's command; ſo that there could be no reaſon of quitting either of theſe poſts in the precipitate manner they did, which was the cauſe of infinite confuſion amongſt ourſelves, and of no ſmall encouragement to the enemy, and proves a ſupport to the cenſure I think I have juſtly paſſed on our ſecond capital error, that it had been a happy incident if theſe out-poſts had never been thought of. I muſt not quit this ſubject, without doing particular juſtice to Lieutenant Blagg

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and ten of our volunteers, (eight of them your covenanted ſervants) viz. Meſſrs. Law, Ellis, Took, N. Drake, Charles Smith, Wilkinſon, Dodd, Knapton, William Parker and Macpherſon; theſe Gentlemen were detached from Captain Buchanan's poſt, to ſuſtain a Serjeant and 16 men poſted in Mr. Goddard's houſe, to defend the poſt at Mr. Putham's, and threw themſelves into Captain Minchin's houſe, from the top of which they made a great ſlaughter of the enemy; and when that poſt was forced, the Serjeant and his men made a precipitate retreat to the battery, without once thinking of the Gentlemen poſted at Captain Minchin's, where theſe had a long and bloody conflict with a number of the enemy, moſt unequal, and at laſt forced a retreat, glorious to themſelves, but with the loſs of two of their ſmall detachment, viz. Meſſrs. Smith and Wilkinſon, who by miſtake were ſeparated from the body; the firſt refuſed quarter, and killed five of the enemy before he fell; the other called for quarter, but was denied it, and cut to pieces.

43d. I have now brought you, Honourable Sirs, to the fifth and laſt act of our tragedy of errors, which brought on as fatal and melancholy a cataſtrophe, I believe, as ever the annals of any people, or colony of people, ſuffered ſince the days of Adam; to wit, the Governor, Meſſ. Manningham, Frankland, Macket, the principal officers, and a conſiderable part of the colony, abandoning your fort, effects and garriſon, with the ſhips and veſſels, whereby the retreat of thoſe who remained was to all intents and purpoſes cut off, to the number of about 170 perſons, and left a ſacrifice to an exaſperated and mercileſs enemy; amongſt thoſe four of your council, a great number of your principal and valuable covenanted ſervants, three military Captains, ſeveral Commanders of ſhips, eight or

nine

nine commiſſioned officers, many of the principal inhabitants, and others. Our proceedings in this diſtreſsful ſituation, I have in few words ſummed up in my letter of the 17th July from the capital of the province, which I beg leave to repeat here, leſt that letter by any accident ſhould not have reached you. "Mr. Pearke's waving his right of ſeniority, he, and the gentlemen in council, with the unanimous approval of the gentlemen in the ſervice, the garriſon and inhabitants, elected me their Governor and Adminiſtrator of your affairs during the troubles, and ſuſpended your Preſident, and Meſſrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket, from your ſervice, for their breach of truſt; as alſo the military officers who accompanied them." In my letter above referred to, I indiſcriminately blamed the whole who had left us, in which I may well be excuſed, for I had it not then in my power to make the juſt diſtinctions and exceptions I have here already done; for, in truth, it can be incumbent only on your Governor, and Commander in Chief, and the Gentlemen of Council, and the officers who accompanied him in this defection, to vindicate, if poſſible, this piece of conduct; nor can it be wondered at, that thoſe neither in truſt nor command, ſhould quit a cauſe, where thoſe who bore the higheſt diſtinctions in both, deſerted it: That the fort was not tenable, is a truth cannot be contradicted, any more than that a general retreat, with all its effects public and private, might, with eaſe, have been effected, had thoſe on whom it reſted done their duty. When I mention a general retreat, I would be underſtood to mean no more than the European inhabitants, the garriſon and their families; as for the multitudes of others that were (by an infatuation not to be accounted for) admitted into the fort, to the number of 6000 at leaſt, they muſt have been

abandoned;

abandoned; they would have ſuffered nothing by being left behind, and would have cauſed much embarraſſment and diſtreſs to the whole by being embarked. As I have before done juſtice to the officers of militia and others, who were embarked without (I am convinced) having any intention of abandoning the fort, I muſt in this place likewiſe render juſtice, to the beſt of my knowledge and information, to the character of one of your Board, Mr. William Mackett: This gentleman had the command of the ſecond company of militia, and went to ſee his lady (and children) on board the Dodaly the 18th at night, where he left her dangerouſly ill about 11, and returned to the fort, though the ſtrongeſt perſuaſions, I am well informed, were uſed to detain him on board. Could any conſideration or plea have been prevalent enough to ſhake that of honour, the ſituation of this gentleman's family, joined to thoſe perſuaſions, would have determined his ſtay; but he returned to the duty his honour called him to, and with the conſent and approbation of Mrs. Mackett. Early on the morning of the 19th, the Preſident, Mr. Mackett, the Reverend Mr. Mapletoft, myſelf and others, were employed in cutting open the bales of cotton, and filling it in bags, to carry upon the parapets; then (I recollect) Mr. Mackett intimated to me the unhappy condition he left his lady in the preceding night, and expreſſed his deſire and intention to ſtep on board for five minutes, to ſee her: That this was the ſole motive of his going, without any deſign of abandoning the fort, I am convinced of; and is, I think, proved by the whole of his behaviour during the ſiege, and his return to the fort from the Dodaly the preceding night. With equal pleaſure I would embrace any, even probable, appearance to juſtify the conduct of your other ſervants in higher truſt; againſt whom,

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I with more real concern ſay, the charge lies too heavy and obvious to admit of extenuation. The proof, and ſupporting this charge, I could wiſh a taſk impoſed on any body elſe; but unluckily, none but myſelf is equal to it, as none can be ſo well acquainted with the circumſtances attending it; and however galling the remembrance of my own chains, ſufferings and loſſes may be, they ſhall not influence me to deviate from truth, though ſuch remembrance may urge me to terms of ſeeming bitterneſs, hardly unavoidable, when thoſe ſufferings can be attributed to nought but the unaccountable conduct I am now impeaching—a conduct which (however palliated by a thouſand frivolous reaſons) will juſtly lay your Preſident and Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland open to the cenſure of breach of truſt, of the higheſt imprudence and inconſiſtence, and prove them ſtrangers to the very dictates of humanity.

44th. In what degree either of the above-named gentlemen may appear leſs culpable than the others, or really are ſo, is not my buſineſs to determine; this, Honourable Sirs, I will leave to your judgments and ſentence, whilſt I give you as faithful a ſtatement of the facts, as in my power; that Meſſ. Manningham and Frankland's falling down from the fort with the Dodaly, and refuſing to return to it, and join our Councils the night of the 18th, though more than once ſummoned to it by your Preſident, were the primary cauſes of all the confuſion that enſued, will, I think, hardly admit of conteſt: The defence theſe Gentlemen make to exculpate themſelves, ſtands on the face of the Fulta conſultations of the 14th of July laſt, and is replied to by me, on my return from Balliſore, in a letter to the Board at Fulta, under date the 25th of October laſt, a copy of which I hereunto annex; the departure of the Dodaly (of which thoſe gentlemen were

were part owners) and their refuſal to return, were the cauſe of jealouſies and fears, which otherwiſe would never have exiſted; and the garriſon were well vindicated in their concluſions, that when gentlemen, who bore the moſt diſtinguiſhed characters both civil and military, had quitted and refuſed to return to their truſt, and duty, every man was providing for himſelf the beſt he could. The Captain of the Dodaly exculpates himſelf, by producing from your Preſident an order of the 15th of June, purporting, that he ſhould obey all ſuch orders as he ſhould receive from himſelf or Mr. Manningham; and theſe Gentlemen take the advantage of this order, to prove their power, and extenuate their departing with the ſhip; a power which devolved to Mr. Manningham for quite another purpoſe, and cannot be wreſted, with either truth or propriety, to the purpoſe it is now produced to ſerve, as your Preſident can well witneſs. The inſpection and neceſſary orders to be iſſued in matters relative to the Marine, was offered and undertaken by Mr. Manningham, to eaſe the Preſident, and not with the intention that he ſhould be thereby impowered to diſtreſs him and the garriſon with the defection of that ſhip, and of quitting a truſt which opened the way, and was, I believe, in ſome meaſure, the cauſe of your Preſident's quitting his truſt alſo on the ſucceeding morning, though I offer it not in ſufficient vindication of a conduct not to be vindicated in one who bore the character of governor and commander in chief of your fort and garriſon. That things were in the utmoſt confuſion I admit; that no proper order, rule or command was obſerved, is moſt true; that the proceedings of Meſſ. Manningham and Frankland were ſuſpicious and alarming, I grant; but on whom will all this reflect and recoil? Had, on the firſt refuſal theſe gentlemen

men made to join our councils at this important juncture, the ſhip been remanded back, under the cover of our guns, and a detachment ſent to bring them to their duty, in place of their being ſuffered to wait for one to defend the ſhip from the hazard they themſelves had brought her into, without orders or knowledge of any one in the garriſon, the meaſure would have ſpoke the governor and commander in chief; a thouſand miſchiefs had been avoided, nor he himſelf reduced the next day to the unhappy dilemma which at laſt ended in his following their example, to the deſtruction of thoſe left behind; and with the knowledge, that neither the Company's treaſure, books, or eſſential papers were embarked, no more than the immenſe property then depoſited in the fort, conſiſting of your own effects and of a multitude of others, left miſerable and indigent by the deſertion; in having all means cut off from them of ſaving it, and with thoſe very ſhips that were employed and detained for its preſervation. Fortitude is not given to every one; and I may moſt juſtly plead excuſe for any failure ariſing from our want of military knowledge; it could not be expected from us, but every act of common prudence will: If the lives of ſo many brave and valuable men, who periſhed by this conduct, merited no regard, the gentlemen's own ſupport with their Employers depended on their having a regard to their effects entruſted to their charge; as treaſurers, it was incumbent chiefly on them to ſee that the treaſure was embarked; this was a meaſure judged eligible in a Council of War, before the fort was judged not tenable, and ſure ought immediately to have been carried into execution. That Cooleys could not be obtained to carry that and the Company's books off, as alledged on the face of the Fulta conſultations, muſt appear to every body then in garriſon, and indeed to the whole world, a

pretence

pretence to palliate a needleſs pannic, diſorder and neglect. That money and effects were that night embarked, is a truth known to every body; and on ſuppoſition there was not a Cooley in the fort, a ſingle Topaz could have embarked the laſt year's books, the conſultations and eſſential papers. But it muſt appear a fact beyond contradiction, that theſe, and every thing elſe, were ſacrificed and abandoned to the conſideration of theſe gentlemen's own ſafety; though that no ways endangered, but from the ſteps taken to ſecure it; for had we been joined in our councils, and the ſhips continued under the protection of our guns, or brought back, and any the leaſt command exerted, we had it in our power to leave the Suba the bare walls of your fort only, without a gun in it that would have been of any uſe to him, or injury to us or the ſhipping. Had we remained united in our force, and proper ſpirit ſhewn, and examples made, what could have been apprehended from a few drunken Dutch ſoldiers, or a few ſeditions among the rabble of the militia; the Preſident, council, officers, gentlemen in the ſervice, volunteers, and principal inhabitants, were ſurely more than equal to quell any tumult that could have been raiſed by thoſe, to have obſtructed an orderly retreat with every thing of value depoſited in the fort. Had this been done with proper coolneſs and reſolution, and the whole colony proceeded as early in Auguſt as the fleet could puſh out to Fort St. George, with the effects, public and private, immenſe had been the gain to both; there proper meaſures might have been expeditiouſly conſulted and adopted, for the re-eſtabliſhment of the ſettlement; and the remains of our ſhattered and diſtreſſed colony would have found repoſe and ſhelter: this ſtep would have been eligible, even in the wretched circumſtances they retired; but the misfortune is,

errors are fruitful, and generally beget one another; the pannic which ſeized the gentlemen in command, never loſt its influence; the little ſaved was, in the general confuſion, loſt at Tanners and Buzbudgea: and in place of continuing their rout to Fort St. George, the alternative of reſiding at Fulta was determined on, and ſuch advices forwarded to that preſidency by Mr. Manningham, as made it a caſe of neceſſity to remain there, under ſuch diſadvantages and diſtreſſes as I believe hardly ever a wretched people laboured, and at an immenſe expence to yourſelves in ſupporting the colony, and freight of ſhips for their reception and defence; part of your expence, indeed, daily leſſened, by the multitude of deaths here, which has proved a grave to a large portion of the colony, and to more than half the detachment and officers, ſent under Major Kilpatrick; all which might have been avoided by a prudent procedure to Madraſs, as above. Why this was not done, in preference to the advices ſent, and our miſerable reſidence here, I am a ſtranger, and have not yet received or heard one tolerable reaſon to ſupport the meaſure. It has been alledged, the quitting the river would have been giving up the cauſe; had this been done, it would have been only giving up a cauſe already loſt; and which they themſelves had firſt abandoned: the fleet's quitting the river, would have lulled the enemy into a ſecurity which would greatly have facilitated the retaking your ſettlement; whereas our reſidence in it has kept them on the alarm, and preparations are made for the defence of it, which probably would never have been thought of. Nor is it poſſible, in my conception, to account for this ſtrange perſeverance in miſery, and heavy charge to yourſelves, but from two motives, which ſwayed the councils of thoſe gentlemen who had quitted your fort, garriſon and

effects,

effects, whilſt they bore the characters of command in it. Conſcious and ſelf-convicted of a conduct not to be vindicated, it became neceſſary that one of their own body ſhould be diſpatched to give the firſt impreſſion of it; had they proceeded with the colony, a hundred mouths would have been open to report their conduct as well as their own. This, Honourable Sirs, muſt, I think, have been the principle they acted on, to allow them the ſhadow of conſiſtence; if the gentlemen ſupport their remaining in the river from other even probable reaſons, I will be the firſt to retract my ſentiments; not my ſentiments alone, but that of near the whole colony. More, I think, I need not ſay in ſupport of my charge againſt theſe gentlemen; that they juſtly incur the cenſure of breach of truſt, have acted with the greateſt imprudence, and been conſiſtent in nothing but errors, from the firſt moment they meditated abandoning your fort in the manner they did; it remains only that I prove they might ſafely have retrieved this unhappy ſtep, by a return to it with all the ſhips, and that, by this neglect, they not only further merit the cenſure I have already paſſed on them, but that of being ſtrangers alſo to the very dictates of humanity.

45th. The Dodaly (with Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland) and ſome other veſſels, fell down the river the 18th at night. Your Preſident, with the reſt of the ſhips, veſſels and boats, followed them the 19th, about nine in the forenoon: they lay in ſight of our fort, and flag flying, until the 20th. About 11 in the forenoon, we ſaw the St. George, our laſt reſource, was a-ground, and could not come down to our ſuccour, and heard us engaged with the enemy during all this period.—They knew the deſperate ſtate they had left and abandoned us in, without all poſſibility or means to eſcape or retreat; and this their own doing: They

were ſenſible, we had not ammunition to defend the fort two days, or, if we had, that our ſtrength, with continued fatigue, watching, and action, was exhauſted, and that we were reduced to the wretched alternative of either ſacrificing our lives, by reſolving to die ſword in hand, or ſurrender ourſelves to an enraged and mercileſs enemy; and yet neither ſhips, veſſel, or boat, were ſent to favour our retreat, enquire what was our fate, or whether we exiſted, or had periſhed. To palliate this, (I believe, unequalled inhumanity) the danger of returning with the ſhips has been, I hear, alledged. —Capt. Grant, in his letter to us, in vindication of himſelf, the 20th Auguſt, aſſerts, he more than once urged your Preſident to move up with all the ſhips and ſloops before the fort, once in the preſence of Capt. Young, Commander of the Dodaly, who repreſented it as a dangerous attempt. I ſubmit it to you, Honourable Sirs, to determine, whether your Preſident ought to have remained ſatisfied with an anſwer of this kind, or whether the ſhips would have run greater riſk in moving up to the fort, than they did in moving down from it; or if there actually had been danger in the attempt, of which there was not even the ſhadow, whilſt we remained in poſſeſſion of the fort, was the preſervation of ſo many brave and valuable men as were cooped up in it, with your treaſure, effects, books, &c. of ſuch ſmall eſtimation with gentlemen, as not to merit one attempt to retrieve them, though even this attempt had been attended with danger? But it has been urged, that they were at no certainty whether we were in poſſeſſion of the fort, or not; and by ſome conjectured, that we had ſurrendered, or the place had been taken by aſſault, and that the flag was only kept flying by the enemy to decoy the fleet back.—But if theſe were the doubts that actuated them, why did they not ſatisfy themſelves?

A ſingle

A ſingle ſloop or boat ſent up the night of the 19th, might have hailed us from the baſtions, without riſk, even if the place had been in poſſeſſion of the enemy, the contrary of which they would have been aſcertained of, and the fleet might have moved up that night. This motion would have put freſh ſpirits into us, and given diſmay to the enemy, already not a little diſheartened by the numbers ſlain in the day when diſlodged from the houſes round us, and otherwiſe, particularly by our ſhells and cannon at Lady Ruſſell's and the Court-houſe. Had the ſhips moved up, and our forces reunited, and part of the ammunition on board them been diſembarked for the ſervice of the fort, the Suba might at laſt have been obliged to retreat with his army, or at worſt the effects might have been ſhipped off the 20th, even in the face of the enemy, without their having power to obſtruct it, and a general retreat made of the whole garriſon, as glorious to ourſelves, all circumſtances conſidered, as a victory would have been; the Gentlemen would then have found a plan ready formed, to the minuteſt circumſtance, for a general retreat, that would have been attended with no diſorder, confuſion, or difficulty, if proper reſolution and command had appeared: Had your Preſident, as was incumbent on him, hoiſted his flag on board the Dodaly, of which he was likewiſe part owner, and moved up even the 20th, not a man or veſſel but would have followed him, and he would then have been early enough to have given a new face to things; but, in place of that, he rendered himſelf totally inexcuſable, by not only quitting us himſelf, but in telling others, and amongſt them ſome of the Officers of the Militia then on board the Dodaly, That the retreat was general; thereby cooling the reſolutions and endeavours of thoſe who were returning to us, and had never once

entertained a thought of quitting the fort. The want of boats has been another cauſe alledged for a general retreat not being practicable. Were there any grounds for this aſſertion, where did the fault lie? Though there might have been few boats at the Crane Gat, when the Preſident went off, yet it is a known truth, that the wharfs to the right and left were lined with them, and that not one of them ſtirred from the ſhore, until immediately after he put off, when they all rowed acroſs the river, moſt of them with grain on board; and this deſertion occaſioned by neglect of the obvious meaſure of having a ſufficient guard over them. But to obviate every excuſe that can poſſibly be urged againſt the facility with which we could have made the retreat general, I will ſuppoſe there had not a country-boat exiſted, thoſe belonging to the ſhips, and the ſmall craft, brought cloſe in ſhore, would have been amply ſufficient to have embarked the effects, garriſon, and their families, which we had not at all deſpaired of effecting, even with the Saint George's three or four boats, (had ſhe happily come down to our ſuccour) and the aſſiſtance of Captain Witherington's pinnace, then lying at the Crane. But, in ſhort, Honourable Sirs, it is not to be wondered at, that, in a panick ſuch as evidently poſſeſſed thoſe in the chief command and direction, means the moſt obvious ſhould either not occur, or be neglected; nor that handles, the moſt weak and improbable, ſhould be laid hold of, to extenuate the conduct reſulting from it: As ſuch I think myſelf juſtified, in treating every reaſon advanced in vindication of theſe gentlemen quitting the fort in the manner they did, and not returning, when it was ſo demonſtrably in their power, and thereby loſing the means of ſaving your treaſure, books, and effects; of preſerving the lives of the many gallant worthy men, who periſhed in their

defence, and thus fell a ſacrifice; of preventing the tears of the fatherleſs children and widows, left deſtitute and unhappy, as well as thoſe of the many parents and relations, deprived thus of the ornaments of their families, in the miſerable deaths of a number of the moſt promiſing youths you ever had in your ſervice; and laſtly, of ſaving myſelf, and others, your faithful ſervants, from chains, ſhame, and impriſonment, with other diſtreſſes and ſufferings hardly to be deſcribed.

46th. This ſubject, Honourable Sirs, diſagreeable as it is, I muſt not quit, without ſpeaking to an aſperſion which has been ſpread in the fleet, and I doubt not elſewhere, that, "thoſe who "were left behind, and ſome of the principal of "them intended going, had not the means of do-"ing it been cut off from them, and ſo made a "virtue of neceſſity." This aſſertion I will venture to term bold as well as baſe, being founded on the conjecture only of ſome, with impotent hopes to reduce others on a level with themſelves; the intentions of the heart are impenetrable but to the breaſt it dwells in, therefore I can only ſay, I ſolemnly believe that not a man left in the fort had any intention or deſign of quitting it, but in a general retreat, nor could ought be diſcovered in their behaviour, that either did then or could ſince give me cauſe to alter my ſentiments. As to myſelf, againſt whom I don't queſtion but this ſlander is chiefly aimed; it has alſo been as audaciouſly ſaid, that I was not only privy to your Preſident's going away, but was to have gone with him; of both he has honourably and publickly acquitted me; my knowing myſelf free from this ſcandalous imputation of intending to quit your fort (otherwiſe than in a general retreat) is not enough, it is my duty to convince my Honourable Maſters likewiſe, that ſuch could not be my deſign; if it had,

my motives were ſuperior, the means equally in my power, and the reflection leſs in proportion to the leſs command and truſt inveſted in me. Theſe gentlemen declare they embarked no private effects belonging either to themſelves or conſtituents. The Diligence Snow then lying at my Gat, I ſent orders the 18th afternoon from the outer battery, to embark my caſh, plate, eſſential papers, and ſome jewels, in all to the value of about fifty to fifty-two thouſand Arcot Rupees, which was done by my own people, my ſervants having before brought me word every Cooley in the ſettlement was employed in emptying the rice boats at the factory, ſo that they could not get people to carry them to the fort, where moſt people's valuable effects were depoſited; my Godowns being unfortunately full of heavy and cumberſome goods, there was no poſſibility of embarking them, or depoſiting them in the fort, and my houſe ſo far detached as ſurely to be one of the firſt poſſeſſed and plundered by the enemy, which ſo happened.—Had my intention been to abandon the ſettlement, the temptation was great, and ſtill greater, as the whole remains of my fortune then in Calcutta were embarked, the means in my own hands, the veſſel under no command but my own, without any poſſibility of my being obſtructed the whole night of the 18th, or the morning of the 19th. If ſuch had been my deſign, I might have laid hold of the pretence to accompany Mrs. Drake, and the ladies embarked on board the Diligence, about eleven the night of the 18th, or afterwards, when I requeſted and ſent Monſieur Le Beaume, with three of my ſervants to embark on board that veſſel, for the greater ſecurity of her and the ladies. Such were the opportunities, and ſuch were the temptations I had to have quitted your fort, but the thought never entered my breaſt, nor of any one elſe, with the

the certainty of the retreat being general the ſucceeding night; and that I neither did go, nor had a ſentiment that tended to it, I am ſtill happy in; and notwithſtanding all my ſufferings; and with this reflection, that had I gone, I had in all human probability ſaved the above remains of my fortune, which fell a prey to the enemy the 21ſt, at Buzbudgee, without any one friendly, humane, or ſalutary ſtep being taken by the fleet or thoſe who commanded in it to preſerve the Snow: The officer on board, having weighed in the general rout, and accompanied the other ſhips without my orders or knowledge. As to our having "made a "virtue of neceſſity," theſe gentlemen ſhould be the laſt to reproach us, or take advantage even in expreſſion of the neceſſity they had reduced us to; that any has aſſumed a virtue from it, I do not believe; we did our duty and no more, in defending your property as long as was in our power, which certainly is a virtue comparatively conſidered, with reſpect to thoſe who did not do ſo.

47th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, I have with ſtrict truth to the utmoſt of my knowledge and remembrance, traced out and laid before you, the cauſes and various capital errors, which occaſioned the loſs of your Preſidency and ſettlements in theſe provinces. Neceſſary as it has been, I am ſenſible by what I feel myſelf on this ſubject, how unpleaſing to you, therefore will not give you further pain, than in the addition of a few lines, explaining the manner your fort was taken, on which I find I have in my letters from Muxadabad and Hougly been rather too ſhort.

48th. Having been preſſed at different times on the 20th, by the gentlemen of council and others, to throw out a flag of truce, I oppoſed it as much as poſſible, foreſeeing the little utility would ariſe from it, conſidering the enemy we had to deal with,

and

and that they were as perfectly acquainted with our diſtreſſed ſituation, as we ourſelves; however, to quiet the minds of every body as much as in my power, I cauſed a letter to be wrote the 20th, early in the morning, by Omychund, who was left a priſoner in the fort, to Raja Monick Chund, to the following purport. "That, as he and his "houſe had always been a friend and tenant to the "Engliſh, we hoped to experience it on this occa- "ſion, and that he would uſe his influence with "the Suba, to order his troops to ceaſe hoſtilities; "that we were ready to obey his commands, and "perſiſted only in defending the fort, in preſer- "vation of our lives and honours." At this period I was at no certainty of the Suba's being at the ſiege in perſon, and all the hopes I had from this letter, or a flag of truce, was to amuſe them until the St. George came down, and that we might have the night to make our general retreat in. About noon, as I before obſerved, the enemy were repulſed from the attacks they made this day to the northward, and a ceſſation on both ſides enſued for more than two hours, and not one of the enemy to be ſeen; the gentlemen of council, officers and inhabitants, ſtill preſſing me, I was prevailed on to conſent to a flag of truce being thrown out before dark. About four in the afternoon, word was brought me that one of the enemy was advancing with a flag in his hand, and called to ceaſe firing, and that we ſhould have quarter if we ſurrendered: this was judged a favourable juncture to anſwer it with a flag of truce; accordingly I repaired with the flag on the original S. E. Baſtion, where Captain Buchanan was then poſted, and ordered firing to ceaſe. I had a letter prepared with me, addreſſed to Roy Doolub, general of his forces, importing an overture to ceaſe hoſtilities, till the Suba could be wrote to, and his pleaſure known. This

letter

letter I threw over the ramparts, and hoiſted the flag of truce on the baſtion; the letter was taken up by the perſon who advanced with the flag, who retired with it: ſoon after, multitudes of the enemy came out of their hiding places round us, and flocked under the walls; a ſhort parly enſued, I demanded a truce to hoſtilities, until the Suba's pleaſure could be known; to which I was anſwered by one of his officers from below, that the Suba was there, and his pleaſure was that we ſhould immediately ſtrike our colours and ſurrender the fort, and ourſelves, and that we ſhould have quarter. I was going to reply, when at that inſtant Mr. William Bailie, ſtanding near me, was ſlightly wounded by a muſket ball from the enemy, on the ſide of his head, and word was brought me that they were attempting to force the S. W. barrier, and were cutting at the eaſtern gate. On being aſcertained of this, I ordered Captain Buchanan to point a cannon from the Baſtion, which flanked the eaſtern curtain, and told them to withdraw from the walls, or I would inſtantly fire amongſt them; they withdrew, and I immediately took down the flag of truce, and ſtept to the parade to iſſue orders for a general diſcharge of our cannon and ſmall arms. The moment I arrived there, Captain Dickſon, (who now commands the Lively Grabb, at preſent in your ſervice) and juſt after him Enſign Walcot came running to me, and told me the weſtern gate was forced by our own people and betrayed. I inſtantly ſent Enſign Walcot with orders to ſee if there was no poſſibility of ſecuring it again; he returned and told me it was impoſſible, for the locks and bolts were forced off. On this I returned to Captain Buchanan's poſt, and found ſome of the enemies colours planted on the baſtion. I aſked him how he came to ſuffer it; he replied he found farther reſiſtance was in vain, for that the moment

moment I had left him, advice was brought him of the weſtern gate being betrayed, and turning myſelf I ſaw below multitudes of the enemy, who had entered that way, and others who had ſcaled by the S. W. baſtion, and the new Godowns, that baſtion and the barrier, as I afterwards learnt, having been deſerted the time the weſtern gate was forced. To the firſt Jemmautdaar who ſcaled at the S. W. baſtion I advanced, and delivered my piſtols; he told me to order inſtantly our colours to be cut down; I replied, I would give no ſuch orders, they were maſters of the fort, and might order it themſelves; he demanded my ſword, I refuſed delivering it, but in preſence of the Suba, on which the Jemmautdaar carried me round the ramparts, oppoſite to where the Suba was below, without the walls, from thence I made him the cuſtomary Salaam, and delivered my ſword to his Jemmautdaar; the Suba from his litter returned my Salaam, and moved round to the northward, and entered the fort by the ſmall weſtern gate. I had three interviews with him that evening, one in Durbar. At firſt he expreſſed much reſentment at our preſumption, in defending the fort againſt his army with ſo few men, aſked why I did not run away with my Governor, &c. ſeemed much diſappointed and diſſatisfied at the ſum found in the treaſury, aſked me many queſtions on this ſubject, to all which I made the beſt reply that occurred; and on the concluſion he aſſured me on the word of a ſoldier, that no harm ſhould come to me, which he repeated more than once. The conſequence proved how little regard was paid to this aſſurance, for I was with the reſt of my fellow ſufferers, about eight at night, crammed into the Black-Hole Priſon, and paſt a night of horrors I will not attempt to deſcribe, as they bar all deſcriptions. On the enſuing morning, (the 21ſt of June) I was taken

out

out from amongſt the dead, and again carried before the Suba, more dead than alive; he ſeemed little affected when I told him the miſerable cataſtrophe of my companions; he anſwered me, by ſaying, he was well informed there was an immenſe treaſure buried or ſecreted in the fort, and that I was privy to it, and commanded me to point out where it was hid, if I expected favour (one of his Jemmautdaars had told me on the way the cauſe of my being ſent for, and adviſed me to make a full diſcovery, or that I ſhould be ſhot off from the mouth of a cannon the next half hour.) I urged every thing poſſible againſt the information he had received, or that if ſuch a thing had been done, I was totally a ſtranger to it; but all I could ſay ſeemed to gain no credit with the Suba, who ordered me a priſoner, under charge of one of his generals, Mhir Modun, and with me Meſſrs. Court, Walcot and Burdet, as intimated in my letter from Muxadabad, to which letter I beg leave to refer for the account of our ſubſequent ſufferings, and to ſubſcribe myſelf, with the moſt perfect reſpect and duty,

Honourable Sirs,

Your ever faithful

Fulta, Nov. 30th, 1756. and obedient humble ſervant.

Mr. HOLWELL's *Minute and Diſſent in Council, the* 20*th of* Auguſt, 1756, *at* Fulta, *referred to in the preceding letter of the* 25*th* October.

MR. Holwell obſerves that we have a bill before us, amounting to Arcot Rupees 64662 8 Annaes, on account of expences and damages of ſhip Dodaly, commencing 9th of June, 1756. —— He further remarks, that the charge of this ſhip is founded on her being taken up for the defence of the Company's fort, effects,

effects, and ſettlement; but that ſhe abandoned ſuch defence, by falling down from the fort and ſettlement, without orders, the 18th of June at night; to which he cannot help attributing all the misfortunes which enſued.—He therefore diſſents to any payment or conſideration being made by the Honourable Company, on account of her expence, loſs or damage charged in the ſaid bill, except for proviſions, &c. for the uſe of the Company's ſervants on board.

Mr. HOLWELL's *Minute on the* Fulta *Conſultations, at his firſt joining the Agency at that place.*

Fulta, 13th Auguſt, 1756.

CAPTAIN Dugald Campbell's commiſſion being tendered to Mr. Holwell to ſign, he refuſed the ſame, and requeſted the gentlemen would pleaſe to excuſe his not ſigning that, or any other paper whatſoever, in the preſent ſtate of the government affairs, for the following reaſons:

1ſt. He conceives that when the Honourable the late Preſident, and Meſſrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket abandoned the fort and garriſon of Fort William the 18th and 19th of June laſt, and quitted the defence of theſe and the Honourable Company's effects, they did, by ſuch act, to all intents and purpoſes, diveſt themſelves of all right or pretenſions to the future government of the Company's affairs, or the colony.

2dly. That on the ſaid abdication of the Honourable the late Preſident, and Meſſrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket, the remaining gentlemen of Council (the only government then ſubſiſting) did, with the unanimous approval of the garriſon, officers, &c. elect and appoint, in Council, him, Mr. Holwell, Governor of the fort and garriſon, and adminiſtrator of the Company's affairs

affairs during the troubles; his right to which latter appointment, he does not think the gentlemen at preſent conſtituting the Agency have any juſt power to diveſt him of, or with-hold from him; howſoever, and under whatſoever other head the remainder of the colony, who are not ſervants to the Company, may think proper to diſpoſe of themſelves.

3dly. That the late Preſident, and Meſſrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket being (juſtly as he conceives) the 19th of June in Council, ſuſpended the Honourable Company's ſervice, he thinks this act alone ſufficient to diveſt them of all future rule in any matters relative to the Company's affairs, until their pleaſure from Europe be known. The more eſpecially as the ſaid ſuſpenſion met with (as he is informed) the approval and aſſent of Meſſrs. Watts and Collet, in their diſavowing any ſubjection to be due to the orders of the Agency, iſſued to them from Fulta; a confirmation of the ſuſpenſion by ſix members, the majority of the whole Council.

4thly. That in conſequence of the before-recited tranſaction, he thinks Mr. Peter Amyat (the ſenior ſervant of the Company then preſent) was on his joining the fleet with his factory of Luckypore, the only perſon inveſted with any juſt title or authority to conduct the affairs and concerns of the Company, and to aſſociate with him as many of their ſervants next in ſtanding to him, as he thought neceſſary, until the arrival of the gentlemen of the board of Calcutta, who lay under no cenſure or ſuſpicion from the ſervice.

5thly and laſtly, That, to avoid the further embroiling his Honourable Employers affairs, by raiſing feuds and differences, which might enſue by his openly and publicly aſſerting and claiming his undoubted title to the adminiſtration of them, he

he ſubmits ſuch his juſt right to the breaſts of the Agency themſelves, and will quietly abide by their determination; but cannot, by any act of his own, either wave ſuch his juſt title, or admit any juſt authority to be inveſted in the Agency; a character aſſumed, in his abſence, without right; and permitted by the indulgence only of the remainder of the colony, and now continued, as he conceives, to the prejudice of the rights of himſelf and others. He therefore thinks himſelf juſtified in refuſing to ſign any paper or conſultation whatſoever, which he cannot do conſiſtently with himſelf, as he cannot conſider himſelf in any other view, or point of light, than in that in which the laſt ſubſiſting government of Fort William placed him; but ſhall, notwithſtanding, be always ready to devote his perſon and counſel to the intereſt of his Honourable Maſters affairs, wherever they call him. To that purpoſe ſhall duly attend the councils of the Agency, agreeably to the requeſt of the Honourable the late Preſident made to him in writing the 12th inſtant.

Copy of the Preſident's Letter abovementioned to Mr. Holwell.

To JOHN Z. HOLWELL, *Eſq.*

SIR,

HAD not our boat been ſo extremely leaky, I purpoſed doing myſelf the pleaſure of waiting on you this morning.

We have concluded to meet on ſhore, on Mondays, Wedneſdays, and Fridays. It will be an infinite ſatisfaction that you will be pleaſed to join us, particularly to me, who eſteem your advice, and who am, very truly,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Thurſday, Aug. 12, 1756. (Signed) ROGER DRAKE, jun.

N. B. Some few days ſubſequent to the above tranſaction, the Agency thought it highly eſſential to elect and conſtitute a Secret Committee; and urging to Mr. Holwell, that the good of the ſervice required his being one of that body; but that ſuch election was impoſſible, unleſs he receded from his reſolution of not ſigning; he therefore was prevailed upon to recede from that part of his minute only, on the above conſideration, and to evince that no private motive or reſentment could ſway him to any determination detrimental to his employers ſervice. The Committee was accordingly appointed, conſiſting of the Preſident, Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Holwell.

To the Honourable Roger Drake, *Eſq*; *&c. Council, at* Fulta.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs, *Fulta*, Oct. 25, 1756.

ON a late peruſal of your Fulta conſultations of the 14th of July, I find myſelf called upon (amongſt others of the ſurviving members of the Council of War, held in Calcutta the 18th of June laſt) to atteſt the aſſertion of Meſſrs. Manninghim and Frankland, touching their being ordered by that Council of War, "To embark the Europe-"pean women on board the Dodaly and Diligence, "with a detachment of 30 men to guard the ſaid "ſhips, with directions to move the Dodaly clear "of the ſmall craft, with which ſhe was incum-"bered, and of the enemy's fire." Moſt ſorry I am, gentlemen, to find myſelf obliged to ſpeak on a ſubject ſo very diſagreeable to my memory; but the whole proceedings of that council appearing to my conception of ſo extraordinary a nature, joined to the conſideration of my minute and diſſent in Council of the 2d September laſt (againſt any allowance being made the owners of the Dodaly,

for her loſs and damages) that I cannot remain ſilent without incurring my own cenſure, as well as the imputation from you, of much injuſtice in my minute above referred to. Thus far I thought it neceſſary to apologize for giving you trouble at this juncture, and ſhall, with your leave, proceed to ſpeak with that ſtrict regard which every gentleman owes to truth, not only to the particulars I am called on by thoſe gentlemen to atteſt, but to the whole proceedings of that Council of the 14th July; and conſider the defence Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland there make, for depriving the Company's forts, effects and garriſon, of the ſuccour of that ſhip; and then ſubmit the juſtice of my ſaid minutes and diſſent, to the determination of yourſelves and my Honourable Employers.

That the European women were ordered to be embarked by the Council of War of the 18th, is true; but that Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland ſhould embark them, was no part of the order; thoſe gentlemen tendered themſelves for that ſervice, to which none objected publickly, though myſelf, with many others, thought their ſtations, both civil and military, were of ſuch importance as might well have excuſed them from that ſervice.

That there was any particular order relative to the Diligence, I do not remember; and think I can truly atteſt the contrary: Mrs. Drake, Mrs. Mapletoft, Mrs. Coales and Mrs. Wedderburn, with their families, being embarked on board that veſſel, was purely the reſult of my own advice to them, imagining the Dodaly would be extremely crouded, and they had my order to be received on board, the ſhip being under my direction.

That a detachment of 30 men was ordered for the defence of theſe ſhips, I do not remember; and ſhould certainly have objected to any ſuch meaſure,

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had it been propoſed whilſt I was in the council of war, as it certainly was both imprudent and needleſs: Imprudent, as it would have been a conſiderable weakening a fatigued garriſon who had barely a relief from duty; and needleſs, whilſt the ſhips remained under the cover of our fort.

That thoſe gentlemen had directions to remove the Dodaly clear of the ſmall craft, with which ſhe was incumbered, and the enemy's fire, are aſſertions to me totally new; and I can truly atteſt was no part of the order of the council of war, nor know I from what quarter ſuch directions went; but if ſhe really was incumbered with ſmall craft, there would ſurely have been more propriety in moving them, than her: or on ſuppoſition propriety was attended to, yet ſurely whatever directions thoſe gentlemen had, did not, nor could imply, that they were to remove her as low as Mr. Margas's houſe; a ſtation where ſhe was more expoſed to the enemy's fire, had they taken the advantage, deprived of the benefit of our guns and ſmall arms, and rendered uſeleſs, as to the defence and ſuccour of the ſettlement; and contrary to Mr. Manningham's expreſs promiſe to me, that ſhe ſhould not ſtir from under the cover of the fort.

Touching the other part of the charge laid againſt thoſe gentlemen, by the colony, as a juſt objection to Mr. Manningham's being ſent to the preſidency of Fort St. George, viz. that of their refuſing joining the Councils when ſent for, I can form no judgment, further than I can collect from the defence of thoſe gentlemen as entered in the conſultation of the 14th July, being a ſtranger to the nature of the orders the Preſident ſent by Captain Wedderburn, and ſubſequently by Mr. Holmes, for their return to the fort.—I was myſelf but juſt come in from the center battery, when the Council of War in the evening of 18th was called,

and having been the preceding night and day exhauſted with continued fatigue, without reſt or food, as ſoon as the Council of war broke up, I retired, in hopes of getting a little repoſe; not doubting but the reſolutions of it would have been ſtrictly obeyed, which were, that the European women, the Company's treaſures, and, I think, their eſſential books and papers, ſhould be embarked that night on board the Dodaly; but whether this laſt was entered on the minutes of that Council, I cannot be poſitive; but perfectly recollect a diſcourſe I had with Mr. Manningham on the propriety of it, juſt as the Council broke up; and indeed, I ever thought, until I joined your Councils here, that both the treaſures and books had been embarked. And here I cannot omit remarking, that better no reaſon at all had been given, for the neglect of a meaſure of ſuch importance to the Company, than that which ſtands on the conſultation of the 20th of Auguſt. But it is time I come to conſider the pleas made uſe of by Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland, for their not returning to the fort; which are, "That a "little after one in the morning, Mr. Lindſay "came on board, and informed them, he left a "general aſſembly ſitting; that the Captain of "the artillery reported there was not two days "ammunition; that many of the military and "militia were in liquor, and mutinous; that it "was the unanimous opinion the fort was not "tenable; that a retreat was reſolved on; that "Mr. Holwell was ſtrenuous for its being made "immediately, and oppoſed by Mr. Baillie particularly; that the whole of the common people "were in confuſion; and that nothing was determined on." Without, gentlemen, my entering particularly into the merits of theſe pleas, let us conſider the weight of thoſe Gentlemen's ſeats in

Council, and their importance as bearing the names and authority of Field-officers, and Colonels, and Lieutenant colonels of the militia; and, I think an impartial eye will at firſt ſight pronounce, that there was not one of the pleas urged by them, in defence of their not returning into the fort, but ſhould have urged their immediate rejoining our Councils, though they had no orders from the Preſident for that purpoſe, in place of waiting on board for the detachment, and removing the Dodaly a ſecond time that night, as low as Govindpore; running that ſhip, and the ladies on board, into ten times the riſque from the enemy. They ought rather to have returned with the ſhip, on the flood, under our guns, to have favoured the embarkation of the Company's books and treaſures, (which they knew were not on board) and the retreat of the garriſon. Mr. Lindſay informed them the Council was ſitting; that our councils were divided; and that when he left the fort, all was in confuſion and nothing was determined on, which was true; the Council not breaking up until near four in the morning, without any thing being reſolved on, but deferring the retreat, without, in my judgment, a ſingle reaſon being urged in defence of it. The preſent weight and authority of thoſe Gentlemen, might have made our Councils unanimous, or, have given a happy majority for a general retreat, have prevented the unhappy defection of the Preſident, the officers, and part of the garriſon the next morning; and have been the cauſe of ſaving the public and private property lodged in the fort, as well as the lives of many who fell a miſerable ſacrifice by our retreat being cut off; the primary cauſe of which, I muſt ſtill attribute to the retreat of that ſhip to Mr. Margaſs's houſe and Govindpore on the night of the 18th, without order or the knowledge of any one

in the garriſon. It was urged, I know, and aſſerted by Mr. Frankland in Council, the 2d September, when I entered my minutes and diſſent to the payment of the Dodaly's loſs and damages; that thoſe Gentlemen had orders for moving the ſhip down. And I beg leave to remind you, that I aſked the Preſident, touching this aſſertion; who, in your preſence, declared he neither gave ſuch orders, nor knew of any ſuch being given. Therefore, on the whole, I hope I ſtand vindicated in your judgment, for ſuch my diſſent, as it is to me not a little aſtoniſhing, how the Gentlemen, compoſing that Council of the 14th July, could unanimouſly, on the defence before them, pronounce it as their opinions, that thoſe Gentlemen had cleared themſelves of the charge laid againſt them, in that letter ſigned, as I am informed, by the greateſt part of the colony. I am, with reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

The laſt letter but one, though delivered in to the Board in November, 1756, did not receive any anſwer until the laſt of January, 1757, two days before the Syren packet had her diſpatches for Europe, (in which ſloop Mr. Holwell took his paſſage, for the perfect recovery of his health) when the Preſident, and three other gentlemen of the Council, thought proper to anſwer ſome parts of it, chiefly relative to themſelves. As Mr. Holwell had no opportunity of noticing thoſe productions abroad, he applied to the Court of Directors, on his arrival here in July, 1757, and was indulged with the peruſal of them, and threw in a reply.

We have no copy of thoſe gentlemen's ſeveral anſwers; but as we dare aver the quotations taken from them, which Mr. Holwell thought worthy reply, are faithfully tranſcribed in this his replication,

tion, we ſhall not heſitate to inſert it. — Upon the face of the whole, you will be fully enabled to form, and paſs an impartial judgment, on the charge laid againſt this Gentleman, of being *particularly inſtrumental in bringing down Sou Rajah Dowla*, &c.

To the Honourable the COURT *of* DIRECTORS.

May it pleaſe your Honours, *Lond.* Aug. 1757.

HAVING peruſed the ſeveral Addreſſes of Meſſrs. Drake, Watts, Becher, and Collet, in anſwer to different parts of my Addreſs to your Honourable Court, under date, Fulta, the 30th of November, 1756, I find myſelf under the neceſſity of making a ſhort reply to each, and moſt humbly tender my thanks for the opportunity you have indulgently granted.—Mr. Becher, by a penetration very commonly aſſumed (as Mr. Drake juſtly obſerves) ſubſequent to events, ſets out with aſſerting, "That the firſt admiſſion of Kiſſendaſs and his "wealth was wrong; that Raagbullob's family "was out of the government, and of no conſe-"quence at the time Mr. Watts wrote the recom-"mendatory letter concerning him, and that he "had been no friend to the Engliſh, but on the "contrary, had given much trouble to us, and "that there was no probability of the ſucceſs of the "young Begum." To theſe I beg leave to reply, and ſay, That though the admiſſion of that family no ways touches me, (it being an act of Mr. Manningham's, the Pro Tempore Governor, even without my knowledge) yet I do not think it was wrong, as things were then circumſtanced. The importance and conſequence of that family, muſt have been better known to Mr. Watts than to Mr. Becher; and though the former parts of Mr. Watts's letter to the Preſident are diſavowed, which

I think he might, with a better grace, have acknowledged; yet, at the close of what he gives your Honours, as the purport of them, he says, that "Raagbullob had been useful to us, and might be more so;" which speaks a flat contradiction to the sentiments of Mr. Becher, touching the regard due to that family from us. Whether there was or was not a probability of the Begum's success, was not the matter in point, nor is a bit cleared up by Mr. Becher's conjecture; that such was our intelligence, as set forth in my letter, is fact; not only the letters which came daily to Omychund, but to many of the other merchants and residents at Calcutta, that kept a correspondence with the Durbar and city, intimated the probability of her success. These were daily brought to the President for his perusal, and many of them read in my hearing. Mr. Becher then proceeds to say,

"That Naran Sing was sent to demand Kissen-
"dass and his wealth, which the English un-
"justly detained from him.——Cannot ac-
"count for his coming in disguise;—believes
"he did not, and is confirmed in that belief
"by Mr. Holwell's own account of the
"affair,—who does not intimate this disguise
"gained credit with him;—expresses and
"repeats his astonishment why the affair
"of Kissendass and the messenger was not
"laid before the Council, and that Messrs.
"Drake, Manningham, and Holwell should
"assume a power no ways delegated to them,
"&c." (This last circumstance is echoed to by Mr. Watts, in his letter before your Honours.)

How Mr. Becher could represent that Naran Sing was sent to demand Kissendass and his wealth, unjustly detained by the English, carries not that needful

needful precaution with it, incumbent on every gentleman who thinks himſelf obliged to cenſure the conduct of another. The detention of any matter or thing can never in propriety of ſpeech, be aſſerted or implied before a demand made.— Kiſſendaſs had been admitted into the ſettlement, as ſome hundreds of others had been in my remembrance, who had connections with the government. Roy Doolob, Rejah Monickchund, Futtuah Chund, and many others had, time out of mind, houſes eſtabliſhed in your ſettlement. The arrival of Naran Sing was the firſt demand made on account of Kiſſendaſs; therefore our being charged with unjuſtly detaining him or his wealth, prior to their being demanded, which the above aſſertion intimated, if it carries any meaning at all, is, I conceive, both unjuſt and improper. I am ſorry to obſerve that gentlemen, in the courſe of their arguments, make uſe of ſuch parts only of my addreſs to your Honours of the 30th of November, as ſeem to ſupport their own conjectures; was it not ſo, Mr. Becher could never have been at a loſs to account for the diſguiſe of Naran Sing, nor would have been at all puzzled to find which diſguiſe I gave credit to. In my ninth paragraph Mr. Becher would have found, that an order had been publiſhed that none ſhould be admitted into the ſettlement without a ſtrict examination. This was well known at Hougley, the laſt place Naran Sing left, ſeveral inhabitants of that city having been refuſed admittance, and others turned out, who were judged to be the ſpies of the government. This was reaſon ſufficient to determine Naran Sing's ſtealing into the place in diſguiſe. In my forty-firſt paragraph, where I form a judgment of Omychund's conduct, I expreſly ſay, that his bringing Naran Sing down will not admit of diſpute; therefore, though I do not as expreſly ſay I gave credit

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to his coming in the diſguiſe of a Bengal Pykar, yet it was obvious ſuch muſt have been my belief, by my implied concluſion of Omychund's deceit. This circumſtance of the diſguiſe may, at firſt ſight, be deemed a matter not worth giving your Honours trouble; but the purpoſe it is brought to ſerve urges my ſpeaking to it, becauſe, if this gentleman can ſtrip us of the diſguiſe, he thinks he diveſts us of the reaſons for our ſubſequent conduct to Naran Sing, which, he then thinks, appear without foundation. Why the admiſſion of Kiſſendaſs, and expulſion of Naran Sing, were not laid before the Council, Mr. Becher might have eaſily anſwered himſelf, if he had been diſpoſed to think a little deeper on the ſubject. The admiſſion of any one into the ſettlement was never, that I have known, a matter judged neceſſary to be laid before the Council; the Preſident having ever had a power lodged in him in matters of this kind. The expulſion of Naran Sing, conſiſtent with the conduct deemed neceſſary on the occaſion, would not admit of time for the Council's meeting. Naran Sing was every moment expected within the fort. Had the Preſident either ſeen the meſſenger, or his purwannah, the meaſure reſolved on could not have been carried properly into execution. Beſides, in my 13th paragraph, Mr Becher might have ſeen, that when I attended the Governor with the account of the preceding night's tranſactions, I found Meſſrs. Manningham and Frankland with him; the meaſure reſolved on was during Mr. Frankland's ſtay, and unanimouſly our opinion, who were in fact a majority of the then members of the Council.—So that I hope, on the whole, your Honours will not think this charge of an aſſuming power, any ways material againſt us, or deſerving your cenſure; nor did a ſingle member of the Council, which met the ſame morning, object to

the ſtep taken; but on the contrary, as Mr. Drake truly aſſerts, expreſſed their approval of it. To cloſe my remarks on this part of Mr. Becher's letter, I muſt with Mr. Drake ſay, that as that gentleman was reſident with leave in Calcutta, and not exempted, though excuſed, from his attendance on Councils, if the admiſſion of Kiſſendaſs, &c. was, in his opinion, a wrong meaſure, and obviouſly injurious to the intereſt of his employers, it was his duty to have attended, or even demanded a council, and objected thereto; in not doing it, he in fact became more deſerving cenſure than ourſelves, who were of a contrary opinion, and can only be accuſed of an error in judgment.—Mr. Becher next

"Refers to the Nabob's letter to Mr. Pigot, as "proof that the detention of the Nabob's "ſubjects was the cauſe of our misfortunes; "—that means were neglected to mollify the "Nabob, why, he knows not;—is perſuaded "money would have ſatisfied him;—believes "it was never attempted;—that we refuſed "the mediation of Wazeed;—that it was "not the intention of the government to di"veſt the Europeans of their fortifications, "he thinks is proved by the Nabob's only "fleecing the French and Dutch, when he "had it ſo evidently in his power to have "taken their factories;—that in not doing "it, he did not act conſiſtent with Ally Ver"dy Cawn's advice;—ſays, he was informed "Naran Sing took the opportunity of the "reſentment the Nabob ſhewed on the re"ceipt of the Governor's anſwer, to repre"ſent the treatment and inſult he had received "in Calcutta;—and that he does not admit "Ally Verdy Cawn's ſpeech to be genuine."

Permit

Permit me, Honourable Sirs, to refer in my turn to the Nabob's letter to Mr. Drake, as a more authentic voucher for the cauſe of our misfortunes than that to Mr. Pigot; which evidently appears calculated as an apology for a conduct, he knew was not to be defended, nor by the Engliſh to be looked over. In his letter to Mr. Drake, he mentions the article of our fortifications only; the anſwer to it is agreed on all hands to have been the principal cauſe of his reſentment and paſſion at Rajamaal: If Naran Sing really took this opportunity, it can only be deemed a ſecondary cauſe, which might help to keep up the firſt impreſſion of reſentment conceived at the Preſident's reply. Mr. Becher aſſerts, he was informed Naran Sing took this opportunity, &c. — May it pleaſe your Honours, to hear what Mr. Watts ſays on this ſubject, in the third paragraph of his letter before you, where he firſt recites, that he had, by proper application, huſhed up the affair; but that "*poſſibly*, "when the Nabob received the Governor's letter, "which ſo incenſed him, Naran Sing *might* take "that opportunity," &c. So that allowing that for fact, which in truth has no proof at all, the utmoſt that can be made of it will fall greatly ſhort of Mr. Becher's ſuppoſititious principal cauſe of our misfortunes: To which let it be remembered, that the Nabob, in the letter to Mr. Pigot, referred to by Mr. Becher, artfully avoids mentioning the cauſe, he had all along aſſigned to us, for his reſentment; though he had, twenty days prior to the diſpatch of that letter, made it the principal article of the Machulka executed by Mr. Watts, to wit, the demolition of our fortifications. The concluſions drawn by Mr. Becher, and alſo by Mr. Watts, that money only was wanted, and that it was never the intention of the government to diveſt the Europeans of their forts, by the Nabob's fleecing

ing only the French and Dutch, are equally fallacious, and can proceed only from wilful or real ignorance of the ſtate of the country, and the Nabob's freſh intelligence, which called his ſpeedy return to Muxadarad from Calcutta. The Nabob of Purranea's troops were in motion on the Malda Creek, from the mouth of which it was eaſy, in the Suba's abſence, to croſs over to the iſland of Coſſimbuzar; therefore the Nabob could not, with ſafety or prudence, engage in any new enterprize againſt the French and Dutch, that would poſſibly hazard his quick return. That money would have ſatisfied him, but that it never was attempted; that means were neglected to mollify him; that Wazeed's mediation was rejected; are all conjectures, and aſſertions, urged againſt known facts, not to treat them more harſhly, which they certainly deſerve. Mr. Becher's ſentiments of Ally Verdy Cawn's ſpeech, in which alſo Meſſrs. Watts and Collet concur, I will beg leave to ſpeak to in my following reply to thoſe Gentlemen.

Your Honours will have the goodneſs to recollect, that when I addreſſed you, the 30th November, I had no conſultations, or other vouchers to refer to; ſo that the utmoſt I could do, in the recital and dates of ſuch papers as were addreſſed to the Board, during the troubles, was to conſult the memory of Mr. Secretary Cooke, as well as my own, which I did. If I erred in the purport of the letter from Mr. Collet, adviſing of the loſs of Coſſimbuzar, it appears however it was not in any very eſſential circumſtance; whether Mr. Watts alone ſigned the Machulka, or Meſſrs. Collet and Batſon with him, is not very material. Mr. Collet denies his having wrote that he was delivering up the factory; but admits that he gave an order to the officer to deliver the cannon and ammunition to Roy Dullob; which I believe will be deemed as

like

like a delivery of the factory as poſſible. This Gentleman, in his 2d paragraph, ſays, "Mr. Holwell inſiſts much that they ought to have made ſome defence:" To which I reply, I have not inſiſted at all on it, nor once uſed the word Ought, on this occaſion, and refer your Honours to my letter. Further ſeparate or diſtinct reply this Gentleman's anſwer does not call for.

Meſſrs. Watts and Collet charge me with labouring to arraign their conduct; I am not conſcious I deſerve it, and therefore diſavow the charge. In my letter of the 30th November, I barely ſet forth the advantages which would probably have reſulted from the ſmalleſt defence of Coſſimbuzar; I have not even ſaid, they *could* or *ought* to have defended it; but on the contrary hoped, and that ſincerely too, they had reaſons ſufficient to vindicate their not defending it; theſe reaſons they had tranſmitted to your Honours.—I conceived it alſo their duty to have laid them before the Board on joining our Councils at Fulta; this conduct would poſſibly have prevented much altercation and writing, and at the ſame time have demonſtrated they had made no repreſentation to your Honours, in which they feared a detection.—Mr. Watts (to whoſe anſwer I come now more particularly) is pleaſed to ſay, ſecond paragraph;

"That he never heard of Raagbullob being
"impriſoned, till after the old Nabob's death;
"wonders where Mr. Holwell picked up his
"intelligence, &c.——denies the purport of
"the letters recommending the reception of
"Raagbullob's family, as ſet forth by me
"in my ſeventh paragraph;—gives a recital
"of the ſaid letters, leaving out thoſe parts
"he imagines might throw any blame upon
"himſelf;——admits the purport of the let-
"ter he wrote the Preſident, as quoted by

"me

" me in my eighth paragraph ;———never
" heard the Begum would get the better ;—
" wonders again where Mr. Holwell got his
" intelligence ;—admits Mr. Holwell's fifth
" paragraph ;—never imagined a looſe aban-
" doned woman could ſtand in competition
" with Surajud Dowla, &c."——

Touching the impriſonment of Raagbullob, I will not at this diſtance contend with Mr. Watts; that he was ſome time under the reſtraint of a ſtrong guard, after the deceaſe of his maſter, is fact;—that he did not diſcover his wealth to the old Nabob, unleſs in ſome trifles, plainly appears from hence, that the Nabob did not get at the knowledge of his uncle's capital wealth, until after his return to the city from Calcutta.—Mr. Watts's admitting my fifth paragraph is the ſtrongeſt proof againſt himſelf I can poſſibly produce; for in that very paragraph, the reſolution Raagbullob had ſhewn for the intereſt of the family, is urged by me as a reaſon for his never being forgiven by Surajud Dowla:—And lower down, " That, in reſentment " for the uſage he had unjuſtly received for his " integrity," he joined the young Begum's councils. Therefore, on what foundation Mr. Watts attempts here to invalidate my intelligence, and at the ſame time accedes to my fifth paragraph, which demonſtrably ſupports that intelligence, is ſomething unaccountable.—Touching my miſrecital of his letters in favour of the reception of Raagbullob's family, I will only ſay, that no ſelf-conſideration could poſſibly ſway me to deviate from truth. I never condemned, nor do now, the recommendation tranſmitted in their favour by Mr. Watts; I thought, as things were circumſtanced, he was vindicated in urging their reception, and have therefore ſaid, he might, with better grace, have owned his inſtances in their favour were in ſtronger terms.

terms.—" *My only view was to juſtify the Gentleman* " *who received them, being myſelf noways concerned* " *in that tranſaction.*"—However I will for once ſuppoſe, his letters were as he recites them, which he cloſes by ſaying,—" Raagbullob had been of " uſe, and might be more ſo." Theſe expreſſions are ſufficient, in my opinion, to juſtify Mr. Manningham's receiving his family.—But wholly to refute Mr. Watts's repreſentations on theſe heads, I muſt obſerve, that he admits " He did write the " Governor to turn them out, (as I have ſet forth " in my eighth paragraph) the moment he ſuſ- " pected any ill conſequences might attend their " longer reſidence in Calcutta."—Now permit me, Honourable Sirs, to enquire, what could be the motives which urged Mr. Watts to the contrary meaſures, of firſt recommending their reception, and afterwards their expulſion?—Mr. Watts acknowledges, " Raagbullob had been uſeful, and " might be more ſo."—That he could be more uſeful, was not in nature, but in conſequence of his miſtreſs, the young Begum's ſucceſs; if there was no probability of her ſucceſs, Mr. Watts becomes unpardonable in recommending, in any ſhape, the family, or any part of the family, to be received in the ſettlement, as he knew Raagbullob would be highly obnoxious to the ſucceeding government of Surajud Dowla.—Thus it will be manifeſt to your Honours, that this Gentleman's injudicious attempt to cenſure my intelligence, has thrown his own conduct into a difficulty, which might otherwiſe have eſcaped notice; but this inſtance will not appear ſingle.

That Mr. Watts never " heard the taking of " Gyria and naval ſtrength of the Engliſh were " the occaſion of much ſpeculation at the Durbar," I am inclined to believe, or he certainly would have taken ſome pains to have ſet both in a proper light,

light, and prevented their raiſing any jealouſies in the government, which were augmented by the report of the war between us and the French, extending to Bengal. His never hearing likewiſe, that the report of the ſixteen ſhips of war and a ſtrong land force gained belief at the Durbar, I as readily believe; but can by no means admit, that Mr. Watts's ignorance of theſe particulars amounts to proof they were not ſo. In my tenth paragraph, I ſet forth the purport of a letter Mr. Watts wrote the Preſident ſome time before the death of the old Nabob.——This letter Mr. Watts has not diſowned, or denied the truth of the contents, as I have recited them.——In it he informs the Preſident, "That there were a multitude of "the government's ſpies in Calcutta; that the "ſmall ſtrength of its garriſon and fortifications, "and the eaſy capture of it, were the public diſ-"courſe of the Durbar and City, &c."——Diſcourſes of this kind ought to have alarmed Mr. Watts; they were prior to any complaint of the detention of ſubjects, &c.—His advice to the Preſident, to be upon his guard, was doubtleſs well judged; but ought he to have reſted here? Surely no! It muſt have occurred to Mr. Watts, that there were extraordinary cauſes for diſcourſes of this unprecedented nature, which he ſhould have traced to their ſource, and guarded againſt them, by an eaſy refutation of our enemies miſrepreſentation: Had this been done, he would have found, that a belief of the above-recited reports could alone be the cauſe of the diſcourſes he tranſmitted to the Preſident, and of which he confeſſes his intire ignorance.—The character he is pleaſed to draw of Angria, and his concluſions from it, appear to me ſo extremely and obviouſly weak and unjuſt, as to require no reply; and the deſpicable light he repreſents the Durbar in, ſhews he has

little real knowledge of a people he has ſo long reſided with.

The reports above-mentioned, and the public diſcourſes of the Durbar and City which followed, on their gaining belief, without any attempts made to confute them, have ſo cloſe a connection with the old Suba's laſt Council to Surajud Dowla, as recited in my 28th paragraph, that I cannot, in a more proper place, reply to the reception it has met with from Meſſrs. Becher, Watts, and Collet, whoſe ſentiments have a mixture of the ſolemn and ſprightly, not becoming the ſubject they were treating of, nor the civility or decency due to every gentleman engaged in any point of controverſy, as the ſum-total of all their opinions does in fact charge me with impoſing a forgery on your Honours, that had no foundation but my own invention. This will beſt appear from the gentlemens own words.

Mr. Becher is pleaſed to ſay,

"He does not admit of Ally Verdy Cawn's "ſpeech to be genuine; that Mr. Holwell, "in his diſtreſſed ſituation, was unable to "unravel the myſteries of the cabinet, and "explore a ſecret never yet known to any "one but himſelf."

Mr. Collet is pleaſed to call Ally Verdy Cawn's ſpeech a ſpecious fable: And Mr. Watts ſays,

"The laſt dying ſpeech of Mahabut Jung, "neither I, nor I believe any of the factory "ever heard of;—nor ſince from any of the "country-people;—it ſeems an imitation of "Lewis the XIV. to his grandſon, and ap-"pears, as Mr. Collet aptly terms it, a "ſpecious fable."

That Mr. Becher ſhould not believe the ſpeech genuine, I do not much wonder at,—as he ſeems fully reſolved that nothing ſhall drive him from his adopted principal cauſe of our misfortunes, the

detention

detention of the Nabob's ſubjects;—in confutation of which I have ſaid ſufficient; but the reaſons this gentleman gives for his believing the ſpeech not genuine, had been better omitted, for his own ſake.—The ſpeech might probably enough have been a ſecret, whilſt it was neceſſary it ſhould be ſo; but when I obtained it, that neceſſity had long vaniſhed, and Mr. Becher might have obſerved, I ſay, I had it from good authority, after my releaſement, which was more than three months after the period it was uttered, and was no longer to be deemed a myſtery of the cabinet, but might be judiciouſly enough divulged and circulated, as an apology for, and in ſupport of Surajud Dowla's proceedings againſt the Engliſh, &c.——Mr. Becher's opinion, "that I was unable to *explore* a "ſecret, never yet known to any *one* but myſelf," I would explain and reply to, could I poſſibly underſtand him. Shall only add, for your Honours ſatisfaction, and in vindication of my own veracity, that I was releaſed the 16th of July, and continued at the Tankſall, and the Dutch and French factories, until the 19th at night; during which period I had frequent conferences with the principal Armenians, and ſome the immediate ſervants of the late and preſent Suba, from whence I had the ſpeech literally as I have given it: and notwithſtanding the ingenious ridicule it meets with from Meſſieurs Watts and Collet, to cover their deficiency in matters which ought to have been known to them, I will not deſpair of giving your Honours yet more convincing proofs of its being genuine; and that there paſſed ſome other tranſactions, at the Durbar, to which they appear utter ſtrangers, or if known, unhappily for your ſervice and us, were unattended to.

Subſequent to the delivery of my Letter of the 30th of November, I received an intimation of a

converſation which had paſſed between the old Suba, Surajud Dowla, and Mr. William Forth, your Surgeon at Coſſimbuzar: this converſation appearing to me the ſtrongeſt corroborating proof of my aſſertions, on the real cauſe of our misfortunes,—I requeſted Mr. Forth would give it me, in writing, which he obligingly did, from Chinſura, under date the 15th of December 1756,—but it reached me not until after my letter was delivered into council: I have had the honour of ſhowing it to your chairman, and now beg leave to tranſcribe it here, the original being ready for your peruſal. —It is as follows.—

SIR,

" About fifteen days before the old Nabob died, " I being obliged to attend every morning to ſee " him, his ſon came in, and with a face full of " reſentment and anger, addreſſed himſelf to the " old man thus:—Father, I am well informed the " Engliſh are going to aſſiſt the Begum.—The old " man aſked me directly if this was true? I " anſwered, That this muſt be a malicious report, " of ſome who were not our friends, and done on " purpoſe to prejudice the Company; that the " Company were merchants, and not ſoldiers; and " that in all the troubles that had happened in the " country, ſince we had a ſettlement in it, if he " pleaſed to enquire, he would find, we had not " joined any party, or interfered in any thing but " our trade; and that the Company had been nigh " a hundred years in this country, in which time " they never once had a diſpute with the Govern- " ment on that head.—How many ſoldiers, ſays " he, have you in your fort or factory (Coſſimbu- " zar)? Anſwer, The uſual number, about forty, " gentlemen included.—Have you never more? " Anſwer, No.—Only when the Morattors were

" in

" in the country; but as ſoon as they were gone,
" the ſoldiers were returned to Calcutta.——Do
" you know, aſked he, if the Dutch and French
" have any come up?—Anſwer, I cannot tell.—
" Where are your ſhips of war? Anſwer, At
" Bombay.—Will they come here?——Not that
" I know of, there is no occaſion for them.—Had
" you not ſome here three months ago? Anſwer,
" Yes.—There comes one or two yearly, for to carry
" proviſions for the reſt of the ſhips.—What is the
" reaſon you have theſe ſhips of war in theſe parts,
" of late? Anſwer, To protect the Company's
" trade, and for fear of a war with France.——
" Is there war now between you and the French?
" Anſwer, No, not at preſent, but we are afraid
" it will be ſoon.———He then turned about to
" his grand-ſon, and told him, he did not believe
" a word of the report he had heard; upon which
" Surajud Dowla, anſwered, He could prove it.
" The old man deſired I would ſend our vaqueel to
" him directly, which having accordingly done;
" when he returned, I aſked the vaqueel what the
" old man ſaid to him, which was almoſt word for
" word that paſſed with me. Surajud Dowla
" ordered the vaqueel to attend his Durbar daily,
" which was accordingly done, agreeably to his
" orders. I am, Sir, &c.

WILLIAM FORTH.'

Though the report which introduced this converſation was moſt untrue, yet the interrogatories which followed plainly point out the ſentiments of the Durbar; and this, joined to the other public diſcourſes of the Durbar and City, touching the defenceleſs ſtate and eaſy capture of Calcutta, as tranſmitted by Mr. Watts, about this time, to the Preſident, are I muſt again repeat, manifeſt proofs, that jealouſies in the government were the firſt and

principal cauſes which urged the Suba's determination to diveſt us of our fortification: and though they may be ſaid not to amount to an abſolute proof of the genuineneſs of the old Suba's ſpeech to his grandſon, yet they are ſtrongly preſumptive.—But to return to Mr. Watts, whoſe inſinuations and hearſays, from his eighth paragraph, require but ſhort notice.

This gentleman is pleaſed to ſay, we had ten times the number of men and ſtores they had; to which I ſay, that the difference of our fortifications, and the force brought againſt us and them conſidered, we had not even an equality.—In their letter to us of the firſt of June, they adviſe of 12,000 troops only brought againſt them, which Mr. Watts now ſwells to 30,000. Mr. Watts aſks me why I did not continue to defend the factory, when at the time I delivered up the factory, I had five times the number of men they had at Coſſimbuzar? Had not Mr. Watts been guided more by malice than truth, in this and his ſubſequent interrogatories, he would, from the letter he is anſwering, have found the number left in the factory did not exceed 170; that of theſe we had 25 killed and 70 wounded by noon, the 20th, and that every man who ſurvived, was exhauſted of ſtrength and vigour. In theſe circumſtances, I believe I ſhould be juſtified to my honourable employers, if I had really delivered up the factory, which Mr. Watts aſſerts I did, from the account drawn up by Mr. Gray, who, I believe, wrote from the beſt of his knowledge, though his narrative is in many parts very defective.—Mr. Watts avers, he never heard a ſyllable of the Back Gate being betrayed, until I returned.——If he had been ſolicitous to come at the truth, how came he not to apply to Meſſrs. Walcot and Dickſon; they were both at Chandanagore, and are both mentioned by me in my

my narrative. Mr. Gray mentions in his account, that "ſome ruſhed out at the gate towards the "river;" it might have occurred to Mr. Watts, if truth had been his aim, to aſk Mr. Gray how they could ruſh out, the keys being in my poſſeſſion, and that gate not only locked, but barred and bolted? But theſe enquiries would not have ſquared with Mr. Watts's purpoſe of detraction.——His intelligence, picked up (to borrow his own phraſe,) from corporal Angell, is equally authentic; for I ſolemnly aver, ſuch an incident never happened as the match, &c. though moſt certainly I ſhould have ſo acted, had any raſhneſs of that kind been attempted, which could have anſwered no good purpoſe before the order was iſſued for a general diſcharge, which was then my object, if the Back Gate had not been forced.

Touching Mr. Drake's anſwer, I find but few particulars that are not fully diſcuſſed, in my letter of the 30th of November.—His *misfortunes are ſufficiently heavy not to bear any addition to the load; and I could wiſh he had not obliged me to ſpeak at all.*——He remarks, my accuſations are confined to my ſuperiors, and not juniors; intimates, my ſophiſtry only tends to ſupplant my ſeniors.—— I could appeal to ſome of your honourable Court, that this is not my talent, and that I am capable of doing juſtice to the merit of my ſeniors, though my declared enemies.——Mr. Drake taking advantage of the loſt conſultations, aſſerts, the letter to the Nabob was anſwered in conſultation; in this aſſertion he ſhould have taken care that no circumſtance ſhould impeach his veracity, as effectually as if the conſultations could appear againſt him.— He knows in his heart, that it never appeared in conſultation, until after the receipt of the Chief and Council of Coſſimbuzar's letter, adviſing of the Nabob's being incenſed at the purport of it,

when it was judged neceſſary to diſpatch immediately a copy of it to thoſe gentlemen: had he not been conſcious of this, would he have neglected ſo favourable an opportunity, when he had it in his power of conſulting me, and thereby of juſtly rendering every part of my narrative ſuſpected?—I was poſitive and clear in my averment and reaſoning thereon, that the anſwer was an act of his own; and there were of thoſe members ſurviving, Meſſrs. Pearkes, Frankland, Macket, and Mr. Secretary Cooke, to have confuted me; but in place of this, Mr. Drake prefers the meaſure of throwing this allegation into his letter, at a time he was ſure I ſhould never ſee it abroad, and imagining poſſibly that might be the caſe here.

I did not, 'tis true, mention the 70 men in ſick quarters, becauſe, on enquiry, I could not find there was one. The attempt to poſſeſs Tannas's, was made ſome day after my motion in the Council of War was over-ruled. Mr. Drake aſſerts, all methods were uſed to ſend ſuccours to the Fort; but intimates that Captain Nicholſon was the only one would undertake it. Him we never ſaw nor heard of. On my joining the fleet at Fulta, I did hear he was ſent into Govindpore Creek, to burn and deſtroy the great boats there, that they might not be employed by the enemy, in the attack or purſuit of the ſhips.

I am, moſt reſpectfully, &c.

Having, we think, ſufficiently vindicated this gentleman's character from the aſperſions in this anonymous Pamphlet, we proceed to exculpate him from reflections no leſs infamous, ſcandalous, and (conſequently) unjuſt.

Your

Your Court of Directors, in 1758, that is, the Bombay faction, which compoſed the majority of that Court, being determined to prevent Mr. Holwell's ſucceeding to the Chair of Bengal, ſuperſeded him the very next ſhip, after his departure on the Warren, in favour of a gentleman who had not been on the civil liſt of your ſervants; and ſoon after in favour of a young gentleman, Mr. Ellis, whoſe rank in your ſervice, before the capture of Fort William, entitled him only to the ſubordinate poſt of ſecond aſſiſtant to this gentleman in the Zemindary; and finally diſmiſſed him from your ſervice, for ſigning the general letter, per Hardwick and Calcutta. The 147th paragraph of this letter has been often exhibited to you; we are not aſhamed to avow it was drawn up by Mr. Holwell, who, in his letters to us, declared, he gloried more in this honeſt production of his pen, than ever Cicero did in his moſt famed orations.

After the very high encomiums beſtowed upon this gentleman's zeal, integrity, and capacity, during the ſpace of five years, a treatment ſo oppoſite as we have now ſet forth, called for ſome excuſe and palliation. Theſe were not long wanting. To countenance and give the colour of juſtice to the moſt cruel and ungrateful return for his many and eminent ſervices, ſeveral charges were raiſed againſt him by the majority of the then Court of Directors. Thoſe charges, and Mr. Holwell's reply to them, we lay before you, in two letters addreſſed to the Board of Calcutta, and leave you the judges between them and him.

To the Honourable Robert Clive, *Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of* Fort William.

Fort William,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs, Decem. 1759.

THE 132d paragraph of the Supplement to the Honourable the Court of Director's Letter of the 23d of March, 1759, read for the firſt time the 2d inſtant, is of ſo extraordinary a nature, that it cannot too early be ſpoken to by thoſe who are, or who may be ſuppoſed to be pointed at;—for neceſſary reaſons, I beg leave to inſert the whole paragraph.

"We are informed from good authority, that "two of our ſervants, of conſiderable rank, actu- "ally received from Kiſſendaſs upwards of fifty "thouſand rupees, for our protecting this perſon "againſt Surajah Dowla; if this iniquitous tranſ- "action ſhould be proved, what an account have "theſe men to render here and hereafter? For, "according to human conjecture, it was the foun- "dation of your late bloody calamities. The "juſtice you owe to thoſe murdered innocents, to "your employers, and to your own characters, "will not ſuffer us even to ſurmiſe that you will "ſcreen ſuch villainy; you will therefore exa- "mine ſtrictly, and immediately into the truth "of this report; give the enquiry preference to "every other concern, and uſe every juſtifiable "method with Europeans and natives to come at "the knowledge of facts; and ſhould any be found "guilty, diſmiſſion from our ſervice muſt not only "inſtantly follow, but a proſecution on our behalf "for damages ſuſtained muſt be commenced againſt "him or them in the Mayor's Court; and what- "ever precautions can be uſed for the ſecurity of "our demand, we expect, upon this occaſion, will "be put in force."

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The rectitude of my own heart, joined to the words "of conſiderable rank," had nearly convinced me no part of this heavy charge of iniquity and villainy could poſſibly be aimed at me; but when I found myſelf unjuſtly ſuperſeded in the very next paragraph, without any cauſe given by me, or aſſigned by the Honourable the Court of Directors, I could no longer remain in doubt that the meaſure of my perſecution was not yet full. And as I find myſelf doomed ſooner or later a ſacrifice to private pique and party on one pretence or another, forgive me, gentlemen, if, conſcious of my own innocence, I am bold in my defence; I doubt not but each of you will make my caſe your own. You have been all witneſſes of my unſhaken zeal for the Company's intereſt and welfare, and are likewiſe witneſſes of the returns I have met with; —returns that muſt alarm each of you who are liable, as well as myſelf, to have your honour and character ſtigmatized, by covert inſinuations—conveyed into the ready and open ears of credulity, by the tongues of malice and ſlander. Happy are thoſe few remaining gentlemen who were of Council at the period alluded to in the foregoing paragraph, in being able to deſpiſe the information, and retire from a ſervice of ſuch precarious tenure, and ſubject to ſuch cruel aſperſions: ſuch ſhould be my conduct alſo, was it equally in my power; but ſince that is not the caſe, and my rank in the ſervice will probably in a ſhort time become really conſiderable, I hold myſelf bound to give *you*, Gentlemen, every ſatisfaction in the premiſes, and to convince you by every means in my power, that if I am one of the two glanced at in the ſaid 132d paragraph, ſuch information, with reſpect to myſelf, is groundleſs, falſe, and wicked, in the moſt ſuperlative degree; and I will juſtly borrow from the ſaid paragraph, and ſay, what an account have

thoſe

thoſe men (the informers) to render here and hereafter, who could from no foundation but that of infamous ſurmiſe, or lying report, attempt to blaſt the fame and integrity of others?—With regard to the Honourable the Court of Directors ſo readily giving credit and ſanction to that information, and their tacit condemnation unheard, (obvious from their 133d paragraph) my duty and reſpect withholds my pen, and tells me it is time I ſhould proceed to conſider the charge itſelf, with that freedom which every one owes to the juſtification of his own character, though I am ſenſible this freedom (to which the Honourable the Court of Directors are ſuch ſtrangers) will cauſe my diſmiſſion from the ſervice.

You are told, Gentlemen, by the Honourable the Court of Directors, that they are informed from good authority, "that two of their ſervants," &c. in reply to which, permit me to ſay, if their authority has been good, common juſtice to their ſervants ſhould have urged them to tranſmit the nature of that authority to you, as well as openly to have named the two ſervants aimed at here. You would have then had a foundation to proceed on, without being reduced to the neceſſity, as you now are, of going a hunting both for the accuſers and accuſed; a taſk that ſurely never was impoſed on any body of gentlemen whatſoever.

You are ſubſequently told, that the protection given to the perſon of Kiſſendaſs, was, from all human conjecture, the foundation of your late bloody calamities; if the Honourable the Court of Directors were really ſenſible, this was the foundation, permit me moſt humbly to expoſtulate with them, why their reſentment does not openly fall on thoſe two perſons, who were more immediately concerned in granting ſuch protection, to wit, on the then Chief of Coſſimbuzar, who ſo ſtrongly

urged

urged the neceſſity of doing it, and the then Governor, who would not withdraw that protection when it became equally neceſſary? But, Gentlemen, had the Honourable the Court of Directors thought proper to give a preference to facts, in place of all human conjecture, (which is ſo often ſubordinate to all human malice and partiality) they would be convinced the protection granted to Kiſſendaſs was not in any the leaſt degree the foundation of your bloody calamities: ſo that, could that iniquitous circumſtance of receiving the 50,000 Rupees, be proved againſt one or two of their ſervants, their enjoined proſecutions for damages muſt fall to the ground. The facts above alluded to, which ſhould in juſtice and propriety have had the preference to human conjecture, are before the Honourable the Court of Directors, both in my addreſs to them of November 1756 from Fulta, and in that of Auguſt 1757 at London, which puts it out of their power to ſay they were ſtrangers to them. The motives which have urged the ſuppreſſion of theſe, and many other facts very material for the knowledge of the world, are beſt known to the wiſdom of the Honourable the Court of Directors; and it is my duty to ſuppoſe thoſe motives are juſt, or at leaſt proper to further their particular purpoſes, which doubtleſs ultimately tend to the promoting the welfare of the Company committed to their charge. Thus, for inſtance, I believe many can remember, amongſt the multitude of infamous reports ſpread at Fulta, one was, that three Gentlemen in the ſervice had received from Kiſſendaſs 50,000 Rupees each, and I have no doubt but this aſſertion was impudently wrote home from various hands: yet now you obſerve, Gentlemen, it is for the good of the ſervice, that the charge ſhould only be aimed at two. Public bodies do not deem themſelves accountable for the

juſtice

juſtice and equity of their conduct to individuals under their command; and individuals, howſoever injured or oppreſſed, will be thought audacious if they complain; but as tame ſubmiſſion and ſilence in this caſe would juſtly be conſtrued into guilt, and wear more the complexion of a ſtate of abſolute ſlavery than a voluntary ſervitude, I would here aſſert my own integrity and injuries without reſerve, were certain poverty and want to be the conſequence. The Court of Directors may, if they pleaſe, take the Company's bread from me, but they ought not by inuendo and inſinuations, couched as they imagine without the letter of the laws of England, diveſt me of my good name and character, which their 132d paragraph moſt evidently aims at; and though prudence made it neceſſary for them to ſuppreſs names, yet the manifeſt tendency of the whole paragraph, is only calculated to give a colouring and introduction to that which immediately follows, wherein not only myſelf, but ſeven members of your board, and a multitude of ſenior ſervants, all unexceptionable in their characters and abilities, are ſuperſeded in open violation of that avowed principle of equity, on which the Honourable the Court of Directors reduced me laſt year to my rank in the ſervice. But to reſume my own vindication, permit me to repreſent to you, Gentlemen,

That the protection granted to Kiſſendaſs concerns not me more than any other member of the board: that I had never, on my honour, any communication or converſe with Kiſſendaſs or with any one belonging to him, prior to my ſeeing him a priſoner in the factory: that my fortune conſidered in the year 1752, when I firſt came into the ſervice, and compared with the public ſtate of it, expoſed in our late calamities, will not leave room for the leaſt ſhadow of a ſurmiſe, that it ever had

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any acquiſitions of ſuch a nature, or in ſuch a degree. Theſe, you will ſay, do by no means amount to proofs; they are negative proofs, however, and what other than negative proofs can be given againſt a charge ſo indirect and dark? However, as a further ſatisfaction to myſelf, and I hope to you, I entreat, that the ſolemn oath which I ſhall annex to this addreſs, may be adminiſtred to me in council, as the only additional proof as yet in my power to give you of my innocence in this particular.

Having in a former part of this addreſs mentioned my being moſt unjuſtly ſuperſeded, it remains incumbent on me to prove this aſſertion, and however little I may benefit myſelf by this proof, it may have this uſe at leaſt, that you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, and the reſt of our fellow ſervants, may know in future the eſtimation you ought to put on your having real merit in the ſervice, and in having that merit acknowledged and celebrated by the Honourable the Court of Directors, whoſe memories on this occaſion, I muſt humbly beg leave to refreſh, by various extracts from their general letters to this preſidency, reſpecting my conduct in their ſervice.

[Here were inſerted the ſeveral paragraphs already given you, after the ſtate of the revenues, and then the letter to the Board went on as follows.]

From the tenor of this laſt paragraph (25th March, 1757) I think I may be juſtified in ſaying, that perſonal reſentment, or other private motives, took the rule, and not thoſe of juſtice and equity, as the acknowledging and rewarding my merit, and at the ſame time fixing the clog again upon me, which they had ſo graciouſly, and for the ſelf-ſame reaſons, taken off in the year 1755, per Eaſtcourt, implies a moſt manifeſt and unaccountable contradiction; however, in the general

neral letter of the 11th of November, 1757, per London and Warren, I am again releaſed from that clog, and appointed one of their four Governors in rotation; and in a ſubſequent letter by the ſame ſhips, on the rotation being aboliſhed, appointed to ſucceed to the government next after Mr. Manningham; and again by the laſt letters per London and Warren of the 11th of April, 1758, reduced to my rank in the ſervice, and appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors to ſucceed to the Government in turn; and now by the Prince Henry's letter ſuperſeded in favour of Captain James Barton, without the Honourable the Court of Directors impeaching, or having cauſe to impeach, that zeal, integrity, and attachment to the Company, which they ſo often acknowledged and rewarded. Permit me, therefore, Gentlemen, through the channel of your Board, humbly to repreſent to the Honourable the Court of Directors, the very hard treatment I have on the whole received, and to hope it will merit their future more favourable conſideration, the more eſpecially as it appears that many, I may ſay moſt of the gentlemen who have ſigned the Prince Henry's letter, have alſo given the ſanction of their hands to every paragraph tranſmitted to this preſidency in my favour.

I am, with reſpect,

Fort William, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, &c.
Dec. 1759. J. Z. H.

N. B. The following oath was tendered to, and taken by Mr. Holwell in Council the 24th of December, 1759.

" I John Zephaniah Holwell, one of the Council of Fort William, 1756, when Kiſſendaſs, the ſon of Rajah Bullob, received the protection of

this preſidency, do ſolemnly ſwear that I never did, directly or indirectly, receive from the ſaid Kiſſendaſs, or from any one on his behalf, any the leaſt reward or gratuity, either in money, jewels, or merchandize, for ſuch protection granted the ſaid Kiſſendaſs; and that I never did, on any other pretence or conſideration whatſoever, benefit myſelf by the ſaid Kiſſendaſs to the amount or value of one rupee. So help me God.

J. Z. Holwell."

The ſcrutiny ordered in the before-recited 132d paragraph, was made by Colonel Clive at Moorſhadabad, (where Kiſſendaſs then reſided) at the time the Colonel went to take leave of the Nabob, on his departure for Europe. On his return to Fort William, he wrote the following letter to the Board, on the ſubject of his enquiry.

To the Gentlemen of Council.

SIRS, 23d January, 1760.

" THE juſtice I owe to my own reputation, as " well as my duty to the Company, obliged " me prior to the reſignation of this Government, to " uſe my utmoſt endeavours in coming at the truth " of the heavy charge, ſeemingly contained againſt " Mr. Holwell, in the 132d paragraph of the " general letter. Incloſed is the ſolemn atteſtation " of Kiſſendaſs; and I make no doubt but that " gentleman's innocence will appear as clear to " the Court of Directors, as it did to us who " were preſent at, and witneſſed the ſaid at- " teſtation."

N. B. The gentlemen who witneſſed the atteſtation were,

Col. Clive,
Col. Ford,
Major Caillaud,
Mr. Pybus,
Capt. Carnac.

To the Honourable Henry Vanſittart, *Eſq; &c. Council of* Fort William.

Gentlemen, 24th of November, 1760.

ACCEPT my beſt thanks for the obliging readineſs wherewith you have granted me copies of thoſe paragraphs, in this year's General Letter from England, which relate particularly to myſelf.

As the Honourable the Court of Directors had long determined me unworthy of ſucceeding in their ſervice, according to the rank they moſt graciouſly allotted me, in their General Letter of the 11th of April, 1758; I could wiſh they had reſted there, without laying me under a neceſſity of breaking in upon your time at this very buſy period, by a needful reply to ſome very unjuſt reflections thrown upon me in the 119th and 127th paragraphs of their Letter, under date the 1ſt of April, 1760. The conſideration of that indiſpenſible duty, which binds every Gentleman to the defence of his own character, will, I am ſure, be ſufficient apology to your Honourable Board, for this intruſion.

Reſpecting the ſalary I received by appointment of the Board, as annexed to the poſt of Import Warehouſe-keeper, and as being poſſeſſed by the ſame individual nominated to that poſt, when the Government of Bengal was ordered to four perſons, the Court of Directors are pleaſed to ſay, "The "Gentlemen of Council might miſtake their in- "tentions; but that Mr. Holwell ſhould have "acted with more ſincerity, becauſe he was per- "fectly acquainted with the Court's ſentiments, "and particularly with the motives of their orders, "&c."

" &c." To this I may juſtly reply, That the ſentiments and motives of that Court of Directors were as well, or better known to the Gentlemen of that Council than to myſelf. I attempted not to ſurprize them into that meaſure; I laid what I thought an equitable ſtate of the caſe before them. They took it into ſerious conſideration, gave a careful peruſal to every letter which reached them that year by the Warren; and on the whole, were of opinion, they contained not a ſyllable that contradicted their giving me that emolument. To this I may add, the Gentlemen of Council would have paid a very bad compliment to the ſentiments and motives which dictated the General Letter of the 11th of April, 1758, if they had ſurmiſed, the Court's intention was to diveſt me of any emolument annexed to the poſt which the rank they deigned to give me regularly brought me to, eſpecially when that Letter not only puſhed me from the top of the Council to the bottom, but alſo diveſted me of a poſt which I had filled near five years, and to which the ſame Directors had but the year before annexed, (to me particularly) a ſalary of 6,000 Rupees per annum, as a reward for my integrity and juſt conduct in the due execution thereof.

Touching the high reſentment of the Court of Directors, at " my weak and preſumptuous conduct, for joining in conſultation with the Captains and Officers of the Warren," as ſet forth in the 147 paragraph, I with all humility kiſs the rod, and confeſs it was out of my province to meddle with ſuch a ſubject. From this ſtep I cannot exculpate myſelf, but by averring, I had no motive to urge me, but the welfare and ſafety of the ſhip, the Company's effects, and the troops on board. This plea, I know, will avail me little before judges, who have already, and at random, loaded me with

the heavy charge of influencing the Captain to diſobey their orders, from ſelfiſh proſpects of my own. Surely, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, I ſhall not give offence, when I ſay, this charge has neither truth or probability to ſupport it. The Captain and his Officers had formed their reſolutions, *a priori*, without my interfering directly or indirectly; ſo that I cannot be ſaid to have influenced their councils. To this Captain Glover will witneſs, if he has regard to truth, which I will not doubt: And he was under no obligation of regarding my concurrence or non-concurrence, which I do ſuppoſe would not have varied his meaſures; howſoever that might have been, he intreated me and Captain Drake to hear the reaſons which determined him to the Bay, and give our opinions thereon; to which we aſſented: And from the face both of the inſtructions and orders received from the Court of Directors, and the intelligence received from *Ceylon*, which he had laid before us, I then was of opinion, as I am to this hour, that he and his officers acted a faithful and judicious part; and I ſcrupled not to ſign to that opinion, though I own it was an ill-judged compliance, conſidering, as the Court juſtly obſerves, my "intereſted ſituation," when I might have known that every handle which could be trumped up, would be ſeized on to my prejudice, to give a colour and plea for injuſtice. Had I not renounced my then ſelfiſh proſpects, my opinion would have been very different. The Gentlemen themſelves knew, they had taken care my ſelfiſh proſpects at the Bay could be of little eſtimation to me, and that it was totally a matter of indifference to me or mine, whether I arrived there a month ſooner or later. On the contrary, it was to me an intereſting event the touching at Madraſs, as by not doing it I was a loſer to the amount of near 2000 l. for the truth of which the Gentlemen may,

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if they pleaſe, apply to Meſſrs. Muilman, Solomon, and Adams of London, to ſay nothing of ſome other very ſelfiſh proſpects which might probably have been the conſequence of my touching at that Port; but all theſe I renounced when the intereſts of my employers came in competition: And adequate has been my reward, as well in this as in every other endeavour to ſerve them.—The Court of Directors are pleaſed to cloſe this paragraph with ſaying, "They are not willing to remember paſt tranſactions; but caution me to "be more guarded in future; for perhaps by my "influence the diſtreſſes of Madraſs were increaſed, "and an unhappy Commander ruined." That the honourable the Court of Directors ſhould be unwilling to remember paſt tranſactions, (reſpecting me) I do not wonder at; the reaſons are obvious and ſtriking to the whole world! However, I humbly tranſmit them my thanks for their gracious precaution, which follows *in terrorem*; but I have the pleaſure of thinking, that long before this they are convinced it was quite thrown away. That my influence increaſed the diſtreſſes of Madraſs, and ruined an unhappy Commander; are moſt ſevere inſinuations, and require diſtinct paragraphs for reply, as the word—*perhaps*,—by no means extenuates the intended venom of the charge.

It would give me the deepeſt affliction, had I been the cauſe of increaſing the diſtreſſes of Madraſs, even by an error in judgment. If the Warren's proceeding to the Bay really had that effect, for ſhe had no money, and as I remember but 60 men, it cannot, however, be laid at my door, with the leaſt ſhadow of juſtice. But I know that (trifling as the number of troops were) the ſhip's arrival here, at the critical time ſhe did, had a very neceſſary effect on the Government of the Provinces, which was then in Secret Treaty with

the Dutch, taking the advantage of our great weakneſs, cauſed by the expedition to the Southward, under Colonel Ford; and we had great reaſon to think it gave for ſome time a very ſeaſonable check to their Councils, as the troops were, with good ſucceſs, ſwelled by us to ſix times their real number.

That I ſhould be deemed the cauſe of an unhappy Commander's ruin, is a charge which gives me more real concern than any other the Court of Directors have been pleaſed to load me with.—To wipe off this cruel aſperſion, I am under a neceſſity of tranſcribing part of Captain Glover's laſt Letter to me from Madraſs, under date the 2d of November, 1759, which will, I hope, not only ſet his own honour and honeſty in a clear light, but alſo further evince, that I had not thoſe ſelfiſh proſpects in view with which I have been ſo groſsly accuſed.——After intreating I would write to my friends in his favour, He goes on, "I need "not mention to Mr. Holwell what is neceſſary, "as he is a much better judge than I am; and ſhall "only hint one thing that will be of ſervice.— "They lay the blame entirely on this,—That you "and I were concerned together, and wanted to "puſh for the firſt ſhip at the Bay, to make our "market;—or this—that you wanted not to come "here; and my being a good-natured man (meaning, as I ſuppoſe, a ſoft one, or rather a fool) "you over-perſuaded me to go immediately to "Bengal. Now, Sir, I aſſure you, that I have "acted as an honeſt man in regard to this affair; "and no more than what I ought, as I am very "certain of its falſhood, and tell every body "where I go, that you never was the man that "concerned yourſelf with any thing relating to the "ſhip, or where I went; and that you had con-"cerns at Madraſs; that you would have been

"very

" very glad to have gone there, which is, I be-
" lieve, the truth; and I ſhall ever abide by it."

The very ſhameful ſuppoſition, which Captain Glover mentions above, of my being concerned with him, and which ſeems to have been taken up by the Court of Directors, and appears the groundwork of their charging me with theſe ſelfiſh proſpects, is almoſt unworthy my notice, though its confutation is in my power, from a thouſand proofs. It is only for your ſatisfaction, Gentlemen, that, on my honour, I ſolemnly aver, I never had a concern with that Gentleman, directly or indirectly, to the value of a ſhilling. I am, with true reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obliged and obedient humble ſervant,

J. Z. H.

In the foregoing letter you ſee two charges laid againſt this gentleman, the one touching the ſalary annexed to the poſt of Import Warehouſe-Keeper; the other, his influencing Capt. Glover, commander of the Warren, to paſs the port of Madraſs, and ſtand directly for Bengal. As to the firſt, a debate in full Council was had, on the terms of the Court of Directors letters, when it was agreed to continue the ſalary to this gentleman; and it was paid to him accordingly, ſo long as he remained at the head of that office.

Touching the ſecond charge, let it be remarked, that notwithſtanding Capt. Glover had been diveſted of his ſhip by the Preſidency of Fort St. George, your Court of Directors, on his return home, thought his conduct ſo juſtifiable, that he was again reſtored to a command in your ſervice.

Mr. Holwell (contrary to the laboured intentions of your Court of Directors) arrived at laſt to the head of your affairs in Bengal. In this capacity,

how anxious his ſituation, (may be ſeen in his Addreſs) much more to be pitied than envied. Though he was himſelf, immediately after Colonel Clive's departure, plunged in the heavieſt difficulties, to ſupport a government overwhelmed in confuſion, and the public tranſactions of that active and turbulent period were apparently ſufficient to employ the attention and genius of any one man, yet did he find leiſure (to the loſs of his health and peace) to ſuperintend every the minuteſt branch of your private concerns and intereſts. He had the addreſs to diſcover an injurious confederacy in the execution of your new works of fortifications, commenced a proſecution againſt the parties concerned, diſdained a bribe of 10,000 l. to drop that proſecution, and might have gained treble that ſum, had he ſhewed the leaſt propenſity to come to any compromiſe with the delinquents. The frauds he traced amounted to near 50,000 l. the greateſt part of which he ſaw refunded, and ſecurity taken for the reſt, before he was ſuperſeded in your government. For proof of theſe facts, we ſubjoin the following vouchers.

COPY *of a Minute of Council, the* 14*th* July, 1760, *touching Frauds in the new Works.*

" The Preſident, during the whole courſe of " this ſcrutiny, having ſhewn the moſt unwearied " application in bringing to light the frauds " hitherto diſcovered, and given the higheſt proof " of his integrity, in refuſing a bribe of eighty " thouſand Rupees, and paying it into the trea- " ſury, as a ſmall recompence for the frauds com- " mitted."

" Reſolved, That the thanks of this Board be " returned to him, on behalf of our Honourable " Employers."

COPY *of 195th Paragraph of Governor* Vanſittart's *and his Council's General Letter to the Court of Directors, under Date the 16th of* January, 1761.

" In the former part of this letter, concerning " the frauds committed in the new works, we " mentioned the ſums confeſſed by Govindram " Goze, and Captain Brohier; and that ſeveral " ſums had been paid in, on that account: Be- " ſides theſe, the ſum of 80,000 Rupees was pri- " vately preſented to Mr. Holwell, (ſuppoſed by " thoſe concerned in the affair) with a view of " prevailing on him (who alone was acquainted " with the diſcovery) to drop the proſecution; " the ſum was paid by him into the treaſury, and " carried likewiſe to the credit of—*Over Charges*, " the New Works, *but was not accounted* as a part " of the ſums for which the delinquents were an- " ſwerable. Mr. Holwell, through the whole courſe " of this enquiry, ſhewed a diligence and atten- " tion, for which he received the thanks of the " Board, and merits likewiſe your particular " notice."

COPY *of Mr.* Holwell's *laſt Letter to the Board of* Calcutta.

To the Honourable Henry Vanſittart, *Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of* Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs, September 29th, 1760.

" THE many unmerited, and conſequently un- " juſt, marks of reſentment, which I have " lately received from the preſent Court of Direc- " tors, will not ſuffer me longer to hold a ſervice, " in the courſe of which, my ſteady and unwearied

" zeal

" zeal for the honour and intereſt of the Company,
" might have expected a more equitable return.—
" Permit me, therefore, Gentlemen, to reſign the
" Service; and at the ſame time to requeſt the
" favour of your indulgence to reſide in Bengal,
" until I can fully collect my ſcattered concerns in
" trade, previous to my quitting India.—Herein
" you will lay an obligation on him, who is (with
" true reſpect, as well as moſt ſanguine wiſhes for
" the honour and ſucceſs of this Board, and proſ-
" perity of the ſettlement,)

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient, humble ſervant,

J. Z. HOLWELL.

Copy of the Minute in Council of the 29th of September, 1760, *on receipt of the foregoing Letter.*

" MR. Holwell lays before the Board a letter,
" requeſting leave to reſign the ſervice, and
" permiſſion to reſide in Bengal, until he can fully
" collect his concerns in trade.

" Agreed Mr. Holwell's requeſt be complied
" with, though the Board are concerned at the
" departure of ſo valuable a member. Ordered
" this letter be entered after this day's conſul-
" tation."

For the truth of the ſeveral facts, vouchers, and quotations, here laid before you, we appeal to the records of Leadenhall-ſtreet.

Thus have we compleated our undertaking, *viz.* the Vindication of Mr. Holwell's character, and at the ſame time ſhewn from inconteſtible facts, the eminent benefits you have received from his ſteady zeal and integrity; benefits that juſtly demanded your higheſt notice and gratitude. How

muſt

muſt your Court of Directors appear (to the impartial?)—They have been often laviſh of their *public thanks and praiſes* to ſome of your ſervants, whilſt this gentleman (who from the firſt to the laſt hour he had a ſeat in your Councils abroad, never ceaſed *ſucceſsfully* labouring for *your good*) was ſo ſhamefully neglected, nay, "evil entreated."

We cloſe this addreſs by a ſhort recapitulation of Mr. Holwell's nine years ſervices, and in a juſt eſtimate lay before you at one view the ſum total added to your eſtate, for which you are (in ſome Items *ſolely*, and in the others *chiefly*) indebted to Mr. Holwell's ſagacity, integrity, and application, viz.

Zemindary Calcutta — —		10,000
Zemindary of the 24th Purgannah		60,000
Lands ceded by Mhir Coſſin Aly Khan, chiefly by Mr. Holwell's influence over him		700,000
	£.	770,000 per ann.

The ſum ſent to Mr. Holwell's houſe in his abſence on the evening of the 13th July, 1760, to engage him to drop the proſecution of the frauds in the fortifications, (the perſons who ſent it, not preciſely known) was by him the next morning preſented to the Company, and paid into your treaſury, viz. — — — — — 10,000

Frauds traced and proved by Mr. Holwell, and ſince brought to your credit		50,000
	£.	60,000

We are ſenſible that the lands ceded by Coſſin Aly Khan, have been commonly valued only at 600,000 *l.* per annum, but we know their real net value is as above eſtimated.

A GENUINE

NARRATIVE

OF THE

DEPLORABLE DEATHS

OF THE

ENGLISH GENTLEMEN, and Others, who were ſuffocated in the BLACK HOLE in FORT-WILLIAM, at CALCUTTA, in the Kingdom of BENGAL; in the Night ſucceeding the 20th Day of JUNE, 1756.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

By J. Z. HOLWELL, Eſq.

——————— *Quæque ipſe miſerrima vidi,*
Et quorum pars magna fui. Quis talia fando,
Myrmidonum, Dolopumve, aut duri miles Ulyſſei
Temperet a lachrymis?

Virg. Æneid. Lib. ii.

TO THE

READER.

THE following narrative will appear, upon peruſal, to be a ſimple detail of a moſt melancholy event, delivered in the genuine language of ſincere concern, in a letter to a friend; from whom the greateſt kindneſſes had been received, and in whom the greateſt confidence was placed. It was written on board the veſſel in which the author returned from the Eaſt-Indies, when he had leiſure to reflect, and was at liberty to throw upon paper, what was too ſtrongly impreſſed upon his memory, ever to wear out. If therefore it appears in ſome places a little paſſionate; in others ſomewhat diffuſe; and, through the whole, tinctured with that diſpoſition under which it was written; the occaſion, and the nature of the performance, will ſufficiently excuſe what might have been conſidered as imperfections, if it had been intended for the public view; and which may perhaps be conſidered in another light, now, that through a train of unforeſeen accidents, it comes to appear in print.

The ſubject being of a very mixed nature, and ſomething more than a bare relation of private calamity, rendered many people curious to ſee it, when it was once known, that ſuch a paper exiſted; and as there was nothing contained in it, that required either

either much ſecrecy, or circumſpection, it has been freely communicated to ſeveral, and amongſt thoſe, to ſome perſons of the firſt diſtinction; who thought it might gratify public expectation, more eſpecially if it appeared in the ſame natural and undiſguiſed dreſs, in which they had ſeen it; for truth, and more eſpecially ſo affecting a truth, ſtands little in need of ornament, and appears to more advantage, the leſs it is aſſiſted by the arts of writing, to which the author being a ſtranger, he truſted to his feeling, and endeavoured to expreſs by his pen, the emotions of his heart. He the more readily yielded to this requeſt of his friends, from the following motives, which, as they wrought much upon him, may poſſibly have ſome weight with you.

It is ſomewhat rare, to find tranſactions of an extraordinary nature delivered circumſtantially by thoſe who are not only acquainted with, but were alſo actors in them, whilſt the matter is freſh in their minds, and conſequently, when they are fitteſt to give a clear, connected, and impartial account. This therefore having been his original intention, though for the ſatisfaction only of a private friend; yet, when called upon to make it public, it appeared to him a very perſuaſive argument, as he was conſcious to himſelf, that he had written it with the ſtricteſt regard to veracity, in every point, and to diſburthen his thoughts of that load of affliction, which would have been as intolerable as the misfortune itſelf, if both had not been qualified by the remembrance of that mercy by which he was delivered, and which ſeemed to claim a grateful return of public acknowledgment, for ſo peculiar a deliverance.

He was farther moved, by the conſideration that there are ſome ſcenes in real life ſo full of miſery and horror, that the boldeſt imagination would not dare to feign them, for fear of ſhocking credibility.

He

He thought ſuch ſcenes as theſe could not be permitted, by a wiſe, a beneficent Being, but for the ſake of their becoming leſſons to mankind; and he therefore concluded, that this intention could never be better anſwered, than by conſenting to render them public; that by this means, a door of hope, and of confidence, may be opened, to ſuch as may hereafter fall under like tryals, by giving them an inſtance (and ſure a ſtronger cannot well be given), that we ought never to deſpair, when innocence and duty have been the cauſes of our diſtreſs.

A

LETTER

FROM

J. Z. HOLWELL, Eſq.

TO

Wm. DAVIS, Eſq.

From on board the SYREN-SLOOP, the 28th of February, 1757.

DEAR SIR,

THE confuſion which the late capture of the Eaſt-India Company's ſettlements in Bengal muſt neceſſarily excite in the city of London, will, I fear, be not a little heightened by the miſerable deaths of the greateſt part of thoſe gentlemen, who were reduced to the ſad neceſſity of ſurrendering themſelves priſoners at diſcretion in Fort William.

By narratives made public you will only know, that of one hundred and forty-ſix priſoners, one hundred and twenty-three were ſmothered in the Black-Hole priſon, in the night of the 20th of June, 1756. Few ſurvived capable of giving any detail of the manner in which it happened; and of

theſe I believe none have attempted it: for my own part, I have often ſat down with this reſolution, and as often relinquiſhed the melancholy taſk, not only from the diſturbance and affliction it raiſed a-freſh in my remembrance, but from the conſideration of the impoſſibility of finding language capable of raiſing an adequate idea of the horrors of the ſcene I eſſayed to draw. But as I believe the annals of the world cannot produce an incident like it in any degree or proportion to all the diſmal circumſtances attending it, and as my own health of body and peace of mind are once again, in a great meaſure, recovered from the injuries they ſuffered from that fatal night, I cannot allow it to be buried in oblivion; though ſtill conſcious, that however high the colouring my retentive memory may ſupply, it will fall infinitely ſhort of the horrors accompanying this ſcene. Theſe defects muſt, and I doubt not, will be aſſiſted by your own humane and benevolent imagination; in the exerciſe of which I never knew you deficient, where unmerited diſtreſs was the object.

The ſea-air has already had that ſalutary effect on my conſtitution I expected; and my mind enjoys a calm it has been many months a ſtranger to, ſtrengthened by a clear chearful ſky and atmoſphere, joined to an unuſual pleaſant gale, with which we are paſſing the equinoctial. I can now, therefore, look back with leſs agitation on the dreadful night I am going to deſcribe; and with a grateful heart ſincerely acknowledge, and deeply revere that Providence, which alone could have preſerved me through that and all my ſucceeding ſufferings and hazards.

Before I conduct you into the Black-Hole, it is neceſſary you ſhould be acquainted with a few introductory

introductory circumſtances. The Suba * and his troops were in poſſeſſion of the fort before ſix in the evening. I had in all three interviews with him: the laſt in Durbar † before ſeven, when he repeated his aſſurances to me, *on the word of a ſoldier*, that no harm ſhould come to us; and indeed I believe his orders were only general, That we ſhould for that night be ſecured; and that what followed was the reſult of revenge and reſentment in the breaſts of the lower Jemmaatdaars ‡, to whoſe cuſtody we were delivered, for the number of their order killed during the ſiege. Be this as it may, as ſoon as it was dark, we were all, without diſtinction, directed by the guard over us, to collect ourſelves into one body, and ſit down quietly under the arched Veranda or piazza, to the weſt of the Black-Hole priſon, and the barracks to the left of the court of guard; and juſt over-againſt the windows of the governor's eaſterly apartments. Beſides the guard over us, another was placed at the foot of the ſtairs at the ſouth end of this Veranda, leading up to the ſouth-eaſt baſtion, to prevent any of us eſcaping that way. On the parade (where you will remember the two twenty-four pounders ſtood) were alſo drawn up about four or five hundred gun-men with lighted matches.

At this time the factory was in flames to the right and left of us; to the right the Armory and Laboratory; to the left the Carpenter's yard: though at this time we imagined it was the Cotta-warehouſes ‖. Various were our conjectures on this appearance; the fire advanced with rapidity on both ſides; and it was the prevailing opinion, that they intended ſuffocating us between the two fires: and

* Suzajud-Dowla, viceroy of Bengal, Bakar, and Orixa.
† In council. ‡ An officer of the rank of Serjeant.
‖ The Company's cloth warehouſes.

this notion was confirmed by the appearance, about half an hour paſt ſeven, of ſome officers and people with lighted torches in their hands, who went into all the apartments under the eaſterly curtain to the right of us; to which we apprehended they were ſetting fire, to expedite their ſcheme of burning us. On this we preſently came to a reſolution, of ruſhing on the guard, ſeizing their ſcymitars, and attacking the troops upon the parade, rather than be thus tamely roaſted to death. But to be ſatisfied of their intentions, I advanced, at the requeſt of Meſſrs. Baillie, Jenks, and Revely, to ſee if they were really ſetting fire to the apartments, and found the contrary; for in fact, as it appeared afterwards, they were only ſearching for a place to confine us in; the laſt they examined being the barracks of the court of guard behind us.

Here I muſt detain you a little, to do honour to the memory of a man, to whom I had in many inſtances been a friend, and who, on this occaſion, demonſtrated his ſenſibility of it in a degree worthy of a much higher rank. His name was Leech, the Company's ſmith, as well as clerk of the pariſh; this man had made his eſcape when the Moors entered the fort, and returned juſt as it was dark, to tell me he had provided a boat, and would enſure my eſcape, if I would follow him through a paſſage few were acquainted with, and by which he had then entered. (This might eaſily have been accompliſhed, as the guard put over us took but very ſlight notice of us.) I thanked him in the beſt terms I was able; but told him it was a ſtep I could not prevail on myſelf to take, as I ſhould thereby very ill repay the attachment the gentlemen and the garriſon had ſhewn to me; and, that I was reſolved to ſhare their fate, be it what it would: but preſſed him to ſecure his own eſcape without

without loſs of time; to which he gallantly replied, that "then he was reſolved to ſhare mine, "and would not leave me."

To myſelf and the world I ſhould ſurely have ſtood excuſed in embracing the overture abovementioned, could I have conceived what immediately followed; for I had ſcarce time to make him an anſwer, before we obſerved part of the guard drawn up on the parade, advance to us with the officers who had been viewing the rooms. They ordered us all to riſe and go into the barracks to the left of the court of guard. The barracks, you may remember, have a large wooden platform for the ſoldiers to ſleep on, and are open to the weſt by arches and a ſmall parapet-wall, correſponding to the arches of the Veranda without. In we went moſt readily, and were pleaſing ourſelves with the proſpect of paſſing a comfortable night on the platform, little dreaming of the infernal apartments in reſerve for us. For we were no ſooner all within the barracks, than the guard advanced to the inner arches and parapet-wall; and, with their muſkets preſented, ordered us to go into the room at the ſouthermoſt end of the barracks, commonly called the Black-Hole priſon; whilſt others from the Court of Guard, with clubs and drawn ſcymitars, preſſed upon thoſe of us next to them. This ſtroke was ſo ſudden, ſo unexpected, and the throng and preſſure ſo great upon us next the door of the Black-Hole priſon, there was no reſiſting it; but like one agitated wave impelling another, we were obliged to give way and enter; the reſt followed like a torrent, few amongſt us, the ſoldiers excepted, having the leaſt idea of the dimenſions or nature of a place we had never ſeen: for if we had, we ſhould at all events have ruſhed upon the guard, and been, as the leſſer evil, by our own choice cut to pieces.

Amongſt the firſt that entered, were myſelf, Meſſrs. Baillie, Jenks, Cooke, T. Coles, Enſign Scot, Revely, Law, Buchanan, &c. I got poſſeſſion of the window neareſt the door, and took Meſſrs. Coles and Scot into the window with me, they being both wounded (the firſt I believe mortally). The reſt of the above-mentioned gentlemen were cloſe round me. It was now about eight o'clock.

Figure to yourſelf, my friend, if poſſible, the ſituation of a hundred and forty-ſix wretches, exhauſted by continual fatigue and action, thus crammed together in a cube of about eighteen feet, in a cloſe ſultry night, in Bengal, ſhut up to the eaſtward and ſouthward (the only quarters from whence air could reach us) by dead walls, and by a wall and door to the north, open only to the weſtward by two windows, ſtrongly barred with iron, from which we could receive ſcarce any the leaſt circulation of freſh air.

What muſt enſue, appeared to me in lively and dreadful colours, the inſtant I caſt my eyes round, and ſaw the ſize and ſituation of the room. Many unſucceſsful attempts were made to force the door; for having nothing but our hands to work with, and the door opening inward, all endeavours were vain and fruitleſs.

Obſerving every one giving way to the violence of paſſions, which I foreſaw muſt be fatal to them, I requeſted ſilence might be preſerved, whilſt I ſpoke to them, and in the moſt pathetic and moving terms which occurred, "I begged and intreated, that as they had paid a ready obedience to me in the day, they would now for their own ſakes, and the ſakes of thoſe who were dear to them, and were intereſted in the preſervation of their lives, regard the advice I had to give them. I aſſured them, the return of day would give us air and liberty;

urged

urged to them, that the only chance we had left for ſuſtaining this misfortune, and ſurviving the night, was the preſerving a calm mind and quiet reſignation to our fate; intreating them to curb, as much as poſſible, every agitation of mind and body, as raving and giving a looſe to their paſſions could anſwer no purpoſe, but that of haſtening their deſtruction."

This remonſtrance produced a ſhort interval of peace, and gave me a few minutes for reflection: though even this pauſe was not a little diſturbed by the cries and groans of the many wounded, and more particularly of my two companions in the window. Death, attended with the moſt cruel train of circumſtances, I plainly perceived muſt prove our inevitable deſtiny. I had ſeen this common migration in too many ſhapes, and accuſtomed myſelf to think on the ſubject with too much propriety to be alarmed at the proſpect, and indeed felt much more for my wretched companions than myſelf.

Amongſt the guards poſted at the windows, I obſerved an old Jemmautdaar near me, who ſeemed to carry ſome compaſſion for us in his countenance; and indeed he was the only one of the many in his ſtation, who diſcovered the leaſt trace of humanity. I called him to me, and in the moſt perſuaſive terms I was capable, urged him to commiſerate the ſufferings he was a witneſs to, and preſſed him to endeavour to get us ſeparated, half in one place, and half in another; and that he ſhould in the morning receive a thouſand Rupees for this act of tenderneſs. He promiſed he would attempt it, and withdrew; but in a few minutes returned, and told me it was impoſſible. I then thought I had been deficient in my offer, and promiſed him two thouſand. He withdrew a ſecond time, but returned ſoon, and (with I believe much

real

real pity and concern) told me, it was not practicable; that it could not be done but by the Suba's orders, and that no one dared awake him.

During this interval, though their paſſions were leſs violent, their uneaſineſs increaſed. We had been but few minutes confined, before every one fell into a perſpiration ſo profuſe, you can form no idea of it. This conſequently brought on a raging thirſt, which ſtill increaſed, in proportion as the body was drained of its moiſture.

Various expedients were thought of to give more room and air. To obtain the former, it was moved to put off their cloaths. This was approved as a happy motion, and in a few minutes I believe every man was ſtripped (myſelf, Mr. Court, and the two wounded young gentlemen by me, excepted). For a little time they flattered themſelves with having gained a mighty advantage; every hat was put in motion, to produce a circulation of air; and Mr. Baillie propoſed that every man ſhould ſit down on his hams. As they were truly in the ſituation of drowning wretches, no wonder they caught at every thing that bore a flattering appearance of ſaving them. This expedient was ſeveral times put in practice, and at each time many of the poor creatures, whoſe natural ſtrength was leſs than others, or had been more exhauſted, and could not immediately recover their legs, as others did, when the word was given to RISE, fell to riſe no more; for they were inſtantly trod to death, or ſuffocated. When the whole body ſat down, they were ſo cloſely wedged together, that they were obliged to uſe many efforts, before they could put themſelves in motion to get up again.

Before nine o'clock every man's thirſt grew intolerable, and reſpiration difficult. Our ſituation was much more wretched than that of ſo many miſerable

animals in an exhauſted receiver; no circulation of freſh air ſufficient to continue life, nor yet enough diveſted of its vivifying particles to put a ſpeedy period to it.

Efforts were again made to force the door, but in vain. Many inſults were uſed to the guard, to provoke them to fire in upon us (which, as I learned afterwards, were carried to much greater lengths, when I was no more ſenſible of what was tranſacted). For my own part, I hitherto felt little pain or uneaſineſs, but what reſulted from my anxiety for the ſufferings of thoſe within. By keeping my face between two of the bars, I obtained air enough to give my lungs eaſy play, tho' my perſpiration was exceſſive, and thirſt commencing. At this period, ſo ſtrong an urinous volatile effluvia came from the priſon, that I was not able to turn my head that way, for more than a few ſeconds of time.

Now every body, excepting thoſe ſituated in and near the windows, began to grow outragious, and many delirious: *Water*, *Water*, became the general cry. And the old Jemmautdaar, before mentioned, taking pity on us, ordered the people to bring ſome ſkins of water, little dreaming, I believe, of its fatal effects. This was what I dreaded. I foreſaw it would prove the ruin of the ſmall chance left us, and eſſayed many times to ſpeak to him privately to forbid its being brought; but the clamour was ſo loud, it became impoſſible. The water appeared. Words cannot paint to you the univerſal agitation and raving the ſight of it threw us into. I had flattered myſelf that ſome, by preſerving an equal temper of mind, might outlive the night; but now the reflection which gave me the greateſt pain, was, that I ſaw no poſſibility of one eſcaping to tell the diſmal tale.

Until

Until the water came, I had myſelf not ſuffered much from thirſt, which inſtantly grew exceſſive. We had no means of conveying it into the priſon, but by hats forced through the bars; and thus myſelf, and Meſſrs. Coles and Scot (notwithſtanding the pains they ſuffered from their wounds) ſupplied them as faſt as poſſible. But thoſe, who have experienced intenſe thirſt, or are acquainted with the cauſe and nature of this appetite, will be ſufficiently ſenſible it could receive no more than a momentary alleviation; the cauſe ſtill ſubſiſted. Though we brought full hats within the bars, there enſued ſuch violent ſtruggles, and frequent conteſts, to get at it, that before it reached the lips of any one, there would be ſcarcely a ſmall tea-cup full left in them. Theſe ſupplies, like ſprinkling water on fire, only ſerved to feed and raiſe the flame.

Oh! my dear Sir, how ſhall I give you a conception of what I felt at the cries and ravings of thoſe in the remoter parts of the priſon, who could not entertain a probable hope of obtaining a drop, yet could not diveſt themſelves of expectation, however unavailing! And others calling on me by the tender conſiderations of friendſhip and affection, and who knew they were really dear to me. Think, if poſſible, what my heart muſt have ſuffered at ſeeing and hearing their diſtreſs, without having it in my power to relieve them; for the confuſion now became general and horrid. Several quitted the other window (the only chance they had for life) to force their way to the water, and the throng and preſs upon the window was beyond bearing; many forcing their paſſage from the further part of the room, preſſed down thoſe in their way, who had leſs ſtrength, and trampled them to death.

Can it gain belief, that this ſcene of miſery proved entertainment to the brutal wretches without? But ſo it was; and they took care to keep us ſupplied with water, that they might have the ſatisfaction of ſeeing us fight for it, as they phraſed it, and held up lights to the bars, that they might loſe no part of the inhuman diverſion.

From about nine to near eleven, I ſuſtained this cruel ſcene and painful ſituation, ſtill ſupplying them with water, though my legs were almoſt broke with the weight againſt them. By this time I myſelf was very near preſſed to death, and my two companions, with Mr. William Parker, (who had forced himſelf into the window) were *really* ſo.

For a great while they preſerved a reſpect and regard to me, more than indeed I could well expect, our circumſtances conſidered; but now all diſtinction was loſt. My friend Baillie, Meſſrs. Jenks, Revely, Law, Buchanan, Simſon, and ſeveral others, for whom I had a real eſteem and affection, had for ſome time been dead at my feet, and were now trampled upon by every corporal or common ſoldier, who, by the help of more robuſt conſtitutions, had forced their way to the window, and held faſt by the bars over me, till at laſt I became ſo preſſed and wedged up, I was deprived of all motion.

Determined now to give every thing up, I called to them, and begged, as the laſt inſtance of their regard, they would remove the preſſure upon me, and permit me to retire out of the window, to die in quiet. They gave way; and with much difficulty I forced a paſſage into the center of the priſon, where the throng was leſs by the many dead, (then I believe amounting to one-third) and the numbers who flocked to the windows; for by this time they had water alſo at the other window.

In

In the Black-Hole there is a platform * corresponding with that in the barracks: I travelled over the dead, and repaired to the further end of it, juſt oppoſite the other window, and ſeated myſelf on the platform between Mr. Dumbleton and Capt. Stevenſon, the former juſt then expiring. I was ſtill happy in the ſame calmneſs of mind I had preſerved the whole time; death I expected as unavoidable, and only lamented its ſlow approach, though the moment I quitted the window, my breathing grew ſhort and painful.

Here my poor friend Mr. Edward Eyre came ſtaggering over the dead to me, and with his uſual coolneſs and good-nature, aſked me how I did? but fell and expired before I had time to make him a reply. I laid myſelf down on ſome of the dead behind me, on the platform; and recommending myſelf to heaven, had the comfort of thinking my ſufferings could have no long duration.

My thirſt grew now inſupportable, and difficulty of breathing much increaſed; and I had not remained in this ſituation, I believe, ten minutes, when I was ſeized with a pain in my breaſt, and palpitation of my heart, both to the moſt exquiſite degree. Theſe rouſed and obliged me to get up again; but ſtill the pain, palpitation, thirſt, and difficulty of breathing increaſed. I retained my ſenſes notwithſtanding, and had the grief to ſee death not ſo near me as I hoped; but could no longer bear the pains I ſuffered without attempting a relief, which I knew freſh air would and could only give me. I inſtantly determined to puſh for the window oppoſite to me; and by an effort of double the ſtrength I ever before poſſeſſed, gained the

* This platform was raiſed between three and four feet from the floor, open underneath: it extended the whole length of the eaſt ſide of the priſon, and was about ſix feet wide.

the third rank at it, with one hand ſeized a bar, and by that means gained a ſecond, though I think there were at leaſt ſix or ſeven ranks between me and the window.

In a few moments my pain, palpitation, and difficulty of breathing ceaſed; but my thirſt continued intolerable. I called aloud for "WATER "FOR GOD'S SAKE:" had been concluded dead; but as ſoon as they heard me amongſt them, they had ſtill the reſpect and tenderneſs for me, to cry out, "GIVE HIM WATER, GIVE HIM WATER!" nor would one of them at the window attempt to touch it until I had drank. But from the water I found no relief; my thirſt was rather increaſed by it; ſo I determined to drink no more, but patiently wait the event; and kept my mouth moiſt from time to time by ſucking the perſpiration out of my ſhirt-ſleeves, and catching the drops as they fell, like heavy rain from my head and face: you can hardly imagine how unhappy I was if any of them eſcaped my mouth.

I came into the priſon without coat or waiſtcoat; the ſeaſon was too hot to bear the former, and the latter tempted the avarice of one of the guards, who robbed me of it when we were under the Veranda. Whilſt I was at this ſecond window, I was obſerved by one of my miſerable companions on the right of me, in the expedient of allaying my thirſt by ſucking my ſhirt-ſleeve. He took the hint, and robbed me from time to time of a conſiderable part of my ſtore; though after I detected him, I had ever the addreſs to begin on that ſleeve firſt, when I thought my reſervoirs were ſufficiently repleniſhed; and our mouths and noſes often met in the conteſt. This plunderer, I found afterwards, was a worthy young gentleman in the ſervice, Mr. Luſhington, one of the few who eſcaped from death, and ſince paid me the compliment of aſſuring

ing me, he believed he owed his life to the many comfortable draughts he had from my ſleeves. I mention this incident, as I think nothing can give you a more lively idea of the melancholy ſtate and diſtreſs we were reduced to. Before I hit upon this happy expedient, I had, in an ungovernable fit of thirſt, attempted drinking my urine; but it was ſo intenſely bitter there was no enduring a ſecond taſte, whereas no Briſtol water could be more ſoft or pleaſant than what aroſe from perſpiration.

By half an hour paſt eleven the much greater number of thoſe living were in an outrageous delirium, and the others quite ungovernable; few retaining any calmneſs, but the ranks next the windows. By what I had felt myſelf, I was fully ſenſible what thoſe within ſuffered; but had only pity to beſtow upon them, not then thinking how ſoon I ſhould myſelf become a greater object of it.

They all now found, that water, inſtead of relieving, rather heightened their uneaſineſſes; and, "AIR, AIR," was the general cry. Every inſult that could be deviſed againſt the guard, all the opprobrious names and abuſe that the Suba, Monickchund *, &c. could be loaded with, were repeated to provoke the guard to fire upon us, every man that could, ruſhing tumultuouſly towards the windows with eager hopes of meeting the firſt ſhot. Then a general prayer to heaven, to haſten the approach of the flames to the right and left of us, and put a period to our miſery. But theſe failing, they whoſe ſtrength and ſpirits were quite exhauſted, laid themſelves down and expired quietly upon their fellows: others who had yet ſome ſtrength and vigour left, made a laſt effort for the windows, and ſeveral ſucceeded by leaping and ſcrambling

* Rajah Monickchund, appointed by the Suba Governor of Calcutta.

ſcrambling over the backs and heads of thoſe in the firſt ranks; and got hold of the bars, from which there was no removing them. Many to the right and left ſunk with the violent preſſure, and were ſoon ſuffocated; for now a ſteam aroſe from the living and the dead, which affected us in all its circumſtances, as if we were forcibly held with our heads over a bowl full of ſtrong volatile ſpirit of hartſhorn, until ſuffocated; nor could the effluvia of the one be diſtinguiſhed from the other; and frequently, when I was forced by the load upon my head and ſhoulders, to hold my face down, I was obliged, near as I was to the window, inſtantly to raiſe it again to eſcape ſuffocation.

I need not, my dear friend, aſk your commiſeration, when I tell you, that in this plight, from half an hour paſt eleven till near two in the morning, I ſuſtained the weight of a heavy man, with his knees in my back, and the preſſure of his whole body on my head. A Dutch ſerjeant, who had taken his ſeat upon my left ſhoulder, and a Topaz † bearing on my right; all which nothing could have enabled me long to ſupport, but the props and preſſure equally ſuſtaining me all around. The two latter I frequently diſlodged, by ſhifting my hold on the bars, and driving my knuckles into their ribs; but my friend above ſtuck faſt, and as he held by two bars, was immoveable.

When I had bore this conflict above an hour, with a train of wretched reflections, and ſeeing no glimpſe of hope on which to found a proſpect of relief, my ſpirits, reſolution, and every ſentiment of religion gave way. I found I was unable much longer to ſupport this trial, and could not bear the dreadful thoughts of retiring into the inner part of the priſon, where I had before ſuffered

† A black Chriſtian ſoldier: uſually termed ſubjects of Portugal.

ſo much. Some infernal ſpirit, taking the advantage of this period, brought to my remembrance my having a ſmall claſp penknife in my pocket, with which I determined inſtantly to open my arteries, and finiſh a ſyſtem no longer to be borne. I had got it out, when heaven interpoſed, and reſtored me to freſh ſpirits and reſolution, with an abhorrence of the act of cowardice I was juſt going to commit: I exerted a-new my ſtrength and fortitude; but the repeated trials and efforts I made to diſlodge the inſufferable incumbrances upon me at laſt quite exhauſted me, and towards two o'clock, finding I muſt quit the window, or ſink where I was, I reſolved on the former, having bore, truly for the ſake of others, infinitely more for life than the beſt of it is worth.

In the rank cloſe behind me was an officer of one of the ſhips, whoſe name was Carey, who had behaved with much bravery during the ſiege, (his wife, a fine woman though country-born, would not quit him, but accompanied him into the priſon, and was one who ſurvived.) This poor wretch had been long raving for water and air; I told him I was determined to give up life, and recommended his gaining my ſtation. On my quitting, he made a fruitleſs attempt to get my place; but the Dutch ſerjeant who ſat on my ſhoulder ſupplanted him.

Poor Carey expreſſed his thankfulneſs, and ſaid, he would give up life too; but it was with the utmoſt labour we forced our way from the window, (ſeveral in the inner ranks appearing to me dead ſtanding *.) He laid himſelf down to die: and his death, I believe, was very ſudden; for he was a ſhort, full, ſanguine man: his ſtrength was great, and I imagine, had he not retired with me, I ſhould never have been able to have forced my way.

I was

* Unable to fall by the throng and equal preſſure round.

I was at this time ſenſible of no pain and little uneaſineſs: I can give you no better idea of my ſituation than by repeating my ſimile of the bowl of ſpirit of hartſhorn. I found a ſtupor coming on a-pace, and laid myſelf down by that gallant old man, the reverend Mr. Jervas Bellamy, who lay dead with his ſon the lieutenant, hand in hand, near the ſouthermoſt wall of the priſon.

When I had lain there ſome little time, I ſtill had reflection enough to ſuffer ſome uneaſineſs in the thought, that I ſhould be trampled upon, when dead, as I myſelf had done to others. With ſome difficulty I raiſed myſelf, and gained the platform a ſecond time, where I preſently loſt all ſenſation: the laſt trace of ſenſibility that I have been able to recollect after my lying down, was my ſaſh being uneaſy about my waiſte, which I untied and threw from me.

Of what paſſed in this interval to the time of my reſurrection from this hole of horrors, I can give you no account; and indeed, the particulars mentioned by ſome of the gentlemen who ſurvived, (ſolely by the number of thoſe dead, by which they gained a freer acceſſion of air, and approach to the windows) were ſo exceſſively abſurd and contradictory, as to convince me, very few of them retained their ſenſes; or at leaſt, loſt them ſoon after they came into the open air, by the fever they carried out with them.

In my own eſcape from abſolute death the hand of heaven was manifeſtly exerted: the manner take as follows. When the day broke, and the gentlemen found that no intreaties could prevail to get the door opened, it occurred to one of them, (I think to Mr. ſecretary Cooke) to make a ſearch for me, in hopes I might have influence enough to gain a releaſe from this ſcene of miſery. Accordingly Meſſrs. Luſhington and Walcot undertook the ſearch, and

by my ſhirt diſcovered me under the dead upon the platform. They took me from thence; and imagining I had ſome ſigns of life, brought me toward the window I had firſt poſſeſſion of.

But as life was equally dear to every man, (and the ſtench ariſing from the dead bodies was grown intolerable) no one would give up his ſtation in or near the window: ſo they were obliged to carry me back again. But ſoon after Captain Mills (now captain of the company's yacht) who was in poſſeſſion of a ſeat in the window, had the humanity to offer to reſign it. I was again brought by the ſame gentlemen, and placed in the window.

At this juncture the Suba, who had received an account of the havock death had made amongſt us, ſent one of his Jemmautdaars to inquire if the chief ſurvived. They ſhewed me to him; told him I had appearance of life remaining, and believed I might recover if the door was opened very ſoon. This anſwer being returned to the Suba, an order came immediately for our releaſe, it being then near ſix in the morning.

The freſh air at the window ſoon brought me to life; and a few minutes after the departure of the Jemmautdaar, I was reſtored to my ſight and ſenſes. But oh! Sir, what words ſhall I adopt to tell you the whole that my ſoul ſuffered at reviewing the dreadful deſtruction round me? I will not attempt it; and indeed, tears (a tribute I believe I ſhall ever pay to the remembrance of this ſcene, and to the memory of thoſe brave and valuable men) ſtop my pen.

The little ſtrength remaining amongſt the moſt robuſt who ſurvived, made it a difficult taſk to remove the dead piled up againſt the door; ſo that I believe it was more than twenty minutes before we obtained a paſſage out for one at a time.

I had ſoon reaſon to be convinced the particular inquiry made after me did not reſult from any dictate of favour, humanity, or contrition; when I came out, I found myſelf in a high putrid fever, and, not being able to ſtand, threw myſelf on the wet graſs without the Veranda, when a meſſage was brought me, ſignifying I muſt immediately attend the Suba. Not being capable of walking, they were obliged to ſupport me under each arm; and on the way, one of the Jemmautdaurs told me, as a friend, to make a full confeſſion where the treaſure was buried in the fort, or that in half an hour I ſhould be ſhot off from the mouth of a cannon *. The intimation gave me no manner of concern; for, at that juncture, I ſhould have eſteemed death the greateſt favour the tyrant could have beſtowed upon me.

Being brought into his preſence, he ſoon obſerved the wretched plight I was in, and ordered a large folio volume, which lay on a heap of plunder, to be brought for me to ſit on. I endeavoured two or three times to ſpeak, but my tongue was dry and without motion. He ordered me water. As ſoon as I got ſpeech, I began to recount the diſmal cataſtrophe of my miſerable companions. But he ſtopt me ſhort, with telling me, he was well informed of great treaſure being buried or ſecreted in the fort, and that I was privy to it; and if I expected favour, muſt diſcover it.

I urged every thing I could to convince him there was no truth in the information; or that if any ſuch thing had been done, it was without my knowledge. I reminded him of his repeated aſſurance to me, the day before; but he reſumed the ſubject of the treaſure, and all I could ſay ſeemed to gain no credit with him. I was ordered priſoner

* A ſentence of death common in Indoſtan.

under Mhir Muddon, General of the Houſhold Troops.

Amongſt the guard which carried me from the Suba, one bore a large Moratter battle-axe, which gave riſe, I imagine, to Mr. Secretary Cooke's belief and report to the fleet, that he ſaw me carried out, with the edge of the ax towards me, to have my head ſtruck off. This I believe is the only account you will have of me, until I bring you a better myſelf. But to reſume my ſubject: I was ordered to the camp of Mhir Muddon's quarters, within the outward ditch, ſomething ſhort of Omychund's garden (which you know is above three miles from the fort) and with me Meſſieurs Court, Walcot, and Burdet. The reſt, who ſurvived the fatal night, gained their liberty, except Mrs. Carey, who was too young and handſome. The dead bodies were promiſcuouſly thrown into the ditch of our unfiniſhed ravelin, and covered with the earth.

My being treated with this ſeverity, I have ſufficient reaſon to affirm, proceeded from the following cauſes. The Suba's reſentment for my defending the fort, after the Governor, &c. had abandoned it; his prepoſſeſſion touching the treaſure; and thirdly, the inſtigations of Omychund *, in reſentment for my not releaſing him out of priſon, as ſoon as I had the command of the fort; a circumſtance, which in the heat and hurry of action, never once occurred to me, or I had certainly done it; becauſe I thought his impriſonment unjuſt. But that the hard treatment I met with, may truly be attributed in a great meaſure to his ſuggeſtion and inſinuations, I am well aſſured, from the whole of his ſubſequent conduct; and this further confirmed me, in the three gentlemen ſelected to be my companions, againſt each of whom he

* A great Gentoo merchant of Calcutta.

he had conceived particular reſentment; and you know Omychund can never forgive.

We were conveyed in a Hackery * to the camp the 21ſt of June, in the morning, and ſoon loaded with fetters, and ſtowed all four in a ſeapoy's tent, about four feet long, three wide, and about three high; ſo that we were half *in*, half *out*: All night it rained ſeverely. Diſmal as this was, it appeared a paradiſe compared with our lodging the preceding night. Here I became covered from head to foot with large painful boils, the firſt ſymptom of my recovery; for until theſe appeared, my fever did not leave me.

On the morning of the 22d, they marched us to town in our fetters, under the ſcorching beams of an intenſe hot ſun, and lodged us at the Dock-head in the open ſmall Veranda, fronting the river, where we had a ſtrong guard over us, commanded by Bundo Sing Hazary, an officer under Mhir Muddon. Here the other gentlemen broke out likewiſe in boils all over their bodies (a happy circumſtance, which, as I afterwards learned, attended every one who came out of the Black-Hole.)

On our arrival at this place, we ſoon were given to underſtand, we ſhould be embarked for Muxadabad †, where I think you have never been; and ſince I have brought you thus far, you may as well take this trip with us likewiſe. I have much leiſure on my hands at preſent; and, you know, you may chuſe your leiſure for peruſal.

We ſet out on our travels from the Dock-head the 24th in the afternoon, and were embarked on a large Wollack ‡, containing part of Bundo Sing's plunder, &c. She bulged a-ſhore a little after we ſet off, and broke one of her floor timbers:

* A coach drawn by oxen. † The capital of Bengal.
‡ A large boat.

however they puſhed on, though ſhe made ſo much water ſhe could hardly ſwim. Our bedſtead and bedding were a platform of looſe unequal bamboos laid on the bottom timbers: ſo that when they had been negligent in bailing, we frequently waked with half of us in the water. We had hardly any cloaths to our bodies, and nothing but a bit of mat, and a bit or two of old gunny-bag, which we begged at the Dock-head to defend us from the ſun, rains, and dews. Our food only rice, and the water along-ſide, which, you know, is neither very clean, nor very palatable, in the rains: but there was enough of it without ſcrambling.

In ſhort, Sir, though our diſtreſſes in this ſituation, covered with tormenting boils, and loaded with irons, will be thought, and doubtleſs were, very deplorable; yet the grateful conſideration of our being ſo providentially a remnant of the ſaved, made every thing elſe appear light to us. Our rice and water-diet, deſigned as a grievance to us, was certainly our preſervation: for, could we (circumſtanced as we were) have indulged in fleſh and wine, we had died beyond all doubt.

When we arrived at Hougly fort, I wrote a ſhort letter to governor Biſdom (by means of a pencil and blank leaf of a volume of Archbiſhop Tillotſon's ſermons given us by one of our guard, part of his plunder) adviſing him of our miſerable plight. He had the humanity to diſpatch three ſeveral boats after us, with freſh proviſions, liquors, cloaths, and money; neither of which reached us. But, "Whatever is, is right." Our rice and water were more ſalutary and proper for us.

Matters ridiculous and droll abundantly occurred in the courſe of our trip. But theſe I will poſtpone for a perſonal recital, that I may laugh with you, and will only mention, that MY hands alone being free from impoſthumes, I was obliged for ſome time

time to turn nurſe, and feed my poor diſtreſſed companions.

When we came oppoſite to Santipore, they found the Wollack would not be able to proceed further, for want of water in the river; and one of the guard was ſent a-ſhore to demand of the Zemindar* of that diſtrict, light boats to carry priſoners of ſtate under their charge to Muxadabad. The Zemindar, giving no credit to the fellow, muſtered his guard of pykes, beat him, and drove him away.

This, on the return of the Burkandaſs, raiſed a moſt furious combuſtion. Our Jemmautdaar ordered his people to arms, and the reſolution was to take the Zemindar and carry him bound a priſoner to Muxadabad. Accordingly they landed with their fire-arms, ſwords, and targets; when it occurred to one miſchievous mortal amongſt them, that the taking me with them, would be a proof of their commiſſion, and the high offence the Zemindar had committed.

Being immediately lugged aſhore, I urged the impoſſibility of my walking, covered as my legs were with boils, and ſeveral of them in the way of my fetters; and intreated, if I muſt go, that they would for the time take off my irons, as it was not in my power to eſcape from them; for they ſaw I was hardly able to ſtand. But I might as well have petitioned tygers, or made ſupplication to the wind. I was obliged to crawl: They ſignified to me, it was now my buſineſs to obey, and that I ſhould remember, I was not then in the Kella of Allynagore †. Thus was I marched in a ſcorching ſun, near noon, for more than a mile and half; my legs running in a ſtream of blood from the irritation of my irons, and myſelf ready to drop

* A proprietor of land. † The name given to Calcutta, by the Suba, after the capture.

drop every ſtep with exceſſive faintneſs and unſpeakable pain.

When we came near the Cutcherry of the diſtrict, the Zemindar with his pykes was drawn up ready to receive us; but as ſoon as they preſented me to him as a priſoner of ſtate, eſtimated and valued to them at four lack of Rupees *, he confeſſed himſelf ſenſible of his miſtake, and made no further ſhew of reſiſtance. The Jemmautdaar ſeized him, and gave orders to have him bound and ſent to the boat: but on his making further ſubmiſſion, and promiſing to get boats from Santipore to ſend after us, and agreeing to pay them for the trouble he had cauſed, he was releaſed, and matters accommodated.

I was become ſo very low and weak with this cruel travel, that it was ſome time before they would venture to march me back; and the "hard-"hearted villains," for their own ſakes, were at laſt obliged to carry me part of the way, and ſupport me the reſt, covering me from the ſun with their ſhields. A poor fellow, one of our Under-Gomaſtaus of Santipore, ſeeing me at the Cutcherry, knew me, and, with tears in his eyes, preſented me with a bunch of plantains, the half of which my guard plundered by the way.

We departed from hence directly, in expectation of boats following us, but they never came; and the next day (I think the laſt of June) they preſſed a ſmall open fiſhing-dingy, and embarked us on that, with two of our guard only; for in fact, any more would have ſunk her. Here we had a bed of bamboos, ſomething ſofter, I think, than thoſe of the great boat; that is, they were ſomething ſmoother, but we were ſo diſtreſſed for room, that we could not ſtir without our fetters bruiſing our own, or each others boils; and were in woeful diſtreſs

* 50,000 l.

diſtreſs indeed, not arriving at Muxadabad until the 7th of July in the afternoon. We were all this while expoſed to one regular ſucceſſion of heavy rain, or intenſe ſun-ſhine, and nothing to defend us from either.

But then don't let me forget our bleſſings; for by the good-nature of one of our guard, Shaike Bodul, we now and then latterly got a few plantains, onions, parched rice, with Jaggree *, and the bitter green, called Curella: all which were to us luxurious indulgencies, and made the rice go down deliciouſly.

On the 7th of July, early in the morning, we came in ſight of the French factory. I had a letter prepared for Mr. Law the Chief, and prevailed with my friend Bodul, to put to there. On the receipt of my letter, Mr. Law, with much politeneſs and humanity, came down to the water-ſide, and remained near an hour with us. He gave the Shaike a genteel preſent for his civilities, and offered him a conſiderable reward and ſecurity, if he would permit us to land for an hour's refreſhment: but he replied, his head would pay for the indulgence. After Mr. Law had given us a ſupply of cloaths, linen, proviſions, liquors, and caſh, we left his factory with grateful hearts and compliments.

We could not, as you may imagine, long reſiſt touching our ſtock of proviſions; but however temperate we thought ourſelves, we were all diſordered more or leſs by this firſt indulgence. A few hours after I was ſeized with a painful inflammation in my right leg and thigh.

Paſſing by our fort and factory at Coſſimbuzar, raiſed ſome melancholy reflections amongſt us. About four in the afternoon we landed at Muxadabad, and were conducted to, and depoſited in an

* Molaſſes,

an open ſtable, not far from the Suba's palace in the city.

This march, I will freely confeſs to you, drew tears of diſdain and anguiſh of heart from me; thus to be led like a felon, a ſpectacle to the inhabitants of this populous city! My ſoul could not ſupport itſelf with any degree of patience; the pain too ariſing from my boils, and inflammation of my leg, added not a little, I believe, to the depreſſion of my ſpirits.

Here we had a guard of Moors placed on one ſide of us, and a guard of Gentoos on the other; and being deſtined to remain in this place of purgatory, until the Suba returned to the city, I can give you no idea of our ſufferings. The immenſe crowd of ſpectators, who came from all quarters of the city to ſatisfy their curioſity, ſo blocked us up from morning till night, that I may truly ſay we narrowly eſcaped a ſecond ſuffocation, the weather proving exceeding ſultry.

The firſt night after our arrival in the ſtable, I was attacked by a fever; and that night and the next day, the inflammation of my leg and thigh greatly increaſed: but all terminated the ſecond night in a regular fit of the gout in my right-foot and ankle; the firſt and laſt fit of this kind I ever had. How my irons agreed with this new viſitor I leave you to judge; for I could not by any intreaty obtain liberty for ſo much as that poor leg.

During our reſidence here, we experienced every act of humanity and friendſhip from Monſ. Law and Mynheer Vernet, the French and Dutch Chiefs of Coſſimbuzar, who left no means uneſſayed to procure our releaſe. Our proviſions were regularly ſent us from the Dutch Tankſal * in Coriemabad; and we were daily viſited by Meſſrs. Roſs and

* The Dutch Mint near Muxadabad.

and Ekſtone, the Chief and Second there; and indeed received ſuch inſtances of commiſeration and affection from Mynheer Roſs, as will ever claim my moſt grateful remembrance.

The whole body of Armenian merchants too were moſt kind and friendly to us; particularly Aga Manuel Satoor: we were not a little indebted to the obliging good-natured behaviour of Meſſrs. Haſtings and Chambers, who gave us as much of their company as they could. They had obtained their liberty by the French and Dutch Chiefs becoming bail for their appearance. This ſecurity was often tendered for us, but without effect.

The 11th of July the Suba arrived in the city, and with him Bundoo Sing, to whoſe houſe we were removed that afternoon in a Hackery; for I was not able to put my foot to the ground. Here we were confirmed in a report which had before reached us, that the Suba, on his return to Houghly, made enquiry for us when he releaſed Meſſieurs Watts and Collett, &c. with intention to releaſe us alſo; and, that he had expreſſed ſome reſentment at Mhir Muddon for having ſo haſtily ſent us up to Muxadabad. This proved a very pleaſing piece of intelligence to us; and gave us reaſon to hope the iſſue would be more favourable to us than we expected.

Though we were here lodged in an open Bungulo only, yet we found ourſelves relieved from the crowd of people which had ſtifled us at the ſtable, and once more breathed the freſh air. We were treated with much kindneſs and reſpect by Bundoo Sing, who generally paſſed ſome time or other of the day with us, and feaſted us with hopes of being ſoon releaſed.

The 15th we were conducted in a hackery to the Kella *, in order to have an audience of the Suba,

* The ſeat of the Suba's reſidence in the city of Muxadabad.

Suba, and know our fate. We were kept above an hour in the ſun oppoſite the gate; whilſt here we ſaw ſeveral of his miniſters brought out diſgraced, in the cuſtody of Sootapurdars, and diſmiſſed from their employs, who but a few minutes before we had ſeen enter the Kella in the utmoſt pomp and magnificence.

Receiving advice, that we ſhould have no audience or admittance to the Suba that day, we were depoſited again at our former lodgings, the ſtable, to be at hand, and had the mortification of paſſing another night there.

The 16th in the morning an old female attendant on *Allyverdy Cawn's Begum* †, paid a viſit to our Shaike, and diſcourſed half an hour with him. Overhearing part of the converſation to be favourable to us, I obtained the whole from him; and learned, that at a feaſt the preceding night, the *Begum* had ſollicited our liberty, and that the Suba had promiſed he would releaſe us on the morrow. This, you may believe, gave us no ſmall ſpirits; but at noon all our hopes were daſhed by a piece of intelligence from Bundoo Sing, implying, that an order was prepared, and ready to paſs the ſeal, for returning us in irons to Rajah Monickchund, governor of Allynâgore, the name the Suba had given to Calcutta.

I need not tell you what a thunderclap this proved to us in the very height of our flattering expectations; for I was, as to myſelf, well convinced I ſhould never have got alive out of the hands of that rapacious harpy, who is a genuine Hindoo ‡, in the very worſt acceptation of the word; therefore, from that moment, gave up every hope of liberty.

Men

† The dowager princeſs, grandmother of Surajud Dowla.
‡ Hindoo or Gentoo.

Men in this ſtate of mind are generally pretty eaſy: it is hope which gives anxiety. We dined and laid ourſelves down to ſleep; and for my own part, I never enjoyed a ſounder afternoon's nap.

Towards five the Shaike waked me with notice, that the Suba would preſently paſs by to his palace of Mooteejeel. We rouſed, and deſired the guard would keep the view clear for us. When the Suba came in ſight, we made him the uſual Salaam; and when he came abreaſt of us, he ordered his litter to ſtop, and us to be called to him. We advanced; and I addreſſed him in a ſhort ſpeech, ſetting forth our ſufferings, and petitioned for our liberty. The wretched ſpectacle we made muſt, I think, have made an impreſſion on a breaſt the moſt brutal; and if he is capable of pity or contrition, his heart felt it then. I think it appeared in ſpight of him in his countenance. He gave me no reply; but ordered a Sootapurdar and Chubdaar, immediately to ſee our irons cut off, and to conduct us wherever we choſe to go, and to take care we received no trouble nor inſult; and having repeated this order diſtinctly, directed his retinue to go on. As ſoon as our legs were free we took boat and proceeded to the Tankſall, where we were received and entertained with real joy and humanity.

Thus, my worthy friend, you ſee us reſtored to liberty, at a time when we could entertain no probable hope of ever obtaining it. The foundation of the alarm at noon was this: Moneloll, the Suba's Dewan, and ſome others, had in the morning taken no ſmall pains to convince the Suba, "That, "notwithſtanding my loſſes at *Allynagore*, I was "ſtill poſſeſſed of enough to pay a conſiderable "ſum for my freedom; and adviſed the ſending "me to *Monickchund*, who would be better able "to trace out the remainder of my effects." To this, I was afterwards informed, the Suba replied:

" It may be; if he has any thing left, let him " keep it: his ſufferings have been great; he ſhall " have his liberty." Whether this was the reſult of his own ſentiments, or the conſequence of his promiſe the night before to the old *Begum*, I cannot ſay; but believe, we owe our freedom partly to both.

Being myſelf once again at liberty, it is time I ſhould releaſe you, Sir, alſo from the unpleaſing travel I have led you in this narrative of our diſtreſſes, from our entrance into that fatal Black-Hole. And, ſhall it after all be ſaid, or even thought, that I can poſſibly have arraigned or commented too ſeverely on a conduct which alone plunged us into theſe unequalled ſufferings? I hope not. I am,

DEAR SIR,

Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. HOLWELL.

LIST *of the* SMOTHERED *in the* BLACK-HOLE *Priſon, excluſive of Sixty-nine, (conſiſting of* Dutch *and* Engliſh *Serjeants, Corporals, Soldiers, Topaz's, Militia, Whites and* Portugueze, *whoſe Names I am unacquainted with), making on the whole, One hundred and twenty-three Perſons.*

Of Council.

E. Eyre, Wm. Baillie } Eſqrs. The Reverend Jervas Bellamy.

Gentlemen in the Service.

Meſſrs.	Jenks	Meſſrs.	Harod
	Revely		P. Johnſtone
	Law		Ballard
	Coales, Enſ. Mil.		N. Drake
	Valicourt		Carſe
	Jeb		Knapton
	Toriano		Goſling
	E. Page		Bing
	S. Page		Dod
	Grub		Dalrymple.
	Street		

Military Captains.

Clayton, Buchanan, Witherington.

Lieutenants.

Biſhop, Hays, Blagg, Simſon, Bellamy.

Enſigns.

Paccard, Scot, Haſtings, C. Wedderburn, Dumbleton, Enſ. Mil.

Serjeants, &c.

Serjeant Major	Abraham	Serjeants of Militia.
Quarter-Maſter Serjeant	Cartwright	
	Bleau	

Sea Captains.

Hunt	Guy
Oſburne	Porter
Purnell, ſurvived the night, but died the next day.	W. Parker
	Caulker
	Bendall
Meſſrs. Carey	Atkinſon
Stephenſon	Leech, *&c. &c.*

LIST *of thoſe who* SURVIVED *the* BLACK-HOLE *Priſon.*

Meſſrs. Holwell	Capt. Dickſon
Court	Mr. Moran
Secretary Cooke	John Meadows, and 12 Military and Militia Blacks and Whites, ſome of whom recovered when the door was open.
Luſhington	
Burdet	
Enſ. Walcott	
Mrs. Carey	
Capt. Mills	

A

DEFENCE

OF

Mr. VANSITTART's Conduct,

IN CONCLUDING THE

Treaty of Commerce

WITH

MHIR COSSIM ALY CHAWN,

AT MONGHEER.

By a SERVANT of the COMPANY,
long resident in BENGAL.

TO THE

PROPRIETORS

OF

EAST-INDIA STOCK.

IN the courſe of altercation on your affairs at Bengal, many injurious inſinuations have been levelled at the conduct and character of the Gentleman now preſiding there; amongſt theſe, the greateſt ſtreſs ſeems to be laid on two accuſations; to wit, the Treaty of Commerce made at Mongheer, and a Model of Cannon preſented by Mr. Vanſittart to Mhir Coſſim Aly Khan. The firſt of theſe charges *may be* (in part) founded on ignorance: the ſecond, on premeditated malice only. From both we undertake to exculpate him. Much has been ſaid touching the liberties of the Company's phirmaunds from the Great Moguls, and Confidence aſſerts they were given up by Mr. Vanſittart in the treaty of commerce he concluded at Mongheer. Let us examine this fact firſt, and clear it of the veil of darkneſs that covers it.

When Mr. Surman (head of the embaſſy ſent by the Company to the emperor Farrucſeer, to ſolicit the laſt phirmaund, and explanation of former grants) was on his return to Fort William, he pitched his tents in the neighbourhood of Moorſhadabad, and having acquired from the Emperor a title and rank in the liſt of Omrahs, ſomething ſuperior to that which Jaffier Khan (then

Suba of Bengal) bore, Mr. Surman expected the firſt viſit.——Jaffier Khan allowed Mr. Surman's ſuperior title, but conſidering himſelf in rank the third Suba of the empire, and Vice-Roy of Bengal confirmed from court, thought the dignity of his poſt demanded the firſt viſit from Mr. Surman: frequent meſſengers paſſed between them, touching this ceremonial, for the ſpace of three days; but neither ſtooping, Mr. Surman ſtruck his tents, and returned to Calcutta.—Thus an injudicious punctilio in Mr. Surman deſtroyed all future cordiality with a man, on whom (from the nature and power of his poſt) ſo much depended, for the due execution of thoſe phirmaunds granted by Farrucſeer.

We grant, that in the original phirmaunds to the Company, there was a general liberty of trade given, without any exemption of particulars; but when this general trade, as well inland as exports and imports, continued to be exerciſed by the ſervants of the Company as formerly, Jaffier Khan preſently manifeſted the reſentment he had conceived againſt the Engliſh at Mr. Surman's behaviour to him; and though his predeceſſors had been troubleſome on this head, yet he went much further.

His firſt operations were, refuſing us the right of coinage, and ſpiriting up the Zemindars, proprietors of the 37 villages on the other ſide the Ganges; both ceded to the Company by the phirmaund. Theſe Zemindars kept up their demands ſo high, and ſtarted ſo many difficulties with regard to parting with their lands, that the Company have never got poſſeſſion of them to this day: from the ſame cauſe, their preſidency of Fort William was eternally incommoded by a vexatious government's juriſdiction in the very heart of Calcutta, known by the names of Molungah, Simlea, &c.

His

His next ſtep was to claim an executive right to the trade of three the moſt ſtaple and lucrative articles of tobacco, ſalt and beetlenut; alleging, that from time immemorial none had preſumed to trade in theſe three articles, but thoſe who had his particular licence and expreſs purwannah. He ſignified theſe ſentiments to the Preſidency, and prohibited the Company or their ſervants trading in them for the future.

The Company's ſervants ſtill perſiſting to trade in theſe articles, Jaffier Khan ſtopped the Company's whole trade and inveſtment for Europe, which could never again obtain a currency, but by the payment of a ſevere mulct, of one, two, three, and ſometimes four lacks of rupees at a time.

The ſame ſyſtem of politics was perſued by his ſucceſſor, until the Company at home being wearied out with continued advices of theſe conteſts between the Government and their Bengal ſervants, came to a reſolution of relinquiſhing their right to the trade of theſe three articles, tobacco, ſalt, and beetle nut, for themſelves, and ſtrictly prohibited their ſervants ever interfering in them, on pain of immediate diſmiſſion from their ſervice; and theſe commands were repeatedly iſſued by the Court of Directors to their ſervants abroad. Henceforward the ſervants were content to trade in theſe articles under the covert of a Mahometan duſtick (or paſſport.) This they did on the beſt terms they poſſibly could with the Mahometan merchant, which was generally a conſideration of 25 per cent. a conſideration very moderate on articles that commonly yield a profit of 80 to 150 per cent. This 25 per cent. was a clear profit, without riſque, to the merchant who gave his name, provided he was in favour at the Durbar; but at the worſt, he was always able to get off for paying 8 or 10 per cent. cuſtoms on the trade he covered, and put the reſt

into his pocket. Sometimes a joint trade was entered into in copartnerſhip, though not always in equal proportions.

The continual abuſe of the Company's duſticks, by their ſervants, has been for the ſpace of forty years laſt paſt, another great cauſe for repeated juſt complaints from the Durbar; for thereby the Emperor was robbed of his legal cuſtoms on a conſiderable proportion of the trade of the provinces.—As the nature of the Company's duſtick, and the miſchiefs ariſing from the abuſe of it, muſt be little known to you; a ſhort explanation of both, becomes here abſolutely neceſſary to your information.

The Company's duſtick is a paſſport for their trade, iſſued under their broad Perſian Purwannah ſeal, or ſeal of office, ſigned by the Preſident, and counter-ſigned by the Secretary to the Council, ſpecifying the quantity, number, package and quality of the goods to be paſſed by virtue of that particular duſtick, clear of all duties, let, hindrance, or obſtructions from the Government's guards, and receipts of cuſtom ſettled on different parts of the rivers and other inland parts of the provinces.—The duſtick was alſo occaſionally iſſued by the chiefs of your ſubordinate factories, under the ſame formalities; and whether from the Preſidency or Subordinates, always ſpecified the place from whence the goods came, and were deſtined; and with the particulars before recited, were ſet forth both in Engliſh and Perſian, and a regiſter regularly kept of every duſtick iſſued. The duſtick was drawn in Perſian, as well as Engliſh, becauſe at every Government's chowkey there was ſtationed a Perſian Moonſpee (Writer or Secretary) on the part of the Government, who being a ſtranger to the Engliſh language, the Company's trade might otherwiſe be liable to obſtruction, delay, loſs and damage, by

by a longer detention in their boats at ſometimes inclement ſeaſons of the year.

Your ſervants, down to the junior Writer, were entitled to a duſtick on application, for the protection of his private trade. The wiſdom of firſt granting this liberty and indulgence, and the continuing it ſo long after the fatal conſequences were viſible, are points I will not here diſcuſs. Let it ſuffice, that I ſay the abuſe of it gave too juſt a handle to the Government for frequently putting a ſtop to the proviſion of your inveſtment in every part of the provinces, for one, two, and ſometimes three months together, until bought off by the payment of a high mulct, which generally grew higher the longer a ſtand was made againſt it. Thus have I known a contention of this kind, which might eaſily (in the beginning of an embargo laid on your inveſtment) have been compromiſed for fifty or a hundred thouſand rupees, coſt you, at the end of two or three months, three or four lacks. Though the policy of the government was invariable in this particular of the abuſe of the duſtick, (as formerly touching our trading in the three prohibited articles of ſalt, tobacco and beetlenut) they never, before the times of the Subas Ally Verdy Khan and Surajud Dowla, meditated the attack and deſtruction of your forts and garriſons; theſe had new and particular motives; former Subas, on a tranſgreſſion either in the one or the other of the two before-mentioned cauſes, put an immediate ſtop to the proviſion of your inveſtments, by laying a prohibition on the weavers and others employed in your manufactures, ſurrounding your ſubordinates with guards, and cutting off ſupplies of proviſions, &c. They knew the importance of your inveſtments, and the ſeaſons for the diſpatch of it to Europe, and knew alſo you could hardly ſuſtain yourſelves under the failure

of

of one year's returns; all this they were perfectly acquainted with, and therefore knew your ſervants muſt neceſſarily ſubmit, ſooner or later, to any terms they thought fit to impoſe: a conſideration alſo, which ſhould have determined your Preſidency to finiſh every diſpute of this kind with all poſſible expedition. I will not ſay theſe exactions would not have been made, had no real cauſe been given; light pretences are ſufficient for arbitrary governments to act upon; but where real cauſe exiſted, which (regarding the abuſe of the duſtick at leaſt) was too truly the caſe, we cannot ſurely much wonder at it. But to explain the nature of this abuſe of your duſtick, ſo conſtantly the ſource of complaints from the durbar:

When youth firſt embark in your ſervice, at the age of 15 or 16, it cannot be reaſonably ſuppoſed they ſet out with any fixed principles of moral rectitude; conſequently the good diſpoſitions they may have acquired by a careful education, become too much liable to be perverted, by deſigning artful men. Theſe young gentlemen, on their arrival in Bengal, entertain a ſervant, under the denomination of a Banian, who, in the general, ſoon becomes their maſter, and continues that power and influence over them, more or leſs, as long as they reſide in India; but more eſpecially, if the Banian happens to be poſſeſſed of a capital that can be aſſiſting to his (nominal) maſter in trade, the young gentleman himſelf rarely having a capital of his own to begin with.

Theſe Banians are either ſimply ſo, or merchants as well as Banians. In general, they have no principle to be the rule of their actions, but gain; this is their ſole purſuit, and to accompliſh it they ſtick at nothing, ſo they can guard againſt a detection of their rogueries.

If

If they are Banians ſimply ſo called, they are moſtly tools of ſome native merchant, whoſe principles of rectitude are not a whit better than the Banians.

The Seats (a Gentoo Caſt, ſo called) and the other Company's Dadney merchants, who provided their inveſtments until the year 1753, rarely before that period ſtooped to be Banians to the gentlemen in your ſervice; but from that period, finding the meaſure was adopted for providing your inveſtment by your own gomaſtahs or factors at the Arungs, they condeſcended to ſerve either in perſon or by Banians who were entirely dependant on them.

Theſe Dadney merchants, whilſt they continued in that employ, always had the addreſs to bring down their own private goods and merchandize with the Company's, under the cover and protection of the ſame duſtick; but being in the abovementioned year ſtripped of that means of eluding the king's duties, they fixed on another which they knew had been for a long term ſucceſsfully practiſed by the Banians; that is, covering their trade by the Company's duſticks, obtained chiefly from your junior ſervants.

Various were the terms of this illicit compact; ſometimes the Company's ſervant was entitled to $\frac{1}{8}$th, $\frac{1}{4}$th, or $\frac{1}{2}$ of the profits on the trade ſo covered. At other times, with ſorrow I ſpeak it, your duſtick was ſold at various prices, from 200 to 25 rupees each; and to ſuch a ſhameful proſtitution did this trade in duſticks come to, that it was no uncommon thing to ſee on the regiſter a trade of two lack per annum carried on in appearance by perſons known never to have been worth five pounds in their lives, nor that had credit to this amount in your Preſidency. Sometimes they engaged in a joint trade, the Banian or merchant finding the capital, in the courſe of which if your

ſervant

ſervant came in for 1-16th of the profits he was well off, but oftener was brought in debtor.

The Government's ſpies in the ſettlement were well acquainted with proſtitutions and abuſe of the Company's Duſtick, and ſent daily advices thereof to the Durbar, where it uſed to be often thrown out in terrorem, "that they had a long Duſtick "account to ſettle with the Engliſh."—And Surajud Dowla in 1756, declared he would prove from vouchers in his poſſeſſion "that the Engliſh had "defrauded the King in his revenues, by covering "the trade of his ſubjects with their Duſticks, to "the amount of one Corore and a half (one million "five hundred thouſand pound ſterling) in the "ſpace of fifty years." Howſoever this charge was exaggerated, it is a truth, that the ſum of the frauds ariſing from this illicit practice muſt have been very important.

Your Court of Directors were ſo ſenſible of the repeated abuſe of this indulgence, that, I think, there are no leſs than five and twenty STANDING ORDERS againſt it tranſmitted to your Preſident and Council of Fort William from the year 1702 to 1756, each of theſe orders directing, on detection, reſtitution of the King's duties, immediate diſmiſſion from the ſervice, and the aggreſſor to be ſent to England on the firſt returning ſhip; but notwithſtanding theſe orders, and the utmoſt vigilance of your Council abroad to prevent this practice, it was found impoſſible. The ſtrongeſt prohibitions, the moſt ſolemn oaths, proved ineffectual; and though it was notoriouſly known, that there was hardly any period of your ſervice, that there were not ſome of your ſervants who had no viſible means of ſubſiſting, but on this trade of Duſticks; yet, ſtrange to tell! we find few examples made of the aggreſſors on the records of the Company. This can be accounted for, only from the difficulty of full detection; but ſurely in this caſe, where

the very exiſtence of the Company was liable to be brought into hazard, ſtrong and glaring preſumption of the fact ſhould have been deemed proof ſufficient; the more eſpecially, as it was long evident, nothing but examples made of this preſumptive proof, would be capable of putting a total ſtop to a practice that had ſo often embroiled, and diſtreſſed your affairs; and was at laſt *one* of thoſe cauſes aſſigned by Surajud Dowla, for that deſtruction brought on your Bengal ſettlements in 1756. Theſe examples ſhould not have been confined to your ſervants only, but ſhould have been extended to the Black Merchant or Banian, *ſuſpected* of being concerned with them; theſe ſhould have been baniſhed your ſettlements, and in flagrant inſtances delivered up to the government. Three examples of this kind, we dare ſay, would have effectually put a ſtop to this miſchief for ever: We think ſome directions to the above purport and intention were ſent out by your Court of Directors a few years ago, but they were never put in practice.

To draw our foregoing anecdotes into a ſmaller compaſs, we beg leave to remind you, that we have ſhewn two principal cauſes that gave riſe to every conteſt which happened between your ſervants and the Government, down to the time of Surajud Dowla, viz. Your ſervants trading in the three prohibited articles ſo often mentioned, and their abuſe of the Company's Duſtick, both repeatedly forbid by your Court of Directors under the ſevereſt and moſt poſitive reſtrictions, and yet both continued, and lately the one of them abſolutely avowed, nay, even contended for by ſome of your ſervants with indecency, arrogance and violence; to the utter ſubverſion of the laws and natural liberties of a country where you trade upon ſufferance; as well as in defiance and diſobedience of the reiterated commands of their maſters at home.

Let

Let us take a ſhort view of this government in the year 1760, when you ſaw a Vice Roy at the head of it, raiſed by your ſervants from motives of juſtice, joined to the neceſſity of your affairs; confirmed by yourſelves in the opinion and judgment of your Directors: Conſider this Vice Roy making you princely donations of the moſt valuable parts of his country; then ſee your ſervants aiming to ſtrip him of the remainder, the commercial legal duties which were to be his future ſupport in that government you had promoted him to—now ſee him driven from two of his provinces for not tamely ſubmitting to arrogant impoſitions—then ſurely you will bluſh for the reproaches ſo wantonly thrown upon the Engliſh name and nation. But to return more immediately to our ſubject.

Soon after Mr. Vanſittart's arrival to the Government of Fort William, ſuch was the licentious conduct of your ſervants, more particularly at your ſubordinates, in thoſe articles of trade ſo often forbid both by the Company and Government, that continual complaints came in of the unbounded violences of them and their agents. Mr. Vanſittart plainly ſaw, unleſs ſome remedy was applied, general confuſion muſt enſue. He took a middle road, and formed a judicious plan that all parties ought to have been ſatisfied with, and, as he expreſſes it, would have reconciled all differences, if faithfully adhered to on both ſides: The liberties of the Phirmaunds touching theſe conteſted articles, as well as the whole inland trade, had been given up and relinquiſhed by the Company long ago.—He has the merit of ſtipulating for the reſuming thoſe liberties, and preſerving them in perpetuity on terms highly advantageous to every one engaged in it, as we have already made appear. It has been charged againſt him, that he concluded this Treaty of Commerce without the

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aſſent of his Council. That he was firſt inveſted with a diſcretional power has been proved beyond contradiction; and though it has been alſo inſinuated, he ſuppreſſed and never acknowledged the receipt of a letter ſent by the Council, revoking that power, and containing a diſſent to the terms of the Treaty tranſmitted to them by Mr. Vanſittart:—yet—if ſuch a revocation and diſſent was diſpatched, it appears very extraordinary that his enemies have not produced a copy of it, ſince, in other matters leſs important, they have been ſo minute.—Therefore it is no unreaſonable concluſion to ſay, We believe no ſuch letter was ever ſent,—or it would certainly have appeared againſt him.——Another objection has been ſtarted againſt his conduct, for not giving due time for this Treaty taking place.—To this we ſay, that poſſibly he thought this licentious contraband trade of your ſervants required an immediate check.—And as they had engaged in it, in direct breach of their maſters orders, and we fear in breach alſo of their covenants; it was but juſt they ſhould ſuffer the conſequences, for they ſurely had no title to indulgence. One objection only, to this Gentleman's conduct regarding this Treaty, remains unanſwered; and that is the article by which he gives the deciſion of diſputes into the hands of the Government's officers: but for this error he has ſo ingenuouſly apologiſed himſelf, that nothing but ill-nature could be capable of continuing it as a charge againſt him. However, had not the unhappy and ill-judged ſecond deputation taken place, this error might eaſily have been retrieved, and over-ruled as ſoon as the inconveniencies had been diſcovered.

Concerning *the preſent of Cannon*, (levelled at Mr. Vanſittart's reputation only) the charge is ſo evidently malicious, as hardly to deſerve a reply.——It is a notorious truth, that at the capture

ture of Coſſimbuzar and Fort William, the Government had ſtore both of cannon and field pieces with their carriages, which they had ſix months in their poſſeſſion.—Surajud Dowla had 20 of the latter ſo well conſtructed by his own people, that they could hardly be known from thoſe made in Europe. But we will not affront your underſtanding, by dwelling longer in the refutation of a charge ſo repugnant to ſenſe as well as decency.

FINIS.

MVSEVM
BRITANNICVM